2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
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/*
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2018-02-20 13:16:28 +00:00
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* remote_daemon.c: daemon start of day, guest process & i/o management
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2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
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*
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2018-02-20 13:16:28 +00:00
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* Copyright (C) 2006-2018 Red Hat, Inc.
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2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
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* Copyright (C) 2006 Daniel P. Berrange
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*
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* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
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* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
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* version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
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* Lesser General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
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2012-09-20 22:30:55 +00:00
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* License along with this library. If not, see
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2012-07-21 10:06:23 +00:00
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* <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
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*/
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2008-01-29 18:15:54 +00:00
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#include <config.h>
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2007-02-14 15:42:55 +00:00
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2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
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#include <unistd.h>
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|
|
|
#include <fcntl.h>
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/wait.h>
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|
|
|
#include <sys/stat.h>
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <getopt.h>
|
2007-09-19 02:28:01 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <grp.h>
|
2007-04-10 23:17:46 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-11-04 23:22:06 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "libvirt_internal.h"
|
2012-12-13 18:21:53 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "virerror.h"
|
2011-07-19 18:32:58 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "virfile.h"
|
2014-02-28 12:16:17 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "virlog.h"
|
2011-08-05 14:11:11 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "virpidfile.h"
|
2012-09-24 17:10:37 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "virprocess.h"
|
Standardize use of header files, making internal.h primary.
* qemud/internal.h, qemud/qemud.h: Rename this file so it
doesn't conflict with src/internal.h.
* HACKING: Document how header files should be used.
* qemud/Makefile.am: Add src/ directory to includes.
* qemud/event.c, qemud/mdns.c, qemud/qemud.c, qemud/remote.c,
qemud/remote_protocol.c, qemud/remote_protocol.h,
qemud/remote_protocol.x, src/buf.c, src/libvirt.c,
src/nodeinfo.c, src/qemu_conf.c, src/qemu_driver.c,
src/stats_linux.c, src/storage_backend.c, src/storage_backend_fs.c,
src/storage_backend_iscsi.c, src/storage_backend_logical.c,
src/storage_conf.c, src/storage_driver.c, src/util.c,
src/util.h, src/virsh.c, src/virterror.c, src/xend_internal.c,
src/xml.c, tests/reconnect.c, tests/xmlrpctest.c,
tests/qparamtest.c: Standardize use of header files.
* docs/*, po/*: Rebuild docs.
2008-05-23 08:24:41 +00:00
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|
|
2009-02-09 17:52:38 +00:00
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|
#define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_QEMU
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|
2018-02-20 13:16:28 +00:00
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#include "remote_daemon.h"
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|
#include "remote_daemon_config.h"
|
2009-07-10 11:20:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-01-19 11:30:31 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "admin/admin_server_dispatch.h"
|
2012-12-13 18:01:25 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "viruuid.h"
|
2009-09-16 15:55:16 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "remote_driver.h"
|
2012-12-12 18:06:53 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "viralloc.h"
|
2012-12-12 16:35:35 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "virconf.h"
|
2012-02-22 13:17:13 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "virnetlink.h"
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "virnetdaemon.h"
|
2018-02-20 13:16:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "remote_daemon_dispatch.h"
|
2012-12-12 17:00:34 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "virhook.h"
|
2011-07-11 19:42:15 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "viraudit.h"
|
2013-04-03 10:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "virstring.h"
|
2013-04-17 11:01:24 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "locking/lock_manager.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "viraccessmanager.h"
|
2014-07-15 13:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "virutil.h"
|
2016-04-12 22:29:52 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "virgettext.h"
|
2017-02-07 15:16:44 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "util/virnetdevopenvswitch.h"
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "virsystemd.h"
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-07-26 19:31:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "driver.h"
|
2008-11-17 12:18:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2010-11-16 14:54:17 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "configmake.h"
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-31 19:03:57 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "virdbus.h"
|
|
|
|
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_LOG_INIT("daemon." DAEMON_NAME);
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|
|
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|
#ifndef SOCK_PREFIX
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|
# define SOCK_PREFIX DAEMON_NAME
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|
|
|
#endif
|
2014-02-28 12:16:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-09-20 11:58:29 +00:00
|
|
|
#if WITH_SASL
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
virNetSASLContextPtr saslCtxt = NULL;
|
2011-06-30 17:18:08 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
virNetServerProgramPtr remoteProgram = NULL;
|
|
|
|
virNetServerProgramPtr qemuProgram = NULL;
|
2007-06-11 12:04:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-12-03 10:27:22 +00:00
|
|
|
volatile bool driversInitialized = false;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-10-16 11:14:54 +00:00
|
|
|
enum {
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|
|
|
VIR_DAEMON_ERR_NONE = 0,
|
|
|
|
VIR_DAEMON_ERR_PIDFILE,
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|
|
|
VIR_DAEMON_ERR_RUNDIR,
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|
|
|
VIR_DAEMON_ERR_INIT,
|
|
|
|
VIR_DAEMON_ERR_SIGNAL,
|
|
|
|
VIR_DAEMON_ERR_PRIVS,
|
|
|
|
VIR_DAEMON_ERR_NETWORK,
|
|
|
|
VIR_DAEMON_ERR_CONFIG,
|
2010-03-26 14:53:32 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_DAEMON_ERR_HOOKS,
|
2010-09-15 13:44:11 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_DAEMON_ERR_AUDIT,
|
2018-04-19 16:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_DAEMON_ERR_DRIVER,
|
2009-10-16 11:14:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
VIR_DAEMON_ERR_LAST
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|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2019-01-20 16:04:56 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDaemonErr);
|
2019-03-16 18:20:32 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_ENUM_IMPL(virDaemonErr,
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|
|
|
VIR_DAEMON_ERR_LAST,
|
2009-10-16 11:14:54 +00:00
|
|
|
"Initialization successful",
|
|
|
|
"Unable to obtain pidfile",
|
|
|
|
"Unable to create rundir",
|
|
|
|
"Unable to initialize libvirt",
|
|
|
|
"Unable to setup signal handlers",
|
|
|
|
"Unable to drop privileges",
|
|
|
|
"Unable to initialize network sockets",
|
2010-03-26 14:53:32 +00:00
|
|
|
"Unable to load configuration file",
|
2010-09-15 13:44:11 +00:00
|
|
|
"Unable to look for hook scripts",
|
2018-04-19 16:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
"Unable to initialize audit system",
|
2019-01-20 16:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
"Unable to initialize driver",
|
|
|
|
);
|
2009-10-16 11:14:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
static int daemonForkIntoBackground(const char *argv0)
|
2007-06-11 12:04:54 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-10-16 11:14:54 +00:00
|
|
|
int statuspipe[2];
|
|
|
|
if (pipe(statuspipe) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
build: use correct type for pid and similar types
No thanks to 64-bit windows, with 64-bit pid_t, we have to avoid
constructs like 'int pid'. Our API in libvirt-qemu cannot be
changed without breaking ABI; but then again, libvirt-qemu can
only be used on systems that support UNIX sockets, which rules
out Windows (even if qemu could be compiled there) - so for all
points on the call chain that interact with this API decision,
we require a different variable name to make it clear that we
audited the use for safety.
Adding a syntax-check rule only solves half the battle; anywhere
that uses printf on a pid_t still needs to be converted, but that
will be a separate patch.
* cfg.mk (sc_correct_id_types): New syntax check.
* src/libvirt-qemu.c (virDomainQemuAttach): Document why we didn't
use pid_t for pid, and validate for overflow.
* include/libvirt/libvirt-qemu.h (virDomainQemuAttach): Tweak name
for syntax check.
* src/vmware/vmware_conf.c (vmwareExtractPid): Likewise.
* src/driver.h (virDrvDomainQemuAttach): Likewise.
* tools/virsh.c (cmdQemuAttach): Likewise.
* src/remote/qemu_protocol.x (qemu_domain_attach_args): Likewise.
* src/qemu_protocol-structs (qemu_domain_attach_args): Likewise.
* src/util/cgroup.c (virCgroupPidCode, virCgroupKillInternal):
Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_command.c(qemuParseProcFileStrings): Likewise.
(qemuParseCommandLinePid): Use pid_t for pid.
* daemon/libvirtd.c (daemonForkIntoBackground): Likewise.
* src/conf/domain_conf.h (_virDomainObj): Likewise.
* src/probes.d (rpc_socket_new): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_command.h (qemuParseCommandLinePid): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemudGetProcessInfo, qemuDomainAttach):
Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c (qemuProcessAttach): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_process.h (qemuProcessAttach): Likewise.
* src/uml/uml_driver.c (umlGetProcessInfo): Likewise.
* src/util/virnetdev.h (virNetDevSetNamespace): Likewise.
* src/util/virnetdev.c (virNetDevSetNamespace): Likewise.
* tests/testutils.c (virtTestCaptureProgramOutput): Likewise.
* src/conf/storage_conf.h (_virStoragePerms): Use mode_t, uid_t,
and gid_t rather than int.
* src/security/security_dac.c (virSecurityDACSetOwnership): Likewise.
* src/conf/storage_conf.c (virStorageDefParsePerms): Avoid
compiler warning.
2012-02-10 23:08:11 +00:00
|
|
|
pid_t pid = fork();
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (pid) {
|
|
|
|
case 0:
|
|
|
|
{
|
daemon: clean up daemonization
Valgrind detected a pipe fd leak before the parent exits on success,
introduced in commit 4296cea; by itself, the leak is not bad, since
we immediately called _exit(), but we might as well be clean to make
valgrind analysis easier. Meanwhile, if the daemon grandchild detects
an error, the parent failed to flush the error message before exiting.
Also, we had the possibility of both parent and child returning to the
caller, such that the user could see duplicated reports of failure
from the two return paths. And we might as well be robust to the
(unlikely) situation of being started with stdin closed.
* daemon/libvirtd.c (daemonForkIntoBackground): Use exit if an
error message was generated, avoid fd leaks for valgrind's sake,
avoid returning to caller in both parent and child, and don't
close a just-dup'd stdin.
Based on a report by Alex Jia.
* How to reproduce?
% service libvirtd stop
% valgrind -v --track-fds=yes /usr/sbin/libvirtd --daemon
* Actual valgrind result:
==16804== FILE DESCRIPTORS: 7 open at exit.
==16804== Open file descriptor 7:
==16804== at 0x321FAD8B87: pipe (in /lib64/libc-2.12.so)
==16804== by 0x41F34D: daemonForkIntoBackground (libvirtd.c:186)
==16804== by 0x4207A0: main (libvirtd.c:1420)
Signed-off-by: Alex Jia <ajia@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2011-12-22 08:28:04 +00:00
|
|
|
/* intermediate child */
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
int stdinfd = -1;
|
|
|
|
int stdoutfd = -1;
|
2007-02-16 18:26:18 +00:00
|
|
|
int nextpid;
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2010-11-09 20:48:48 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(statuspipe[0]);
|
2009-10-16 11:14:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-09-11 20:58:40 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((stdinfd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY)) <= STDERR_FILENO)
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2014-09-11 20:58:40 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((stdoutfd = open("/dev/null", O_WRONLY)) <= STDERR_FILENO)
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
if (dup2(stdinfd, STDIN_FILENO) != STDIN_FILENO)
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
if (dup2(stdoutfd, STDOUT_FILENO) != STDOUT_FILENO)
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
if (dup2(stdoutfd, STDERR_FILENO) != STDERR_FILENO)
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2014-09-11 20:58:40 +00:00
|
|
|
if (VIR_CLOSE(stdinfd) < 0)
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2014-09-11 20:58:40 +00:00
|
|
|
if (VIR_CLOSE(stdoutfd) < 0)
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (setsid() < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
nextpid = fork();
|
|
|
|
switch (nextpid) {
|
daemon: clean up daemonization
Valgrind detected a pipe fd leak before the parent exits on success,
introduced in commit 4296cea; by itself, the leak is not bad, since
we immediately called _exit(), but we might as well be clean to make
valgrind analysis easier. Meanwhile, if the daemon grandchild detects
an error, the parent failed to flush the error message before exiting.
Also, we had the possibility of both parent and child returning to the
caller, such that the user could see duplicated reports of failure
from the two return paths. And we might as well be robust to the
(unlikely) situation of being started with stdin closed.
* daemon/libvirtd.c (daemonForkIntoBackground): Use exit if an
error message was generated, avoid fd leaks for valgrind's sake,
avoid returning to caller in both parent and child, and don't
close a just-dup'd stdin.
Based on a report by Alex Jia.
* How to reproduce?
% service libvirtd stop
% valgrind -v --track-fds=yes /usr/sbin/libvirtd --daemon
* Actual valgrind result:
==16804== FILE DESCRIPTORS: 7 open at exit.
==16804== Open file descriptor 7:
==16804== at 0x321FAD8B87: pipe (in /lib64/libc-2.12.so)
==16804== by 0x41F34D: daemonForkIntoBackground (libvirtd.c:186)
==16804== by 0x4207A0: main (libvirtd.c:1420)
Signed-off-by: Alex Jia <ajia@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2011-12-22 08:28:04 +00:00
|
|
|
case 0: /* grandchild */
|
2009-10-16 11:14:54 +00:00
|
|
|
return statuspipe[1];
|
daemon: clean up daemonization
Valgrind detected a pipe fd leak before the parent exits on success,
introduced in commit 4296cea; by itself, the leak is not bad, since
we immediately called _exit(), but we might as well be clean to make
valgrind analysis easier. Meanwhile, if the daemon grandchild detects
an error, the parent failed to flush the error message before exiting.
Also, we had the possibility of both parent and child returning to the
caller, such that the user could see duplicated reports of failure
from the two return paths. And we might as well be robust to the
(unlikely) situation of being started with stdin closed.
* daemon/libvirtd.c (daemonForkIntoBackground): Use exit if an
error message was generated, avoid fd leaks for valgrind's sake,
avoid returning to caller in both parent and child, and don't
close a just-dup'd stdin.
Based on a report by Alex Jia.
* How to reproduce?
% service libvirtd stop
% valgrind -v --track-fds=yes /usr/sbin/libvirtd --daemon
* Actual valgrind result:
==16804== FILE DESCRIPTORS: 7 open at exit.
==16804== Open file descriptor 7:
==16804== at 0x321FAD8B87: pipe (in /lib64/libc-2.12.so)
==16804== by 0x41F34D: daemonForkIntoBackground (libvirtd.c:186)
==16804== by 0x4207A0: main (libvirtd.c:1420)
Signed-off-by: Alex Jia <ajia@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2011-12-22 08:28:04 +00:00
|
|
|
case -1: /* error */
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
default: /* intermediate child succeeded */
|
|
|
|
_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
2010-11-09 20:48:48 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(stdoutfd);
|
|
|
|
VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(stdinfd);
|
daemon: clean up daemonization
Valgrind detected a pipe fd leak before the parent exits on success,
introduced in commit 4296cea; by itself, the leak is not bad, since
we immediately called _exit(), but we might as well be clean to make
valgrind analysis easier. Meanwhile, if the daemon grandchild detects
an error, the parent failed to flush the error message before exiting.
Also, we had the possibility of both parent and child returning to the
caller, such that the user could see duplicated reports of failure
from the two return paths. And we might as well be robust to the
(unlikely) situation of being started with stdin closed.
* daemon/libvirtd.c (daemonForkIntoBackground): Use exit if an
error message was generated, avoid fd leaks for valgrind's sake,
avoid returning to caller in both parent and child, and don't
close a just-dup'd stdin.
Based on a report by Alex Jia.
* How to reproduce?
% service libvirtd stop
% valgrind -v --track-fds=yes /usr/sbin/libvirtd --daemon
* Actual valgrind result:
==16804== FILE DESCRIPTORS: 7 open at exit.
==16804== Open file descriptor 7:
==16804== at 0x321FAD8B87: pipe (in /lib64/libc-2.12.so)
==16804== by 0x41F34D: daemonForkIntoBackground (libvirtd.c:186)
==16804== by 0x4207A0: main (libvirtd.c:1420)
Signed-off-by: Alex Jia <ajia@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2011-12-22 08:28:04 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(statuspipe[1]);
|
|
|
|
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
daemon: clean up daemonization
Valgrind detected a pipe fd leak before the parent exits on success,
introduced in commit 4296cea; by itself, the leak is not bad, since
we immediately called _exit(), but we might as well be clean to make
valgrind analysis easier. Meanwhile, if the daemon grandchild detects
an error, the parent failed to flush the error message before exiting.
Also, we had the possibility of both parent and child returning to the
caller, such that the user could see duplicated reports of failure
from the two return paths. And we might as well be robust to the
(unlikely) situation of being started with stdin closed.
* daemon/libvirtd.c (daemonForkIntoBackground): Use exit if an
error message was generated, avoid fd leaks for valgrind's sake,
avoid returning to caller in both parent and child, and don't
close a just-dup'd stdin.
Based on a report by Alex Jia.
* How to reproduce?
% service libvirtd stop
% valgrind -v --track-fds=yes /usr/sbin/libvirtd --daemon
* Actual valgrind result:
==16804== FILE DESCRIPTORS: 7 open at exit.
