This array is allocated in virSecuritySELinuxContextListAppend()
but never freed. This commit is essentially the same as ca25026.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
All of the ones being removed are pulled in by internal.h. The only
exception is sanlock which expects the application to include <stdint.h>
before sanlock's headers, because sanlock prototypes use fixed width
int, but they don't include stdint.h themselves, so we have to leave
that one in place.
Signed-off-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
It doesn't really make sense for us to have stdlib.h and string.h but
not stdio.h in the internal.h header.
Signed-off-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Lock all the paths we want to relabel to mutually exclude other
libvirt daemons.
The only hitch here is that directories can't be locked.
Therefore, when relabeling a directory do not lock it (this
happens only when setting up some domain private paths anyway,
e.g. huge pages directory).
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
So far the whole transaction handling is done
virSecuritySELinuxSetFileconHelper(). This needs to change for
the sake of security label remembering and locking. Otherwise we
would be locking a path when only appending it to transaction
list and not when actually relabelling it.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
Firstly, the following code pattern is harder to follow:
if (func() < 0) {
error();
} else {
/* success */
}
We should put 'goto cleanup' into the error branch and move the
else branch one level up.
Secondly, 'rc' should really be named 'ret' because it holds
return value of the function. Not some intermediate value.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
This label is used in both successful and error paths. Therefore
it should be named 'cleanup' and not 'err'.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
Lock all the paths we want to relabel to mutually exclude other
libvirt daemons.
The only hitch here is that directories can't be locked.
Therefore, when relabeling a directory do not lock it (this
happens only when setting up some domain private paths anyway,
e.g. huge pages directory).
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
Firstly, the message that says we're setting uid:gid shouldn't be
called from virSecurityDACSetOwnershipInternal() because
virSecurityDACRestoreFileLabelInternal() is calling it too.
Secondly, there are places between us reporting label restore and
us actually doing it where we can quit. Don't say we're doing
something until we are actually about to do it.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
So far the whole transaction handling is done
virSecurityDACSetOwnershipInternal(). This needs to change for
the sake of security label remembering and locking. Otherwise we
would be locking a path when only appending it to transaction
list and not when actually relabeling it.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
Two new APIs are added so that security driver can lock and
unlock paths it wishes to touch. These APIs are not for other
drivers to call but security drivers (DAC and SELinux). That is
the reason these APIs are not exposed through our
libvirt_private.syms file.
Three interesting things happen in this commit. The first is the
global @lockManagerMutex. Unfortunately, this has to exist so that
there is only one thread talking to virtlockd at a time. If there
were more threads and one of them closed the connection
prematurely, it would cause virtlockd killing libvirtd. Instead
of complicated code that would handle that, let's have a mutex
and keep the code simple.
The second interesting thing is keeping connection open between
lock and unlock API calls. This is achieved by duplicating client
FD and keeping it open until unlock is called. This trick is used
by regular disk content locking code when the FD is leaked to
qemu.
Finally, the third thing is polling implemented at client side.
Since virtlockd has only one thread that handles locking
requests, all it can do is either acquire lock or error out.
Therefore, the polling has to be implemented in client. The
polling is capped at 60 second timeout, which should be plenty
since the metadata lock is held only for a fraction of a second.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
Now that we know what metadata lock manager user wishes to use we
can load it when initializing security driver. This is achieved
by adding new argument to virSecurityManagerNewDriver() and
subsequently to all functions that end up calling it.
The cfg.mk change is needed in order to allow lock_manager.h
inclusion in security driver without 'syntax-check' complaining.
This is safe thing to do as locking APIs will always exist (it's
only backend implementation that changes). However, instead of
allowing the include for all other drivers (like cpu, network,
and so on) allow it only for security driver. This will still
trigger the error if including from other drivers.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
It will be desirable to run transactions more often than we
currently do. Even if the domain we're relabeling the paths for
does not run in a namespace. If that's the case, there is no need
to fork() as we are already running in the right namespace. To
differentiate whether transaction code should fork() or not the
@pid argument now accepts -1 (which means do not fork).
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
These two functions (virSecurityDACSetOwnership and
virSecurityDACRestoreFileLabelInternal) do not really change
@src. Make it const.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
This function is going call security manager APIs and therefore
it needs pointer to it.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
This function is going call security manager APIs and therefore
it needs pointer to it.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
The virSecurityStackAddNested() can fail in which case
virSecurityManagerNewStack() should fail too.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
Currently, the functions return a pointer to the
destination buffer on success or NULL on failure.
Not only does this kind of error handling look quite
alien in the context of libvirt, where most functions
return zero on success and a negative int on failure,
but it's also somewhat pointless because unless there's
been a failure the returned pointer will be the same
one passed in by the user, thus offering no additional
value.
Change the functions so that they return an int
instead.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
This patch extends the AppArmor domain profile with file paths
the swtpm accesses for state, log, pid, and socket files.
