libvirt/src/security/security_apparmor.c

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/*
* AppArmor security driver for libvirt
*
conf: move host disk type to util/ A continuation of the migration of disk details to virstoragefile. This patch moves a single enum, but converting the name has quite a bit of fallout. * src/conf/domain_conf.h (virDomainDiskType): Move... * src/util/virstoragefile.h (virStorageType): ...and rename. * src/bhyve/bhyve_command.c (bhyveBuildDiskArgStr) (virBhyveProcessBuildLoadCmd): Update clients. * src/conf/domain_conf.c (virDomainDiskSourceDefParse) (virDomainDiskDefParseXML, virDomainDiskSourceDefFormatInternal) (virDomainDiskDefFormat, virDomainDiskGetActualType) (virDomainDiskDefForeachPath, virDomainDiskSourceIsBlockType): Likewise. * src/conf/snapshot_conf.h (_virDomainSnapshotDiskDef): Likewise. * src/conf/snapshot_conf.c (virDomainSnapshotDiskDefParseXML) (virDomainSnapshotAlignDisks, virDomainSnapshotDiskDefFormat): Likewise. * src/esx/esx_driver.c (esxAutodetectSCSIControllerModel) (esxDomainDefineXML): Likewise. * src/locking/domain_lock.c (virDomainLockManagerAddDisk): Likewise. * src/lxc/lxc_controller.c (virLXCControllerSetupLoopDeviceDisk) (virLXCControllerSetupNBDDeviceDisk) (virLXCControllerSetupLoopDevices, virLXCControllerSetupDisk): Likewise. * src/parallels/parallels_driver.c (parallelsGetHddInfo): Likewise. * src/phyp/phyp_driver.c (phypDiskType): Likewise. * src/qemu/qemu_command.c (qemuGetDriveSourceString) (qemuDomainDiskGetSourceString, qemuBuildDriveStr) (qemuBuildCommandLine, qemuParseCommandLineDisk) (qemuParseCommandLine): Likewise. * src/qemu/qemu_conf.c (qemuCheckSharedDevice) (qemuTranslateDiskSourcePool) (qemuTranslateSnapshotDiskSourcePool): Likewise. * src/qemu/qemu_domain.c (qemuDomainDeviceDefPostParse) (qemuDomainDetermineDiskChain): Likewise. * src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemuDomainGetBlockInfo) (qemuDomainSnapshotPrepareDiskExternalBackingInactive) (qemuDomainSnapshotPrepareDiskExternalBackingActive) (qemuDomainSnapshotPrepareDiskExternalOverlayActive) (qemuDomainSnapshotPrepareDiskExternalOverlayInactive) (qemuDomainSnapshotPrepareDiskInternal) (qemuDomainSnapshotPrepare) (qemuDomainSnapshotCreateSingleDiskActive): Likewise. * src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c (qemuDomainChangeEjectableMedia): Likewise. * src/qemu/qemu_migration.c (qemuMigrationIsSafe): Likewise. * src/security/security_apparmor.c (AppArmorRestoreSecurityImageLabel) (AppArmorSetSecurityImageLabel): Likewise. * src/security/security_dac.c (virSecurityDACSetSecurityImageLabel) (virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityImageLabelInt) (virSecurityDACSetSecurityAllLabel): Likewise. * src/security/security_selinux.c (virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabelInt) (virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel) (virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityAllLabel): Likewise. * src/storage/storage_backend.c (virStorageFileBackendForType): Likewise. * src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c (virStorageFileBackendFile) (virStorageFileBackendBlock): Likewise. * src/storage/storage_backend_gluster.c (virStorageFileBackendGluster): Likewise. * src/vbox/vbox_tmpl.c (vboxDomainGetXMLDesc, vboxAttachDrives) (vboxDomainAttachDeviceImpl, vboxDomainDetachDevice): Likewise. * src/vmware/vmware_conf.c (vmwareVmxPath): Likewise. * src/vmx/vmx.c (virVMXParseDisk, virVMXFormatDisk) (virVMXFormatFloppy): Likewise. * src/xenxs/xen_sxpr.c (xenParseSxprDisks, xenParseSxpr) (xenFormatSxprDisk): Likewise. * src/xenxs/xen_xm.c (xenParseXM, xenFormatXMDisk): Likewise. * tests/securityselinuxlabeltest.c (testSELinuxLoadDef): Likewise. * src/libvirt_private.syms (domain_conf.h): Move symbols... (virstoragefile.h): ...as appropriate. Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2014-03-27 15:57:49 -06:00
* Copyright (C) 2011-2014 Red Hat, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
*
* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
* version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License along with this library. If not, see
* <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/apparmor.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "security_apparmor.h"
2012-12-12 18:06:53 +00:00
#include "viralloc.h"
#include "virerror.h"
#include "datatypes.h"
2012-12-13 18:01:25 +00:00
#include "viruuid.h"
2012-12-13 14:52:25 +00:00
#include "virpci.h"
2012-12-12 17:04:51 +00:00
#include "virusb.h"
#include "virscsivhost.h"
#include "virfile.h"
maint: use gnulib configmake rather than open-coding things * bootstrap.conf (gnulib_modules): Add configmake. * daemon/Makefile.am (libvirtd_CFLAGS): Drop defines provided by gnulib. * src/Makefile.am (INCLUDES): Likewise. * tests/Makefile.am (INCLUDES): Likewise. * tools/Makefile.am (virsh_CFLAGS): Likewise. * daemon/libvirtd.c (qemudInitPaths, usage, main): Update clients. * src/cpu/cpu_map.c (CPUMAPFILE): Likewise. * src/driver.c (DEFAULT_DRIVER_DIR): Likewise. * src/internal.h (_): Likewise. * src/libvirt.c (virInitialize): Likewise. * src/lxc/lxc_conf.h (LXC_CONFIG_DIR, LXC_STATE_DIR, LXC_LOG_DIR): Likewise. * src/lxc/lxc_conf.c (lxcCapsInit, lxcLoadDriverConfig): Likewise. * src/network/bridge_driver.c (NETWORK_PID_DIR) (NETWORK_STATE_DIR, DNSMASQ_STATE_DIR, networkStartup): Likewise. * src/nwfilter/nwfilter_driver.c (nwfilterDriverStartup): Likewise. * src/qemu/qemu_conf.c (qemudLoadDriverConfig): Likewise. * src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemudStartup): Likewise. * src/remote/remote_driver.h (LIBVIRTD_PRIV_UNIX_SOCKET) (LIBVIRTD_PRIV_UNIX_SOCKET_RO, LIBVIRTD_CONFIGURATION_FILE) (LIBVIRT_PKI_DIR): Likewise. * src/secret/secret_driver.c (secretDriverStartup): Likewise. * src/security/security_apparmor.c (VIRT_AA_HELPER): Likewise. * src/security/virt-aa-helper.c (main): Likewise. * src/storage/storage_backend_disk.c (PARTHELPER): Likewise. * src/storage/storage_driver.c (storageDriverStartup): Likewise. * src/uml/uml_driver.c (TEMPDIR, umlStartup): Likewise. * src/util/hooks.c (LIBVIRT_HOOK_DIR): Likewise. * tools/virsh.c (main): Likewise. * docs/hooks.html.in: Likewise.
2010-11-16 07:54:17 -07:00
#include "configmake.h"
#include "vircommand.h"
2012-12-12 17:59:27 +00:00
#include "virlog.h"
#include "virstring.h"
#include "virscsi.h"
#include "virmdev.h"
#define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_SECURITY
VIR_LOG_INIT("security.security_apparmor");
#define SECURITY_APPARMOR_VOID_DOI "0"
#define SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME "apparmor"
maint: use gnulib configmake rather than open-coding things * bootstrap.conf (gnulib_modules): Add configmake. * daemon/Makefile.am (libvirtd_CFLAGS): Drop defines provided by gnulib. * src/Makefile.am (INCLUDES): Likewise. * tests/Makefile.am (INCLUDES): Likewise. * tools/Makefile.am (virsh_CFLAGS): Likewise. * daemon/libvirtd.c (qemudInitPaths, usage, main): Update clients. * src/cpu/cpu_map.c (CPUMAPFILE): Likewise. * src/driver.c (DEFAULT_DRIVER_DIR): Likewise. * src/internal.h (_): Likewise. * src/libvirt.c (virInitialize): Likewise. * src/lxc/lxc_conf.h (LXC_CONFIG_DIR, LXC_STATE_DIR, LXC_LOG_DIR): Likewise. * src/lxc/lxc_conf.c (lxcCapsInit, lxcLoadDriverConfig): Likewise. * src/network/bridge_driver.c (NETWORK_PID_DIR) (NETWORK_STATE_DIR, DNSMASQ_STATE_DIR, networkStartup): Likewise. * src/nwfilter/nwfilter_driver.c (nwfilterDriverStartup): Likewise. * src/qemu/qemu_conf.c (qemudLoadDriverConfig): Likewise. * src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemudStartup): Likewise. * src/remote/remote_driver.h (LIBVIRTD_PRIV_UNIX_SOCKET) (LIBVIRTD_PRIV_UNIX_SOCKET_RO, LIBVIRTD_CONFIGURATION_FILE) (LIBVIRT_PKI_DIR): Likewise. * src/secret/secret_driver.c (secretDriverStartup): Likewise. * src/security/security_apparmor.c (VIRT_AA_HELPER): Likewise. * src/security/virt-aa-helper.c (main): Likewise. * src/storage/storage_backend_disk.c (PARTHELPER): Likewise. * src/storage/storage_driver.c (storageDriverStartup): Likewise. * src/uml/uml_driver.c (TEMPDIR, umlStartup): Likewise. * src/util/hooks.c (LIBVIRT_HOOK_DIR): Likewise. * tools/virsh.c (main): Likewise. * docs/hooks.html.in: Likewise.
2010-11-16 07:54:17 -07:00
#define VIRT_AA_HELPER LIBEXECDIR "/virt-aa-helper"
/* Data structure to pass to *FileIterate so we have everything we need */
struct SDPDOP {
virSecurityManager *mgr;
virDomainDef *def;
};
/*
* profile_status returns '-2' on error, '-1' if not loaded, '0' if loaded
*
* If check_enforcing is set to '1', then returns '-2' on error, '-1' if
* not loaded, '0' if loaded in complain mode, and '1' if loaded in
* enforcing mode.