==16804== Open file descriptor 7:
==16804== at 0x321FAD8B87: pipe (in /lib64/libc-2.12.so)
==16804== by 0x41F34D: daemonForkIntoBackground (libvirtd.c:186)
==16804== by 0x4207A0: main (libvirtd.c:1420)
Signed-off-by: Alex Jia <ajia@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2011-12-22 08:28:04 +00:00
|
|
|
case -1: /* error in parent */
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
{
|
daemon: clean up daemonization
Valgrind detected a pipe fd leak before the parent exits on success,
introduced in commit 4296cea; by itself, the leak is not bad, since
we immediately called _exit(), but we might as well be clean to make
valgrind analysis easier. Meanwhile, if the daemon grandchild detects
an error, the parent failed to flush the error message before exiting.
Also, we had the possibility of both parent and child returning to the
caller, such that the user could see duplicated reports of failure
from the two return paths. And we might as well be robust to the
(unlikely) situation of being started with stdin closed.
* daemon/libvirtd.c (daemonForkIntoBackground): Use exit if an
error message was generated, avoid fd leaks for valgrind's sake,
avoid returning to caller in both parent and child, and don't
close a just-dup'd stdin.
Based on a report by Alex Jia.
* How to reproduce?
% service libvirtd stop
% valgrind -v --track-fds=yes /usr/sbin/libvirtd --daemon
* Actual valgrind result:
==16804== FILE DESCRIPTORS: 7 open at exit.
==16804== Open file descriptor 7:
==16804== at 0x321FAD8B87: pipe (in /lib64/libc-2.12.so)
==16804== by 0x41F34D: daemonForkIntoBackground (libvirtd.c:186)
==16804== by 0x4207A0: main (libvirtd.c:1420)
Signed-off-by: Alex Jia <ajia@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2011-12-22 08:28:04 +00:00
|
|
|
/* parent */
|
2009-10-16 11:14:54 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
char status;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-11-09 20:48:48 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(statuspipe[1]);
|
2009-10-16 11:14:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We wait to make sure the first child forked successfully */
|
2014-02-20 03:23:44 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virProcessWait(pid, NULL, false) < 0)
|
daemon: clean up daemonization
Valgrind detected a pipe fd leak before the parent exits on success,
introduced in commit 4296cea; by itself, the leak is not bad, since
we immediately called _exit(), but we might as well be clean to make
valgrind analysis easier. Meanwhile, if the daemon grandchild detects
an error, the parent failed to flush the error message before exiting.
Also, we had the possibility of both parent and child returning to the
caller, such that the user could see duplicated reports of failure
from the two return paths. And we might as well be robust to the
(unlikely) situation of being started with stdin closed.
* daemon/libvirtd.c (daemonForkIntoBackground): Use exit if an
error message was generated, avoid fd leaks for valgrind's sake,
avoid returning to caller in both parent and child, and don't
close a just-dup'd stdin.
Based on a report by Alex Jia.
* How to reproduce?
% service libvirtd stop
% valgrind -v --track-fds=yes /usr/sbin/libvirtd --daemon
* Actual valgrind result:
==16804== FILE DESCRIPTORS: 7 open at exit.
==16804== Open file descriptor 7:
==16804== at 0x321FAD8B87: pipe (in /lib64/libc-2.12.so)
==16804== by 0x41F34D: daemonForkIntoBackground (libvirtd.c:186)
==16804== by 0x4207A0: main (libvirtd.c:1420)
Signed-off-by: Alex Jia <ajia@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2011-12-22 08:28:04 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2009-10-16 11:14:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
daemon: clean up daemonization
Valgrind detected a pipe fd leak before the parent exits on success,
introduced in commit 4296cea; by itself, the leak is not bad, since
we immediately called _exit(), but we might as well be clean to make
valgrind analysis easier. Meanwhile, if the daemon grandchild detects
an error, the parent failed to flush the error message before exiting.
Also, we had the possibility of both parent and child returning to the
caller, such that the user could see duplicated reports of failure
from the two return paths. And we might as well be robust to the
(unlikely) situation of being started with stdin closed.
* daemon/libvirtd.c (daemonForkIntoBackground): Use exit if an
error message was generated, avoid fd leaks for valgrind's sake,
avoid returning to caller in both parent and child, and don't
close a just-dup'd stdin.
Based on a report by Alex Jia.
* How to reproduce?
% service libvirtd stop
% valgrind -v --track-fds=yes /usr/sbin/libvirtd --daemon
* Actual valgrind result:
==16804== FILE DESCRIPTORS: 7 open at exit.
==16804== Open file descriptor 7:
==16804== at 0x321FAD8B87: pipe (in /lib64/libc-2.12.so)
==16804== by 0x41F34D: daemonForkIntoBackground (libvirtd.c:186)
==16804== by 0x4207A0: main (libvirtd.c:1420)
Signed-off-by: Alex Jia <ajia@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2011-12-22 08:28:04 +00:00
|
|
|
/* If we get here, then the grandchild was spawned, so we
|
|
|
|
* must exit. Block until the second child initializes
|
|
|
|
* successfully */
|
2009-10-16 11:14:54 +00:00
|
|
|
again:
|
|
|
|
ret = read(statuspipe[0], &status, 1);
|
|
|
|
if (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR)
|
|
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
|
daemon: clean up daemonization
Valgrind detected a pipe fd leak before the parent exits on success,
introduced in commit 4296cea; by itself, the leak is not bad, since
we immediately called _exit(), but we might as well be clean to make
valgrind analysis easier. Meanwhile, if the daemon grandchild detects
an error, the parent failed to flush the error message before exiting.
Also, we had the possibility of both parent and child returning to the
caller, such that the user could see duplicated reports of failure
from the two return paths. And we might as well be robust to the
(unlikely) situation of being started with stdin closed.
* daemon/libvirtd.c (daemonForkIntoBackground): Use exit if an
error message was generated, avoid fd leaks for valgrind's sake,
avoid returning to caller in both parent and child, and don't
close a just-dup'd stdin.
Based on a report by Alex Jia.
* How to reproduce?
% service libvirtd stop
% valgrind -v --track-fds=yes /usr/sbin/libvirtd --daemon
* Actual valgrind result:
==16804== FILE DESCRIPTORS: 7 open at exit.
==16804== Open file descriptor 7:
==16804== at 0x321FAD8B87: pipe (in /lib64/libc-2.12.so)
==16804== by 0x41F34D: daemonForkIntoBackground (libvirtd.c:186)
==16804== by 0x4207A0: main (libvirtd.c:1420)
Signed-off-by: Alex Jia <ajia@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2011-12-22 08:28:04 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(statuspipe[0]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 1) {
|
|
|
|
char ebuf[1024];
|
|
|
|
|
2010-02-24 16:29:35 +00:00
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr,
|
daemon: clean up daemonization
Valgrind detected a pipe fd leak before the parent exits on success,
introduced in commit 4296cea; by itself, the leak is not bad, since
we immediately called _exit(), but we might as well be clean to make
valgrind analysis easier. Meanwhile, if the daemon grandchild detects
an error, the parent failed to flush the error message before exiting.
Also, we had the possibility of both parent and child returning to the
caller, such that the user could see duplicated reports of failure
from the two return paths. And we might as well be robust to the
(unlikely) situation of being started with stdin closed.
* daemon/libvirtd.c (daemonForkIntoBackground): Use exit if an
error message was generated, avoid fd leaks for valgrind's sake,
avoid returning to caller in both parent and child, and don't
close a just-dup'd stdin.
Based on a report by Alex Jia.
* How to reproduce?
% service libvirtd stop
% valgrind -v --track-fds=yes /usr/sbin/libvirtd --daemon
* Actual valgrind result:
==16804== FILE DESCRIPTORS: 7 open at exit.
==16804== Open file descriptor 7:
==16804== at 0x321FAD8B87: pipe (in /lib64/libc-2.12.so)
==16804== by 0x41F34D: daemonForkIntoBackground (libvirtd.c:186)
==16804== by 0x4207A0: main (libvirtd.c:1420)
Signed-off-by: Alex Jia <ajia@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2011-12-22 08:28:04 +00:00
|
|
|
_("%s: error: unable to determine if daemon is "
|
|
|
|
"running: %s\n"), argv0,
|
|
|
|
virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof(ebuf)));
|
|
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
} else if (status != 0) {
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr,
|
|
|
|
_("%s: error: %s. Check /var/log/messages or run "
|
|
|
|
"without --daemon for more info.\n"), argv0,
|
2010-02-24 16:29:35 +00:00
|
|
|
virDaemonErrTypeToString(status));
|
daemon: clean up daemonization
Valgrind detected a pipe fd leak before the parent exits on success,
introduced in commit 4296cea; by itself, the leak is not bad, since
we immediately called _exit(), but we might as well be clean to make
valgrind analysis easier. Meanwhile, if the daemon grandchild detects
an error, the parent failed to flush the error message before exiting.
Also, we had the possibility of both parent and child returning to the
caller, such that the user could see duplicated reports of failure
from the two return paths. And we might as well be robust to the
(unlikely) situation of being started with stdin closed.
* daemon/libvirtd.c (daemonForkIntoBackground): Use exit if an
error message was generated, avoid fd leaks for valgrind's sake,
avoid returning to caller in both parent and child, and don't
close a just-dup'd stdin.
Based on a report by Alex Jia.
* How to reproduce?
% service libvirtd stop
% valgrind -v --track-fds=yes /usr/sbin/libvirtd --daemon
* Actual valgrind result:
==16804== FILE DESCRIPTORS: 7 open at exit.
==16804== Open file descriptor 7:
==16804== at 0x321FAD8B87: pipe (in /lib64/libc-2.12.so)
==16804== by 0x41F34D: daemonForkIntoBackground (libvirtd.c:186)
==16804== by 0x4207A0: main (libvirtd.c:1420)
Signed-off-by: Alex Jia <ajia@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2011-12-22 08:28:04 +00:00
|
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
2009-10-16 11:14:54 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
daemon: clean up daemonization
Valgrind detected a pipe fd leak before the parent exits on success,
introduced in commit 4296cea; by itself, the leak is not bad, since
we immediately called _exit(), but we might as well be clean to make
valgrind analysis easier. Meanwhile, if the daemon grandchild detects
an error, the parent failed to flush the error message before exiting.
Also, we had the possibility of both parent and child returning to the
caller, such that the user could see duplicated reports of failure
from the two return paths. And we might as well be robust to the
(unlikely) situation of being started with stdin closed.
* daemon/libvirtd.c (daemonForkIntoBackground): Use exit if an
error message was generated, avoid fd leaks for valgrind's sake,
avoid returning to caller in both parent and child, and don't
close a just-dup'd stdin.
Based on a report by Alex Jia.
* How to reproduce?
% service libvirtd stop
% valgrind -v --track-fds=yes /usr/sbin/libvirtd --daemon
* Actual valgrind result:
==16804== FILE DESCRIPTORS: 7 open at exit.
==16804== Open file descriptor 7:
==16804== at 0x321FAD8B87: pipe (in /lib64/libc-2.12.so)
==16804== by 0x41F34D: daemonForkIntoBackground (libvirtd.c:186)
==16804== by 0x4207A0: main (libvirtd.c:1420)
Signed-off-by: Alex Jia <ajia@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2011-12-22 08:28:04 +00:00
|
|
|
_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
daemon: clean up daemonization
Valgrind detected a pipe fd leak before the parent exits on success,
introduced in commit 4296cea; by itself, the leak is not bad, since
we immediately called _exit(), but we might as well be clean to make
valgrind analysis easier. Meanwhile, if the daemon grandchild detects
an error, the parent failed to flush the error message before exiting.
Also, we had the possibility of both parent and child returning to the
caller, such that the user could see duplicated reports of failure
from the two return paths. And we might as well be robust to the
(unlikely) situation of being started with stdin closed.
* daemon/libvirtd.c (daemonForkIntoBackground): Use exit if an
error message was generated, avoid fd leaks for valgrind's sake,
avoid returning to caller in both parent and child, and don't
close a just-dup'd stdin.
Based on a report by Alex Jia.
* How to reproduce?
% service libvirtd stop
% valgrind -v --track-fds=yes /usr/sbin/libvirtd --daemon
* Actual valgrind result:
==16804== FILE DESCRIPTORS: 7 open at exit.
==16804== Open file descriptor 7:
==16804== at 0x321FAD8B87: pipe (in /lib64/libc-2.12.so)
==16804== by 0x41F34D: daemonForkIntoBackground (libvirtd.c:186)
==16804== by 0x4207A0: main (libvirtd.c:1420)
Signed-off-by: Alex Jia <ajia@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2011-12-22 08:28:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-03-25 06:45:38 +00:00
|
|
|
error:
|
daemon: clean up daemonization
Valgrind detected a pipe fd leak before the parent exits on success,
introduced in commit 4296cea; by itself, the leak is not bad, since
we immediately called _exit(), but we might as well be clean to make
valgrind analysis easier. Meanwhile, if the daemon grandchild detects
an error, the parent failed to flush the error message before exiting.
Also, we had the possibility of both parent and child returning to the
caller, such that the user could see duplicated reports of failure
from the two return paths. And we might as well be robust to the
(unlikely) situation of being started with stdin closed.
* daemon/libvirtd.c (daemonForkIntoBackground): Use exit if an
error message was generated, avoid fd leaks for valgrind's sake,
avoid returning to caller in both parent and child, and don't
close a just-dup'd stdin.
Based on a report by Alex Jia.
* How to reproduce?
% service libvirtd stop
% valgrind -v --track-fds=yes /usr/sbin/libvirtd --daemon
* Actual valgrind result:
==16804== FILE DESCRIPTORS: 7 open at exit.
==16804== Open file descriptor 7:
==16804== at 0x321FAD8B87: pipe (in /lib64/libc-2.12.so)
==16804== by 0x41F34D: daemonForkIntoBackground (libvirtd.c:186)
==16804== by 0x4207A0: main (libvirtd.c:1420)
Signed-off-by: Alex Jia <ajia@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2011-12-22 08:28:04 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(statuspipe[0]);
|
|
|
|
VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(statuspipe[1]);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-06-11 12:04:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
daemonUnixSocketPaths(struct daemonConfig *config,
|
|
|
|
bool privileged,
|
|
|
|
char **sockfile,
|
2015-04-15 14:23:55 +00:00
|
|
|
char **rosockfile,
|
|
|
|
char **admsockfile)
|
2009-01-22 17:49:41 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-05-03 06:01:14 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
char *rundir = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
if (config->unix_sock_dir) {
|
2019-07-18 11:30:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virAsprintf(sockfile, "%s/%s-sock",
|
|
|
|
SOCK_PREFIX, config->unix_sock_dir) < 0)
|
2017-05-03 06:01:14 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2015-04-15 14:23:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (privileged) {
|
2019-07-18 11:30:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virAsprintf(rosockfile, "%s/%s-sock-ro",
|
|
|
|
SOCK_PREFIX, config->unix_sock_dir) < 0 ||
|
|
|
|
virAsprintf(admsockfile, "%s/%s-admin-sock",
|
|
|
|
SOCK_PREFIX, config->unix_sock_dir) < 0)
|
2017-05-03 06:01:14 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2015-04-15 14:23:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-10-16 10:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
if (privileged) {
|
2019-08-20 15:05:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virAsprintf(sockfile, "%s/libvirt/%s-sock",
|
|
|
|
RUNSTATEDIR, SOCK_PREFIX) < 0 ||
|
|
|
|
virAsprintf(rosockfile, "%s/libvirt/%s-sock-ro",
|
|
|
|
RUNSTATEDIR, SOCK_PREFIX) < 0 ||
|
|
|
|
virAsprintf(admsockfile, "%s/libvirt/%s-admin-sock",
|
|
|
|
RUNSTATEDIR, SOCK_PREFIX) < 0)
|
2017-05-03 06:01:14 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2012-05-03 16:36:27 +00:00
|
|
|
mode_t old_umask;
|
2007-02-16 18:30:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-05-24 12:29:42 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!(rundir = virGetUserRuntimeDirectory()))
|
2017-05-03 06:01:14 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2007-06-11 12:04:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-05-03 16:36:27 +00:00
|
|
|
old_umask = umask(077);
|
|
|
|
if (virFileMakePath(rundir) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
umask(old_umask);
|
2017-05-03 06:01:14 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2012-05-03 16:36:27 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
umask(old_umask);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-07-18 11:30:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virAsprintf(sockfile, "%s/%s-sock",
|
|
|
|
rundir, SOCK_PREFIX) < 0 ||
|
|
|
|
virAsprintf(admsockfile, "%s/%s-admin-sock",
|
|
|
|
rundir, SOCK_PREFIX) < 0)
|
2017-05-03 06:01:14 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-02-16 18:30:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-05-03 06:01:14 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
|
|
VIR_FREE(rundir);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void daemonErrorHandler(void *opaque ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
|
|
|
|
virErrorPtr err ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
|
2009-10-19 17:28:28 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Don't do anything, since logging infrastructure already
|
|
|
|
* took care of reporting the error */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-01-21 17:25:01 +00:00
|
|
|
static int daemonErrorLogFilter(virErrorPtr err, int priority)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* These error codes don't really reflect real errors. They
|
|
|
|
* are expected events that occur when an app tries to check
|
|
|
|
* whether a particular guest already exists. This filters
|
|
|
|
* them to a lower log level to prevent pollution of syslog
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
switch (err->code) {
|
|
|
|
case VIR_ERR_NO_DOMAIN:
|
|
|
|
case VIR_ERR_NO_NETWORK:
|
|
|
|
case VIR_ERR_NO_STORAGE_POOL:
|
|
|
|
case VIR_ERR_NO_STORAGE_VOL:
|
|
|
|
case VIR_ERR_NO_NODE_DEVICE:
|
|
|
|
case VIR_ERR_NO_INTERFACE:
|
|
|
|
case VIR_ERR_NO_NWFILTER:
|
2018-05-11 17:39:27 +00:00
|
|
|
case VIR_ERR_NO_NWFILTER_BINDING:
|
2011-01-21 17:25:01 +00:00
|
|
|
case VIR_ERR_NO_SECRET:
|
|
|
|
case VIR_ERR_NO_DOMAIN_SNAPSHOT:
|
2011-09-13 10:24:13 +00:00
|
|
|
case VIR_ERR_OPERATION_INVALID:
|
2015-05-12 11:55:30 +00:00
|
|
|
case VIR_ERR_NO_DOMAIN_METADATA:
|
2016-05-04 07:30:58 +00:00
|
|
|
case VIR_ERR_NO_SERVER:
|
|
|
|
case VIR_ERR_NO_CLIENT:
|
2011-01-21 17:25:01 +00:00
|
|
|
return VIR_LOG_DEBUG;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return priority;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-26 13:57:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-04-19 16:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
static int daemonInitialize(void)
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
remote: introduce virtproxyd daemon to handle IP connectivity
The libvirtd daemon provides the traditional libvirt experience where
all the drivers are in a single daemon, and is accessible over both
local UNIX sockets and remote IP sockets.