Both, QEMU and swtpm, use this AppArmor profile.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
As the aa-helper binary is supposed to be used only with libvirt, we can
fully remove it.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Nothing is setting that flag now so it can be removed. Note that
removing 'mgr' from 'load_profile' in the apparmor driver would create a
lot of churn.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
In this patch we label the swtpm process with SELinux labels. We give it the
same label as the QEMU process has. We label its state directory and files
as well. We restore the old security labels once the swtpm has terminated.
The file and process labels now look as follows:
Directory: /var/lib/libvirt/swtpm
[root@localhost swtpm]# ls -lZ
total 4
rwx------. 2 tss tss system_u:object_r:svirt_image_t:s0:c254,c932 4096 Apr 5 16:46 testvm
[root@localhost testvm]# ls -lZ
total 8
-rw-r--r--. 1 tss tss system_u:object_r:svirt_image_t:s0:c254,c932 3648 Apr 5 16:46 tpm-00.permall
The log in /var/log/swtpm/libvirt/qemu is labeled as follows:
-rw-r--r--. 1 tss tss system_u:object_r:svirt_image_t:s0:c254,c932 2237 Apr 5 16:46 vtpm.log
[root@localhost 485d0004-a48f-436a-8457-8a3b73e28567]# ps auxZ | grep swtpm | grep ctrl | grep -v grep
system_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0:c254,c932 tss 25664 0.0 0.0 28172 3892 ? Ss 16:57 0:00 /usr/bin/swtpm socket --daemon --ctrl type=unixio,path=/var/run/libvirt/qemu/swtpm/testvm-swtpm.sock,mode=0660 --tpmstate dir=/var/lib/libvirt/swtpm/testvm/tpm1.2 --log file=/var/log/swtpm/libvirt/qemu/testvm-swtpm.log
[root@localhost 485d0004-a48f-436a-8457-8a3b73e28567]# ps auxZ | grep qemu | grep tpm | grep -v grep
system_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0:c254,c932 qemu 25669 99.0 0.0 3096704 48500 ? Sl 16:57 3:28 /bin/qemu-system-x86_64 [..]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Extend the DAC and SELinux modules with support for the tpm-emulator.
We label the Unix socket that QEMU connects to after starting swtmp
with DAC and SELinux labels. We do not have to restore the labels in
this case since the tpm-emulator will remove the Unix socket when it
terminates.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
This patch adds support for an external swtpm TPM emulator. The XML for
this type of TPM looks as follows:
<tpm model='tpm-tis'>
<backend type='emulator'/>
</tpm>
The XML will currently only define a TPM 1.2.
Extend the documentation.
Add a test case testing the XML parser and formatter.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Currently the driver module loading code does not report an error if the
driver module is physically missing on disk. This is useful for distro
packaging optional pieces. When the daemons are split up into one daemon
per driver, we will expect module loading to always succeed. If a driver
is not desired, the entire daemon should not be installed.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
So far we are repeating the following lines over and over:
if (!(virSomeObjectClass = virClassNew(virClassForObject(),
"virSomeObject",
sizeof(virSomeObject),
virSomeObjectDispose)))
return -1;
While this works, it is impossible to do some checking. Firstly,
the class name (the 2nd argument) doesn't match the name in the
code in all cases (the 3rd argument). Secondly, the current style
is needlessly verbose. This commit turns example into following:
if (!(VIR_CLASS_NEW(virSomeObject,
virClassForObject)))
return -1;
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
nvdimm memory is backed by a path on the host. This currently works only via
hotplug where the AppArmor label is created via the domain label callbacks.
This adds the virt-aa-helper support for nvdimm memory devices to generate
rules for the needed paths from the initial guest definition as well.
Example in domain xml:
<memory model='nvdimm'>
<source>
<path>/tmp/nvdimm-base</path>
</source>
<target>
<size unit='KiB'>524288</size>
<node>0</node>
</target>
</memory>
Works to start now and creates:
"/tmp/nvdimm-base" rw,
Fixes: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libvirt/+bug/1757085
Acked-by: Jamie Strandboge <jamie@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Input devices can passthrough an event device. This currently works only via
hotplug where the AppArmor label is created via the domain label callbacks.
This adds the virt-aa-helper support for passthrough input devices to generate
rules for the needed paths from the initial guest definition as well.
Example in domain xml:
<input type='passthrough' bus='virtio'>
<source evdev='/dev/input/event0' />
</input>
Works to start now and creates:
"/dev/input/event0" rw,
Fixes: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libvirt/+bug/1757085
Acked-by: Jamie Strandboge <jamie@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
d8116b5a "security: Introduce functions for input device hot(un)plug"
implemented the code (Set|Restore)InputLabel for several security modules,
this patch adds an AppArmor implementation for it as well.
That fixes hot-plugging event input devices by generating a rule for the
path that needs to be accessed.
Example hot adding:
<input type='passthrough' bus='virtio'>
<source evdev='/dev/input/event0' />
</input>
Creates now:
"/dev/input/event0" rwk,
Fixes: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libvirt/+bug/1755153
Acked-by: Jamie Strandboge <jamie@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Recent changes have made implementing this mandatory to hot add any
memory.
