Support 'block_passwd' command for QEMU disk encryption

The old text mode monitor prompts for a password when disks are
encrypted. This interactive approach doesn't work for JSON mode
monitor. Thus there is a new 'block_passwd' command that can be
used.

* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Split out code for looking up a disk
  secret from findVolumeQcowPassphrase, into a new method
  getVolumeQcowPassphrase. Enhance qemuInitPasswords() to also
  set the disk encryption password via the monitor
* src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c, src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h,
  src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c, src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h,
  src/qemu/qemu_monitor_text.c, src/qemu/qemu_monitor_text.h: Add
  support for the 'block_passwd' monitor command.
This commit is contained in:
Daniel P. Berrange 2010-02-11 14:28:16 +00:00
parent dfab48ac54
commit c31a116b72
7 changed files with 188 additions and 36 deletions

View File

@ -694,51 +694,46 @@ qemuHandleMonitorEOF(qemuMonitorPtr mon ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
}
static virStorageEncryptionPtr
findDomainDiskEncryption(virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *path)
static virDomainDiskDefPtr
findDomainDiskByPath(virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *path)
{
bool seen_volume;
int i;
seen_volume = false;
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->ndisks; i++) {
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk;
disk = vm->def->disks[i];
if (disk->src != NULL && STREQ(disk->src, path)) {
seen_volume = true;
if (disk->encryption != NULL)
return disk->encryption;
}
if (disk->src != NULL && STREQ(disk->src, path))
return disk;
}
if (seen_volume)
qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INVALID_DOMAIN,
_("missing <encryption> for volume %s"), path);
else
qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("unexpected passphrase request for volume %s"),
path);
qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("no disk found with path %s"),
path);
return NULL;
}
static int
findVolumeQcowPassphrase(qemuMonitorPtr mon ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
virConnectPtr conn,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *path,
char **secretRet,
size_t *secretLen)
getVolumeQcowPassphrase(virConnectPtr conn,
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
char **secretRet,
size_t *secretLen)
{
virStorageEncryptionPtr enc;
virSecretPtr secret;
char *passphrase;
unsigned char *data;
size_t size;
int ret = -1;
virStorageEncryptionPtr enc;
virDomainObjLock(vm);
if (!disk->encryption) {
qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("disk %s does not have any encryption information"),
disk->src);
return -1;
}
enc = disk->encryption;
if (!conn) {
qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_NO_SUPPORT,
@ -754,16 +749,12 @@ findVolumeQcowPassphrase(qemuMonitorPtr mon ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
goto cleanup;
}
enc = findDomainDiskEncryption(vm, path);
if (enc == NULL)
return -1;
if (enc->format != VIR_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_FORMAT_QCOW ||
enc->nsecrets != 1 ||
enc->secrets[0]->type !=
VIR_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_SECRET_TYPE_PASSPHRASE) {
qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INVALID_DOMAIN,
_("invalid <encryption> for volume %s"), path);
_("invalid <encryption> for volume %s"), disk->src);
goto cleanup;
}
@ -782,7 +773,7 @@ findVolumeQcowPassphrase(qemuMonitorPtr mon ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
VIR_FREE(data);
qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INVALID_SECRET,
_("format='qcow' passphrase for %s must not contain a "
"'\\0'"), path);
"'\\0'"), disk->src);
goto cleanup;
}
@ -804,8 +795,30 @@ findVolumeQcowPassphrase(qemuMonitorPtr mon ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
ret = 0;
cleanup:
virDomainObjUnlock(vm);
return ret;
}
static int
findVolumeQcowPassphrase(qemuMonitorPtr mon ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
virConnectPtr conn,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *path,
char **secretRet,
size_t *secretLen)
{
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk;
int ret = -1;
virDomainObjLock(vm);
disk = findDomainDiskByPath(vm, path);
if (!disk)
goto cleanup;
ret = getVolumeQcowPassphrase(conn, disk, secretRet, secretLen);
cleanup:
virDomainObjUnlock(vm);
return ret;
}
@ -1681,8 +1694,10 @@ qemudInitCpuAffinity(virDomainObjPtr vm)
static int
qemuInitPasswords(struct qemud_driver *driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm) {
qemuInitPasswords(virConnectPtr conn,
struct qemud_driver *driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
unsigned long long qemuCmdFlags) {
int ret = 0;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
@ -1698,6 +1713,36 @@ qemuInitPasswords(struct qemud_driver *driver,
qemuDomainObjExitMonitorWithDriver(driver, vm);
}
if (ret < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (qemuCmdFlags & QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_DEVICE) {
int i;
for (i = 0 ; i < vm->def->ndisks ; i++) {
char *secret;
size_t secretLen;
if (!vm->def->disks[i]->encryption ||
!vm->def->disks[i]->src)
continue;
if (getVolumeQcowPassphrase(conn,
vm->def->disks[i],
&secret, &secretLen) < 0)
goto cleanup;
qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorWithDriver(driver, vm);
ret = qemuMonitorSetDrivePassphrase(priv->mon,
vm->def->disks[i]->info.alias,
secret);
qemuDomainObjExitMonitorWithDriver(driver, vm);
if (ret < 0)
goto cleanup;
}
}
cleanup:
return ret;
}
@ -2721,7 +2766,7 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
if (qemudInitCpuAffinity(vm) < 0)
goto abort;
if (qemuInitPasswords(driver, vm) < 0)
if (qemuInitPasswords(conn, driver, vm, qemuCmdFlags) < 0)
goto abort;
/* If we have -device, then addresses are assigned explicitly.