In the new world we're having a set of per-driver daemons which will
primarily be accessed locally via their own UNIX sockets.
We still, however, need to allow for case of applications which will
connect to libvirt remotely. These remote connections can be done as
TCP/TLS sockets, or by SSH tunnelling to the UNIX socket.
In the later case, the old libvirt.so clients will only know about
the path to the old libvirtd socket /var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock,
and not the new driver sockets /var/run/libvirt/virtqemud-sock.
It is also not desirable to expose the main driver specific daemons
over IP directly to minimize their attack service.
Thus the virtproxyd daemon steps into place, to provide TCP/TLS sockets,
and back compat for the old libvirtd UNIX socket path(s). It will then
forward all RPC calls made to the appropriate driver specific daemon.
Essentially it is equivalent to the old libvirtd with absolutely no
drivers registered except for the remote driver (and other stateless
drivers in libvirt.so).
We could have modified libvirtd so none of the drivers are registed
to get the same end result. We could even add a libvirtd.conf parameter
to control whether the drivers are loaded to enable users to switch back
to the old world if we discover bugs in the split-daemon model. Using a
new daemon though has some advantages
- We can make virtproxyd and the virtXXXd per-driver daemons all
have "Conflicts: libvirtd.service" in their systemd unit files.
This will guarantee that libvirtd is never started at the same
time, as this would result in two daemons running the same driver.
Fortunately drivers use locking to protect themselves, but it is
better to avoid starting a daemon we know will conflict.
- It allows us to break CLI compat to remove the --listen parameter.
Both listen_tcp and listen_tls parameters in /etc/libvirtd/virtd.conf
will default to zero. Either TLS or TCP can be enabled exclusively
though virtd.conf without requiring the extra step of adding --listen.
- It allows us to set a strict SELinux policy over virtproxyd. For
back compat the libvirtd policy must continue to allow all drivers
to run. We can't easily give a second policy to libvirtd which
locks it down. By introducing a new virtproxyd we can set a strict
policy for that daemon only.
- It gets rid of the weird naming of having a daemon with "lib" in
its name. Now all normal daemons libvirt ships will have "virt"
as their prefix not "libvirt".
- Distros can more easily choose their upgrade path. They can
ship both sets of daemons in their packages, and choose to
either enable libvirtd, or enable the per-driver daemons and
virtproxyd out of the box. Users can easily override this if
desired by just tweaking which systemd units are active.
After some time we can deprecate use of libvirtd and after some more
time delete it entirely, leaving us in a pretty world filled with
prancing unicorns.
The main downside with introducing a new daemon, and with the
per-driver daemons in general, is figuring out the correct upgrade
path.
The conservative option is to leave libvirtd running if it was
an existing installation. Only use the new daemons & virtproxyd
on completely new installs.
The aggressive option is to disable libvirtd if already running
and activate all the new daemons.
Reviewed-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe de Dinechin <dinechin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2019-07-04 11:33:23 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef LIBVIRTD
|
|
|
|
# ifdef MODULE_NAME
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
/* This a dedicated per-driver daemon build */
|
|
|
|
if (virDriverLoadModule(MODULE_NAME, MODULE_NAME "Register", true) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
remote: introduce virtproxyd daemon to handle IP connectivity
The libvirtd daemon provides the traditional libvirt experience where
all the drivers are in a single daemon, and is accessible over both
local UNIX sockets and remote IP sockets.
In the new world we're having a set of per-driver daemons which will
primarily be accessed locally via their own UNIX sockets.
We still, however, need to allow for case of applications which will
connect to libvirt remotely. These remote connections can be done as
TCP/TLS sockets, or by SSH tunnelling to the UNIX socket.
In the later case, the old libvirt.so clients will only know about
the path to the old libvirtd socket /var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock,
and not the new driver sockets /var/run/libvirt/virtqemud-sock.
It is also not desirable to expose the main driver specific daemons
over IP directly to minimize their attack service.
Thus the virtproxyd daemon steps into place, to provide TCP/TLS sockets,
and back compat for the old libvirtd UNIX socket path(s). It will then
forward all RPC calls made to the appropriate driver specific daemon.
Essentially it is equivalent to the old libvirtd with absolutely no
drivers registered except for the remote driver (and other stateless
drivers in libvirt.so).
We could have modified libvirtd so none of the drivers are registed
to get the same end result. We could even add a libvirtd.conf parameter
to control whether the drivers are loaded to enable users to switch back
to the old world if we discover bugs in the split-daemon model. Using a
new daemon though has some advantages
- We can make virtproxyd and the virtXXXd per-driver daemons all
have "Conflicts: libvirtd.service" in their systemd unit files.
This will guarantee that libvirtd is never started at the same
time, as this would result in two daemons running the same driver.
Fortunately drivers use locking to protect themselves, but it is
better to avoid starting a daemon we know will conflict.
- It allows us to break CLI compat to remove the --listen parameter.
Both listen_tcp and listen_tls parameters in /etc/libvirtd/virtd.conf
will default to zero. Either TLS or TCP can be enabled exclusively
though virtd.conf without requiring the extra step of adding --listen.
- It allows us to set a strict SELinux policy over virtproxyd. For
back compat the libvirtd policy must continue to allow all drivers
to run. We can't easily give a second policy to libvirtd which
locks it down. By introducing a new virtproxyd we can set a strict
policy for that daemon only.
- It gets rid of the weird naming of having a daemon with "lib" in
its name. Now all normal daemons libvirt ships will have "virt"
as their prefix not "libvirt".
- Distros can more easily choose their upgrade path. They can
ship both sets of daemons in their packages, and choose to
either enable libvirtd, or enable the per-driver daemons and
virtproxyd out of the box. Users can easily override this if
desired by just tweaking which systemd units are active.
After some time we can deprecate use of libvirtd and after some more
time delete it entirely, leaving us in a pretty world filled with
prancing unicorns.
The main downside with introducing a new daemon, and with the
per-driver daemons in general, is figuring out the correct upgrade
path.
The conservative option is to leave libvirtd running if it was
an existing installation. Only use the new daemons & virtproxyd
on completely new installs.
The aggressive option is to disable libvirtd if already running
and activate all the new daemons.
Reviewed-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe de Dinechin <dinechin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2019-07-04 11:33:23 +00:00
|
|
|
# else
|
|
|
|
/* This is virtproxyd which merely proxies to the per-driver
|
|
|
|
* daemons for back compat, and also allows IP connectivity.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
# endif
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
/* This is the legacy monolithic libvirtd built with all drivers
|
|
|
|
*
|
2008-12-02 11:37:55 +00:00
|
|
|
* Note that the order is important: the first ones have a higher
|
2014-08-15 10:26:09 +00:00
|
|
|
* priority when calling virStateInitialize. We must register the
|
|
|
|
* network, storage and nodedev drivers before any stateful domain
|
|
|
|
* driver, since their resources must be auto-started before any
|
2015-01-20 16:16:26 +00:00
|
|
|
* domains can be auto-started.
|
2008-12-02 11:37:55 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifdef WITH_NETWORK
|
2018-04-19 16:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virDriverLoadModule("network", "networkRegister", false) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
# ifdef WITH_INTERFACE
|
2018-04-19 16:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virDriverLoadModule("interface", "interfaceRegister", false) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
# ifdef WITH_SECRETS
|
2019-03-01 14:48:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virDriverLoadModule("secret", "secretRegister", false) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
# ifdef WITH_STORAGE
|
2018-04-19 16:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virDriverLoadModule("storage", "storageRegister", false) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
# ifdef WITH_NODE_DEVICES
|
2018-04-19 16:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virDriverLoadModule("nodedev", "nodedevRegister", false) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
# ifdef WITH_NWFILTER
|
2018-04-19 16:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virDriverLoadModule("nwfilter", "nwfilterRegister", false) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
# ifdef WITH_LIBXL
|
2018-04-19 16:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virDriverLoadModule("libxl", "libxlRegister", false) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
# ifdef WITH_QEMU
|
2018-04-19 16:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virDriverLoadModule("qemu", "qemuRegister", false) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
# ifdef WITH_LXC
|
2018-04-19 16:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virDriverLoadModule("lxc", "lxcRegister", false) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
# ifdef WITH_VBOX
|
2018-04-19 16:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virDriverLoadModule("vbox", "vboxRegister", false) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
# ifdef WITH_BHYVE
|
2018-04-19 16:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virDriverLoadModule("bhyve", "bhyveRegister", false) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
# ifdef WITH_VZ
|
2018-04-19 16:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virDriverLoadModule("vz", "vzRegister", false) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
2008-11-17 12:18:18 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2018-04-19 16:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2007-12-05 15:34:05 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-12 12:40:07 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(3)
|
|
|
|
daemonSetupNetworking(virNetServerPtr srv,
|
2015-04-15 14:23:55 +00:00
|
|
|
virNetServerPtr srvAdm,
|
2014-09-12 12:40:07 +00:00
|
|
|
struct daemonConfig *config,
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef WITH_IP
|
|
|
|
bool ipsock,
|
|
|
|
bool privileged,
|
|
|
|
#endif /* ! WITH_IP */
|
2014-09-12 12:40:07 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *sock_path,
|
|
|
|
const char *sock_path_ro,
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *sock_path_adm)
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
gid_t unix_sock_gid = 0;
|
|
|
|
int unix_sock_ro_mask = 0;
|
|
|
|
int unix_sock_rw_mask = 0;
|
2015-04-15 14:23:55 +00:00
|
|
|
int unix_sock_adm_mask = 0;
|
2015-06-18 12:11:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_AUTOPTR(virSystemdActivation) act = NULL;
|
|
|
|
virSystemdActivationMap actmap[] = {
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
{ .name = DAEMON_NAME ".socket", .family = AF_UNIX, .path = sock_path },
|
|
|
|
{ .name = DAEMON_NAME "-ro.socket", .family = AF_UNIX, .path = sock_path_ro },
|
|
|
|
{ .name = DAEMON_NAME "-admin.socket", .family = AF_UNIX, .path = sock_path_adm },
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef WITH_IP
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
{ .name = DAEMON_NAME "-tcp.socket", .family = AF_INET },
|
|
|
|
{ .name = DAEMON_NAME "-tls.socket", .family = AF_INET },
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* ! WITH_IP */
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef WITH_IP
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((actmap[3].port = virSocketAddrResolveService(config->tcp_port)) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((actmap[4].port = virSocketAddrResolveService(config->tls_port)) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* ! WITH_IP */
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virSystemdGetActivation(actmap, ARRAY_CARDINALITY(actmap), &act) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2014-07-15 13:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-08-22 13:52:16 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef WITH_IP
|
|
|
|
if (act && ipsock) {
|
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("--listen parameter not permitted with systemd activation "
|
|
|
|
"sockets, see 'man libvirtd' for further guidance"));
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* ! WITH_IP */
|
|
|
|
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
if (config->unix_sock_group) {
|
|
|
|
if (virGetGroupID(config->unix_sock_group, &unix_sock_gid) < 0)
|
2015-06-18 12:11:21 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-05 15:34:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virStrToLong_i(config->unix_sock_ro_perms, NULL, 8, &unix_sock_ro_mask) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to parse mode '%s'"), config->unix_sock_ro_perms);
|
2015-06-18 12:11:21 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-05 15:34:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-15 14:23:55 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virStrToLong_i(config->unix_sock_admin_perms, NULL, 8, &unix_sock_adm_mask) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to parse mode '%s'"), config->unix_sock_admin_perms);
|
2015-06-18 12:11:21 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2015-04-15 14:23:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virStrToLong_i(config->unix_sock_rw_perms, NULL, 8, &unix_sock_rw_mask) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to parse mode '%s'"), config->unix_sock_rw_perms);
|
2015-06-18 12:11:21 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-05 15:34:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virNetServerAddServiceUNIX(srv,
|
|
|
|
act,
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
DAEMON_NAME ".socket",
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
sock_path,
|
|
|
|
unix_sock_rw_mask,
|
|
|
|
unix_sock_gid,
|
|
|
|
config->auth_unix_rw,
|
|
|
|
NULL,
|
|
|
|
false,
|
|
|
|
config->max_queued_clients,
|
|
|
|
config->max_client_requests) < 0)
|
2015-06-18 12:11:21 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
if (sock_path_ro &&
|
|
|
|
virNetServerAddServiceUNIX(srv,
|
|
|
|
act,
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
DAEMON_NAME "-ro.socket",
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
sock_path_ro,
|
|
|
|
unix_sock_ro_mask,
|
|
|
|
unix_sock_gid,
|
|
|
|
config->auth_unix_ro,
|
|
|
|
NULL,
|
|
|
|
true,
|
|
|
|
config->max_queued_clients,
|
|
|
|
config->max_client_requests) < 0)
|
2015-06-18 12:11:21 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2011-10-11 12:48:42 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
if (sock_path_adm &&
|
|
|
|
virNetServerAddServiceUNIX(srvAdm,
|
|
|
|
act,
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
DAEMON_NAME "-admin.socket",
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
sock_path_adm,
|
|
|
|
unix_sock_adm_mask,
|
|
|
|
unix_sock_gid,
|
|
|
|
REMOTE_AUTH_NONE,
|
|
|
|
NULL,
|
|
|
|
false,
|
|
|
|
config->admin_max_queued_clients,
|
|
|
|
config->admin_max_client_requests) < 0)
|
2015-06-18 12:11:21 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2007-12-05 18:21:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef WITH_IP
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
if (((ipsock && config->listen_tcp) || act) &&
|
|
|
|
virNetServerAddServiceTCP(srv,
|
|
|
|
act,
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
DAEMON_NAME "-tcp.socket",
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
config->listen_addr,
|
|
|
|
config->tcp_port,
|
|
|
|
AF_UNSPEC,
|
|
|
|
config->auth_tcp,
|
|
|
|
NULL,
|
|
|
|
false,
|
|
|
|
config->max_queued_clients,
|
|
|
|
config->max_client_requests) < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2015-04-15 14:23:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
if (((ipsock && config->listen_tls) || (act && virSystemdActivationHasName(act, "ip-tls")))) {
|
|
|
|
virNetTLSContextPtr ctxt = NULL;
|
2015-04-15 14:23:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
if (config->ca_file ||
|
|
|
|
config->cert_file ||
|
|
|
|
config->key_file) {
|
|
|
|
if (!config->ca_file) {
|
|
|
|
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
|
|
|
|
_("No CA certificate path set to match server key/cert"));
|
2015-06-18 12:11:21 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!config->cert_file) {
|
|
|
|
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
|
|
|
|
_("No server certificate path set to match server key"));
|
2015-06-18 12:11:21 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!config->key_file) {
|
|
|
|
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
|
|
|
|
_("No server key path set to match server cert"));
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
VIR_DEBUG("Using CA='%s' cert='%s' key='%s'",
|
|
|
|
config->ca_file, config->cert_file, config->key_file);
|
|
|
|
if (!(ctxt = virNetTLSContextNewServer(config->ca_file,
|
|
|
|
config->crl_file,
|
|
|
|
config->cert_file,
|
|
|
|
config->key_file,
|
|
|
|
(const char *const*)config->tls_allowed_dn_list,
|
|
|
|
config->tls_priority,
|
|
|
|
config->tls_no_sanity_certificate ? false : true,
|
|
|
|
config->tls_no_verify_certificate ? false : true)))
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (!(ctxt = virNetTLSContextNewServerPath(NULL,
|
|
|
|
!privileged,
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
(const char *const*)config->tls_allowed_dn_list,
|
2016-06-03 16:53:18 +00:00
|
|
|
config->tls_priority,
|
2011-07-21 10:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
config->tls_no_sanity_certificate ? false : true,
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
config->tls_no_verify_certificate ? false : true)))
|
2015-06-18 12:11:21 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
Detect heap allocation failure; factor out some duplication.
