From 69a4bc670bdbb2bb64a92214f0e726fda77aecc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Daniel P. Berrange" Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2013 15:25:40 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Add support for using 3-arg pkcheck syntax for process (CVE-2013-4311) With the existing pkcheck (pid, start time) tuple for identifying the process, there is a race condition, where a process can make a libvirt RPC call and in another thread exec a setuid application, causing it to change to effective UID 0. This in turn causes polkit to do its permission check based on the wrong UID. To address this, libvirt must get the UID the caller had at time of connect() (from SO_PEERCRED) and pass a (pid, start time, uid) triple to the pkcheck program. Signed-off-by: Colin Walters Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange (cherry picked from commit 922b7fda77b094dbf022d625238262ea05335666) Conflicts: src/access/viraccessdriverpolkit.c Resolution: Dropped file that does not exist in this branch. --- configure.ac | 8 ++++++++ daemon/remote.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++--- libvirt.spec.in | 3 +-- 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index 9d366e9aaf..14df8bf742 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -1116,6 +1116,14 @@ if test "x$with_polkit" = "xyes" || test "x$with_polkit" = "xcheck"; then AC_PATH_PROG([PKCHECK_PATH],[pkcheck], [], [/usr/sbin:$PATH]) if test "x$PKCHECK_PATH" != "x" ; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PKCHECK_PATH],["$PKCHECK_PATH"],[Location of pkcheck program]) + AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether pkcheck supports uid value]) + pkcheck_supports_uid=`$PKG_CONFIG --variable pkcheck_supports_uid polkit-gobject-1` + if test "x$pkcheck_supports_uid" = "xtrue"; then + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PKCHECK_SUPPORTS_UID], 1, [Pass uid to pkcheck]) + else + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + fi AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([WITH_POLKIT], 1, [use PolicyKit for UNIX socket access checks]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([WITH_POLKIT1], 1, diff --git a/daemon/remote.c b/daemon/remote.c index 90aa178fdc..6bb3a25502 100644 --- a/daemon/remote.c +++ b/daemon/remote.c @@ -2815,10 +2815,12 @@ remoteDispatchAuthPolkit(virNetServerPtr server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, int status = -1; char *ident = NULL; bool authdismissed = 0; + bool supportsuid = false; char *pkout = NULL; struct daemonClientPrivate *priv = virNetServerClientGetPrivateData(client); virCommandPtr cmd = NULL; + static bool polkitInsecureWarned; virMutexLock(&priv->lock); action = virNetServerClientGetReadonly(client) ? @@ -2840,14 +2842,28 @@ remoteDispatchAuthPolkit(virNetServerPtr server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, goto authfail; } + if (timestamp == 0) { + VIR_WARN("Failing polkit auth due to missing client (pid=%lld) start time", + (long long)callerPid); + goto authfail; + } + VIR_INFO("Checking PID %lld running as %d", (long long) callerPid, callerUid); virCommandAddArg(cmd, "--process"); - if (timestamp != 0) { - virCommandAddArgFormat(cmd, "%lld,%llu", (long long) callerPid, timestamp); +# ifdef PKCHECK_SUPPORTS_UID + supportsuid = true; +# endif + if (supportsuid) { + virCommandAddArgFormat(cmd, "%lld,%llu,%lu", + (long long) callerPid, timestamp, (unsigned long) callerUid); } else { - virCommandAddArgFormat(cmd, "%lld", (long long) callerPid); + if (!polkitInsecureWarned) { + VIR_WARN("No support for caller UID with pkcheck. This deployment is known to be insecure."); + polkitInsecureWarned = true; + } + virCommandAddArgFormat(cmd, "%lld,%llu", (long long) callerPid, timestamp); } virCommandAddArg(cmd, "--allow-user-interaction"); diff --git a/libvirt.spec.in b/libvirt.spec.in index 9fb753a9e8..c2d330d9c3 100644 --- a/libvirt.spec.in +++ b/libvirt.spec.in @@ -469,8 +469,7 @@ BuildRequires: cyrus-sasl-devel %endif %if %{with_polkit} %if 0%{?fedora} >= 12 || 0%{?rhel} >= 6 -# Only need the binary, not -devel -BuildRequires: polkit >= 0.93 +BuildRequires: polkit-devel >= 0.93 %else BuildRequires: PolicyKit-devel >= 0.6 %endif