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Add support for using 3-arg pkcheck syntax for process (CVE-2013-4311)

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With the existing pkcheck (pid, start time) tuple for identifying
the process, there is a race condition, where a process can make
a libvirt RPC call and in another thread exec a setuid application,
causing it to change to effective UID 0. This in turn causes polkit
to do its permission check based on the wrong UID.

To address this, libvirt must get the UID the caller had at time
of connect() (from SO_PEERCRED) and pass a (pid, start time, uid)
triple to the pkcheck program.

This fix requires that libvirt is re-built against a version of
polkit that has the fix for its CVE-2013-4288, so that libvirt
can see 'pkg-config --variable pkcheck_supports_uid polkit-gobject-1'

Signed-off-by: Colin Walters <walters@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 922b7fda77b094dbf022d625238262ea05335666)
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>

Conflicts:
	configure.ac - context
	libvirt.spec.in - context of indentation
	src/access/viraccessdriverpolkit.c - not present on this branch
This commit is contained in:
Daniel P. Berrange 2013-08-28 15:25:40 +01:00 committed by Eric Blake
parent cd03624eec
commit 77d448e15d
3 changed files with 28 additions and 5 deletions
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8
configure.ac
View File

@ -1270,6 +1270,14 @@ if test "x$with_polkit" = "xyes" || test "x$with_polkit" = "xcheck"; then
AC_PATH_PROG([PKCHECK_PATH],[pkcheck], [], [/usr/sbin:$PATH])
if test "x$PKCHECK_PATH" != "x" ; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PKCHECK_PATH],["$PKCHECK_PATH"],[Location of pkcheck program])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether pkcheck supports uid value])
pkcheck_supports_uid=`$PKG_CONFIG --variable pkcheck_supports_uid polkit-gobject-1`
if test "x$pkcheck_supports_uid" = "xtrue"; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PKCHECK_SUPPORTS_UID], 1, [Pass uid to pkcheck])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
fi
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_POLKIT], 1,
[use PolicyKit for UNIX socket access checks])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_POLKIT1], 1,

22
daemon/remote.c
View File

@ -2792,10 +2792,12 @@ remoteDispatchAuthPolkit(virNetServerPtr server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
int status = -1;
char *ident = NULL;
bool authdismissed = 0;
bool supportsuid = false;
char *pkout = NULL;
struct daemonClientPrivate *priv =
virNetServerClientGetPrivateData(client);
virCommandPtr cmd = NULL;
static bool polkitInsecureWarned;
virMutexLock(&priv->lock);
action = virNetServerClientGetReadonly(client) ?
@ -2817,14 +2819,28 @@ remoteDispatchAuthPolkit(virNetServerPtr server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
goto authfail;
}
if (timestamp == 0) {
VIR_WARN("Failing polkit auth due to missing client (pid=%lld) start time",
(long long)callerPid);
goto authfail;
}
VIR_INFO("Checking PID %lld running as %d",
(long long) callerPid, callerUid);
virCommandAddArg(cmd, "--process");
if (timestamp != 0) {
virCommandAddArgFormat(cmd, "%lld,%llu", (long long) callerPid, timestamp);
# ifdef PKCHECK_SUPPORTS_UID
supportsuid = true;
# endif
if (supportsuid) {
virCommandAddArgFormat(cmd, "%lld,%llu,%lu",
(long long) callerPid, timestamp, (unsigned long) callerUid);
} else {
virCommandAddArgFormat(cmd, "%lld", (long long) callerPid);
if (!polkitInsecureWarned) {
VIR_WARN("No support for caller UID with pkcheck. This deployment is known to be insecure.");
polkitInsecureWarned = true;
}
virCommandAddArgFormat(cmd, "%lld,%llu", (long long) callerPid, timestamp);
}
virCommandAddArg(cmd, "--allow-user-interaction");

3
libvirt.spec.in
View File

@ -456,8 +456,7 @@ BuildRequires: cyrus-sasl-devel
%endif
%if %{with_polkit}
%if 0%{?fedora} >= 12 || 0%{?rhel} >= 6
# Only need the binary, not -devel
BuildRequires: polkit >= 0.93
BuildRequires: polkit-devel >= 0.93
%else
BuildRequires: PolicyKit-devel >= 0.6
%endif