* qemud/qemud.c (tls_port, tcp_port, mdns_name, tls_allowed_ip_list):
(tls_allowed_dn_list): Remove "const", now that we free these.
(unix_sock_rw_mask): Rename from unix_sock_rw_perms, so that
the latter name can be used as a local string variable, so that the
variable name matches the config attribute name.
(unix_sock_ro_mask): Rename from unix_sock_ro_perms, likewise.
(remoteCheckDN, remoteCheckAccess): Adapt to const removal.
(qemudDispatchServer): Check for heap allocation failure.
(remoteConfigGetStringList): New function, based on code from Dan Berrangé.
(CHECK_TYPE): Remove macro.
(checkType): New function.
(GET_CONF_INT, GET_CONF_STR): New macros.
(remoteReadConfigFile): Use new macros to avoid duplication and to
check for allocation failure.
* src/conf.h (virConfTypeName): New static inline function.
2007-11-30 15:43:42 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_DEBUG("Registering TLS socket %s:%s",
|
|
|
|
config->listen_addr, config->tls_port);
|
|
|
|
if (virNetServerAddServiceTCP(srv,
|
|
|
|
act,
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
DAEMON_NAME "-tls.socket",
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
config->listen_addr,
|
|
|
|
config->tls_port,
|
|
|
|
AF_UNSPEC,
|
|
|
|
config->auth_tls,
|
|
|
|
ctxt,
|
|
|
|
false,
|
|
|
|
config->max_queued_clients,
|
|
|
|
config->max_client_requests) < 0) {
|
2012-07-11 13:35:48 +00:00
|
|
|
virObjectUnref(ctxt);
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2007-06-11 12:04:54 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
virObjectUnref(ctxt);
|
2007-06-11 12:04:54 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* ! WITH_IP */
|
2007-06-11 12:04:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
if (act &&
|
|
|
|
virSystemdActivationComplete(act) < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
|
2012-09-20 11:58:29 +00:00
|
|
|
#if WITH_SASL
|
2019-06-25 16:32:29 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virNetServerNeedsAuth(srv, REMOTE_AUTH_SASL) &&
|
|
|
|
!(saslCtxt = virNetSASLContextNewServer(
|
|
|
|
(const char *const*)config->sasl_allowed_username_list)))
|
2019-06-25 16:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2011-06-30 17:18:08 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-06-18 12:11:21 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
2007-06-11 12:04:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-06-18 12:11:21 +00:00
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-07 15:16:44 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Set up the openvswitch timeout
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
daemonSetupNetDevOpenvswitch(struct daemonConfig *config)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
virNetDevOpenvswitchSetTimeout(config->ovs_timeout);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-12-22 12:53:26 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Set up the logging environment
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
* By default if daemonized all errors go to journald/a logfile
|
2011-03-03 06:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
* but if verbose or error debugging is asked for then also output
|
2011-03-08 10:31:20 +00:00
|
|
|
* informational and debug messages. Default size if 64 kB.
|
2008-12-22 12:53:26 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-12-22 16:16:10 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
daemonSetupLogging(struct daemonConfig *config,
|
|
|
|
bool privileged,
|
|
|
|
bool verbose,
|
|
|
|
bool godaemon)
|
2009-10-23 06:56:21 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-12-22 12:53:26 +00:00
|
|
|
virLogReset();
|
|
|
|
|
2008-12-22 16:16:10 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
* Logging setup order of precedence is:
|
2009-08-06 13:55:07 +00:00
|
|
|
* cmdline > environment > config
|
|
|
|
*
|
2017-08-25 14:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* Given the precedence, we must process the variables in the opposite
|
2009-08-06 13:55:07 +00:00
|
|
|
* order, each one overriding the previous.
|
2008-12-22 16:16:10 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
if (config->log_level != 0)
|
|
|
|
virLogSetDefaultPriority(config->log_level);
|
2009-08-06 13:45:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-25 14:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
/* In case the config is empty, both filters and outputs will become empty,
|
|
|
|
* however we can't start with empty outputs, thus we'll need to define and
|
|
|
|
* setup a default one.
|
2016-10-31 11:52:51 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ignore_value(virLogSetFilters(config->log_filters));
|
|
|
|
ignore_value(virLogSetOutputs(config->log_outputs));
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-10-31 11:52:51 +00:00
|
|
|
/* If there are some environment variables defined, use those instead */
|
|
|
|
virLogSetFromEnv();
|
2008-12-22 12:53:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-25 12:18:01 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Command line override for --verbose
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((verbose) && (virLogGetDefaultPriority() > VIR_LOG_INFO))
|
|
|
|
virLogSetDefaultPriority(VIR_LOG_INFO);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-25 14:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Define the default output. This is only applied if there was no setting
|
|
|
|
* from either the config or the environment.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virLogSetDefaultOutput(DAEMON_NAME, godaemon, privileged) < 0)
|
2017-08-25 14:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (virLogGetNbOutputs() == 0)
|
|
|
|
virLogSetOutputs(virLogGetDefaultOutput());
|
|
|
|
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-12-22 16:16:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-04-17 11:01:24 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
daemonSetupAccessManager(struct daemonConfig *config)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
virAccessManagerPtr mgr;
|
|
|
|
const char *none[] = { "none", NULL };
|
2015-01-27 12:36:10 +00:00
|
|
|
const char **drv = (const char **)config->access_drivers;
|
2013-04-17 11:01:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-27 12:36:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!drv ||
|
|
|
|
!drv[0])
|
|
|
|
drv = none;
|
2013-04-17 11:01:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-27 12:36:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!(mgr = virAccessManagerNewStack(drv)))
|
2013-04-17 11:01:24 +00:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
virAccessManagerSetDefault(mgr);
|
|
|
|
virObjectUnref(mgr);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-12-12 07:56:50 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Display version information. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
daemonVersion(const char *argv0)
|
2008-12-12 07:56:50 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2012-10-17 09:23:12 +00:00
|
|
|
printf("%s (%s) %s\n", argv0, PACKAGE_NAME, PACKAGE_VERSION);
|
2008-12-12 07:56:50 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-10-16 10:48:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
static void daemonShutdownHandler(virNetDaemonPtr dmn,
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
siginfo_t *sig ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
|
|
|
|
void *opaque ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
|
2009-10-16 10:48:50 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
virNetDaemonQuit(dmn);
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-10-16 10:48:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
libvirtd: fix potential deadlock when reloading
It is possible to deadlock libvirtd when concurrently starting a domain
and restarting the daemon. Threads involved in the deadlock are
Thread 4 (Thread 0x7fc13b53e700 (LWP 64084)):
/lib64/libpthread.so.0
at util/virthread.c:154
at qemu/qemu_monitor.c:1083
cmd=0x7fc110017700, scm_fd=-1, reply=0x7fc13b53d318) at
qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c:305
cmd=0x7fc110017700,
reply=0x7fc13b53d318) at qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c:335
at qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c:1298
at qemu/qemu_monitor.c:1697
vm=0x7fc110003d00, asyncJob=QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_START) at qemu/qemu_process.c:1763
vm=0x7fc110003d00,
asyncJob=6, logCtxt=0x7fc1100089c0) at qemu/qemu_process.c:1835
vm=0x7fc110003d00, asyncJob=6, logCtxt=0x7fc1100089c0) at
qemu/qemu_process.c:2180
driver=0x7fc12004e1e0,
vm=0x7fc110003d00, asyncJob=QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_START, incoming=0x0, snapshot=0x0,
vmop=VIR_NETDEV_VPORT_PROFILE_OP_CREATE, flags=17) at qemu/qemu_process.c:6111
driver=0x7fc12004e1e0,
vm=0x7fc110003d00, updatedCPU=0x0, asyncJob=QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_START,
migrateFrom=0x0,
migrateFd=-1, migratePath=0x0, snapshot=0x0,
vmop=VIR_NETDEV_VPORT_PROFILE_OP_CREATE,
flags=17) at qemu/qemu_process.c:6334
xml=0x7fc110000ed0 "<!--\nWARNING: THIS IS AN AUTO-GENERATED FILE.
CHANGES TO IT ARE LIKELY TO BE\nOVERWRITTEN AND LOST. Changes to this xml
configuration should be made using:\n virsh edit testvv\nor other
applicati"..., flags=0) at qemu/qemu_driver.c:1776
...
Thread 1 (Thread 0x7fc143c66880 (LWP 64081)):
/lib64/libpthread.so.0
at util/virthread.c:122
conf/nwfilter_conf.c:159
sig=0x7ffe0a831e30,
opaque=0x0) at remote/remote_daemon.c:724
opaque=0x558c5328b230) at rpc/virnetdaemon.c:654
at util/vireventpoll.c:508
rpc/virnetdaemon.c:858
remote/remote_daemon.c:1496
(gdb) thr 1
[Switching to thread 1 (Thread 0x7fc143c66880 (LWP 64081))]
/lib64/libpthread.so.0
(gdb) f 1
at util/virthread.c:122
122 pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&m->lock);
(gdb) p updateLock
$1 = {lock = {__data = {__lock = 0, __nr_readers = 1, __readers_wakeup = 0,
__writer_wakeup = 0, __nr_readers_queued = 0, __nr_writers_queued = 1,
__writer = 0,
__shared = 0, __rwelision = 0 '\000', __pad1 = "\000\000\000\000\000\000",
__pad2 = 0, __flags = 0},
__size = "\000\000\000\000\001", '\000' <repeats 15 times>, "\001",
'\000' <repeats 34 times>, __align = 4294967296}}
Reloading of the nwfilter driver is stuck waiting for a write lock, which
already has a reader (from qemuDomainCreateXML) in the critical section.
Since the reload occurs in the context of the main event loop thread,
libvirtd becomes deadlocked. The deadlock can be avoided by offloading
the reload work to a thread.
Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2018-03-08 22:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
static void daemonReloadHandlerThread(void *opague ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VIR_INFO("Reloading configuration on SIGHUP");
|
|
|
|
virHookCall(VIR_HOOK_DRIVER_DAEMON, "-",
|
|
|
|
VIR_HOOK_DAEMON_OP_RELOAD, SIGHUP, "SIGHUP", NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (virStateReload() < 0)
|
|
|
|
VIR_WARN("Error while reloading drivers");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
static void daemonReloadHandler(virNetDaemonPtr dmn ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
|
2011-08-15 07:40:46 +00:00
|
|
|
siginfo_t *sig ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
|
|
|
|
void *opaque ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
|
|
|
|
{
|
libvirtd: fix potential deadlock when reloading
It is possible to deadlock libvirtd when concurrently starting a domain
and restarting the daemon. Threads involved in the deadlock are
Thread 4 (Thread 0x7fc13b53e700 (LWP 64084)):
/lib64/libpthread.so.0
at util/virthread.c:154
at qemu/qemu_monitor.c:1083
cmd=0x7fc110017700, scm_fd=-1, reply=0x7fc13b53d318) at
qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c:305
cmd=0x7fc110017700,
reply=0x7fc13b53d318) at qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c:335
at qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c:1298
at qemu/qemu_monitor.c:1697
vm=0x7fc110003d00, asyncJob=QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_START) at qemu/qemu_process.c:1763
vm=0x7fc110003d00,
asyncJob=6, logCtxt=0x7fc1100089c0) at qemu/qemu_process.c:1835
vm=0x7fc110003d00, asyncJob=6, logCtxt=0x7fc1100089c0) at
qemu/qemu_process.c:2180
driver=0x7fc12004e1e0,
vm=0x7fc110003d00, asyncJob=QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_START, incoming=0x0, snapshot=0x0,
vmop=VIR_NETDEV_VPORT_PROFILE_OP_CREATE, flags=17) at qemu/qemu_process.c:6111
driver=0x7fc12004e1e0,
vm=0x7fc110003d00, updatedCPU=0x0, asyncJob=QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_START,
migrateFrom=0x0,
migrateFd=-1, migratePath=0x0, snapshot=0x0,
vmop=VIR_NETDEV_VPORT_PROFILE_OP_CREATE,
flags=17) at qemu/qemu_process.c:6334
xml=0x7fc110000ed0 "<!--\nWARNING: THIS IS AN AUTO-GENERATED FILE.
CHANGES TO IT ARE LIKELY TO BE\nOVERWRITTEN AND LOST. Changes to this xml
configuration should be made using:\n virsh edit testvv\nor other
applicati"..., flags=0) at qemu/qemu_driver.c:1776
...
Thread 1 (Thread 0x7fc143c66880 (LWP 64081)):
/lib64/libpthread.so.0
at util/virthread.c:122
conf/nwfilter_conf.c:159
sig=0x7ffe0a831e30,
opaque=0x0) at remote/remote_daemon.c:724
opaque=0x558c5328b230) at rpc/virnetdaemon.c:654
at util/vireventpoll.c:508
rpc/virnetdaemon.c:858
remote/remote_daemon.c:1496
(gdb) thr 1
[Switching to thread 1 (Thread 0x7fc143c66880 (LWP 64081))]
/lib64/libpthread.so.0
(gdb) f 1
at util/virthread.c:122
122 pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&m->lock);
(gdb) p updateLock
$1 = {lock = {__data = {__lock = 0, __nr_readers = 1, __readers_wakeup = 0,
__writer_wakeup = 0, __nr_readers_queued = 0, __nr_writers_queued = 1,
__writer = 0,
__shared = 0, __rwelision = 0 '\000', __pad1 = "\000\000\000\000\000\000",
__pad2 = 0, __flags = 0},
__size = "\000\000\000\000\001", '\000' <repeats 15 times>, "\001",
'\000' <repeats 34 times>, __align = 4294967296}}
Reloading of the nwfilter driver is stuck waiting for a write lock, which
already has a reader (from qemuDomainCreateXML) in the critical section.
Since the reload occurs in the context of the main event loop thread,
libvirtd becomes deadlocked. The deadlock can be avoided by offloading
the reload work to a thread.
Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2018-03-08 22:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
virThread thr;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-18 15:10:58 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!driversInitialized) {
|
|
|
|
VIR_WARN("Drivers are not initialized, reload ignored");
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
libvirtd: fix potential deadlock when reloading
It is possible to deadlock libvirtd when concurrently starting a domain
and restarting the daemon. Threads involved in the deadlock are
Thread 4 (Thread 0x7fc13b53e700 (LWP 64084)):
/lib64/libpthread.so.0
at util/virthread.c:154
at qemu/qemu_monitor.c:1083
cmd=0x7fc110017700, scm_fd=-1, reply=0x7fc13b53d318) at
qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c:305
cmd=0x7fc110017700,
reply=0x7fc13b53d318) at qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c:335
at qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c:1298
at qemu/qemu_monitor.c:1697
vm=0x7fc110003d00, asyncJob=QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_START) at qemu/qemu_process.c:1763
vm=0x7fc110003d00,
asyncJob=6, logCtxt=0x7fc1100089c0) at qemu/qemu_process.c:1835
vm=0x7fc110003d00, asyncJob=6, logCtxt=0x7fc1100089c0) at
qemu/qemu_process.c:2180
driver=0x7fc12004e1e0,
vm=0x7fc110003d00, asyncJob=QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_START, incoming=0x0, snapshot=0x0,
vmop=VIR_NETDEV_VPORT_PROFILE_OP_CREATE, flags=17) at qemu/qemu_process.c:6111
driver=0x7fc12004e1e0,
vm=0x7fc110003d00, updatedCPU=0x0, asyncJob=QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_START,
migrateFrom=0x0,
migrateFd=-1, migratePath=0x0, snapshot=0x0,
vmop=VIR_NETDEV_VPORT_PROFILE_OP_CREATE,
flags=17) at qemu/qemu_process.c:6334
xml=0x7fc110000ed0 "<!--\nWARNING: THIS IS AN AUTO-GENERATED FILE.
CHANGES TO IT ARE LIKELY TO BE\nOVERWRITTEN AND LOST. Changes to this xml
configuration should be made using:\n virsh edit testvv\nor other
applicati"..., flags=0) at qemu/qemu_driver.c:1776
...