*/
static int
profile_status(const char *str, const int check_enforcing)
{
char *content = NULL;
char *tmp = NULL;
char *etmp = NULL;
int rc = -2;
/* create string that is '<str> \0' for accurate matching */
tmp = g_strdup_printf("%s ", str);
if (check_enforcing != 0) {
/* create string that is '<str> (enforce)\0' for accurate matching */
etmp = g_strdup_printf("%s (enforce)", str);
}
if (virFileReadAll(APPARMOR_PROFILES_PATH, MAX_FILE_LEN, &content) < 0) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("Failed to read AppArmor profiles list "
"\'%s\'"), APPARMOR_PROFILES_PATH);
goto cleanup;
}
if (strstr(content, tmp) != NULL)
rc = 0;
else
rc = -1; /* return -1 if not loaded */
if (check_enforcing != 0) {
if (rc == 0 && strstr(content, etmp) != NULL)
rc = 1; /* return '1' if loaded and enforcing */
}
VIR_FREE(content);
cleanup:
VIR_FREE(tmp);
VIR_FREE(etmp);
return rc;
}
static int
profile_loaded(const char *str)
{
return profile_status(str, 0);
}
/*
* profile_status_file returns '-1' on error, '0' if file on disk is in
* complain mode and '1' if file on disk is in enforcing mode
*/
static int
profile_status_file(const char *str)
{
char *profile = NULL;
char *content = NULL;
char *tmp = NULL;
int rc = -1;
int len;
profile = g_strdup_printf("%s/%s", APPARMOR_DIR "/libvirt", str);
if (!virFileExists(profile))
goto failed;
if ((len = virFileReadAll(profile, MAX_FILE_LEN, &content)) < 0) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("Failed to read \'%s\'"), profile);
goto failed;
}
/* create string that is ' <str> flags=(complain)\0' */
tmp = g_strdup_printf(" %s flags=(complain)", str);
if (strstr(content, tmp) != NULL)
rc = 0;
else
rc = 1;
failed:
VIR_FREE(tmp);
VIR_FREE(profile);
VIR_FREE(content);
return rc;
}
/*
* load (add) a profile. Will create one if necessary
*/
static int
load_profile(virSecurityManager *mgr G_GNUC_UNUSED,
const char *profile,
virDomainDef *def,
const char *fn,
bool append)
{
bool create = true;
g_autofree char *xml = NULL;
g_autoptr(virCommand) cmd = NULL;
xml = virDomainDefFormat(def, NULL, VIR_DOMAIN_DEF_FORMAT_SECURE);
if (!xml)
return -1;
if (profile_status_file(profile) >= 0)
create = false;
cmd = virCommandNewArgList(VIRT_AA_HELPER,
create ? "-c" : "-r",
"-u", profile, NULL);
if (!create && fn) {
if (append) {
virCommandAddArgList(cmd, "-F", fn, NULL);
} else {
virCommandAddArgList(cmd, "-f", fn, NULL);
}
}
virCommandAddEnvFormat(cmd,
"LIBVIRT_LOG_OUTPUTS=%d:stderr",
virLogGetDefaultPriority());
virCommandSetInputBuffer(cmd, xml);
return virCommandRun(cmd, NULL);
}
static int
remove_profile(const char *profile)
{
g_autoptr(virCommand) cmd = virCommandNewArgList(VIRT_AA_HELPER, "-D", "-u",
profile, NULL);
return virCommandRun(cmd, NULL);
}
static char *
get_profile_name(virDomainDef *def)
{
char uuidstr[VIR_UUID_STRING_BUFLEN];
virUUIDFormat(def->uuid, uuidstr);
return g_strdup_printf("%s%s", AA_PREFIX, uuidstr);
}
/* returns -1 on error or profile for libvirtd is unconfined, 0 if complain
* mode and 1 if enforcing. This is required because at present you cannot
* aa_change_profile() from a process that is unconfined.
*/
static int
use_apparmor(void)
{
int rc = -1;
char *libvirt_daemon = NULL;
if (virFileResolveLink("/proc/self/exe", &libvirt_daemon) < 0) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"%s", _("could not find libvirtd"));
return rc;
}
/* If libvirt_lxc is calling us, then consider apparmor is used
* and enforced. */
if (strstr(libvirt_daemon, "libvirt_lxc"))
return 1;
if (access(APPARMOR_PROFILES_PATH, R_OK) != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* First check profile status using full binary path. If that fails
* check using profile name.
*/
rc = profile_status(libvirt_daemon, 1);
if (rc < 0) {
rc = profile_status("libvirtd", 1);
/* Error or unconfined should all result in -1 */
if (rc < 0)
rc = -1;
}
cleanup:
VIR_FREE(libvirt_daemon);
return rc;
}
/* reload the profile, adding read/write file specified by fn if it is not
* NULL.
*/
static int
reload_profile(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *def,
const char *fn,
bool append)
{
virSecurityLabelDef *secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(
def, SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME);
if (!secdef || !secdef->relabel)
return 0;
/* Update the profile only if it is loaded */
if (profile_loaded(secdef->imagelabel) >= 0) {
if (load_profile(mgr, secdef->imagelabel, def, fn, append) < 0) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("cannot update AppArmor profile "
"\'%s\'"),
secdef->imagelabel);
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int
AppArmorSetSecurityHostdevLabelHelper(const char *file, void *opaque)
{
struct SDPDOP *ptr = opaque;
virDomainDef *def = ptr->def;
return reload_profile(ptr->mgr, def, file, true);
}
static int
AppArmorSetSecurityUSBLabel(virUSBDevice *dev G_GNUC_UNUSED,
const char *file, void *opaque)
{
return AppArmorSetSecurityHostdevLabelHelper(file, opaque);
}
static int
AppArmorSetSecurityPCILabel(virPCIDevice *dev G_GNUC_UNUSED,
const char *file, void *opaque)
{
return AppArmorSetSecurityHostdevLabelHelper(file, opaque);
}
static int
AppArmorSetSecuritySCSILabel(virSCSIDevice *dev G_GNUC_UNUSED,
const char *file, void *opaque)
{
return AppArmorSetSecurityHostdevLabelHelper(file, opaque);
}
static int
AppArmorSetSecurityHostLabel(virSCSIVHostDevice *dev G_GNUC_UNUSED,
const char *file, void *opaque)
{
return AppArmorSetSecurityHostdevLabelHelper(file, opaque);
}
/* Called on libvirtd startup to see if AppArmor is available */
static int
AppArmorSecurityManagerProbe(const char *virtDriver G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
char *template_qemu = NULL;
char *template_lxc = NULL;
int rc = SECURITY_DRIVER_DISABLE;
if (use_apparmor() < 0)
return rc;
/* see if template file exists */
template_qemu = g_strdup_printf("%s/TEMPLATE.qemu", APPARMOR_DIR "/libvirt");
template_lxc = g_strdup_printf("%s/TEMPLATE.lxc", APPARMOR_DIR "/libvirt");
if (!virFileExists(template_qemu)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("template \'%s\' does not exist"), template_qemu);
goto cleanup;
}
if (!virFileExists(template_lxc)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("template \'%s\' does not exist"), template_lxc);
goto cleanup;
}
rc = SECURITY_DRIVER_ENABLE;
cleanup:
VIR_FREE(template_qemu);
VIR_FREE(template_lxc);
return rc;
}
/* Security driver initialization. DOI is for 'Domain of Interpretation' and is
* currently not used.
*/
static int
AppArmorSecurityManagerOpen(virSecurityManager *mgr G_GNUC_UNUSED)
Refactor the security drivers to simplify usage The current security driver usage requires horrible code like if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) This pair of checks for NULL clutters up the code, making the driver calls 2 lines longer than they really need to be. The goal of the patchset is to change the calling convention to simply if (virSecurityManagerSetHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) The first check for 'driver->securityDriver' being NULL is removed by introducing a 'no op' security driver that will always be present if no real driver is enabled. This guarentees driver->securityDriver != NULL. The second check for 'driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel' being non-NULL is hidden in a new abstraction called virSecurityManager. This separates the driver callbacks, from main internal API. The addition of a virSecurityManager object, that is separate from the virSecurityDriver struct also allows for security drivers to carry state / configuration information directly. Thus the DAC/Stack drivers from src/qemu which used to pull config from 'struct qemud_driver' can now be moved into the 'src/security' directory and store their config directly. * src/qemu/qemu_conf.h, src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Update to use new virSecurityManager APIs * src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.h src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.h: Move into src/security directory * src/security/security_stack.c, src/security/security_stack.h, src/security/security_dac.c, src/security/security_dac.h: Generic versions of previous QEMU specific drivers * src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_apparmor.h, src/security/security_driver.c, src/security/security_driver.h, src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_selinux.h: Update to take virSecurityManagerPtr object as the first param in all callbacks * src/security/security_nop.c, src/security/security_nop.h: Stub implementation of all security driver APIs. * src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_manager.c: New internal API for invoking security drivers * src/libvirt.c: Add missing debug for security APIs
2010-11-17 20:26:30 +00:00
{
return 0;
}
static int
AppArmorSecurityManagerClose(virSecurityManager *mgr G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
return 0;
}
Refactor the security drivers to simplify usage The current security driver usage requires horrible code like if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) This pair of checks for NULL clutters up the code, making the driver calls 2 lines longer than they really need to be. The goal of the patchset is to change the calling convention to simply if (virSecurityManagerSetHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) The first check for 'driver->securityDriver' being NULL is removed by introducing a 'no op' security driver that will always be present if no real driver is enabled. This guarentees driver->securityDriver != NULL. The second check for 'driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel' being non-NULL is hidden in a new abstraction called virSecurityManager. This separates the driver callbacks, from main internal API. The addition of a virSecurityManager object, that is separate from the virSecurityDriver struct also allows for security drivers to carry state / configuration information directly. Thus the DAC/Stack drivers from src/qemu which used to pull config from 'struct qemud_driver' can now be moved into the 'src/security' directory and store their config directly. * src/qemu/qemu_conf.h, src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Update to use new virSecurityManager APIs * src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.h src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.h: Move into src/security directory * src/security/security_stack.c, src/security/security_stack.h, src/security/security_dac.c, src/security/security_dac.h: Generic versions of previous QEMU specific drivers * src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_apparmor.h, src/security/security_driver.c, src/security/security_driver.h, src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_selinux.h: Update to take virSecurityManagerPtr object as the first param in all callbacks * src/security/security_nop.c, src/security/security_nop.h: Stub implementation of all security driver APIs. * src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_manager.c: New internal API for invoking security drivers * src/libvirt.c: Add missing debug for security APIs
2010-11-17 20:26:30 +00:00
static const char *
AppArmorSecurityManagerGetModel(virSecurityManager *mgr G_GNUC_UNUSED)
Refactor the security drivers to simplify usage The current security driver usage requires horrible code like if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) This pair of checks for NULL clutters up the code, making the driver calls 2 lines longer than they really need to be. The goal of the patchset is to change the calling convention to simply if (virSecurityManagerSetHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) The first check for 'driver->securityDriver' being NULL is removed by introducing a 'no op' security driver that will always be present if no real driver is enabled. This guarentees driver->securityDriver != NULL. The second check for 'driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel' being non-NULL is hidden in a new abstraction called virSecurityManager. This separates the driver callbacks, from main internal API. The addition of a virSecurityManager object, that is separate from the virSecurityDriver struct also allows for security drivers to carry state / configuration information directly. Thus the DAC/Stack drivers from src/qemu which used to pull config from 'struct qemud_driver' can now be moved into the 'src/security' directory and store their config directly. * src/qemu/qemu_conf.h, src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Update to use new virSecurityManager APIs * src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.h src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.h: Move into src/security directory * src/security/security_stack.c, src/security/security_stack.h, src/security/security_dac.c, src/security/security_dac.h: Generic versions of previous QEMU specific drivers * src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_apparmor.h, src/security/security_driver.c, src/security/security_driver.h, src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_selinux.h: Update to take virSecurityManagerPtr object as the first param in all callbacks * src/security/security_nop.c, src/security/security_nop.h: Stub implementation of all security driver APIs. * src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_manager.c: New internal API for invoking security drivers * src/libvirt.c: Add missing debug for security APIs
2010-11-17 20:26:30 +00:00
{
return SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME;
}
static const char *
AppArmorSecurityManagerGetDOI(virSecurityManager *mgr G_GNUC_UNUSED)
Refactor the security drivers to simplify usage The current security driver usage requires horrible code like if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) This pair of checks for NULL clutters up the code, making the driver calls 2 lines longer than they really need to be. The goal of the patchset is to change the calling convention to simply if (virSecurityManagerSetHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) The first check for 'driver->securityDriver' being NULL is removed by introducing a 'no op' security driver that will always be present if no real driver is enabled. This guarentees driver->securityDriver != NULL. The second check for 'driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel' being non-NULL is hidden in a new abstraction called virSecurityManager. This separates the driver callbacks, from main internal API. The addition of a virSecurityManager object, that is separate from the virSecurityDriver struct also allows for security drivers to carry state / configuration information directly. Thus the DAC/Stack drivers from src/qemu which used to pull config from 'struct qemud_driver' can now be moved into the 'src/security' directory and store their config directly. * src/qemu/qemu_conf.h, src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Update to use new virSecurityManager APIs * src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.h src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.h: Move into src/security directory * src/security/security_stack.c, src/security/security_stack.h, src/security/security_dac.c, src/security/security_dac.h: Generic versions of previous QEMU specific drivers * src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_apparmor.h, src/security/security_driver.c, src/security/security_driver.h, src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_selinux.h: Update to take virSecurityManagerPtr object as the first param in all callbacks * src/security/security_nop.c, src/security/security_nop.h: Stub implementation of all security driver APIs. * src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_manager.c: New internal API for invoking security drivers * src/libvirt.c: Add missing debug for security APIs
2010-11-17 20:26:30 +00:00
{
return SECURITY_APPARMOR_VOID_DOI;
}
/* Currently called in qemudStartVMDaemon to setup a 'label'. We look for and
* use a profile based on the UUID, otherwise create one based on a template.
