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Don't allow renaming of domains by the backdoor

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Several APIs allow for custom XML to be passed in. This is
checked for ABI stability, which will ensure the UUID is
not being changed. There isn't validation that the name
did not change though. This could allow renaming of guests
via the backdoor, which in turn could allow for bypassing
access control restrictions based on names.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Daniel P. Berrange 2013-04-29 10:56:03 +01:00
parent 142e6e2784
commit 03a600368e
2 changed files with 11 additions and 6 deletions
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11
src/conf/domain_conf.c
View File

@ -12558,6 +12558,17 @@ virDomainDefCheckABIStability(virDomainDefPtr src,
return false;
}
/* Not strictly ABI related, but we want to make sure domains
* don't get silently re-named through the backdoor when passing
* custom XML into various APIs, since this would create havoc
*/
if (STRNEQ(src->name, dst->name)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED,
_("Target domain name '%s' does not match source '%s'"),
dst->name, src->name);
return false;
}
if (src->mem.max_balloon != dst->mem.max_balloon) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED,
_("Target domain max memory %lld does not match source %lld"),

6
src/qemu/qemu_migration.c
View File

@ -1940,12 +1940,6 @@ char *qemuMigrationBegin(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
VIR_DOMAIN_XML_INACTIVE)))
goto cleanup;
if (STRNEQ(def->name, vm->def->name)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INVALID_ARG, "%s",
_("target domain name doesn't match source name"));
goto cleanup;
}
if (!virDomainDefCheckABIStability(vm->def, def))
goto cleanup;