Thread 1 (Thread 0x7fc143c66880 (LWP 64081)):
/lib64/libpthread.so.0
at util/virthread.c:122
conf/nwfilter_conf.c:159
sig=0x7ffe0a831e30,
opaque=0x0) at remote/remote_daemon.c:724
opaque=0x558c5328b230) at rpc/virnetdaemon.c:654
at util/vireventpoll.c:508
rpc/virnetdaemon.c:858
remote/remote_daemon.c:1496
(gdb) thr 1
[Switching to thread 1 (Thread 0x7fc143c66880 (LWP 64081))]
/lib64/libpthread.so.0
(gdb) f 1
at util/virthread.c:122
122 pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&m->lock);
(gdb) p updateLock
$1 = {lock = {__data = {__lock = 0, __nr_readers = 1, __readers_wakeup = 0,
__writer_wakeup = 0, __nr_readers_queued = 0, __nr_writers_queued = 1,
__writer = 0,
__shared = 0, __rwelision = 0 '\000', __pad1 = "\000\000\000\000\000\000",
__pad2 = 0, __flags = 0},
__size = "\000\000\000\000\001", '\000' <repeats 15 times>, "\001",
'\000' <repeats 34 times>, __align = 4294967296}}
Reloading of the nwfilter driver is stuck waiting for a write lock, which
already has a reader (from qemuDomainCreateXML) in the critical section.
Since the reload occurs in the context of the main event loop thread,
libvirtd becomes deadlocked. The deadlock can be avoided by offloading
the reload work to a thread.
Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2018-03-08 22:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virThreadCreate(&thr, false, daemonReloadHandlerThread, NULL) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Not much we can do on error here except log it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to create thread to handle daemon restart"));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-08-15 07:40:46 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
static int daemonSetupSignals(virNetDaemonPtr dmn)
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virNetDaemonAddSignalHandler(dmn, SIGINT, daemonShutdownHandler, NULL) < 0)
|
2009-10-16 10:48:50 +00:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virNetDaemonAddSignalHandler(dmn, SIGQUIT, daemonShutdownHandler, NULL) < 0)
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virNetDaemonAddSignalHandler(dmn, SIGTERM, daemonShutdownHandler, NULL) < 0)
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virNetDaemonAddSignalHandler(dmn, SIGHUP, daemonReloadHandler, NULL) < 0)
|
2011-08-15 07:40:46 +00:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-10-16 10:48:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-10-31 19:03:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void daemonInhibitCallback(bool inhibit, void *opaque)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
virNetDaemonPtr dmn = opaque;
|
2012-10-31 19:03:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (inhibit)
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
virNetDaemonAddShutdownInhibition(dmn);
|
2012-10-31 19:03:55 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
virNetDaemonRemoveShutdownInhibition(dmn);
|
2012-10-31 19:03:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-23 15:20:11 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef WITH_DBUS
|
2012-10-31 19:03:57 +00:00
|
|
|
static DBusConnection *sessionBus;
|
|
|
|
static DBusConnection *systemBus;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void daemonStopWorker(void *opaque)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
virNetDaemonPtr dmn = opaque;
|
2012-10-31 19:03:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_DEBUG("Begin stop dmn=%p", dmn);
|
2012-10-31 19:03:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ignore_value(virStateStop());
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_DEBUG("Completed stop dmn=%p", dmn);
|
2012-10-31 19:03:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Exit daemon cleanly */
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
virNetDaemonQuit(dmn);
|
2012-10-31 19:03:57 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We do this in a thread to not block the main loop */
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
static void daemonStop(virNetDaemonPtr dmn)
|
2012-10-31 19:03:57 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
virThread thr;
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
virObjectRef(dmn);
|
|
|
|
if (virThreadCreate(&thr, false, daemonStopWorker, dmn) < 0)
|
|
|
|
virObjectUnref(dmn);
|
2012-10-31 19:03:57 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static DBusHandlerResult
|
|
|
|
handleSessionMessageFunc(DBusConnection *connection ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
|
|
|
|
DBusMessage *message,
|
|
|
|
void *opaque)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
virNetDaemonPtr dmn = opaque;
|
2012-10-31 19:03:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_DEBUG("dmn=%p", dmn);
|
2012-10-31 19:03:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (dbus_message_is_signal(message,
|
|
|
|
DBUS_INTERFACE_LOCAL,
|
|
|
|
"Disconnected"))
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
daemonStop(dmn);
|
2012-10-31 19:03:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return DBUS_HANDLER_RESULT_NOT_YET_HANDLED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static DBusHandlerResult
|
|
|
|
handleSystemMessageFunc(DBusConnection *connection ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
|
|
|
|
DBusMessage *message,
|
|
|
|
void *opaque)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
virNetDaemonPtr dmn = opaque;
|
2012-10-31 19:03:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_DEBUG("dmn=%p", dmn);
|
2012-10-31 19:03:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (dbus_message_is_signal(message,
|
|
|
|
"org.freedesktop.login1.Manager",
|
|
|
|
"PrepareForShutdown"))
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
daemonStop(dmn);
|
2012-10-31 19:03:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return DBUS_HANDLER_RESULT_NOT_YET_HANDLED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
static void daemonRunStateInit(void *opaque)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
virNetDaemonPtr dmn = opaque;
|
2013-04-17 11:01:24 +00:00
|
|
|
virIdentityPtr sysident = virIdentityGetSystem();
|
2019-07-23 12:05:18 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MODULE_NAME
|
|
|
|
bool mandatory = true;
|
|
|
|
#else /* ! MODULE_NAME */
|
|
|
|
bool mandatory = false;
|
|
|
|
#endif /* ! MODULE_NAME */
|
2013-04-17 11:01:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
virIdentitySetCurrent(sysident);
|
2009-10-16 10:48:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-12-05 19:21:14 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Since driver initialization can take time inhibit daemon shutdown until
|
|
|
|
we're done so clients get a chance to connect */
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
daemonInhibitCallback(true, dmn);
|
2012-12-05 19:21:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Start the stateful HV drivers
|
2011-08-23 17:02:02 +00:00
|
|
|
* This is deliberately done after telling the parent process
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
* we're ready, since it can take a long time and this will
|
|
|
|
* seriously delay OS bootup process */
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virStateInitialize(virNetDaemonIsPrivileged(dmn),
|
2019-07-23 12:05:18 +00:00
|
|
|
mandatory,
|
2012-10-31 19:03:55 +00:00
|
|
|
daemonInhibitCallback,
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
dmn) < 0) {
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("Driver state initialization failed"));
|
2011-07-21 17:23:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Ensure the main event loop quits */
|
|
|
|
kill(getpid(), SIGTERM);
|
2012-12-05 19:21:14 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2009-10-16 10:48:50 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-12-03 10:27:22 +00:00
|
|
|
driversInitialized = true;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-23 15:20:11 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef WITH_DBUS
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Tie the non-privileged daemons to the session/shutdown lifecycle */
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!virNetDaemonIsPrivileged(dmn)) {
|
2012-10-31 19:03:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sessionBus = virDBusGetSessionBus();
|
|
|
|
if (sessionBus != NULL)
|
|
|
|
dbus_connection_add_filter(sessionBus,
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
handleSessionMessageFunc, dmn, NULL);
|
2012-10-31 19:03:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
systemBus = virDBusGetSystemBus();
|
|
|
|
if (systemBus != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
dbus_connection_add_filter(systemBus,
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
handleSystemMessageFunc, dmn, NULL);
|
2012-10-31 19:03:57 +00:00
|
|
|
dbus_bus_add_match(systemBus,
|
|
|
|
"type='signal',sender='org.freedesktop.login1', interface='org.freedesktop.login1.Manager'",
|
|
|
|
NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Only now accept clients from network */
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
virNetDaemonUpdateServices(dmn, true);
|
2014-03-25 06:45:38 +00:00
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
daemonInhibitCallback(false, dmn);
|
|
|
|
virObjectUnref(dmn);
|
2013-04-17 11:01:24 +00:00
|
|
|
virObjectUnref(sysident);
|
|
|
|
virIdentitySetCurrent(NULL);
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-10-16 10:48:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
static int daemonStateInit(virNetDaemonPtr dmn)
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
virThread thr;
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
virObjectRef(dmn);
|
|
|
|
if (virThreadCreate(&thr, false, daemonRunStateInit, dmn) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
virObjectUnref(dmn);
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-10-16 10:48:50 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-03 09:12:41 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
daemonSetupHostUUID(const struct daemonConfig *config)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
static const char *machine_id = "/etc/machine-id";
|
|
|
|
char buf[VIR_UUID_STRING_BUFLEN];
|
|
|
|
const char *uuid;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (config->host_uuid) {
|
|
|
|
uuid = config->host_uuid;
|
|
|
|
} else if (!config->host_uuid_source ||
|
|
|
|
STREQ(config->host_uuid_source, "smbios")) {
|
|
|
|
/* smbios UUID is fetched on demand in virGetHostUUID */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
} else if (STREQ(config->host_uuid_source, "machine-id")) {
|
|
|
|
if (virFileReadBufQuiet(machine_id, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("Can't read %s"), machine_id);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uuid = buf;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("invalid UUID source: %s"), config->host_uuid_source);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (virSetHostUUIDStr(uuid)) {
|
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("invalid host UUID: %s"), uuid);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-07-18 11:30:22 +00:00
|
|
|
typedef struct {
|
|
|
|
const char *opts;
|
|
|
|
const char *help;
|
|
|
|
} virOptionHelp;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-04-04 09:32:00 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Print command-line usage. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
daemonUsage(const char *argv0, bool privileged)
|
2007-04-04 09:32:00 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-07-18 11:30:22 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
virOptionHelp opthelp[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ "-h | --help", N_("Display program help") },
|
|
|
|
{ "-v | --verbose", N_("Verbose messages") },
|
|
|
|
{ "-d | --daemon", N_("Run as a daemon & write PID file") },
|
remote: introduce virtproxyd daemon to handle IP connectivity
The libvirtd daemon provides the traditional libvirt experience where
all the drivers are in a single daemon, and is accessible over both
local UNIX sockets and remote IP sockets.
In the new world we're having a set of per-driver daemons which will
primarily be accessed locally via their own UNIX sockets.
We still, however, need to allow for case of applications which will
connect to libvirt remotely. These remote connections can be done as
TCP/TLS sockets, or by SSH tunnelling to the UNIX socket.
In the later case, the old libvirt.so clients will only know about
the path to the old libvirtd socket /var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock,
and not the new driver sockets /var/run/libvirt/virtqemud-sock.
It is also not desirable to expose the main driver specific daemons
over IP directly to minimize their attack service.
Thus the virtproxyd daemon steps into place, to provide TCP/TLS sockets,
and back compat for the old libvirtd UNIX socket path(s). It will then
forward all RPC calls made to the appropriate driver specific daemon.
Essentially it is equivalent to the old libvirtd with absolutely no
drivers registered except for the remote driver (and other stateless
drivers in libvirt.so).
We could have modified libvirtd so none of the drivers are registed
to get the same end result. We could even add a libvirtd.conf parameter
to control whether the drivers are loaded to enable users to switch back
to the old world if we discover bugs in the split-daemon model. Using a
new daemon though has some advantages
- We can make virtproxyd and the virtXXXd per-driver daemons all
have "Conflicts: libvirtd.service" in their systemd unit files.
This will guarantee that libvirtd is never started at the same
time, as this would result in two daemons running the same driver.
Fortunately drivers use locking to protect themselves, but it is
better to avoid starting a daemon we know will conflict.
- It allows us to break CLI compat to remove the --listen parameter.
Both listen_tcp and listen_tls parameters in /etc/libvirtd/virtd.conf
will default to zero. Either TLS or TCP can be enabled exclusively
though virtd.conf without requiring the extra step of adding --listen.
- It allows us to set a strict SELinux policy over virtproxyd. For
back compat the libvirtd policy must continue to allow all drivers
to run. We can't easily give a second policy to libvirtd which
locks it down. By introducing a new virtproxyd we can set a strict
policy for that daemon only.
- It gets rid of the weird naming of having a daemon with "lib" in
its name. Now all normal daemons libvirt ships will have "virt"
as their prefix not "libvirt".
- Distros can more easily choose their upgrade path. They can
ship both sets of daemons in their packages, and choose to
either enable libvirtd, or enable the per-driver daemons and
virtproxyd out of the box. Users can easily override this if
desired by just tweaking which systemd units are active.
After some time we can deprecate use of libvirtd and after some more
time delete it entirely, leaving us in a pretty world filled with
prancing unicorns.
The main downside with introducing a new daemon, and with the
per-driver daemons in general, is figuring out the correct upgrade
path.
The conservative option is to leave libvirtd running if it was
an existing installation. Only use the new daemons & virtproxyd
on completely new installs.
The aggressive option is to disable libvirtd if already running
and activate all the new daemons.
Reviewed-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe de Dinechin <dinechin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2019-07-04 11:33:23 +00:00
|
|
|
#if defined(WITH_IP) && defined(LIBVIRTD)
|
2019-07-18 11:30:22 +00:00
|
|
|
{ "-l | --listen", N_("Listen for TCP/IP connections") },
|
remote: introduce virtproxyd daemon to handle IP connectivity
The libvirtd daemon provides the traditional libvirt experience where
all the drivers are in a single daemon, and is accessible over both
local UNIX sockets and remote IP sockets.
In the new world we're having a set of per-driver daemons which will
primarily be accessed locally via their own UNIX sockets.
We still, however, need to allow for case of applications which will
connect to libvirt remotely. These remote connections can be done as
TCP/TLS sockets, or by SSH tunnelling to the UNIX socket.
In the later case, the old libvirt.so clients will only know about
the path to the old libvirtd socket /var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock,
and not the new driver sockets /var/run/libvirt/virtqemud-sock.
It is also not desirable to expose the main driver specific daemons
over IP directly to minimize their attack service.
Thus the virtproxyd daemon steps into place, to provide TCP/TLS sockets,
and back compat for the old libvirtd UNIX socket path(s). It will then
forward all RPC calls made to the appropriate driver specific daemon.
Essentially it is equivalent to the old libvirtd with absolutely no
drivers registered except for the remote driver (and other stateless
drivers in libvirt.so).
We could have modified libvirtd so none of the drivers are registed
to get the same end result. We could even add a libvirtd.conf parameter
to control whether the drivers are loaded to enable users to switch back
to the old world if we discover bugs in the split-daemon model. Using a
new daemon though has some advantages
- We can make virtproxyd and the virtXXXd per-driver daemons all
have "Conflicts: libvirtd.service" in their systemd unit files.
This will guarantee that libvirtd is never started at the same
time, as this would result in two daemons running the same driver.
Fortunately drivers use locking to protect themselves, but it is
better to avoid starting a daemon we know will conflict.
- It allows us to break CLI compat to remove the --listen parameter.
Both listen_tcp and listen_tls parameters in /etc/libvirtd/virtd.conf
will default to zero. Either TLS or TCP can be enabled exclusively
though virtd.conf without requiring the extra step of adding --listen.
- It allows us to set a strict SELinux policy over virtproxyd. For
back compat the libvirtd policy must continue to allow all drivers
to run. We can't easily give a second policy to libvirtd which
locks it down. By introducing a new virtproxyd we can set a strict
policy for that daemon only.
- It gets rid of the weird naming of having a daemon with "lib" in
its name. Now all normal daemons libvirt ships will have "virt"
as their prefix not "libvirt".
- Distros can more easily choose their upgrade path. They can
ship both sets of daemons in their packages, and choose to
either enable libvirtd, or enable the per-driver daemons and
virtproxyd out of the box. Users can easily override this if
desired by just tweaking which systemd units are active.
After some time we can deprecate use of libvirtd and after some more
time delete it entirely, leaving us in a pretty world filled with
prancing unicorns.
The main downside with introducing a new daemon, and with the
per-driver daemons in general, is figuring out the correct upgrade
path.
The conservative option is to leave libvirtd running if it was
an existing installation. Only use the new daemons & virtproxyd
on completely new installs.
The aggressive option is to disable libvirtd if already running
and activate all the new daemons.