* Keep in mind that this is called on 'start' with RestoreSecurityLabel being
* called on shutdown.
*/
static int
AppArmorGenSecurityLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainDef *def)
{
int rc = -1;
char *profile_name = NULL;
virSecurityLabelDef *secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def,
SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME);
if (!secdef)
return 0;
2014-03-03 11:26:46 +01:00
if ((secdef->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC) ||
(secdef->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_NONE))
return 0;
if (secdef->baselabel) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED,
"%s", _("Cannot set a base label with AppArmour"));
return rc;
}
if (secdef->label || secdef->imagelabel) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"%s",
_("security label already defined for VM"));
return rc;
}
if ((profile_name = get_profile_name(def)) == NULL)
return rc;
secdef->label = g_strdup(profile_name);
/* set imagelabel the same as label (but we won't use it) */
secdef->imagelabel = g_strdup(profile_name);
if (!secdef->model)
secdef->model = g_strdup(SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME);
/* Now that we have a label, load the profile into the kernel. */
if (load_profile(mgr, secdef->label, def, NULL, false) < 0) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("cannot load AppArmor profile "
"\'%s\'"), secdef->label);
goto err;
}
rc = 0;
goto cleanup;
err:
VIR_FREE(secdef->label);
VIR_FREE(secdef->imagelabel);
VIR_FREE(secdef->model);
cleanup:
VIR_FREE(profile_name);
return rc;
}
Refactor setup & cleanup of security labels in security driver The current security driver architecture has the following split of logic * domainGenSecurityLabel Allocate the unique label for the domain about to be started * domainGetSecurityLabel Retrieve the current live security label for a process * domainSetSecurityLabel Apply the previously allocated label to the current process Setup all disk image / device labelling * domainRestoreSecurityLabel Restore the original disk image / device labelling. Release the unique label for the domain The 'domainSetSecurityLabel' method is special because it runs in the context of the child process between the fork + exec. This is require in order to set the process label. It is not required in order to label disks/devices though. Having the disk labelling code run in the child process limits what it can do. In particularly libvirtd would like to remember the current disk image label, and only change shared image labels for the first VM to start. This requires use & update of global state in the libvirtd daemon, and thus cannot run in the child process context. The solution is to split domainSetSecurityLabel into two parts, one applies process label, and the other handles disk image labelling. At the same time domainRestoreSecurityLabel is similarly split, just so that it matches the style. Thus the previous 4 methods are replaced by the following 6 new methods * domainGenSecurityLabel Allocate the unique label for the domain about to be started No actual change here. * domainReleaseSecurityLabel Release the unique label for the domain * domainGetSecurityProcessLabel Retrieve the current live security label for a process Merely renamed for clarity. * domainSetSecurityProcessLabel Apply the previously allocated label to the current process * domainRestoreSecurityAllLabel Restore the original disk image / device labelling. * domainSetSecurityAllLabel Setup all disk image / device labelling The SELinux and AppArmour drivers are then updated to comply with this new spec. Notice that the AppArmour driver was actually a little different. It was creating its profile for the disk image and device labels in the 'domainGenSecurityLabel' method, where as the SELinux driver did it in 'domainSetSecurityLabel'. With the new method split, we can have consistency, with both drivers doing that in the domainSetSecurityAllLabel method. NB, the AppArmour changes here haven't been compiled so may not build.
2010-01-11 11:04:40 +00:00
static int
AppArmorSetSecurityAllLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *def,
const char *incomingPath,
bool chardevStdioLogd G_GNUC_UNUSED,
bool migrated G_GNUC_UNUSED)
Refactor setup & cleanup of security labels in security driver The current security driver architecture has the following split of logic * domainGenSecurityLabel Allocate the unique label for the domain about to be started * domainGetSecurityLabel Retrieve the current live security label for a process * domainSetSecurityLabel Apply the previously allocated label to the current process Setup all disk image / device labelling * domainRestoreSecurityLabel Restore the original disk image / device labelling. Release the unique label for the domain The 'domainSetSecurityLabel' method is special because it runs in the context of the child process between the fork + exec. This is require in order to set the process label. It is not required in order to label disks/devices though. Having the disk labelling code run in the child process limits what it can do. In particularly libvirtd would like to remember the current disk image label, and only change shared image labels for the first VM to start. This requires use & update of global state in the libvirtd daemon, and thus cannot run in the child process context. The solution is to split domainSetSecurityLabel into two parts, one applies process label, and the other handles disk image labelling. At the same time domainRestoreSecurityLabel is similarly split, just so that it matches the style. Thus the previous 4 methods are replaced by the following 6 new methods * domainGenSecurityLabel Allocate the unique label for the domain about to be started No actual change here. * domainReleaseSecurityLabel Release the unique label for the domain * domainGetSecurityProcessLabel Retrieve the current live security label for a process Merely renamed for clarity. * domainSetSecurityProcessLabel Apply the previously allocated label to the current process * domainRestoreSecurityAllLabel Restore the original disk image / device labelling. * domainSetSecurityAllLabel Setup all disk image / device labelling The SELinux and AppArmour drivers are then updated to comply with this new spec. Notice that the AppArmour driver was actually a little different. It was creating its profile for the disk image and device labels in the 'domainGenSecurityLabel' method, where as the SELinux driver did it in 'domainSetSecurityLabel'. With the new method split, we can have consistency, with both drivers doing that in the domainSetSecurityAllLabel method. NB, the AppArmour changes here haven't been compiled so may not build.
2010-01-11 11:04:40 +00:00
{
virSecurityLabelDef *secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def,
SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME);
if (!secdef || !secdef->relabel)
Refactor setup & cleanup of security labels in security driver The current security driver architecture has the following split of logic * domainGenSecurityLabel Allocate the unique label for the domain about to be started * domainGetSecurityLabel Retrieve the current live security label for a process * domainSetSecurityLabel Apply the previously allocated label to the current process Setup all disk image / device labelling * domainRestoreSecurityLabel Restore the original disk image / device labelling. Release the unique label for the domain The 'domainSetSecurityLabel' method is special because it runs in the context of the child process between the fork + exec. This is require in order to set the process label. It is not required in order to label disks/devices though. Having the disk labelling code run in the child process limits what it can do. In particularly libvirtd would like to remember the current disk image label, and only change shared image labels for the first VM to start. This requires use & update of global state in the libvirtd daemon, and thus cannot run in the child process context. The solution is to split domainSetSecurityLabel into two parts, one applies process label, and the other handles disk image labelling. At the same time domainRestoreSecurityLabel is similarly split, just so that it matches the style. Thus the previous 4 methods are replaced by the following 6 new methods * domainGenSecurityLabel Allocate the unique label for the domain about to be started No actual change here. * domainReleaseSecurityLabel Release the unique label for the domain * domainGetSecurityProcessLabel Retrieve the current live security label for a process Merely renamed for clarity. * domainSetSecurityProcessLabel Apply the previously allocated label to the current process * domainRestoreSecurityAllLabel Restore the original disk image / device labelling. * domainSetSecurityAllLabel Setup all disk image / device labelling The SELinux and AppArmour drivers are then updated to comply with this new spec. Notice that the AppArmour driver was actually a little different. It was creating its profile for the disk image and device labels in the 'domainGenSecurityLabel' method, where as the SELinux driver did it in 'domainSetSecurityLabel'. With the new method split, we can have consistency, with both drivers doing that in the domainSetSecurityAllLabel method. NB, the AppArmour changes here haven't been compiled so may not build.
2010-01-11 11:04:40 +00:00
return 0;
/* Reload the profile if incomingPath is specified. Note that
GenSecurityLabel() will have already been run. */
if (incomingPath)
return reload_profile(mgr, def, incomingPath, true);
Refactor setup & cleanup of security labels in security driver The current security driver architecture has the following split of logic * domainGenSecurityLabel Allocate the unique label for the domain about to be started * domainGetSecurityLabel Retrieve the current live security label for a process * domainSetSecurityLabel Apply the previously allocated label to the current process Setup all disk image / device labelling * domainRestoreSecurityLabel Restore the original disk image / device labelling. Release the unique label for the domain The 'domainSetSecurityLabel' method is special because it runs in the context of the child process between the fork + exec. This is require in order to set the process label. It is not required in order to label disks/devices though. Having the disk labelling code run in the child process limits what it can do. In particularly libvirtd would like to remember the current disk image label, and only change shared image labels for the first VM to start. This requires use & update of global state in the libvirtd daemon, and thus cannot run in the child process context. The solution is to split domainSetSecurityLabel into two parts, one applies process label, and the other handles disk image labelling. At the same time domainRestoreSecurityLabel is similarly split, just so that it matches the style. Thus the previous 4 methods are replaced by the following 6 new methods * domainGenSecurityLabel Allocate the unique label for the domain about to be started No actual change here. * domainReleaseSecurityLabel Release the unique label for the domain * domainGetSecurityProcessLabel Retrieve the current live security label for a process Merely renamed for clarity. * domainSetSecurityProcessLabel Apply the previously allocated label to the current process * domainRestoreSecurityAllLabel Restore the original disk image / device labelling. * domainSetSecurityAllLabel Setup all disk image / device labelling The SELinux and AppArmour drivers are then updated to comply with this new spec. Notice that the AppArmour driver was actually a little different. It was creating its profile for the disk image and device labels in the 'domainGenSecurityLabel' method, where as the SELinux driver did it in 'domainSetSecurityLabel'. With the new method split, we can have consistency, with both drivers doing that in the domainSetSecurityAllLabel method. NB, the AppArmour changes here haven't been compiled so may not build.
2010-01-11 11:04:40 +00:00
return 0;
}
/* Seen with 'virsh dominfo <vm>'. This function only called if the VM is
* running.
*/
static int
AppArmorGetSecurityProcessLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainDef *def,
pid_t pid G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virSecurityLabelPtr sec)
{
int rc = -1;
int status;
char *profile_name = NULL;
if ((profile_name = get_profile_name(def)) == NULL)
return rc;
status = profile_status(profile_name, 1);
if (status < -1) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"%s", _("error getting profile status"));
goto cleanup;
} else if (status == -1) {
sec->label[0] = '\0';
} else {
if (virStrcpy(sec->label, profile_name, VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN) < 0) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"%s", _("error copying profile name"));
goto cleanup;
}
}
sec->enforcing = status == 1;
rc = 0;
cleanup:
VIR_FREE(profile_name);
return rc;
}
/* Called on VM shutdown and destroy. See AppArmorGenSecurityLabel (above) for
* more details. Currently called via qemudShutdownVMDaemon.
