diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c b/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c
index 400a2b39b8..759ea9119e 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c
@@ -618,24 +618,7 @@ int qemuSetupCgroup(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
     }
 
     if (virCgroupHasController(priv->cgroup, VIR_CGROUP_CONTROLLER_MEMORY)) {
-        unsigned long long hard_limit = vm->def->mem.hard_limit;
-
-        if (!hard_limit) {
-            /* If there is no hard_limit set, set a reasonable one to avoid
-             * system thrashing caused by exploited qemu.  A 'reasonable
-             * limit' has been chosen:
-             *     (1 + k) * (domain memory + total video memory) + (32MB for
-             *     cache per each disk) + F
-             * where k = 0.5 and F = 200MB.  The cache for disks is important as
-             * kernel cache on the host side counts into the RSS limit. */
-            hard_limit = vm->def->mem.max_balloon;
-            for (i = 0; i < vm->def->nvideos; i++)
-                hard_limit += vm->def->videos[i]->vram;
-            hard_limit = hard_limit * 1.5 + 204800;
-            hard_limit += vm->def->ndisks * 32768;
-        }
-
-        rc = virCgroupSetMemoryHardLimit(priv->cgroup, hard_limit);
+        rc = virCgroupSetMemoryHardLimit(priv->cgroup, vm->def->mem.hard_limit);
         if (rc != 0) {
             virReportSystemError(-rc,
                                  _("Unable to set memory hard limit for domain %s"),