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Re-order config options in qemu driver augeas lens
Currently all the config options are listed under a 'vnc_entry' group. Create a bunch of new groups & move options to the right place Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
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@ -32,11 +32,14 @@ module Libvirtd_qemu =
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| str_entry "vnc_password"
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| bool_entry "vnc_sasl"
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| str_entry "vnc_sasl_dir"
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| str_entry "spice_listen"
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| bool_entry "vnc_allow_host_audio"
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let spice_entry = str_entry "spice_listen"
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| bool_entry "spice_tls"
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| str_entry "spice_tls_x509_cert_dir"
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| str_entry "spice_password"
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| str_entry "security_driver"
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let security_entry = str_entry "security_driver"
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| bool_entry "security_default_confined"
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| bool_entry "security_require_confined"
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| str_entry "user"
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@ -44,27 +47,37 @@ module Libvirtd_qemu =
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| bool_entry "dynamic_ownership"
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| str_array_entry "cgroup_controllers"
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| str_array_entry "cgroup_device_acl"
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| str_entry "save_image_format"
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let save_entry = str_entry "save_image_format"
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| str_entry "dump_image_format"
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| str_entry "auto_dump_path"
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| bool_entry "auto_dump_bypass_cache"
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| bool_entry "auto_start_bypass_cache"
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| str_entry "hugetlbfs_mount"
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| bool_entry "mac_filter"
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| bool_entry "relaxed_acs_check"
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| bool_entry "vnc_allow_host_audio"
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let process_entry = str_entry "hugetlbfs_mount"
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| bool_entry "clear_emulator_capabilities"
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| bool_entry "allow_disk_format_probing"
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| bool_entry "set_process_name"
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| int_entry "max_processes"
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| int_entry "max_files"
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let device_entry = bool_entry "mac_filter"
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| bool_entry "relaxed_acs_check"
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| bool_entry "allow_disk_format_probing"
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| str_entry "lock_manager"
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| int_entry "max_queued"
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let rpc_entry = int_entry "max_queued"
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| int_entry "keepalive_interval"
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| int_entry "keepalive_count"
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(* Each enty in the config is one of the following three ... *)
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let entry = vnc_entry
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| spice_entry
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| security_entry
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| save_entry
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| process_entry
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| device_entry
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| rpc_entry
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let comment = [ label "#comment" . del /#[ \t]*/ "# " . store /([^ \t\n][^\n]*)?/ . del /\n/ "\n" ]
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let empty = [ label "#empty" . eol ]
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@ -88,6 +88,16 @@
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#vnc_sasl_dir = "/some/directory/sasl2"
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# QEMU implements an extension for providing audio over a VNC connection,
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# though if your VNC client does not support it, your only chance for getting
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# sound output is through regular audio backends. By default, libvirt will
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# disable all QEMU sound backends if using VNC, since they can cause
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# permissions issues. Enabling this option will make libvirtd honor the
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# QEMU_AUDIO_DRV environment variable when using VNC.
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#
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#vnc_allow_host_audio = 0
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# SPICE is configured to listen on 127.0.0.1 by default.
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# To make it listen on all public interfaces, uncomment
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@ -253,29 +263,6 @@
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#hugetlbfs_mount = "/dev/hugepages"
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# mac_filter enables MAC addressed based filtering on bridge ports.
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# This currently requires ebtables to be installed.
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#
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#mac_filter = 1
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# By default, PCI devices below non-ACS switch are not allowed to be assigned
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# to guests. By setting relaxed_acs_check to 1 such devices will be allowed to
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# be assigned to guests.
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#
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#relaxed_acs_check = 1
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# QEMU implements an extension for providing audio over a VNC connection,
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# though if your VNC client does not support it, your only chance for getting
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# sound output is through regular audio backends. By default, libvirt will
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# disable all QEMU sound backends if using VNC, since they can cause
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# permissions issues. Enabling this option will make libvirtd honor the
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# QEMU_AUDIO_DRV environment variable when using VNC.
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#
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#vnc_allow_host_audio = 0
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# If clear_emulator_capabilities is enabled, libvirt will drop all
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# privileged capabilities of the QEmu/KVM emulator. This is enabled by
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# default.
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@ -286,18 +273,6 @@
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#clear_emulator_capabilities = 1
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# If allow_disk_format_probing is enabled, libvirt will probe disk
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# images to attempt to identify their format, when not otherwise
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# specified in the XML. This is disabled by default.
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#
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# WARNING: Enabling probing is a security hole in almost all
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# deployments. It is strongly recommended that users update their
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# guest XML <disk> elements to include <driver type='XXXX'/>
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# elements instead of enabling this option.
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#
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#allow_disk_format_probing = 1
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# If enabled, libvirt will have QEMU set its process name to
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# "qemu:VM_NAME", where VM_NAME is the name of the VM. The QEMU
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# process will appear as "qemu:VM_NAME" in process listings and
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@ -317,12 +292,41 @@
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#max_processes = 0
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#max_files = 0
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# mac_filter enables MAC addressed based filtering on bridge ports.
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# This currently requires ebtables to be installed.
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#
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#mac_filter = 1
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# By default, PCI devices below non-ACS switch are not allowed to be assigned
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# to guests. By setting relaxed_acs_check to 1 such devices will be allowed to
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# be assigned to guests.
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#
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#relaxed_acs_check = 1
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# If allow_disk_format_probing is enabled, libvirt will probe disk
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# images to attempt to identify their format, when not otherwise
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# specified in the XML. This is disabled by default.
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#
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# WARNING: Enabling probing is a security hole in almost all
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# deployments. It is strongly recommended that users update their
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# guest XML <disk> elements to include <driver type='XXXX'/>
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# elements instead of enabling this option.
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#
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#allow_disk_format_probing = 1
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# To enable 'Sanlock' project based locking of the file
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# content (to prevent two VMs writing to the same
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# disk), uncomment this
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#
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#lock_manager = "sanlock"
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# Set limit of maximum APIs queued on one domain. All other APIs
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# over this threshold will fail on acquiring job lock. Specially,
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# setting to zero turns this feature off.
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