*/
static int
AppArmorReleaseSecurityLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainDef *def)
Refactor setup & cleanup of security labels in security driver The current security driver architecture has the following split of logic * domainGenSecurityLabel Allocate the unique label for the domain about to be started * domainGetSecurityLabel Retrieve the current live security label for a process * domainSetSecurityLabel Apply the previously allocated label to the current process Setup all disk image / device labelling * domainRestoreSecurityLabel Restore the original disk image / device labelling. Release the unique label for the domain The 'domainSetSecurityLabel' method is special because it runs in the context of the child process between the fork + exec. This is require in order to set the process label. It is not required in order to label disks/devices though. Having the disk labelling code run in the child process limits what it can do. In particularly libvirtd would like to remember the current disk image label, and only change shared image labels for the first VM to start. This requires use & update of global state in the libvirtd daemon, and thus cannot run in the child process context. The solution is to split domainSetSecurityLabel into two parts, one applies process label, and the other handles disk image labelling. At the same time domainRestoreSecurityLabel is similarly split, just so that it matches the style. Thus the previous 4 methods are replaced by the following 6 new methods * domainGenSecurityLabel Allocate the unique label for the domain about to be started No actual change here. * domainReleaseSecurityLabel Release the unique label for the domain * domainGetSecurityProcessLabel Retrieve the current live security label for a process Merely renamed for clarity. * domainSetSecurityProcessLabel Apply the previously allocated label to the current process * domainRestoreSecurityAllLabel Restore the original disk image / device labelling. * domainSetSecurityAllLabel Setup all disk image / device labelling The SELinux and AppArmour drivers are then updated to comply with this new spec. Notice that the AppArmour driver was actually a little different. It was creating its profile for the disk image and device labels in the 'domainGenSecurityLabel' method, where as the SELinux driver did it in 'domainSetSecurityLabel'. With the new method split, we can have consistency, with both drivers doing that in the domainSetSecurityAllLabel method. NB, the AppArmour changes here haven't been compiled so may not build.
2010-01-11 11:04:40 +00:00
{
virSecurityLabelDef *secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def,
SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME);
if (secdef) {
VIR_FREE(secdef->model);
VIR_FREE(secdef->label);
VIR_FREE(secdef->imagelabel);
}
Refactor setup & cleanup of security labels in security driver The current security driver architecture has the following split of logic * domainGenSecurityLabel Allocate the unique label for the domain about to be started * domainGetSecurityLabel Retrieve the current live security label for a process * domainSetSecurityLabel Apply the previously allocated label to the current process Setup all disk image / device labelling * domainRestoreSecurityLabel Restore the original disk image / device labelling. Release the unique label for the domain The 'domainSetSecurityLabel' method is special because it runs in the context of the child process between the fork + exec. This is require in order to set the process label. It is not required in order to label disks/devices though. Having the disk labelling code run in the child process limits what it can do. In particularly libvirtd would like to remember the current disk image label, and only change shared image labels for the first VM to start. This requires use & update of global state in the libvirtd daemon, and thus cannot run in the child process context. The solution is to split domainSetSecurityLabel into two parts, one applies process label, and the other handles disk image labelling. At the same time domainRestoreSecurityLabel is similarly split, just so that it matches the style. Thus the previous 4 methods are replaced by the following 6 new methods * domainGenSecurityLabel Allocate the unique label for the domain about to be started No actual change here. * domainReleaseSecurityLabel Release the unique label for the domain * domainGetSecurityProcessLabel Retrieve the current live security label for a process Merely renamed for clarity. * domainSetSecurityProcessLabel Apply the previously allocated label to the current process * domainRestoreSecurityAllLabel Restore the original disk image / device labelling. * domainSetSecurityAllLabel Setup all disk image / device labelling The SELinux and AppArmour drivers are then updated to comply with this new spec. Notice that the AppArmour driver was actually a little different. It was creating its profile for the disk image and device labels in the 'domainGenSecurityLabel' method, where as the SELinux driver did it in 'domainSetSecurityLabel'. With the new method split, we can have consistency, with both drivers doing that in the domainSetSecurityAllLabel method. NB, the AppArmour changes here haven't been compiled so may not build.
2010-01-11 11:04:40 +00:00
return 0;
}
static int
AppArmorRestoreSecurityAllLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainDef *def,
bool migrated G_GNUC_UNUSED,
bool chardevStdioLogd G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
int rc = 0;
virSecurityLabelDef *secdef =
virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME);
if (!secdef)
return 0;
if (secdef->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC) {
if ((rc = remove_profile(secdef->label)) != 0) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("could not remove profile for \'%s\'"),
secdef->label);
}
}
return rc;
}
/* Called via virCommand hook. Output goes to
maint: use gnulib configmake rather than open-coding things * bootstrap.conf (gnulib_modules): Add configmake. * daemon/Makefile.am (libvirtd_CFLAGS): Drop defines provided by gnulib. * src/Makefile.am (INCLUDES): Likewise. * tests/Makefile.am (INCLUDES): Likewise. * tools/Makefile.am (virsh_CFLAGS): Likewise. * daemon/libvirtd.c (qemudInitPaths, usage, main): Update clients. * src/cpu/cpu_map.c (CPUMAPFILE): Likewise. * src/driver.c (DEFAULT_DRIVER_DIR): Likewise. * src/internal.h (_): Likewise. * src/libvirt.c (virInitialize): Likewise. * src/lxc/lxc_conf.h (LXC_CONFIG_DIR, LXC_STATE_DIR, LXC_LOG_DIR): Likewise. * src/lxc/lxc_conf.c (lxcCapsInit, lxcLoadDriverConfig): Likewise. * src/network/bridge_driver.c (NETWORK_PID_DIR) (NETWORK_STATE_DIR, DNSMASQ_STATE_DIR, networkStartup): Likewise. * src/nwfilter/nwfilter_driver.c (nwfilterDriverStartup): Likewise. * src/qemu/qemu_conf.c (qemudLoadDriverConfig): Likewise. * src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemudStartup): Likewise. * src/remote/remote_driver.h (LIBVIRTD_PRIV_UNIX_SOCKET) (LIBVIRTD_PRIV_UNIX_SOCKET_RO, LIBVIRTD_CONFIGURATION_FILE) (LIBVIRT_PKI_DIR): Likewise. * src/secret/secret_driver.c (secretDriverStartup): Likewise. * src/security/security_apparmor.c (VIRT_AA_HELPER): Likewise. * src/security/virt-aa-helper.c (main): Likewise. * src/storage/storage_backend_disk.c (PARTHELPER): Likewise. * src/storage/storage_driver.c (storageDriverStartup): Likewise. * src/uml/uml_driver.c (TEMPDIR, umlStartup): Likewise. * src/util/hooks.c (LIBVIRT_HOOK_DIR): Likewise. * tools/virsh.c (main): Likewise. * docs/hooks.html.in: Likewise.
2010-11-16 07:54:17 -07:00
* LOCALSTATEDIR/log/libvirt/qemu/<vm name>.log
*/
static int
AppArmorSetSecurityProcessLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainDef *def)
{
int rc = -1;
char *profile_name = NULL;
virSecurityLabelDef *secdef =
virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME);
if (!secdef || !secdef->label)
2014-03-03 11:26:46 +01:00
return 0;
if ((profile_name = get_profile_name(def)) == NULL)
return rc;
if (STRNEQ(SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME, secdef->model)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("security label driver mismatch: "
"\'%s\' model configured for domain, but "
"hypervisor driver is \'%s\'."),
secdef->model, SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME);
if (use_apparmor() > 0)
goto cleanup;
}
VIR_DEBUG("Changing AppArmor profile to %s", profile_name);
if (aa_change_profile(profile_name) < 0) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
_("error calling aa_change_profile()"));
goto cleanup;
}
rc = 0;
cleanup:
VIR_FREE(profile_name);
return rc;
}
security: add new virSecurityManagerSetChildProcessLabel API The existing virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() API is designed so that it must be called after forking the child process, but before exec'ing the child. Due to the way the virCommand API works, that means it needs to be put in a "hook" function that virCommand is told to call out to at that time. Setting the child process label is a basic enough need when executing any process that virCommand should have a method of doing that. But virCommand must be told what label to set, and only the security driver knows the answer to that question. The new virSecurityManagerSet*Child*ProcessLabel() API is the way to transfer the knowledge about what label to set from the security driver to the virCommand object. It is given a virCommandPtr, and each security driver calls the appropriate virCommand* API to tell virCommand what to do between fork and exec. 1) in the case of the DAC security driver, it calls virCommandSetUID/GID() to set a uid and gid that must be set for the child process. 2) for the SELinux security driver, it calls virCommandSetSELinuxLabel() to save a copy of the char* that will be sent to setexeccon_raw() *after forking the child process*. 3) for the AppArmor security drivers, it calls virCommandSetAppArmorProfile() to save a copy of the char* that will be sent to aa_change_profile() *after forking the child process*. With this new API in place, we will be able to remove virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() from any virCommand pre-exec hooks. (Unfortunately, the LXC driver uses clone() rather than virCommand, so it can't take advantage of this new security driver API, meaning that we need to keep around the older virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel(), at least for now.)
2013-02-01 15:02:03 -05:00
/* Called directly by API user prior to virCommandRun().
* virCommandRun() will then call aa_change_profile() (if a
* cmd->appArmorProfile has been set) *after forking the child
* process*.
*/
static int
AppArmorSetSecurityChildProcessLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainDef *def,
virCommand *cmd)
security: add new virSecurityManagerSetChildProcessLabel API The existing virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() API is designed so that it must be called after forking the child process, but before exec'ing the child. Due to the way the virCommand API works, that means it needs to be put in a "hook" function that virCommand is told to call out to at that time. Setting the child process label is a basic enough need when executing any process that virCommand should have a method of doing that. But virCommand must be told what label to set, and only the security driver knows the answer to that question. The new virSecurityManagerSet*Child*ProcessLabel() API is the way to transfer the knowledge about what label to set from the security driver to the virCommand object. It is given a virCommandPtr, and each security driver calls the appropriate virCommand* API to tell virCommand what to do between fork and exec. 1) in the case of the DAC security driver, it calls virCommandSetUID/GID() to set a uid and gid that must be set for the child process. 2) for the SELinux security driver, it calls virCommandSetSELinuxLabel() to save a copy of the char* that will be sent to setexeccon_raw() *after forking the child process*. 3) for the AppArmor security drivers, it calls virCommandSetAppArmorProfile() to save a copy of the char* that will be sent to aa_change_profile() *after forking the child process*. With this new API in place, we will be able to remove virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() from any virCommand pre-exec hooks. (Unfortunately, the LXC driver uses clone() rather than virCommand, so it can't take advantage of this new security driver API, meaning that we need to keep around the older virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel(), at least for now.)
2013-02-01 15:02:03 -05:00
{
int rc = -1;
char *profile_name = NULL;
char *cmd_str = NULL;
virSecurityLabelDef *secdef =
security: add new virSecurityManagerSetChildProcessLabel API The existing virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() API is designed so that it must be called after forking the child process, but before exec'ing the child. Due to the way the virCommand API works, that means it needs to be put in a "hook" function that virCommand is told to call out to at that time. Setting the child process label is a basic enough need when executing any process that virCommand should have a method of doing that. But virCommand must be told what label to set, and only the security driver knows the answer to that question. The new virSecurityManagerSet*Child*ProcessLabel() API is the way to transfer the knowledge about what label to set from the security driver to the virCommand object. It is given a virCommandPtr, and each security driver calls the appropriate virCommand* API to tell virCommand what to do between fork and exec. 1) in the case of the DAC security driver, it calls virCommandSetUID/GID() to set a uid and gid that must be set for the child process. 2) for the SELinux security driver, it calls virCommandSetSELinuxLabel() to save a copy of the char* that will be sent to setexeccon_raw() *after forking the child process*. 3) for the AppArmor security drivers, it calls virCommandSetAppArmorProfile() to save a copy of the char* that will be sent to aa_change_profile() *after forking the child process*. With this new API in place, we will be able to remove virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() from any virCommand pre-exec hooks. (Unfortunately, the LXC driver uses clone() rather than virCommand, so it can't take advantage of this new security driver API, meaning that we need to keep around the older virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel(), at least for now.)