View File

@ -1331,3 +1331,18 @@ int qemuMonitorAddDrive(qemuMonitorPtr mon,
ret = qemuMonitorTextAddDrive(mon, drivestr);
return ret;
}
int qemuMonitorSetDrivePassphrase(qemuMonitorPtr mon,
const char *alias,
const char *passphrase)
{
DEBUG("mon=%p, fd=%d alias=%s passphrase=%p(value hidden)", mon, mon->fd, alias, passphrase);
int ret;
if (mon->json)
ret = qemuMonitorJSONSetDrivePassphrase(mon, alias, passphrase);
else
ret = qemuMonitorTextSetDrivePassphrase(mon, alias, passphrase);
return ret;
}

View File

@ -291,4 +291,8 @@ int qemuMonitorAddDevice(qemuMonitorPtr mon,
int qemuMonitorAddDrive(qemuMonitorPtr mon,
const char *drivestr);
int qemuMonitorSetDrivePassphrase(qemuMonitorPtr mon,
const char *alias,
const char *passphrase);
#endif /* QEMU_MONITOR_H */

View File

@ -1841,3 +1841,36 @@ int qemuMonitorJSONAddDrive(qemuMonitorPtr mon,
virJSONValueFree(reply);
return ret;
}
int qemuMonitorJSONSetDrivePassphrase(qemuMonitorPtr mon,
const char *alias,
const char *passphrase)
{
int ret;
virJSONValuePtr cmd;
virJSONValuePtr reply = NULL;
char *drive;
if (virAsprintf(&drive, "%s%s", QEMU_DRIVE_HOST_PREFIX, alias) < 0) {
virReportOOMError();
return -1;
}
cmd = qemuMonitorJSONMakeCommand("block_passwd",
"s:device", drive,
"s:password", passphrase,
NULL);
VIR_FREE(drive);
if (!cmd)
return -1;
ret = qemuMonitorJSONCommand(mon, cmd, &reply);
if (ret == 0)
ret = qemuMonitorJSONCheckError(cmd, reply);
virJSONValueFree(cmd);
virJSONValueFree(reply);
return ret;
}

View File

@ -162,4 +162,8 @@ int qemuMonitorJSONAddDevice(qemuMonitorPtr mon,
int qemuMonitorJSONAddDrive(qemuMonitorPtr mon,
const char *drivestr);
int qemuMonitorJSONSetDrivePassphrase(qemuMonitorPtr mon,
const char *alias,
const char *passphrase);
#endif /* QEMU_MONITOR_JSON_H */

View File

@ -2127,3 +2127,50 @@ cleanup:
VIR_FREE(safe_str);
return ret;
}
int qemuMonitorTextSetDrivePassphrase(qemuMonitorPtr mon,
const char *alias,
const char *passphrase)
{
char *cmd = NULL;
char *reply = NULL;
int ret = -1;
char *safe_str;
safe_str = qemuMonitorEscapeArg(passphrase);
if (!safe_str) {
virReportOOMError();
return -1;
}
ret = virAsprintf(&cmd, "block_passwd %s%s \"%s\"", QEMU_DRIVE_HOST_PREFIX, alias, safe_str);
if (ret == -1) {
virReportOOMError();
goto cleanup;
}
if (qemuMonitorCommand(mon, cmd, &reply) < 0) {
qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_FAILED,
_("failed to close fd in qemu with '%s'"), cmd);
goto cleanup;
}
if (strstr(reply, "\nunknown command:")) {
qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_FAILED, "%s",
_("setting disk password is not supported"));
goto cleanup;
} else if (strstr(reply, "The entered password is invalid")) {
qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_FAILED, "%s",
_("the disk password is incorrect"));
goto cleanup;
}
ret = 0;
cleanup:
VIR_FREE(cmd);
VIR_FREE(reply);
VIR_FREE(safe_str);
return ret;
}

View File

@ -166,4 +166,8 @@ int qemuMonitorTextAddDevice(qemuMonitorPtr mon,
int qemuMonitorTextAddDrive(qemuMonitorPtr mon,
const char *drivestr);
int qemuMonitorTextSetDrivePassphrase(qemuMonitorPtr mon,
const char *alias,
const char *passphrase);
#endif /* QEMU_MONITOR_TEXT_H */