Reviewed-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe de Dinechin <dinechin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2019-07-04 11:33:23 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* !(WITH_IP && LIBVIRTD) */
|
2019-07-18 11:30:22 +00:00
|
|
|
{ "-t | --timeout <secs>", N_("Exit after timeout period") },
|
|
|
|
{ "-f | --config <file>", N_("Configuration file") },
|
|
|
|
{ "-V | --version", N_("Display version information") },
|
|
|
|
{ "-p | --pid-file <file>", N_("Change name of PID file") },
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", _("Usage:"));
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, " %s [%s]\n", argv0, _("options"));
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", _("Options:"));
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_CARDINALITY(opthelp); i++)
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, " %-22s %s\n", opthelp[i].opts,
|
|
|
|
_(opthelp[i].help));
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", _("libvirt management daemon:"));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, " %s\n", _("Default paths:"));
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, " %s\n", _("Configuration file (unless overridden by -f):"));
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, " %s/libvirt/%s.conf\n",
|
|
|
|
privileged ? SYSCONFDIR : "$XDG_CONFIG_HOME", DAEMON_NAME);
|
2019-07-18 11:30:22 +00:00
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, " %s\n", _("Sockets:"));
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, " %s/libvirt/%s-sock\n",
|
2019-08-20 15:05:12 +00:00
|
|
|
privileged ? RUNSTATEDIR : "$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR",
|
2019-07-18 11:30:22 +00:00
|
|
|
SOCK_PREFIX);
|
|
|
|
if (privileged)
|
2019-08-20 15:05:12 +00:00
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, " %s/libvirt/%s-sock-ro\n",
|
|
|
|
RUNSTATEDIR, SOCK_PREFIX);
|
2019-07-18 11:30:22 +00:00
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
|
|
|
|
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef WITH_IP
|
2019-07-18 11:30:22 +00:00
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, " %s\n", _("TLS:"));
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, " %s %s\n",
|
|
|
|
_("CA certificate:"),
|
|
|
|
privileged ? LIBVIRT_CACERT : "$HOME/.pki/libvirt/cacert.pem");
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, " %s %s\n",
|
|
|
|
_("Server certificate:"),
|
|
|
|
privileged ? LIBVIRT_SERVERCERT : "$HOME/.pki/libvirt/servercert.pem");
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, " %s %s\n",
|
|
|
|
_("Server private key:"),
|
|
|
|
privileged ? LIBVIRT_SERVERKEY : "$HOME/.pki/libvirt/serverkey.pem");
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* ! WITH_IP */
|
2019-07-18 11:30:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, " %s\n",
|
|
|
|
_("PID file (unless overridden by -p):"));
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, " %s/%s.pid\n",
|
2019-08-20 15:05:12 +00:00
|
|
|
privileged ? RUNSTATEDIR : "$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/libvirt",
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
DAEMON_NAME);
|
2019-07-18 11:30:22 +00:00
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
|
2007-04-04 09:32:00 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
virNetDaemonPtr dmn = NULL;
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
virNetServerPtr srv = NULL;
|
2015-04-15 14:23:55 +00:00
|
|
|
virNetServerPtr srvAdm = NULL;
|
2018-03-08 12:20:37 +00:00
|
|
|
virNetServerProgramPtr adminProgram = NULL;
|
|
|
|
virNetServerProgramPtr lxcProgram = NULL;
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
char *remote_config_file = NULL;
|
2009-10-16 11:14:54 +00:00
|
|
|
int statuswrite = -1;
|
2007-02-23 12:48:36 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret = 1;
|
2011-08-05 14:11:11 +00:00
|
|
|
int pid_file_fd = -1;
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
char *pid_file = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *sock_file = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *sock_file_ro = NULL;
|
2015-04-15 14:23:55 +00:00
|
|
|
char *sock_file_adm = NULL;
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
int timeout = -1; /* -t: Shutdown timeout */
|
|
|
|
int verbose = 0;
|
|
|
|
int godaemon = 0;
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef WITH_IP
|
remote: introduce virtproxyd daemon to handle IP connectivity
The libvirtd daemon provides the traditional libvirt experience where
all the drivers are in a single daemon, and is accessible over both
local UNIX sockets and remote IP sockets.
In the new world we're having a set of per-driver daemons which will
primarily be accessed locally via their own UNIX sockets.
We still, however, need to allow for case of applications which will
connect to libvirt remotely. These remote connections can be done as
TCP/TLS sockets, or by SSH tunnelling to the UNIX socket.
In the later case, the old libvirt.so clients will only know about
the path to the old libvirtd socket /var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock,
and not the new driver sockets /var/run/libvirt/virtqemud-sock.
It is also not desirable to expose the main driver specific daemons
over IP directly to minimize their attack service.
Thus the virtproxyd daemon steps into place, to provide TCP/TLS sockets,
and back compat for the old libvirtd UNIX socket path(s). It will then
forward all RPC calls made to the appropriate driver specific daemon.
Essentially it is equivalent to the old libvirtd with absolutely no
drivers registered except for the remote driver (and other stateless
drivers in libvirt.so).
We could have modified libvirtd so none of the drivers are registed
to get the same end result. We could even add a libvirtd.conf parameter
to control whether the drivers are loaded to enable users to switch back
to the old world if we discover bugs in the split-daemon model. Using a
new daemon though has some advantages
- We can make virtproxyd and the virtXXXd per-driver daemons all
have "Conflicts: libvirtd.service" in their systemd unit files.
This will guarantee that libvirtd is never started at the same
time, as this would result in two daemons running the same driver.
Fortunately drivers use locking to protect themselves, but it is
better to avoid starting a daemon we know will conflict.
- It allows us to break CLI compat to remove the --listen parameter.
Both listen_tcp and listen_tls parameters in /etc/libvirtd/virtd.conf
will default to zero. Either TLS or TCP can be enabled exclusively
though virtd.conf without requiring the extra step of adding --listen.
- It allows us to set a strict SELinux policy over virtproxyd. For
back compat the libvirtd policy must continue to allow all drivers
to run. We can't easily give a second policy to libvirtd which
locks it down. By introducing a new virtproxyd we can set a strict
policy for that daemon only.
- It gets rid of the weird naming of having a daemon with "lib" in
its name. Now all normal daemons libvirt ships will have "virt"
as their prefix not "libvirt".
- Distros can more easily choose their upgrade path. They can
ship both sets of daemons in their packages, and choose to
either enable libvirtd, or enable the per-driver daemons and
virtproxyd out of the box. Users can easily override this if
desired by just tweaking which systemd units are active.
After some time we can deprecate use of libvirtd and after some more
time delete it entirely, leaving us in a pretty world filled with
prancing unicorns.
The main downside with introducing a new daemon, and with the
per-driver daemons in general, is figuring out the correct upgrade
path.
The conservative option is to leave libvirtd running if it was
an existing installation. Only use the new daemons & virtproxyd
on completely new installs.
The aggressive option is to disable libvirtd if already running
and activate all the new daemons.
Reviewed-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe de Dinechin <dinechin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2019-07-04 11:33:23 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifdef LIBVIRTD
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
int ipsock = 0;
|
remote: introduce virtproxyd daemon to handle IP connectivity
The libvirtd daemon provides the traditional libvirt experience where
all the drivers are in a single daemon, and is accessible over both
local UNIX sockets and remote IP sockets.
In the new world we're having a set of per-driver daemons which will
primarily be accessed locally via their own UNIX sockets.
We still, however, need to allow for case of applications which will
connect to libvirt remotely. These remote connections can be done as
TCP/TLS sockets, or by SSH tunnelling to the UNIX socket.
In the later case, the old libvirt.so clients will only know about
the path to the old libvirtd socket /var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock,
and not the new driver sockets /var/run/libvirt/virtqemud-sock.
It is also not desirable to expose the main driver specific daemons
over IP directly to minimize their attack service.
Thus the virtproxyd daemon steps into place, to provide TCP/TLS sockets,
and back compat for the old libvirtd UNIX socket path(s). It will then
forward all RPC calls made to the appropriate driver specific daemon.
Essentially it is equivalent to the old libvirtd with absolutely no
drivers registered except for the remote driver (and other stateless
drivers in libvirt.so).
We could have modified libvirtd so none of the drivers are registed
to get the same end result. We could even add a libvirtd.conf parameter
to control whether the drivers are loaded to enable users to switch back
to the old world if we discover bugs in the split-daemon model. Using a
new daemon though has some advantages
- We can make virtproxyd and the virtXXXd per-driver daemons all
have "Conflicts: libvirtd.service" in their systemd unit files.
This will guarantee that libvirtd is never started at the same
time, as this would result in two daemons running the same driver.
Fortunately drivers use locking to protect themselves, but it is
better to avoid starting a daemon we know will conflict.
- It allows us to break CLI compat to remove the --listen parameter.
Both listen_tcp and listen_tls parameters in /etc/libvirtd/virtd.conf
will default to zero. Either TLS or TCP can be enabled exclusively
though virtd.conf without requiring the extra step of adding --listen.
- It allows us to set a strict SELinux policy over virtproxyd. For
back compat the libvirtd policy must continue to allow all drivers
to run. We can't easily give a second policy to libvirtd which
locks it down. By introducing a new virtproxyd we can set a strict
policy for that daemon only.
- It gets rid of the weird naming of having a daemon with "lib" in
its name. Now all normal daemons libvirt ships will have "virt"
as their prefix not "libvirt".
- Distros can more easily choose their upgrade path. They can
ship both sets of daemons in their packages, and choose to
either enable libvirtd, or enable the per-driver daemons and
virtproxyd out of the box. Users can easily override this if
desired by just tweaking which systemd units are active.
After some time we can deprecate use of libvirtd and after some more
time delete it entirely, leaving us in a pretty world filled with
prancing unicorns.
The main downside with introducing a new daemon, and with the
per-driver daemons in general, is figuring out the correct upgrade
path.
The conservative option is to leave libvirtd running if it was
an existing installation. Only use the new daemons & virtproxyd
on completely new installs.
The aggressive option is to disable libvirtd if already running
and activate all the new daemons.
Reviewed-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe de Dinechin <dinechin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2019-07-04 11:33:23 +00:00
|
|
|
# else /* ! LIBVIRTD */
|
|
|
|
int ipsock = 1; /* listen_tcp/listen_tls default to 0 */
|
|
|
|
# endif /* ! LIBVIRTD */
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* ! WITH_IP */
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
struct daemonConfig *config;
|
|
|
|
bool privileged = geteuid() == 0 ? true : false;
|
2011-07-08 17:44:25 +00:00
|
|
|
bool implicit_conf = false;
|
2011-08-29 02:52:23 +00:00
|
|
|
char *run_dir = NULL;
|
|
|
|
mode_t old_umask;
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct option opts[] = {
|
2013-08-13 11:14:15 +00:00
|
|
|
{ "verbose", no_argument, &verbose, 'v'},
|
|
|
|
{ "daemon", no_argument, &godaemon, 'd'},
|
remote: introduce virtproxyd daemon to handle IP connectivity
The libvirtd daemon provides the traditional libvirt experience where
all the drivers are in a single daemon, and is accessible over both
local UNIX sockets and remote IP sockets.
In the new world we're having a set of per-driver daemons which will
primarily be accessed locally via their own UNIX sockets.
We still, however, need to allow for case of applications which will
connect to libvirt remotely. These remote connections can be done as
TCP/TLS sockets, or by SSH tunnelling to the UNIX socket.
In the later case, the old libvirt.so clients will only know about
the path to the old libvirtd socket /var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock,
and not the new driver sockets /var/run/libvirt/virtqemud-sock.
It is also not desirable to expose the main driver specific daemons
over IP directly to minimize their attack service.
Thus the virtproxyd daemon steps into place, to provide TCP/TLS sockets,
and back compat for the old libvirtd UNIX socket path(s). It will then
forward all RPC calls made to the appropriate driver specific daemon.
Essentially it is equivalent to the old libvirtd with absolutely no
drivers registered except for the remote driver (and other stateless
drivers in libvirt.so).
We could have modified libvirtd so none of the drivers are registed
to get the same end result. We could even add a libvirtd.conf parameter
to control whether the drivers are loaded to enable users to switch back
to the old world if we discover bugs in the split-daemon model. Using a
new daemon though has some advantages
- We can make virtproxyd and the virtXXXd per-driver daemons all
have "Conflicts: libvirtd.service" in their systemd unit files.
This will guarantee that libvirtd is never started at the same
time, as this would result in two daemons running the same driver.
Fortunately drivers use locking to protect themselves, but it is
better to avoid starting a daemon we know will conflict.
- It allows us to break CLI compat to remove the --listen parameter.
Both listen_tcp and listen_tls parameters in /etc/libvirtd/virtd.conf
will default to zero. Either TLS or TCP can be enabled exclusively
though virtd.conf without requiring the extra step of adding --listen.
- It allows us to set a strict SELinux policy over virtproxyd. For
back compat the libvirtd policy must continue to allow all drivers
to run. We can't easily give a second policy to libvirtd which
locks it down. By introducing a new virtproxyd we can set a strict
policy for that daemon only.
- It gets rid of the weird naming of having a daemon with "lib" in
its name. Now all normal daemons libvirt ships will have "virt"
as their prefix not "libvirt".
- Distros can more easily choose their upgrade path. They can
ship both sets of daemons in their packages, and choose to
either enable libvirtd, or enable the per-driver daemons and
virtproxyd out of the box. Users can easily override this if
desired by just tweaking which systemd units are active.
After some time we can deprecate use of libvirtd and after some more
time delete it entirely, leaving us in a pretty world filled with
prancing unicorns.
The main downside with introducing a new daemon, and with the
per-driver daemons in general, is figuring out the correct upgrade
path.
The conservative option is to leave libvirtd running if it was
an existing installation. Only use the new daemons & virtproxyd
on completely new installs.
The aggressive option is to disable libvirtd if already running
and activate all the new daemons.
Reviewed-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe de Dinechin <dinechin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2019-07-04 11:33:23 +00:00
|
|
|
#if defined(WITH_IP) && defined(LIBVIRTD)
|
2013-08-13 11:14:15 +00:00
|
|
|
{ "listen", no_argument, &ipsock, 'l'},
|
remote: introduce virtproxyd daemon to handle IP connectivity
The libvirtd daemon provides the traditional libvirt experience where
all the drivers are in a single daemon, and is accessible over both
local UNIX sockets and remote IP sockets.
In the new world we're having a set of per-driver daemons which will
primarily be accessed locally via their own UNIX sockets.
We still, however, need to allow for case of applications which will
connect to libvirt remotely. These remote connections can be done as
TCP/TLS sockets, or by SSH tunnelling to the UNIX socket.
In the later case, the old libvirt.so clients will only know about
the path to the old libvirtd socket /var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock,
and not the new driver sockets /var/run/libvirt/virtqemud-sock.
It is also not desirable to expose the main driver specific daemons
over IP directly to minimize their attack service.
Thus the virtproxyd daemon steps into place, to provide TCP/TLS sockets,
and back compat for the old libvirtd UNIX socket path(s). It will then
forward all RPC calls made to the appropriate driver specific daemon.
Essentially it is equivalent to the old libvirtd with absolutely no
drivers registered except for the remote driver (and other stateless
drivers in libvirt.so).
We could have modified libvirtd so none of the drivers are registed
to get the same end result. We could even add a libvirtd.conf parameter
to control whether the drivers are loaded to enable users to switch back
to the old world if we discover bugs in the split-daemon model. Using a
new daemon though has some advantages
- We can make virtproxyd and the virtXXXd per-driver daemons all
have "Conflicts: libvirtd.service" in their systemd unit files.
This will guarantee that libvirtd is never started at the same
time, as this would result in two daemons running the same driver.
Fortunately drivers use locking to protect themselves, but it is
better to avoid starting a daemon we know will conflict.
- It allows us to break CLI compat to remove the --listen parameter.
Both listen_tcp and listen_tls parameters in /etc/libvirtd/virtd.conf
will default to zero. Either TLS or TCP can be enabled exclusively
though virtd.conf without requiring the extra step of adding --listen.
- It allows us to set a strict SELinux policy over virtproxyd. For
back compat the libvirtd policy must continue to allow all drivers
to run. We can't easily give a second policy to libvirtd which
locks it down. By introducing a new virtproxyd we can set a strict
policy for that daemon only.
- It gets rid of the weird naming of having a daemon with "lib" in
its name. Now all normal daemons libvirt ships will have "virt"
as their prefix not "libvirt".
- Distros can more easily choose their upgrade path. They can
ship both sets of daemons in their packages, and choose to
either enable libvirtd, or enable the per-driver daemons and
virtproxyd out of the box. Users can easily override this if
desired by just tweaking which systemd units are active.
After some time we can deprecate use of libvirtd and after some more
time delete it entirely, leaving us in a pretty world filled with
prancing unicorns.
The main downside with introducing a new daemon, and with the
per-driver daemons in general, is figuring out the correct upgrade
path.
The conservative option is to leave libvirtd running if it was
an existing installation. Only use the new daemons & virtproxyd
on completely new installs.
The aggressive option is to disable libvirtd if already running
and activate all the new daemons.
Reviewed-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe de Dinechin <dinechin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2019-07-04 11:33:23 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* !(WITH_IP && LIBVIRTD) */
|
2007-08-07 13:24:22 +00:00
|
|
|
{ "config", required_argument, NULL, 'f'},
|
2007-04-04 09:32:00 +00:00
|
|
|
{ "timeout", required_argument, NULL, 't'},
|
|
|
|
{ "pid-file", required_argument, NULL, 'p'},
|
2013-08-13 11:14:15 +00:00
|
|
|
{ "version", no_argument, NULL, 'V' },
|
|
|
|
{ "help", no_argument, NULL, 'h' },
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
{0, 0, 0, 0}
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-12 22:29:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virGettextInitialize() < 0 ||
|
2010-11-16 19:01:37 +00:00
|
|
|
virInitialize() < 0) {
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: initialization failed\n"), argv[0]);
|
2010-11-16 19:01:37 +00:00
|
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
2010-05-20 07:52:20 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-10-16 10:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-03-05 17:20:50 +00:00
|
|
|
virUpdateSelfLastChanged(argv[0]);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-04-24 14:57:36 +00:00
|
|
|
virFileActivateDirOverride(argv[0]);
|
|
|
|
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
while (1) {
|
|
|
|
int optidx = 0;
|
|
|
|
int c;
|
|
|
|
char *tmp;
|
remote: introduce virtproxyd daemon to handle IP connectivity
The libvirtd daemon provides the traditional libvirt experience where
all the drivers are in a single daemon, and is accessible over both
local UNIX sockets and remote IP sockets.