2013-02-01 15:02:03 -05:00
virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME);
if (!secdef || !secdef->label)
2014-03-03 11:26:46 +01:00
return 0;
security: add new virSecurityManagerSetChildProcessLabel API The existing virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() API is designed so that it must be called after forking the child process, but before exec'ing the child. Due to the way the virCommand API works, that means it needs to be put in a "hook" function that virCommand is told to call out to at that time. Setting the child process label is a basic enough need when executing any process that virCommand should have a method of doing that. But virCommand must be told what label to set, and only the security driver knows the answer to that question. The new virSecurityManagerSet*Child*ProcessLabel() API is the way to transfer the knowledge about what label to set from the security driver to the virCommand object. It is given a virCommandPtr, and each security driver calls the appropriate virCommand* API to tell virCommand what to do between fork and exec. 1) in the case of the DAC security driver, it calls virCommandSetUID/GID() to set a uid and gid that must be set for the child process. 2) for the SELinux security driver, it calls virCommandSetSELinuxLabel() to save a copy of the char* that will be sent to setexeccon_raw() *after forking the child process*. 3) for the AppArmor security drivers, it calls virCommandSetAppArmorProfile() to save a copy of the char* that will be sent to aa_change_profile() *after forking the child process*. With this new API in place, we will be able to remove virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() from any virCommand pre-exec hooks. (Unfortunately, the LXC driver uses clone() rather than virCommand, so it can't take advantage of this new security driver API, meaning that we need to keep around the older virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel(), at least for now.)
2013-02-01 15:02:03 -05:00
if (STRNEQ(SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME, secdef->model)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("security label driver mismatch: "
"\'%s\' model configured for domain, but "
"hypervisor driver is \'%s\'."),
secdef->model, SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME);
if (use_apparmor() > 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if ((profile_name = get_profile_name(def)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
qemu: use line breaks in command line args written to log The QEMU command line arguments are very long and currently all written on a single line to /var/log/libvirt/qemu/$GUEST.log. This introduces logic to add line breaks after every env variable and "-" optional argument, and every positional argument. This will create a clearer log file, which will in turn present better in bug reports when people cut + paste from the log into a bug comment. An example log file entry now looks like this: 2018-12-14 12:57:03.677+0000: starting up libvirt version: 5.0.0, qemu version: 3.0.0qemu-3.0.0-1.fc29, kernel: 4.19.5-300.fc29.x86_64, hostname: localhost.localdomain LC_ALL=C \ PATH=/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin \ HOME=/home/berrange \ USER=berrange \ LOGNAME=berrange \ QEMU_AUDIO_DRV=none \ /usr/bin/qemu-system-ppc64 \ -name guest=guest,debug-threads=on \ -S \ -object secret,id=masterKey0,format=raw,file=/home/berrange/.config/libvirt/qemu/lib/domain-33-guest/master-key.aes \ -machine pseries-2.10,accel=tcg,usb=off,dump-guest-core=off \ -m 1024 \ -realtime mlock=off \ -smp 1,sockets=1,cores=1,threads=1 \ -uuid c8a74977-ab18-41d0-ae3b-4041c7fffbcd \ -display none \ -no-user-config \ -nodefaults \ -chardev socket,id=charmonitor,fd=23,server,nowait \ -mon chardev=charmonitor,id=monitor,mode=control \ -rtc base=utc \ -no-shutdown \ -boot strict=on \ -device qemu-xhci,id=usb,bus=pci.0,addr=0x1 \ -device virtio-balloon-pci,id=balloon0,bus=pci.0,addr=0x2 \ -sandbox on,obsolete=deny,elevateprivileges=deny,spawn=deny,resourcecontrol=deny \ -msg timestamp=on 2018-12-14 12:57:03.730+0000: shutting down, reason=failed Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2018-12-14 12:07:08 +00:00
cmd_str = virCommandToString(cmd, false);
VIR_DEBUG("Changing AppArmor profile to %s on %s", profile_name, cmd_str);
security: add new virSecurityManagerSetChildProcessLabel API The existing virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() API is designed so that it must be called after forking the child process, but before exec'ing the child. Due to the way the virCommand API works, that means it needs to be put in a "hook" function that virCommand is told to call out to at that time. Setting the child process label is a basic enough need when executing any process that virCommand should have a method of doing that. But virCommand must be told what label to set, and only the security driver knows the answer to that question. The new virSecurityManagerSet*Child*ProcessLabel() API is the way to transfer the knowledge about what label to set from the security driver to the virCommand object. It is given a virCommandPtr, and each security driver calls the appropriate virCommand* API to tell virCommand what to do between fork and exec. 1) in the case of the DAC security driver, it calls virCommandSetUID/GID() to set a uid and gid that must be set for the child process. 2) for the SELinux security driver, it calls virCommandSetSELinuxLabel() to save a copy of the char* that will be sent to setexeccon_raw() *after forking the child process*. 3) for the AppArmor security drivers, it calls virCommandSetAppArmorProfile() to save a copy of the char* that will be sent to aa_change_profile() *after forking the child process*. With this new API in place, we will be able to remove virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() from any virCommand pre-exec hooks. (Unfortunately, the LXC driver uses clone() rather than virCommand, so it can't take advantage of this new security driver API, meaning that we need to keep around the older virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel(), at least for now.)
2013-02-01 15:02:03 -05:00
virCommandSetAppArmorProfile(cmd, profile_name);
rc = 0;
cleanup:
security: add new virSecurityManagerSetChildProcessLabel API The existing virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() API is designed so that it must be called after forking the child process, but before exec'ing the child. Due to the way the virCommand API works, that means it needs to be put in a "hook" function that virCommand is told to call out to at that time. Setting the child process label is a basic enough need when executing any process that virCommand should have a method of doing that. But virCommand must be told what label to set, and only the security driver knows the answer to that question. The new virSecurityManagerSet*Child*ProcessLabel() API is the way to transfer the knowledge about what label to set from the security driver to the virCommand object. It is given a virCommandPtr, and each security driver calls the appropriate virCommand* API to tell virCommand what to do between fork and exec. 1) in the case of the DAC security driver, it calls virCommandSetUID/GID() to set a uid and gid that must be set for the child process. 2) for the SELinux security driver, it calls virCommandSetSELinuxLabel() to save a copy of the char* that will be sent to setexeccon_raw() *after forking the child process*. 3) for the AppArmor security drivers, it calls virCommandSetAppArmorProfile() to save a copy of the char* that will be sent to aa_change_profile() *after forking the child process*. With this new API in place, we will be able to remove virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() from any virCommand pre-exec hooks. (Unfortunately, the LXC driver uses clone() rather than virCommand, so it can't take advantage of this new security driver API, meaning that we need to keep around the older virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel(), at least for now.)
2013-02-01 15:02:03 -05:00
VIR_FREE(profile_name);
VIR_FREE(cmd_str);
security: add new virSecurityManagerSetChildProcessLabel API The existing virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() API is designed so that it must be called after forking the child process, but before exec'ing the child. Due to the way the virCommand API works, that means it needs to be put in a "hook" function that virCommand is told to call out to at that time. Setting the child process label is a basic enough need when executing any process that virCommand should have a method of doing that. But virCommand must be told what label to set, and only the security driver knows the answer to that question. The new virSecurityManagerSet*Child*ProcessLabel() API is the way to transfer the knowledge about what label to set from the security driver to the virCommand object. It is given a virCommandPtr, and each security driver calls the appropriate virCommand* API to tell virCommand what to do between fork and exec. 1) in the case of the DAC security driver, it calls virCommandSetUID/GID() to set a uid and gid that must be set for the child process. 2) for the SELinux security driver, it calls virCommandSetSELinuxLabel() to save a copy of the char* that will be sent to setexeccon_raw() *after forking the child process*. 3) for the AppArmor security drivers, it calls virCommandSetAppArmorProfile() to save a copy of the char* that will be sent to aa_change_profile() *after forking the child process*. With this new API in place, we will be able to remove virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() from any virCommand pre-exec hooks. (Unfortunately, the LXC driver uses clone() rather than virCommand, so it can't take advantage of this new security driver API, meaning that we need to keep around the older virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel(), at least for now.)
2013-02-01 15:02:03 -05:00
return rc;
}
Refactor the security drivers to simplify usage The current security driver usage requires horrible code like if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) This pair of checks for NULL clutters up the code, making the driver calls 2 lines longer than they really need to be. The goal of the patchset is to change the calling convention to simply if (virSecurityManagerSetHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) The first check for 'driver->securityDriver' being NULL is removed by introducing a 'no op' security driver that will always be present if no real driver is enabled. This guarentees driver->securityDriver != NULL. The second check for 'driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel' being non-NULL is hidden in a new abstraction called virSecurityManager. This separates the driver callbacks, from main internal API. The addition of a virSecurityManager object, that is separate from the virSecurityDriver struct also allows for security drivers to carry state / configuration information directly. Thus the DAC/Stack drivers from src/qemu which used to pull config from 'struct qemud_driver' can now be moved into the 'src/security' directory and store their config directly. * src/qemu/qemu_conf.h, src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Update to use new virSecurityManager APIs * src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.h src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.h: Move into src/security directory * src/security/security_stack.c, src/security/security_stack.h, src/security/security_dac.c, src/security/security_dac.h: Generic versions of previous QEMU specific drivers * src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_apparmor.h, src/security/security_driver.c, src/security/security_driver.h, src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_selinux.h: Update to take virSecurityManagerPtr object as the first param in all callbacks * src/security/security_nop.c, src/security/security_nop.h: Stub implementation of all security driver APIs. * src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_manager.c: New internal API for invoking security drivers * src/libvirt.c: Add missing debug for security APIs
2010-11-17 20:26:30 +00:00
static int
AppArmorSetSecurityDaemonSocketLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainDef *vm G_GNUC_UNUSED)
Refactor the security drivers to simplify usage The current security driver usage requires horrible code like if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) This pair of checks for NULL clutters up the code, making the driver calls 2 lines longer than they really need to be. The goal of the patchset is to change the calling convention to simply if (virSecurityManagerSetHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) The first check for 'driver->securityDriver' being NULL is removed by introducing a 'no op' security driver that will always be present if no real driver is enabled. This guarentees driver->securityDriver != NULL. The second check for 'driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel' being non-NULL is hidden in a new abstraction called virSecurityManager. This separates the driver callbacks, from main internal API. The addition of a virSecurityManager object, that is separate from the virSecurityDriver struct also allows for security drivers to carry state / configuration information directly. Thus the DAC/Stack drivers from src/qemu which used to pull config from 'struct qemud_driver' can now be moved into the 'src/security' directory and store their config directly. * src/qemu/qemu_conf.h, src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Update to use new virSecurityManager APIs * src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.h src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.h: Move into src/security directory * src/security/security_stack.c, src/security/security_stack.h, src/security/security_dac.c, src/security/security_dac.h: Generic versions of previous QEMU specific drivers * src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_apparmor.h, src/security/security_driver.c, src/security/security_driver.h, src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_selinux.h: Update to take virSecurityManagerPtr object as the first param in all callbacks * src/security/security_nop.c, src/security/security_nop.h: Stub implementation of all security driver APIs. * src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_manager.c: New internal API for invoking security drivers * src/libvirt.c: Add missing debug for security APIs
2010-11-17 20:26:30 +00:00
{
return 0;
}
static int
AppArmorSetSecuritySocketLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainDef *def G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
return 0;
}
Refactor the security drivers to simplify usage The current security driver usage requires horrible code like if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) This pair of checks for NULL clutters up the code, making the driver calls 2 lines longer than they really need to be. The goal of the patchset is to change the calling convention to simply if (virSecurityManagerSetHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) The first check for 'driver->securityDriver' being NULL is removed by introducing a 'no op' security driver that will always be present if no real driver is enabled. This guarentees driver->securityDriver != NULL. The second check for 'driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel' being non-NULL is hidden in a new abstraction called virSecurityManager. This separates the driver callbacks, from main internal API. The addition of a virSecurityManager object, that is separate from the virSecurityDriver struct also allows for security drivers to carry state / configuration information directly. Thus the DAC/Stack drivers from src/qemu which used to pull config from 'struct qemud_driver' can now be moved into the 'src/security' directory and store their config directly. * src/qemu/qemu_conf.h, src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Update to use new virSecurityManager APIs * src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.h src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.h: Move into src/security directory * src/security/security_stack.c, src/security/security_stack.h, src/security/security_dac.c, src/security/security_dac.h: Generic versions of previous QEMU specific drivers * src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_apparmor.h, src/security/security_driver.c, src/security/security_driver.h, src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_selinux.h: Update to take virSecurityManagerPtr object as the first param in all callbacks * src/security/security_nop.c, src/security/security_nop.h: Stub implementation of all security driver APIs. * src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_manager.c: New internal API for invoking security drivers * src/libvirt.c: Add missing debug for security APIs
2010-11-17 20:26:30 +00:00
static int
AppArmorClearSecuritySocketLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainDef *def G_GNUC_UNUSED)
Refactor the security drivers to simplify usage The current security driver usage requires horrible code like if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) This pair of checks for NULL clutters up the code, making the driver calls 2 lines longer than they really need to be. The goal of the patchset is to change the calling convention to simply if (virSecurityManagerSetHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) The first check for 'driver->securityDriver' being NULL is removed by introducing a 'no op' security driver that will always be present if no real driver is enabled. This guarentees driver->securityDriver != NULL. The second check for 'driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel' being non-NULL is hidden in a new abstraction called virSecurityManager. This separates the driver callbacks, from main internal API. The addition of a virSecurityManager object, that is separate from the virSecurityDriver struct also allows for security drivers to carry state / configuration information directly. Thus the DAC/Stack drivers from src/qemu which used to pull config from 'struct qemud_driver' can now be moved into the 'src/security' directory and store their config directly. * src/qemu/qemu_conf.h, src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Update to use new virSecurityManager APIs * src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.h src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.h: Move into src/security directory * src/security/security_stack.c, src/security/security_stack.h, src/security/security_dac.c, src/security/security_dac.h: Generic versions of previous QEMU specific drivers * src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_apparmor.h, src/security/security_driver.c, src/security/security_driver.h, src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_selinux.h: Update to take virSecurityManagerPtr object as the first param in all callbacks * src/security/security_nop.c, src/security/security_nop.h: Stub implementation of all security driver APIs. * src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_manager.c: New internal API for invoking security drivers * src/libvirt.c: Add missing debug for security APIs
2010-11-17 20:26:30 +00:00
{
return 0;
}
/* Called when hotplugging */
static int
AppArmorRestoreSecurityImageLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *def,
virStorageSource *src,
virSecurityDomainImageLabelFlags flags G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
if (!virStorageSourceIsLocalStorage(src))
return 0;
return reload_profile(mgr, def, NULL, false);
}
/* Called when hotplugging */
static int
AppArmorSetMemoryLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *def,
virDomainMemoryDef *mem)
{
switch (mem->model) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_MEMORY_MODEL_NVDIMM:
case VIR_DOMAIN_MEMORY_MODEL_VIRTIO_PMEM:
if (!virFileExists(mem->nvdimmPath)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("%s: \'%s\' does not exist"),
__func__, mem->nvdimmPath);
return -1;
}
return reload_profile(mgr, def, mem->nvdimmPath, true);
case VIR_DOMAIN_MEMORY_MODEL_NONE:
case VIR_DOMAIN_MEMORY_MODEL_DIMM:
conf: Introduce virtio-mem <memory/> model The virtio-mem is paravirtualized mechanism of adding/removing memory to/from a VM. A virtio-mem-pci device is split into blocks of equal size which are then exposed (all or only a requested portion of them) to the guest kernel to use as regular memory. Therefore, the device has two important attributes: 1) block-size, which defines the size of a block 2) requested-size, which defines how much memory (in bytes) is the device requested to expose to the guest. The 'block-size' is configured on command line and immutable throughout device's lifetime. The 'requested-size' can be set on the command line too, but also is adjustable via monitor. In fact, that is how management software places its requests to change the memory allocation. If it wants to give more memory to the guest it changes 'requested-size' to a bigger value, and if it wants to shrink guest memory it changes the 'requested-size' to a smaller value. Note, value of zero means that guest should release all memory offered by the device. Of course, guest has to cooperate. Therefore, there is a third attribute 'size' which is read only and reflects how much memory the guest still has. This can be different to 'requested-size', obviously. Because of name clash, I've named it 'current' and it is dealt with in future commits (it is a runtime information anyway). In the backend, memory for virtio-mem is backed by usual objects: memory-backend-{ram,file,memfd} and their size puts the cap on the amount of memory that a virtio-mem device can offer to a guest. But we are already able to express this info using <size/> under <target/>. Therefore, we need only two more elements to cover 'block-size' and 'requested-size' attributes. This is the XML I've came up with: <memory model='virtio-mem'> <source> <nodemask>1-3</nodemask> <pagesize unit='KiB'>2048</pagesize> </source> <target> <size unit='KiB'>2097152</size> <node>0</node> <block unit='KiB'>2048</block> <requested unit='KiB'>1048576</requested> </target> <address type='pci' domain='0x0000' bus='0x00' slot='0x04' function='0x0'/> </memory> I hope by now it is obvious that: 1) 'requested-size' must be an integer multiple of 'block-size', and 2) virtio-mem-pci device goes onto PCI bus and thus needs PCI address. Then there is a limitation that the minimal 'block-size' is transparent huge page size (I'll leave this without explanation). Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
2021-01-18 16:13:12 +01:00
case VIR_DOMAIN_MEMORY_MODEL_VIRTIO_MEM:
case VIR_DOMAIN_MEMORY_MODEL_LAST:
break;
}
return 0;
}
static int
AppArmorRestoreMemoryLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *def,
virDomainMemoryDef *mem G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
return reload_profile(mgr, def, NULL, false);
}
/* Called when hotplugging */
static int
AppArmorSetInputLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *def,
virDomainInputDef *input)
{
if (input == NULL)
return 0;
switch ((virDomainInputType)input->type) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_INPUT_TYPE_PASSTHROUGH:
case VIR_DOMAIN_INPUT_TYPE_EVDEV:
if (input->source.evdev == NULL) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("%s: passthrough input device has no source"),
__func__);
return -1;
}
if (!virFileExists(input->source.evdev)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("%s: \'%s\' does not exist"),
__func__, input->source.evdev);
return -1;
}
return reload_profile(mgr, def, input->source.evdev, true);
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_INPUT_TYPE_MOUSE:
case VIR_DOMAIN_INPUT_TYPE_TABLET:
case VIR_DOMAIN_INPUT_TYPE_KBD:
case VIR_DOMAIN_INPUT_TYPE_LAST:
break;
}
return 0;
}
static int
AppArmorRestoreInputLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *def,
virDomainInputDef *input G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
return reload_profile(mgr, def, NULL, false);
}
/* Called when hotplugging */
static int
AppArmorSetSecurityImageLabelInternal(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *def,
virStorageSource *src)
{
g_autofree char *vfioGroupDev = NULL;
const char *path;
if (src->type == VIR_STORAGE_TYPE_NVME) {
const virStorageSourceNVMeDef *nvme = src->nvme;
if (!(vfioGroupDev = virPCIDeviceAddressGetIOMMUGroupDev(&nvme->pciAddr)))
return -1;
path = vfioGroupDev;
} else {
if (!src->path || !virStorageSourceIsLocalStorage(src))
return 0;
path = src->path;
}
/* if the device doesn't exist, error out */
if (!virFileExists(path)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("\'%s\' does not exist"),
path);
return -1;
}
return reload_profile(mgr, def, path, true);
}
static int
AppArmorSetSecurityImageLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *def,
virStorageSource *src,
virSecurityDomainImageLabelFlags flags G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
virSecurityLabelDef *secdef;
virStorageSource *n;
secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME);
if (!secdef || !secdef->relabel)
return 0;
if (!secdef->imagelabel)
return 0;
for (n = src; virStorageSourceIsBacking(n); n = n->backingStore) {
if (AppArmorSetSecurityImageLabelInternal(mgr, def, n) < 0)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
AppArmorSecurityVerify(virSecurityManager *mgr G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainDef *def)
{
virSecurityLabelDef *secdef =
virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME);
if (!secdef)
return 0;
if (secdef->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC) {
if (use_apparmor() < 0 || profile_status(secdef->label, 0) < 0) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR,
_("Invalid security label \'%s\'"),
secdef->label);
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int
AppArmorReserveSecurityLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainDef *def G_GNUC_UNUSED,
pid_t pid G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
/* NOOP. Nothing to reserve with AppArmor */
return 0;
}
static int
AppArmorSetSecurityHostdevLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *def,
virDomainHostdevDef *dev,
const char *vroot)
{
struct SDPDOP *ptr;
int ret = -1;