In the new world we're having a set of per-driver daemons which will
primarily be accessed locally via their own UNIX sockets.
We still, however, need to allow for case of applications which will
connect to libvirt remotely. These remote connections can be done as
TCP/TLS sockets, or by SSH tunnelling to the UNIX socket.
In the later case, the old libvirt.so clients will only know about
the path to the old libvirtd socket /var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock,
and not the new driver sockets /var/run/libvirt/virtqemud-sock.
It is also not desirable to expose the main driver specific daemons
over IP directly to minimize their attack service.
Thus the virtproxyd daemon steps into place, to provide TCP/TLS sockets,
and back compat for the old libvirtd UNIX socket path(s). It will then
forward all RPC calls made to the appropriate driver specific daemon.
Essentially it is equivalent to the old libvirtd with absolutely no
drivers registered except for the remote driver (and other stateless
drivers in libvirt.so).
We could have modified libvirtd so none of the drivers are registed
to get the same end result. We could even add a libvirtd.conf parameter
to control whether the drivers are loaded to enable users to switch back
to the old world if we discover bugs in the split-daemon model. Using a
new daemon though has some advantages
- We can make virtproxyd and the virtXXXd per-driver daemons all
have "Conflicts: libvirtd.service" in their systemd unit files.
This will guarantee that libvirtd is never started at the same
time, as this would result in two daemons running the same driver.
Fortunately drivers use locking to protect themselves, but it is
better to avoid starting a daemon we know will conflict.
- It allows us to break CLI compat to remove the --listen parameter.
Both listen_tcp and listen_tls parameters in /etc/libvirtd/virtd.conf
will default to zero. Either TLS or TCP can be enabled exclusively
though virtd.conf without requiring the extra step of adding --listen.
- It allows us to set a strict SELinux policy over virtproxyd. For
back compat the libvirtd policy must continue to allow all drivers
to run. We can't easily give a second policy to libvirtd which
locks it down. By introducing a new virtproxyd we can set a strict
policy for that daemon only.
- It gets rid of the weird naming of having a daemon with "lib" in
its name. Now all normal daemons libvirt ships will have "virt"
as their prefix not "libvirt".
- Distros can more easily choose their upgrade path. They can
ship both sets of daemons in their packages, and choose to
either enable libvirtd, or enable the per-driver daemons and
virtproxyd out of the box. Users can easily override this if
desired by just tweaking which systemd units are active.
After some time we can deprecate use of libvirtd and after some more
time delete it entirely, leaving us in a pretty world filled with
prancing unicorns.
The main downside with introducing a new daemon, and with the
per-driver daemons in general, is figuring out the correct upgrade
path.
The conservative option is to leave libvirtd running if it was
an existing installation. Only use the new daemons & virtproxyd
on completely new installs.
The aggressive option is to disable libvirtd if already running
and activate all the new daemons.
Reviewed-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe de Dinechin <dinechin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2019-07-04 11:33:23 +00:00
|
|
|
#if defined(WITH_IP) && defined(LIBVIRTD)
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *optstr = "ldf:p:t:vVh";
|
remote: introduce virtproxyd daemon to handle IP connectivity
The libvirtd daemon provides the traditional libvirt experience where
all the drivers are in a single daemon, and is accessible over both
local UNIX sockets and remote IP sockets.
In the new world we're having a set of per-driver daemons which will
primarily be accessed locally via their own UNIX sockets.
We still, however, need to allow for case of applications which will
connect to libvirt remotely. These remote connections can be done as
TCP/TLS sockets, or by SSH tunnelling to the UNIX socket.
In the later case, the old libvirt.so clients will only know about
the path to the old libvirtd socket /var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock,
and not the new driver sockets /var/run/libvirt/virtqemud-sock.
It is also not desirable to expose the main driver specific daemons
over IP directly to minimize their attack service.
Thus the virtproxyd daemon steps into place, to provide TCP/TLS sockets,
and back compat for the old libvirtd UNIX socket path(s). It will then
forward all RPC calls made to the appropriate driver specific daemon.
Essentially it is equivalent to the old libvirtd with absolutely no
drivers registered except for the remote driver (and other stateless
drivers in libvirt.so).
We could have modified libvirtd so none of the drivers are registed
to get the same end result. We could even add a libvirtd.conf parameter
to control whether the drivers are loaded to enable users to switch back
to the old world if we discover bugs in the split-daemon model. Using a
new daemon though has some advantages
- We can make virtproxyd and the virtXXXd per-driver daemons all
have "Conflicts: libvirtd.service" in their systemd unit files.
This will guarantee that libvirtd is never started at the same
time, as this would result in two daemons running the same driver.
Fortunately drivers use locking to protect themselves, but it is
better to avoid starting a daemon we know will conflict.
- It allows us to break CLI compat to remove the --listen parameter.
Both listen_tcp and listen_tls parameters in /etc/libvirtd/virtd.conf
will default to zero. Either TLS or TCP can be enabled exclusively
though virtd.conf without requiring the extra step of adding --listen.
- It allows us to set a strict SELinux policy over virtproxyd. For
back compat the libvirtd policy must continue to allow all drivers
to run. We can't easily give a second policy to libvirtd which
locks it down. By introducing a new virtproxyd we can set a strict
policy for that daemon only.
- It gets rid of the weird naming of having a daemon with "lib" in
its name. Now all normal daemons libvirt ships will have "virt"
as their prefix not "libvirt".
- Distros can more easily choose their upgrade path. They can
ship both sets of daemons in their packages, and choose to
either enable libvirtd, or enable the per-driver daemons and
virtproxyd out of the box. Users can easily override this if
desired by just tweaking which systemd units are active.
After some time we can deprecate use of libvirtd and after some more
time delete it entirely, leaving us in a pretty world filled with
prancing unicorns.
The main downside with introducing a new daemon, and with the
per-driver daemons in general, is figuring out the correct upgrade
path.
The conservative option is to leave libvirtd running if it was
an existing installation. Only use the new daemons & virtproxyd
on completely new installs.
The aggressive option is to disable libvirtd if already running
and activate all the new daemons.
Reviewed-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe de Dinechin <dinechin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2019-07-04 11:33:23 +00:00
|
|
|
#else /* !(WITH_IP && LIBVIRTD) */
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *optstr = "df:p:t:vVh";
|
remote: introduce virtproxyd daemon to handle IP connectivity
The libvirtd daemon provides the traditional libvirt experience where
all the drivers are in a single daemon, and is accessible over both
local UNIX sockets and remote IP sockets.
In the new world we're having a set of per-driver daemons which will
primarily be accessed locally via their own UNIX sockets.
We still, however, need to allow for case of applications which will
connect to libvirt remotely. These remote connections can be done as
TCP/TLS sockets, or by SSH tunnelling to the UNIX socket.
In the later case, the old libvirt.so clients will only know about
the path to the old libvirtd socket /var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock,
and not the new driver sockets /var/run/libvirt/virtqemud-sock.
It is also not desirable to expose the main driver specific daemons
over IP directly to minimize their attack service.
Thus the virtproxyd daemon steps into place, to provide TCP/TLS sockets,
and back compat for the old libvirtd UNIX socket path(s). It will then
forward all RPC calls made to the appropriate driver specific daemon.
Essentially it is equivalent to the old libvirtd with absolutely no
drivers registered except for the remote driver (and other stateless
drivers in libvirt.so).
We could have modified libvirtd so none of the drivers are registed
to get the same end result. We could even add a libvirtd.conf parameter
to control whether the drivers are loaded to enable users to switch back
to the old world if we discover bugs in the split-daemon model. Using a
new daemon though has some advantages
- We can make virtproxyd and the virtXXXd per-driver daemons all
have "Conflicts: libvirtd.service" in their systemd unit files.
This will guarantee that libvirtd is never started at the same
time, as this would result in two daemons running the same driver.
Fortunately drivers use locking to protect themselves, but it is
better to avoid starting a daemon we know will conflict.
- It allows us to break CLI compat to remove the --listen parameter.
Both listen_tcp and listen_tls parameters in /etc/libvirtd/virtd.conf
will default to zero. Either TLS or TCP can be enabled exclusively
though virtd.conf without requiring the extra step of adding --listen.
- It allows us to set a strict SELinux policy over virtproxyd. For
back compat the libvirtd policy must continue to allow all drivers
to run. We can't easily give a second policy to libvirtd which
locks it down. By introducing a new virtproxyd we can set a strict
policy for that daemon only.
- It gets rid of the weird naming of having a daemon with "lib" in
its name. Now all normal daemons libvirt ships will have "virt"
as their prefix not "libvirt".
- Distros can more easily choose their upgrade path. They can
ship both sets of daemons in their packages, and choose to
either enable libvirtd, or enable the per-driver daemons and
virtproxyd out of the box. Users can easily override this if
desired by just tweaking which systemd units are active.
After some time we can deprecate use of libvirtd and after some more
time delete it entirely, leaving us in a pretty world filled with
prancing unicorns.
The main downside with introducing a new daemon, and with the
per-driver daemons in general, is figuring out the correct upgrade
path.
The conservative option is to leave libvirtd running if it was
an existing installation. Only use the new daemons & virtproxyd
on completely new installs.
The aggressive option is to disable libvirtd if already running
and activate all the new daemons.
Reviewed-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe de Dinechin <dinechin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2019-07-04 11:33:23 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* !(WITH_IP && LIBVIRTD) */
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
c = getopt_long(argc, argv, optstr, opts, &optidx);
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 14:20:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (c == -1)
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (c) {
|
|
|
|
case 0:
|
|
|
|
/* Got one of the flags */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 'v':
|
|
|
|
verbose = 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 'd':
|
|
|
|
godaemon = 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
remote: introduce virtproxyd daemon to handle IP connectivity
The libvirtd daemon provides the traditional libvirt experience where
all the drivers are in a single daemon, and is accessible over both
local UNIX sockets and remote IP sockets.
In the new world we're having a set of per-driver daemons which will
primarily be accessed locally via their own UNIX sockets.
We still, however, need to allow for case of applications which will
connect to libvirt remotely. These remote connections can be done as
TCP/TLS sockets, or by SSH tunnelling to the UNIX socket.
In the later case, the old libvirt.so clients will only know about
the path to the old libvirtd socket /var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock,
and not the new driver sockets /var/run/libvirt/virtqemud-sock.
It is also not desirable to expose the main driver specific daemons
over IP directly to minimize their attack service.
Thus the virtproxyd daemon steps into place, to provide TCP/TLS sockets,
and back compat for the old libvirtd UNIX socket path(s). It will then
forward all RPC calls made to the appropriate driver specific daemon.
Essentially it is equivalent to the old libvirtd with absolutely no
drivers registered except for the remote driver (and other stateless
drivers in libvirt.so).
We could have modified libvirtd so none of the drivers are registed
to get the same end result. We could even add a libvirtd.conf parameter
to control whether the drivers are loaded to enable users to switch back
to the old world if we discover bugs in the split-daemon model. Using a
new daemon though has some advantages
- We can make virtproxyd and the virtXXXd per-driver daemons all
have "Conflicts: libvirtd.service" in their systemd unit files.
This will guarantee that libvirtd is never started at the same
time, as this would result in two daemons running the same driver.
Fortunately drivers use locking to protect themselves, but it is
better to avoid starting a daemon we know will conflict.
- It allows us to break CLI compat to remove the --listen parameter.
Both listen_tcp and listen_tls parameters in /etc/libvirtd/virtd.conf
will default to zero. Either TLS or TCP can be enabled exclusively
though virtd.conf without requiring the extra step of adding --listen.
- It allows us to set a strict SELinux policy over virtproxyd. For
back compat the libvirtd policy must continue to allow all drivers
to run. We can't easily give a second policy to libvirtd which
locks it down. By introducing a new virtproxyd we can set a strict
policy for that daemon only.
- It gets rid of the weird naming of having a daemon with "lib" in
its name. Now all normal daemons libvirt ships will have "virt"
as their prefix not "libvirt".
- Distros can more easily choose their upgrade path. They can
ship both sets of daemons in their packages, and choose to
either enable libvirtd, or enable the per-driver daemons and
virtproxyd out of the box. Users can easily override this if
desired by just tweaking which systemd units are active.
After some time we can deprecate use of libvirtd and after some more
time delete it entirely, leaving us in a pretty world filled with
prancing unicorns.
The main downside with introducing a new daemon, and with the
per-driver daemons in general, is figuring out the correct upgrade
path.
The conservative option is to leave libvirtd running if it was
an existing installation. Only use the new daemons & virtproxyd
on completely new installs.
The aggressive option is to disable libvirtd if already running
and activate all the new daemons.
Reviewed-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe de Dinechin <dinechin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2019-07-04 11:33:23 +00:00
|
|
|
#if defined(WITH_IP) && defined(LIBVIRTD)
|
2007-06-26 23:48:46 +00:00
|
|
|
case 'l':
|
|
|
|
ipsock = 1;
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
remote: introduce virtproxyd daemon to handle IP connectivity
The libvirtd daemon provides the traditional libvirt experience where
all the drivers are in a single daemon, and is accessible over both
local UNIX sockets and remote IP sockets.
In the new world we're having a set of per-driver daemons which will
primarily be accessed locally via their own UNIX sockets.
We still, however, need to allow for case of applications which will
connect to libvirt remotely. These remote connections can be done as
TCP/TLS sockets, or by SSH tunnelling to the UNIX socket.
In the later case, the old libvirt.so clients will only know about
the path to the old libvirtd socket /var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock,
and not the new driver sockets /var/run/libvirt/virtqemud-sock.
It is also not desirable to expose the main driver specific daemons
over IP directly to minimize their attack service.
Thus the virtproxyd daemon steps into place, to provide TCP/TLS sockets,
and back compat for the old libvirtd UNIX socket path(s). It will then
forward all RPC calls made to the appropriate driver specific daemon.
Essentially it is equivalent to the old libvirtd with absolutely no
drivers registered except for the remote driver (and other stateless
drivers in libvirt.so).
We could have modified libvirtd so none of the drivers are registed
to get the same end result. We could even add a libvirtd.conf parameter
to control whether the drivers are loaded to enable users to switch back
to the old world if we discover bugs in the split-daemon model. Using a
new daemon though has some advantages
- We can make virtproxyd and the virtXXXd per-driver daemons all
have "Conflicts: libvirtd.service" in their systemd unit files.
This will guarantee that libvirtd is never started at the same
time, as this would result in two daemons running the same driver.
Fortunately drivers use locking to protect themselves, but it is
better to avoid starting a daemon we know will conflict.
- It allows us to break CLI compat to remove the --listen parameter.
Both listen_tcp and listen_tls parameters in /etc/libvirtd/virtd.conf
will default to zero. Either TLS or TCP can be enabled exclusively
though virtd.conf without requiring the extra step of adding --listen.
- It allows us to set a strict SELinux policy over virtproxyd. For
back compat the libvirtd policy must continue to allow all drivers
to run. We can't easily give a second policy to libvirtd which
locks it down. By introducing a new virtproxyd we can set a strict
policy for that daemon only.
- It gets rid of the weird naming of having a daemon with "lib" in
its name. Now all normal daemons libvirt ships will have "virt"
as their prefix not "libvirt".
- Distros can more easily choose their upgrade path. They can
ship both sets of daemons in their packages, and choose to
either enable libvirtd, or enable the per-driver daemons and
virtproxyd out of the box. Users can easily override this if
desired by just tweaking which systemd units are active.
After some time we can deprecate use of libvirtd and after some more
time delete it entirely, leaving us in a pretty world filled with
prancing unicorns.
The main downside with introducing a new daemon, and with the
per-driver daemons in general, is figuring out the correct upgrade
path.
The conservative option is to leave libvirtd running if it was
an existing installation. Only use the new daemons & virtproxyd
on completely new installs.
The aggressive option is to disable libvirtd if already running
and activate all the new daemons.