virSecurityLabelDef *secdef =
virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME);
virDomainHostdevSubsysUSB *usbsrc = &dev->source.subsys.u.usb;
virDomainHostdevSubsysPCI *pcisrc = &dev->source.subsys.u.pci;
virDomainHostdevSubsysSCSI *scsisrc = &dev->source.subsys.u.scsi;
virDomainHostdevSubsysSCSIVHost *hostsrc = &dev->source.subsys.u.scsi_host;
virDomainHostdevSubsysMediatedDev *mdevsrc = &dev->source.subsys.u.mdev;
if (!secdef || !secdef->relabel)
return 0;
if (dev->mode != VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_MODE_SUBSYS)
return 0;
/* Like AppArmorRestoreSecurityImageLabel() for a networked disk,
* do nothing for an iSCSI hostdev
*/
if (dev->source.subsys.type == VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_SCSI &&
scsisrc->protocol == VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SCSI_PROTOCOL_TYPE_ISCSI)
return 0;
if (profile_loaded(secdef->imagelabel) < 0)
return 0;
ptr = g_new0(struct SDPDOP, 1);
Refactor the security drivers to simplify usage The current security driver usage requires horrible code like if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) This pair of checks for NULL clutters up the code, making the driver calls 2 lines longer than they really need to be. The goal of the patchset is to change the calling convention to simply if (virSecurityManagerSetHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) The first check for 'driver->securityDriver' being NULL is removed by introducing a 'no op' security driver that will always be present if no real driver is enabled. This guarentees driver->securityDriver != NULL. The second check for 'driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel' being non-NULL is hidden in a new abstraction called virSecurityManager. This separates the driver callbacks, from main internal API. The addition of a virSecurityManager object, that is separate from the virSecurityDriver struct also allows for security drivers to carry state / configuration information directly. Thus the DAC/Stack drivers from src/qemu which used to pull config from 'struct qemud_driver' can now be moved into the 'src/security' directory and store their config directly. * src/qemu/qemu_conf.h, src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Update to use new virSecurityManager APIs * src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.h src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.h: Move into src/security directory * src/security/security_stack.c, src/security/security_stack.h, src/security/security_dac.c, src/security/security_dac.h: Generic versions of previous QEMU specific drivers * src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_apparmor.h, src/security/security_driver.c, src/security/security_driver.h, src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_selinux.h: Update to take virSecurityManagerPtr object as the first param in all callbacks * src/security/security_nop.c, src/security/security_nop.h: Stub implementation of all security driver APIs. * src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_manager.c: New internal API for invoking security drivers * src/libvirt.c: Add missing debug for security APIs
2010-11-17 20:26:30 +00:00
ptr->mgr = mgr;
ptr->def = def;
switch ((virDomainHostdevSubsysType)dev->source.subsys.type) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_USB: {
virUSBDevice *usb =
virUSBDeviceNew(usbsrc->bus, usbsrc->device, vroot);
if (!usb)
goto done;
ret = virUSBDeviceFileIterate(usb, AppArmorSetSecurityUSBLabel, ptr);
virUSBDeviceFree(usb);
break;
}
case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_PCI: {
virPCIDevice *pci =
virPCIDeviceNew(&pcisrc->addr);
if (!pci)
goto done;
if (pcisrc->backend == VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_PCI_BACKEND_VFIO) {
char *vfioGroupDev = virPCIDeviceGetIOMMUGroupDev(pci);
if (!vfioGroupDev) {
virPCIDeviceFree(pci);
goto done;
}
ret = AppArmorSetSecurityPCILabel(pci, vfioGroupDev, ptr);
VIR_FREE(vfioGroupDev);
} else {
ret = virPCIDeviceFileIterate(pci, AppArmorSetSecurityPCILabel, ptr);
}
virPCIDeviceFree(pci);
break;
}
case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_SCSI: {
virDomainHostdevSubsysSCSIHost *scsihostsrc = &scsisrc->u.host;
virSCSIDevice *scsi =
virSCSIDeviceNew(NULL,
scsihostsrc->adapter, scsihostsrc->bus,
scsihostsrc->target, scsihostsrc->unit,
dev->readonly, dev->shareable);
if (!scsi)
goto done;
ret = virSCSIDeviceFileIterate(scsi, AppArmorSetSecuritySCSILabel, ptr);
virSCSIDeviceFree(scsi);
break;
}
case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_SCSI_HOST: {
virSCSIVHostDevice *host = virSCSIVHostDeviceNew(hostsrc->wwpn);
if (!host)
goto done;
ret = virSCSIVHostDeviceFileIterate(host,
AppArmorSetSecurityHostLabel,
ptr);
virSCSIVHostDeviceFree(host);
break;
}
case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_MDEV: {
char *vfiodev = NULL;
if (!(vfiodev = virMediatedDeviceGetIOMMUGroupDev(mdevsrc->uuidstr)))
goto done;
ret = AppArmorSetSecurityHostdevLabelHelper(vfiodev, ptr);
VIR_FREE(vfiodev);
break;
}
case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_LAST:
ret = 0;
break;
}
done:
VIR_FREE(ptr);
return ret;
}
static int
AppArmorRestoreSecurityHostdevLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *def,
virDomainHostdevDef *dev G_GNUC_UNUSED,
const char *vroot G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
virSecurityLabelDef *secdef =
virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME);
if (!secdef || !secdef->relabel)
return 0;
return reload_profile(mgr, def, NULL, false);
}
static int
AppArmorSetChardevLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *def,
virDomainChrSourceDef *dev_source,
bool chardevStdioLogd G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
char *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
int ret = -1;
virSecurityLabelDef *secdef;
secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME);
if (!secdef)
return 0;
switch ((virDomainChrType)dev_source->type) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_DEV:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_FILE:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_UNIX:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_PTY:
ret = reload_profile(mgr, def, dev_source->data.file.path, true);
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_PIPE:
in = g_strdup_printf("%s.in", dev_source->data.file.path);
out = g_strdup_printf("%s.out", dev_source->data.file.path);
if (virFileExists(in)) {
if (reload_profile(mgr, def, in, true) < 0)
goto done;
}
if (virFileExists(out)) {
if (reload_profile(mgr, def, out, true) < 0)
goto done;
}
ret = reload_profile(mgr, def, dev_source->data.file.path, true);
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_SPICEPORT:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_NULL:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_VC:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_STDIO:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_UDP:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_TCP:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_SPICEVMC:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_NMDM:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_QEMU_VDAGENT:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_LAST:
ret = 0;
break;
}
done:
VIR_FREE(in);
VIR_FREE(out);
return ret;
}
static int
AppArmorRestoreChardevLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *def,
virDomainChrSourceDef *dev_source G_GNUC_UNUSED,
bool chardevStdioLogd G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
virSecurityLabelDef *secdef;
secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME);
if (!secdef)
return 0;
return reload_profile(mgr, def, NULL, false);
}
static int
AppArmorSetNetdevLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *def,
virDomainNetDef *net)
{
int ret = -1;
virSecurityLabelDef *secdef;
virDomainChrSourceDef *dev_source;
virDomainNetType actualType;
secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME);
if (!secdef)
return 0;
actualType = virDomainNetGetActualType(net);
if (actualType != VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_VHOSTUSER)
return 0;
dev_source = net->data.vhostuser;
switch ((virDomainChrType)dev_source->type) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_UNIX:
ret = reload_profile(mgr, def, dev_source->data.file.path, true);
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_DEV:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_FILE:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_PTY:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_PIPE:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_SPICEPORT:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_NULL:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_VC:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_STDIO:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_UDP:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_TCP:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_SPICEVMC:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_NMDM:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_QEMU_VDAGENT:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_LAST:
ret = 0;
break;
}
return ret;
}
static int
AppArmorRestoreNetdevLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *def,
virDomainNetDef *net G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
virSecurityLabelDef *secdef;
secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME);
if (!secdef)
return 0;
return reload_profile(mgr, def, NULL, false);
}
static int
AppArmorSetPathLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *def,
const char *path,
bool allowSubtree)
{
int rc = -1;
char *full_path = NULL;
if (allowSubtree) {
full_path = g_strdup_printf("%s/{,**}", path);
rc = reload_profile(mgr, def, full_path, true);
VIR_FREE(full_path);
} else {
rc = reload_profile(mgr, def, path, true);
}
return rc;
}
static int
AppArmorRestorePathLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *def,
const char *path G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
return reload_profile(mgr, def, NULL, false);
}
static int
AppArmorSetFDLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *def,
int fd)
{
char *proc = NULL;
char *fd_path = NULL;
virSecurityLabelDef *secdef =
virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME);
if (!secdef || !secdef->imagelabel)
return 0;
proc = g_strdup_printf("/proc/self/fd/%d", fd);
if (virFileResolveLink(proc, &fd_path) < 0) {
/* it's a deleted file, presumably. Ignore? */
VIR_WARN("could not find path for descriptor %s, skipping", proc);
return 0;
}
return reload_profile(mgr, def, fd_path, true);
}
static char *
AppArmorGetMountOptions(virSecurityManager *mgr G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainDef *vm G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
return g_strdup("");
}
static const char *
AppArmorGetBaseLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr G_GNUC_UNUSED,
int virtType G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
return NULL;
}
virSecurityDriver virAppArmorSecurityDriver = {
.privateDataLen = 0,
.name = SECURITY_APPARMOR_NAME,
.probe = AppArmorSecurityManagerProbe,
.open = AppArmorSecurityManagerOpen,
.close = AppArmorSecurityManagerClose,
Refactor the security drivers to simplify usage The current security driver usage requires horrible code like if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) This pair of checks for NULL clutters up the code, making the driver calls 2 lines longer than they really need to be. The goal of the patchset is to change the calling convention to simply if (virSecurityManagerSetHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) The first check for 'driver->securityDriver' being NULL is removed by introducing a 'no op' security driver that will always be present if no real driver is enabled. This guarentees driver->securityDriver != NULL. The second check for 'driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel' being non-NULL is hidden in a new abstraction called virSecurityManager. This separates the driver callbacks, from main internal API. The addition of a virSecurityManager object, that is separate from the virSecurityDriver struct also allows for security drivers to carry state / configuration information directly. Thus the DAC/Stack drivers from src/qemu which used to pull config from 'struct qemud_driver' can now be moved into the 'src/security' directory and store their config directly. * src/qemu/qemu_conf.h, src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Update to use new virSecurityManager APIs * src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.h src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.h: Move into src/security directory * src/security/security_stack.c, src/security/security_stack.h, src/security/security_dac.c, src/security/security_dac.h: Generic versions of previous QEMU specific drivers * src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_apparmor.h, src/security/security_driver.c, src/security/security_driver.h, src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_selinux.h: Update to take virSecurityManagerPtr object as the first param in all callbacks * src/security/security_nop.c, src/security/security_nop.h: Stub implementation of all security driver APIs. * src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_manager.c: New internal API for invoking security drivers * src/libvirt.c: Add missing debug for security APIs
2010-11-17 20:26:30 +00:00
.getModel = AppArmorSecurityManagerGetModel,
.getDOI = AppArmorSecurityManagerGetDOI,
Refactor the security drivers to simplify usage The current security driver usage requires horrible code like if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) This pair of checks for NULL clutters up the code, making the driver calls 2 lines longer than they really need to be. The goal of the patchset is to change the calling convention to simply if (virSecurityManagerSetHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) The first check for 'driver->securityDriver' being NULL is removed by introducing a 'no op' security driver that will always be present if no real driver is enabled. This guarentees driver->securityDriver != NULL. The second check for 'driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel' being non-NULL is hidden in a new abstraction called virSecurityManager. This separates the driver callbacks, from main internal API. The addition of a virSecurityManager object, that is separate from the virSecurityDriver struct also allows for security drivers to carry state / configuration information directly. Thus the DAC/Stack drivers from src/qemu which used to pull config from 'struct qemud_driver' can now be moved into the 'src/security' directory and store their config directly. * src/qemu/qemu_conf.h, src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Update to use new virSecurityManager APIs * src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.h src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.h: Move into src/security directory * src/security/security_stack.c, src/security/security_stack.h, src/security/security_dac.c, src/security/security_dac.h: Generic versions of previous QEMU specific drivers * src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_apparmor.h, src/security/security_driver.c, src/security/security_driver.h, src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_selinux.h: Update to take virSecurityManagerPtr object as the first param in all callbacks * src/security/security_nop.c, src/security/security_nop.h: Stub implementation of all security driver APIs. * src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_manager.c: New internal API for invoking security drivers * src/libvirt.c: Add missing debug for security APIs
2010-11-17 20:26:30 +00:00
.domainSecurityVerify = AppArmorSecurityVerify,
Refactor the security drivers to simplify usage The current security driver usage requires horrible code like if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) This pair of checks for NULL clutters up the code, making the driver calls 2 lines longer than they really need to be. The goal of the patchset is to change the calling convention to simply if (virSecurityManagerSetHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) The first check for 'driver->securityDriver' being NULL is removed by introducing a 'no op' security driver that will always be present if no real driver is enabled. This guarentees driver->securityDriver != NULL. The second check for 'driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel' being non-NULL is hidden in a new abstraction called virSecurityManager. This separates the driver callbacks, from main internal API. The addition of a virSecurityManager object, that is separate from the virSecurityDriver struct also allows for security drivers to carry state / configuration information directly. Thus the DAC/Stack drivers from src/qemu which used to pull config from 'struct qemud_driver' can now be moved into the 'src/security' directory and store their config directly. * src/qemu/qemu_conf.h, src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Update to use new virSecurityManager APIs * src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.h src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.h: Move into src/security directory * src/security/security_stack.c, src/security/security_stack.h, src/security/security_dac.c, src/security/security_dac.h: Generic versions of previous QEMU specific drivers * src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_apparmor.h, src/security/security_driver.c, src/security/security_driver.h, src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_selinux.h: Update to take virSecurityManagerPtr object as the first param in all callbacks * src/security/security_nop.c, src/security/security_nop.h: Stub implementation of all security driver APIs. * src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_manager.c: New internal API for invoking security drivers * src/libvirt.c: Add missing debug for security APIs
2010-11-17 20:26:30 +00:00
.domainSetSecurityImageLabel = AppArmorSetSecurityImageLabel,
.domainRestoreSecurityImageLabel = AppArmorRestoreSecurityImageLabel,
.domainSetSecurityMemoryLabel = AppArmorSetMemoryLabel,
.domainRestoreSecurityMemoryLabel = AppArmorRestoreMemoryLabel,
.domainSetSecurityInputLabel = AppArmorSetInputLabel,
.domainRestoreSecurityInputLabel = AppArmorRestoreInputLabel,
.domainSetSecurityDaemonSocketLabel = AppArmorSetSecurityDaemonSocketLabel,
.domainSetSecuritySocketLabel = AppArmorSetSecuritySocketLabel,
.domainClearSecuritySocketLabel = AppArmorClearSecuritySocketLabel,
Refactor the security drivers to simplify usage The current security driver usage requires horrible code like if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) This pair of checks for NULL clutters up the code, making the driver calls 2 lines longer than they really need to be. The goal of the patchset is to change the calling convention to simply if (virSecurityManagerSetHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) The first check for 'driver->securityDriver' being NULL is removed by introducing a 'no op' security driver that will always be present if no real driver is enabled. This guarentees driver->securityDriver != NULL. The second check for 'driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel' being non-NULL is hidden in a new abstraction called virSecurityManager. This separates the driver callbacks, from main internal API. The addition of a virSecurityManager object, that is separate from the virSecurityDriver struct also allows for security drivers to carry state / configuration information directly. Thus the DAC/Stack drivers from src/qemu which used to pull config from 'struct qemud_driver' can now be moved into the 'src/security' directory and store their config directly. * src/qemu/qemu_conf.h, src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Update to use new virSecurityManager APIs * src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.h src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.h: Move into src/security directory * src/security/security_stack.c, src/security/security_stack.h, src/security/security_dac.c, src/security/security_dac.h: Generic versions of previous QEMU specific drivers * src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_apparmor.h, src/security/security_driver.c, src/security/security_driver.h, src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_selinux.h: Update to take virSecurityManagerPtr object as the first param in all callbacks * src/security/security_nop.c, src/security/security_nop.h: Stub implementation of all security driver APIs. * src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_manager.c: New internal API for invoking security drivers * src/libvirt.c: Add missing debug for security APIs
2010-11-17 20:26:30 +00:00
.domainGenSecurityLabel = AppArmorGenSecurityLabel,
.domainReserveSecurityLabel = AppArmorReserveSecurityLabel,
.domainReleaseSecurityLabel = AppArmorReleaseSecurityLabel,
Refactor the security drivers to simplify usage The current security driver usage requires horrible code like if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) This pair of checks for NULL clutters up the code, making the driver calls 2 lines longer than they really need to be. The goal of the patchset is to change the calling convention to simply if (virSecurityManagerSetHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) The first check for 'driver->securityDriver' being NULL is removed by introducing a 'no op' security driver that will always be present if no real driver is enabled. This guarentees driver->securityDriver != NULL. The second check for 'driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel' being non-NULL is hidden in a new abstraction called virSecurityManager. This separates the driver callbacks, from main internal API. The addition of a virSecurityManager object, that is separate from the virSecurityDriver struct also allows for security drivers to carry state / configuration information directly. Thus the DAC/Stack drivers from src/qemu which used to pull config from 'struct qemud_driver' can now be moved into the 'src/security' directory and store their config directly. * src/qemu/qemu_conf.h, src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Update to use new virSecurityManager APIs * src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.h src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.h: Move into src/security directory * src/security/security_stack.c, src/security/security_stack.h, src/security/security_dac.c, src/security/security_dac.h: Generic versions of previous QEMU specific drivers * src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_apparmor.h, src/security/security_driver.c, src/security/security_driver.h, src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_selinux.h: Update to take virSecurityManagerPtr object as the first param in all callbacks * src/security/security_nop.c, src/security/security_nop.h: Stub implementation of all security driver APIs. * src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_manager.c: New internal API for invoking security drivers * src/libvirt.c: Add missing debug for security APIs
2010-11-17 20:26:30 +00:00
.domainGetSecurityProcessLabel = AppArmorGetSecurityProcessLabel,
.domainSetSecurityProcessLabel = AppArmorSetSecurityProcessLabel,
security: add new virSecurityManagerSetChildProcessLabel API The existing virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() API is designed so that it must be called after forking the child process, but before exec'ing the child. Due to the way the virCommand API works, that means it needs to be put in a "hook" function that virCommand is told to call out to at that time. Setting the child process label is a basic enough need when executing any process that virCommand should have a method of doing that. But virCommand must be told what label to set, and only the security driver knows the answer to that question. The new virSecurityManagerSet*Child*ProcessLabel() API is the way to transfer the knowledge about what label to set from the security driver to the virCommand object. It is given a virCommandPtr, and each security driver calls the appropriate virCommand* API to tell virCommand what to do between fork and exec. 1) in the case of the DAC security driver, it calls virCommandSetUID/GID() to set a uid and gid that must be set for the child process. 2) for the SELinux security driver, it calls virCommandSetSELinuxLabel() to save a copy of the char* that will be sent to setexeccon_raw() *after forking the child process*. 3) for the AppArmor security drivers, it calls virCommandSetAppArmorProfile() to save a copy of the char* that will be sent to aa_change_profile() *after forking the child process*. With this new API in place, we will be able to remove virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() from any virCommand pre-exec hooks. (Unfortunately, the LXC driver uses clone() rather than virCommand, so it can't take advantage of this new security driver API, meaning that we need to keep around the older virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel(), at least for now.)
2013-02-01 15:02:03 -05:00
.domainSetSecurityChildProcessLabel = AppArmorSetSecurityChildProcessLabel,
Refactor the security drivers to simplify usage The current security driver usage requires horrible code like if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) This pair of checks for NULL clutters up the code, making the driver calls 2 lines longer than they really need to be. The goal of the patchset is to change the calling convention to simply if (virSecurityManagerSetHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) The first check for 'driver->securityDriver' being NULL is removed by introducing a 'no op' security driver that will always be present if no real driver is enabled. This guarentees driver->securityDriver != NULL. The second check for 'driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel' being non-NULL is hidden in a new abstraction called virSecurityManager. This separates the driver callbacks, from main internal API. The addition of a virSecurityManager object, that is separate from the virSecurityDriver struct also allows for security drivers to carry state / configuration information directly. Thus the DAC/Stack drivers from src/qemu which used to pull config from 'struct qemud_driver' can now be moved into the 'src/security' directory and store their config directly. * src/qemu/qemu_conf.h, src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Update to use new virSecurityManager APIs * src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.h src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.h: Move into src/security directory * src/security/security_stack.c, src/security/security_stack.h, src/security/security_dac.c, src/security/security_dac.h: Generic versions of previous QEMU specific drivers * src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_apparmor.h, src/security/security_driver.c, src/security/security_driver.h, src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_selinux.h: Update to take virSecurityManagerPtr object as the first param in all callbacks * src/security/security_nop.c, src/security/security_nop.h: Stub implementation of all security driver APIs. * src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_manager.c: New internal API for invoking security drivers * src/libvirt.c: Add missing debug for security APIs
2010-11-17 20:26:30 +00:00
.domainSetSecurityAllLabel = AppArmorSetSecurityAllLabel,
.domainRestoreSecurityAllLabel = AppArmorRestoreSecurityAllLabel,
Refactor the security drivers to simplify usage The current security driver usage requires horrible code like if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) This pair of checks for NULL clutters up the code, making the driver calls 2 lines longer than they really need to be. The goal of the patchset is to change the calling convention to simply if (virSecurityManagerSetHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) The first check for 'driver->securityDriver' being NULL is removed by introducing a 'no op' security driver that will always be present if no real driver is enabled. This guarentees driver->securityDriver != NULL. The second check for 'driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel' being non-NULL is hidden in a new abstraction called virSecurityManager. This separates the driver callbacks, from main internal API. The addition of a virSecurityManager object, that is separate from the virSecurityDriver struct also allows for security drivers to carry state / configuration information directly. Thus the DAC/Stack drivers from src/qemu which used to pull config from 'struct qemud_driver' can now be moved into the 'src/security' directory and store their config directly. * src/qemu/qemu_conf.h, src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Update to use new virSecurityManager APIs * src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.h src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.h: Move into src/security directory * src/security/security_stack.c, src/security/security_stack.h, src/security/security_dac.c, src/security/security_dac.h: Generic versions of previous QEMU specific drivers * src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_apparmor.h, src/security/security_driver.c, src/security/security_driver.h, src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_selinux.h: Update to take virSecurityManagerPtr object as the first param in all callbacks * src/security/security_nop.c, src/security/security_nop.h: Stub implementation of all security driver APIs. * src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_manager.c: New internal API for invoking security drivers * src/libvirt.c: Add missing debug for security APIs
2010-11-17 20:26:30 +00:00
.domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel = AppArmorSetSecurityHostdevLabel,
.domainRestoreSecurityHostdevLabel = AppArmorRestoreSecurityHostdevLabel,
Refactor the security drivers to simplify usage The current security driver usage requires horrible code like if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) This pair of checks for NULL clutters up the code, making the driver calls 2 lines longer than they really need to be. The goal of the patchset is to change the calling convention to simply if (virSecurityManagerSetHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver, vm, hostdev) < 0) The first check for 'driver->securityDriver' being NULL is removed by introducing a 'no op' security driver that will always be present if no real driver is enabled. This guarentees driver->securityDriver != NULL. The second check for 'driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel' being non-NULL is hidden in a new abstraction called virSecurityManager. This separates the driver callbacks, from main internal API. The addition of a virSecurityManager object, that is separate from the virSecurityDriver struct also allows for security drivers to carry state / configuration information directly. Thus the DAC/Stack drivers from src/qemu which used to pull config from 'struct qemud_driver' can now be moved into the 'src/security' directory and store their config directly. * src/qemu/qemu_conf.h, src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Update to use new virSecurityManager APIs * src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.h src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.h: Move into src/security directory * src/security/security_stack.c, src/security/security_stack.h, src/security/security_dac.c, src/security/security_dac.h: Generic versions of previous QEMU specific drivers * src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_apparmor.h, src/security/security_driver.c, src/security/security_driver.h, src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_selinux.h: Update to take virSecurityManagerPtr object as the first param in all callbacks * src/security/security_nop.c, src/security/security_nop.h: Stub implementation of all security driver APIs. * src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_manager.c: New internal API for invoking security drivers * src/libvirt.c: Add missing debug for security APIs
2010-11-17 20:26:30 +00:00
.domainSetPathLabel = AppArmorSetPathLabel,
.domainRestorePathLabel = AppArmorRestorePathLabel,
.domainSetSecurityChardevLabel = AppArmorSetChardevLabel,
.domainRestoreSecurityChardevLabel = AppArmorRestoreChardevLabel,
.domainSetSecurityNetdevLabel = AppArmorSetNetdevLabel,
.domainRestoreSecurityNetdevLabel = AppArmorRestoreNetdevLabel,
.domainSetSecurityImageFDLabel = AppArmorSetFDLabel,
.domainSetSecurityTapFDLabel = AppArmorSetFDLabel,
.domainGetSecurityMountOptions = AppArmorGetMountOptions,
.getBaseLabel = AppArmorGetBaseLabel,
};