Reviewed-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe de Dinechin <dinechin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2019-07-04 11:33:23 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* !(WITH_IP && LIBVIRTD) */
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case 't':
|
2008-02-08 09:15:16 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virStrToLong_i(optarg, &tmp, 10, &timeout) != 0
|
2007-11-14 10:53:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|| timeout <= 0
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure that we can multiply by 1000 without overflowing. */
|
2011-09-19 04:16:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|| timeout > INT_MAX / 1000) {
|
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("Invalid value for timeout"));
|
|
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2007-02-23 12:48:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case 'p':
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_FREE(pid_file);
|
2013-05-03 12:39:39 +00:00
|
|
|
if (VIR_STRDUP_QUIET(pid_file, optarg) < 0) {
|
2011-08-12 11:41:29 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("Can't allocate memory"));
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
2011-08-12 11:41:29 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-06-11 12:04:54 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case 'f':
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_FREE(remote_config_file);
|
2013-05-03 12:39:39 +00:00
|
|
|
if (VIR_STRDUP_QUIET(remote_config_file, optarg) < 0) {
|
2011-08-12 11:41:29 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("Can't allocate memory"));
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
2011-08-12 11:41:29 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-02-23 12:48:36 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-08-13 11:14:15 +00:00
|
|
|
case 'V':
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
daemonVersion(argv[0]);
|
2013-08-13 11:14:15 +00:00
|
|
|
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
|
2008-12-12 07:56:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-08-13 11:14:15 +00:00
|
|
|
case 'h':
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
daemonUsage(argv[0], privileged);
|
2013-08-13 11:14:15 +00:00
|
|
|
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-08-13 11:14:15 +00:00
|
|
|
case '?':
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
default:
|
2013-08-13 11:14:15 +00:00
|
|
|
daemonUsage(argv[0], privileged);
|
2012-10-17 09:23:12 +00:00
|
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-05-16 11:03:02 +00:00
|
|
|
if (optind != argc) {
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "%s: unexpected, non-option, command line arguments\n",
|
|
|
|
argv[0]);
|
|
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-08-12 11:41:29 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!(config = daemonConfigNew(privileged))) {
|
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("Can't create initial configuration"));
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
2011-08-12 11:41:29 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* No explicit config, so try and find a default one */
|
2011-07-08 17:44:25 +00:00
|
|
|
if (remote_config_file == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
implicit_conf = true;
|
|
|
|
if (daemonConfigFilePath(privileged,
|
2011-08-12 11:41:29 +00:00
|
|
|
&remote_config_file) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("Can't determine config path"));
|
2011-07-08 17:44:25 +00:00
|
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
2011-08-12 11:41:29 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-07-08 17:44:25 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Read the config file if it exists*/
|
|
|
|
if (remote_config_file &&
|
2012-04-04 12:14:19 +00:00
|
|
|
daemonConfigLoadFile(config, remote_config_file, implicit_conf) < 0) {
|
2016-05-19 19:10:19 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("Can't load config file: %s: %s"),
|
|
|
|
virGetLastErrorMessage(), remote_config_file);
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
2011-08-12 11:41:29 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-03 09:12:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if (daemonSetupHostUUID(config) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("Can't setup host uuid"));
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
2009-01-12 18:22:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-08-12 11:41:29 +00:00
|
|
|
if (daemonSetupLogging(config, privileged, verbose, godaemon) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("Can't initialize logging"));
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
2011-08-12 11:41:29 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-02-07 15:16:44 +00:00
|
|
|
daemonSetupNetDevOpenvswitch(config);
|
|
|
|
|
2013-04-17 11:01:24 +00:00
|
|
|
if (daemonSetupAccessManager(config) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("Can't initialize access manager"));
|
|
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-08-05 14:11:11 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!pid_file &&
|
2014-09-07 17:52:34 +00:00
|
|
|
virPidFileConstructPath(privileged,
|
2019-08-20 15:05:12 +00:00
|
|
|
RUNSTATEDIR,
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
DAEMON_NAME,
|
2014-09-07 17:52:34 +00:00
|
|
|
&pid_file) < 0) {
|
2011-08-12 11:41:29 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("Can't determine pid file path."));
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
2011-08-12 11:41:29 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2012-06-15 12:48:34 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_DEBUG("Decided on pid file path '%s'", NULLSTR(pid_file));
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (daemonUnixSocketPaths(config,
|
|
|
|
privileged,
|
|
|
|
&sock_file,
|
2015-04-15 14:23:55 +00:00
|
|
|
&sock_file_ro,
|
|
|
|
&sock_file_adm) < 0) {
|
2011-08-12 11:41:29 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("Can't determine socket paths"));
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
2011-08-12 11:41:29 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-04-15 14:23:55 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_DEBUG("Decided on socket paths '%s', '%s' and '%s'",
|
|
|
|
sock_file,
|
|
|
|
NULLSTR(sock_file_ro),
|
|
|
|
NULLSTR(sock_file_adm));
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-05-20 16:17:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (godaemon) {
|
2009-02-05 16:28:03 +00:00
|
|
|
char ebuf[1024];
|
2010-12-13 10:18:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (chdir("/") < 0) {
|
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("cannot change to root directory: %s"),
|
|
|
|
virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof(ebuf)));
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2010-12-13 10:18:45 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((statuswrite = daemonForkIntoBackground(argv[0])) < 0) {
|
2009-02-05 16:28:03 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to fork as daemon: %s"),
|
2012-03-29 09:52:04 +00:00
|
|
|
virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof(ebuf)));
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2008-05-20 16:17:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-06 21:51:02 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Try to claim the pidfile, exiting if we can't */
|
|
|
|
if ((pid_file_fd = virPidFileAcquirePath(pid_file, false, getpid())) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_PIDFILE;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-22 17:49:41 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Ensure the rundir exists (on tmpfs on some systems) */
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
if (privileged) {
|
2019-08-20 15:05:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (VIR_STRDUP_QUIET(run_dir, RUNSTATEDIR "/libvirt") < 0) {
|
2013-05-03 12:39:39 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("Can't allocate memory"));
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-08-29 02:52:23 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2012-05-24 12:29:42 +00:00
|
|
|
run_dir = virGetUserRuntimeDirectory();
|
2011-08-29 02:52:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-05-03 16:36:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!run_dir) {
|
2011-08-29 02:52:23 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("Can't determine user directory"));
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2009-01-22 17:49:41 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-06-11 11:31:16 +00:00
|
|
|
if (privileged)
|
|
|
|
old_umask = umask(022);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
old_umask = umask(077);
|
2012-06-15 12:48:34 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_DEBUG("Ensuring run dir '%s' exists", run_dir);
|
2011-08-29 02:52:23 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virFileMakePath(run_dir) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
char ebuf[1024];
|
|
|
|
VIR_ERROR(_("unable to create rundir %s: %s"), run_dir,
|
|
|
|
virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof(ebuf)));
|
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_RUNDIR;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
umask(old_umask);
|
2009-01-22 17:49:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-05-03 14:39:04 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virNetlinkStartup() < 0) {
|
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_INIT;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-06 21:55:15 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!(dmn = virNetDaemonNew())) {
|
2018-04-19 16:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_DRIVER;
|
2017-11-06 21:55:15 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!(srv = virNetServerNew(DAEMON_NAME, 1,
|
2016-03-01 14:34:15 +00:00
|
|
|
config->min_workers,
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
config->max_workers,
|
2011-08-12 12:04:31 +00:00
|
|
|
config->prio_workers,
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
config->max_clients,
|
2014-03-04 17:55:24 +00:00
|
|
|
config->max_anonymous_clients,
|
2011-08-24 13:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
config->keepalive_interval,
|
|
|
|
config->keepalive_count,
|
2018-01-22 18:29:55 +00:00
|
|
|
remoteClientNew,
|
2012-08-09 11:54:54 +00:00
|
|
|
NULL,
|
2018-01-22 18:29:55 +00:00
|
|
|
remoteClientFree,
|
2012-03-15 18:14:51 +00:00
|
|
|
NULL))) {
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_INIT;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-06 21:55:15 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virNetDaemonAddServer(dmn, srv) < 0) {
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_INIT;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-04-19 16:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (daemonInitialize() < 0) {
|
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_INIT;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-02-17 13:17:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
remoteProcs[REMOTE_PROC_AUTH_LIST].needAuth = false;
|
|
|
|
remoteProcs[REMOTE_PROC_AUTH_SASL_INIT].needAuth = false;
|
|
|
|
remoteProcs[REMOTE_PROC_AUTH_SASL_STEP].needAuth = false;
|
|
|
|
remoteProcs[REMOTE_PROC_AUTH_SASL_START].needAuth = false;
|
|
|
|
remoteProcs[REMOTE_PROC_AUTH_POLKIT].needAuth = false;
|
|
|
|
if (!(remoteProgram = virNetServerProgramNew(REMOTE_PROGRAM,
|
|
|
|
REMOTE_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
|
|
|
|
remoteProcs,
|
|
|
|
remoteNProcs))) {
|
2009-10-16 11:14:54 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_INIT;
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (virNetServerAddProgram(srv, remoteProgram) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_INIT;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2007-12-05 15:34:05 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-02-16 18:28:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-12-21 14:20:04 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!(lxcProgram = virNetServerProgramNew(LXC_PROGRAM,
|
|
|
|
LXC_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
|
|
|
|
lxcProcs,
|
|
|
|
lxcNProcs))) {
|
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_INIT;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (virNetServerAddProgram(srv, lxcProgram) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_INIT;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!(qemuProgram = virNetServerProgramNew(QEMU_PROGRAM,
|
|
|
|
QEMU_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
|
|
|
|
qemuProcs,
|
|
|
|
qemuNProcs))) {
|
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_INIT;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (virNetServerAddProgram(srv, qemuProgram) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_INIT;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2009-10-16 11:14:54 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-10-16 10:48:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-04-13 18:54:40 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!(srvAdm = virNetServerNew("admin", 1,
|
2016-03-01 14:34:15 +00:00
|
|
|
config->admin_min_workers,
|
2015-04-15 14:23:55 +00:00
|
|
|
config->admin_max_workers,
|
|
|
|
0,
|
|
|
|
config->admin_max_clients,
|
|
|
|
0,
|
|
|
|
config->admin_keepalive_interval,
|
|
|
|
config->admin_keepalive_count,
|
2018-01-22 18:29:55 +00:00
|
|
|
remoteAdmClientNew,
|
2015-04-15 14:23:55 +00:00
|
|
|
NULL,
|
2018-01-22 18:29:55 +00:00
|
|
|
remoteAdmClientFree,
|
2015-04-15 14:23:55 +00:00
|
|
|
dmn))) {
|
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_INIT;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-01 14:40:31 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virNetDaemonAddServer(dmn, srvAdm) < 0) {
|
2015-04-15 14:23:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_INIT;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!(adminProgram = virNetServerProgramNew(ADMIN_PROGRAM,
|
|
|
|
ADMIN_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
|
|
|
|
adminProcs,
|
|
|
|
adminNProcs))) {
|
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_INIT;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (virNetServerAddProgram(srvAdm, adminProgram) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_INIT;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-06-15 12:48:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if (timeout != -1) {
|
|
|
|
VIR_DEBUG("Registering shutdown timeout %d", timeout);
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
virNetDaemonAutoShutdown(dmn, timeout);
|
2012-06-15 12:48:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((daemonSetupSignals(dmn)) < 0) {
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_SIGNAL;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2009-10-16 11:14:54 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
if (config->audit_level) {
|
2012-06-15 12:48:34 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_DEBUG("Attempting to configure auditing subsystem");
|
2017-12-13 10:56:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virAuditOpen(config->audit_level) < 0) {
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
if (config->audit_level > 1) {
|
2010-09-15 13:44:11 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_AUDIT;
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2010-09-15 13:44:11 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2012-06-15 12:48:34 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_DEBUG("Proceeding without auditing");
|
2010-09-15 13:44:11 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-10-28 19:07:09 +00:00
|
|
|
virAuditLog(config->audit_logging > 0);
|
2010-09-15 13:44:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2010-03-26 14:53:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/* setup the hooks if any */
|
2010-03-30 13:06:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if (virHookInitialize() < 0) {
|
2010-03-26 14:53:32 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_HOOKS;
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2010-03-26 14:53:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-10-19 17:28:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Disable error func, now logging is setup */
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
virSetErrorFunc(NULL, daemonErrorHandler);
|
2011-01-21 17:25:01 +00:00
|
|
|
virSetErrorLogPriorityFunc(daemonErrorLogFilter);
|
2009-10-19 17:28:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2010-03-26 14:53:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Call the daemon startup hook
|
|
|
|
* TODO: should we abort the daemon startup if the script returned
|
|
|
|
* an error ?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
virHookCall(VIR_HOOK_DRIVER_DAEMON, "-", VIR_HOOK_DAEMON_OP_START,
|
2012-02-27 16:06:22 +00:00
|
|
|
0, "start", NULL, NULL);
|
2010-03-26 14:53:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-15 14:23:55 +00:00
|
|
|
if (daemonSetupNetworking(srv, srvAdm,
|
|
|
|
config,
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef WITH_IP
|
|
|
|
ipsock,
|
|
|
|
privileged,
|
|
|
|
#endif /* !WITH_IP */
|
2015-04-15 14:23:55 +00:00
|
|
|
sock_file,
|
|
|
|
sock_file_ro,
|
2019-06-21 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
sock_file_adm) < 0) {
|
2009-10-16 11:14:54 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_NETWORK;
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2007-12-05 15:34:05 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-10-16 11:14:54 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Tell parent of daemon that basic initialization is complete
|
|
|
|
* In particular we're ready to accept net connections & have
|
|
|
|
* written the pidfile
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (statuswrite != -1) {
|
|
|
|
char status = 0;
|
2018-02-20 13:16:28 +00:00
|
|
|
ignore_value(safewrite(statuswrite, &status, 1));
|
2010-11-09 20:48:48 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(statuswrite);
|
2009-10-16 11:14:54 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Initialize drivers & then start accepting new clients from network */
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if (daemonStateInit(dmn) < 0) {
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_INIT;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2009-10-16 11:14:54 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-08-29 01:21:38 +00:00
|
|
|
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(NETLINK_ROUTE)
|
2012-08-22 04:10:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Register the netlink event service for NETLINK_ROUTE */
|
|
|
|
if (virNetlinkEventServiceStart(NETLINK_ROUTE, 0) < 0) {
|
2012-02-22 13:17:13 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_NETWORK;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-08-29 01:21:38 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2012-02-22 13:17:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-08-29 01:21:38 +00:00
|
|
|
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT)
|
2012-08-22 04:10:25 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Register the netlink event service for NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT */
|
|
|
|
if (virNetlinkEventServiceStart(NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT, 1) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
ret = VIR_DAEMON_ERR_NETWORK;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-08-29 01:21:38 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2012-08-22 04:10:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Run event loop. */
|
2015-03-16 14:02:41 +00:00
|
|
|
virNetDaemonRun(dmn);
|
2009-10-16 15:34:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-02-23 12:48:36 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-03-26 14:53:32 +00:00
|
|
|
virHookCall(VIR_HOOK_DRIVER_DAEMON, "-", VIR_HOOK_DAEMON_OP_SHUTDOWN,
|
2012-02-27 16:06:22 +00:00
|
|
|
0, "shutdown", NULL, NULL);
|
2010-03-26 14:53:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-03-25 06:45:38 +00:00
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
2017-11-06 20:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Keep cleanup order in inverse order of startup */
|
|
|
|
virNetDaemonClose(dmn);
|
|
|
|
|
2012-08-22 04:10:24 +00:00
|
|
|
virNetlinkEventServiceStopAll();
|
2017-11-06 20:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (driversInitialized) {
|
|
|
|
/* NB: Possible issue with timing window between driversInitialized
|
|
|
|
* setting if virNetlinkEventServerStart fails */
|
|
|
|
driversInitialized = false;
|
|
|
|
virStateCleanup();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-15 14:23:55 +00:00
|
|
|
virObjectUnref(adminProgram);
|
|
|
|
virObjectUnref(srvAdm);
|
2017-11-06 20:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
virObjectUnref(qemuProgram);
|
|
|
|
virObjectUnref(lxcProgram);
|
|
|
|
virObjectUnref(remoteProgram);
|
|
|
|
virObjectUnref(srv);
|
|
|
|
virObjectUnref(dmn);
|
|
|
|
|
2012-05-03 14:39:04 +00:00
|
|
|
virNetlinkShutdown();
|
2017-11-06 20:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pid_file_fd != -1)
|
|
|
|
virPidFileReleasePath(pid_file, pid_file_fd);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
VIR_FREE(run_dir);
|
|
|
|
|
2009-10-16 11:14:54 +00:00
|
|
|
if (statuswrite != -1) {
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* Tell parent of daemon what failed */
|
|
|
|
char status = ret;
|
2018-02-20 13:16:28 +00:00
|
|
|
ignore_value(safewrite(statuswrite, &status, 1));
|
2009-10-16 11:14:54 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-11-09 20:48:48 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(statuswrite);
|
2009-10-16 11:14:54 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
VIR_FREE(sock_file);
|
|
|
|
VIR_FREE(sock_file_ro);
|
2015-04-15 14:23:55 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_FREE(sock_file_adm);
|
2017-11-06 20:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_FREE(pid_file);
|
2011-08-29 02:52:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-11-06 20:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
VIR_FREE(remote_config_file);
|
2011-05-16 17:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
daemonConfigFree(config);
|
|
|
|
|
2007-02-23 12:48:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2007-02-14 01:40:09 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|