Implementing this in apparmor fixes this as well as allows hot-add of nvdimm
tpye memory with an nvdimmPath set generating a AppArmor rule for that
path.
Example hot adding:
<memory model='nvdimm'>
<source>
<path>/tmp/nvdimm-test</path>
</source>
<target>
<size unit='KiB'>524288</size>
<node>0</node>
</target>
</memory>
Creates now:
"/tmp/nvdimm-test" rwk,
Fixes: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libvirt/+bug/1755153
Acked-by: Jamie Strandboge <jamie@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
In a recent change b932ed69: "virt-aa-helper: resolve yet to be created
paths" several cases with symlinks in paths were fixed, but it regressed
cases where the file being last element of the path was the actual link.
In the case of the last element being the symlink realpath can (and shall)
be called on the full path that was passed.
Examples would be zfs/lvm block devices like:
<disk type='block' device='disk'>
<driver name='qemu' type='raw'/>
<source dev='/dev/mapper/testlvm-testvol1'/>
<target dev='vdd' bus='virtio'/>
</disk>
With the target being:
/dev/mapper/testlvm-testvol1 -> ../dm-0
That currently is rendered as
"/dev/mapper/testlvm-testvol1" rwk,
but instead should be (and is with the fix):
"/dev/dm-0" rwk,
Fixes: b932ed69: "virt-aa-helper: resolve yet to be created paths"
Fixes: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libvirt/+bug/1756394
Signed-off-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
We're freeing individual items in it but not the array itself.
==19200== 40 bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 847 of 1,059
==19200== at 0x4C2D12F: realloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:785)
==19200== by 0x52C5532: virReallocN (viralloc.c:245)
==19200== by 0x52C5628: virExpandN (viralloc.c:294)
==19200== by 0x52C58FC: virInsertElementsN (viralloc.c:436)
==19200== by 0x542856B: virSecurityDACChownListAppend (security_dac.c:115)
==19200== by 0x54286B4: virSecurityDACTransactionAppend (security_dac.c:167)
==19200== by 0x542902F: virSecurityDACSetOwnershipInternal (security_dac.c:560)
==19200== by 0x54295D6: virSecurityDACSetOwnership (security_dac.c:650)
==19200== by 0x542AEE0: virSecurityDACSetInputLabel (security_dac.c:1472)
==19200== by 0x542B61D: virSecurityDACSetAllLabel (security_dac.c:1693)
==19200== by 0x542DD67: virSecurityManagerSetAllLabel (security_manager.c:869)
==19200== by 0x54279C2: virSecurityStackSetAllLabel (security_stack.c:361)
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
In certain cases a xml contains paths that do not yet exist, but
are valid as qemu will create them later on - for example
vhostuser mode=server sockets.
In any such cases so far the check to virFileExists failed and due to
that the paths stayed non-resolved in regard to symlinks.
But for apparmor those non-resolved rules are non functional as they
are evaluated after resolving any symlinks.
Therefore for non-existent files and partially non-existent paths
resolve as much as possible to get valid rules.
Example:
<interface type='vhostuser'>
<model type='virtio'/>
<source type='unix' path='/var/run/symlinknet' mode='server'/>
</interface>
Got rendered as:
"/var/run/symlinknet" rw,
But correct with "/var/run" being a symlink to "/run" is:
"/run/symlinknet" rw,
Signed-off-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Ensure all enum cases are listed in switch statements.
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
The QEMU driver loadable module needs to be able to resolve all ELF
symbols it references against libvirt.so. Some of its symbols can only
be resolved against the storage_driver.so loadable module which creates
a hard dependancy between them. By moving the storage file backend
framework into the util directory, this gets included directly in the
libvirt.so library. The actual backend implementations are still done as
loadable modules, so this doesn't re-add deps on gluster libraries.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The virt-aa-helper fails to parse the xmls with the memory/cpu
hotplug features or user assigned aliases. Set the features in
xmlopt->config for the parsing to succeed.
Signed-off-by: Shivaprasad G Bhat <sbhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Since 1b4f66e "security: introduce virSecurityManager
(Set|Restore)ChardevLabel" this is a public API of security manager.
Implementing this in apparmor avoids miss any rules that should be
added for devices labeled via these calls.
Signed-off-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
virSecurityManagerDomainSetPathLabel is used to make a path known
to the security modules, but today is used interchangably for
- paths to files/dirs to be accessed directly
- paths to a dir, but the access will actually be to files therein
Depending on the security module it is important to know which of
these types it will be.
The argument allowSubtree augments the call to the implementations of
DomainSetPathLabel that can - per security module - decide if extra
actions shall be taken.
For now dac/selinux handle this as before, but apparmor will make
use of it to add a wildcard to the path that was passed.
Signed-off-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
This came up in discussions around huge pages, but it will cover
more per guest paths that should be added to the guests apparmor profile:
- keys via qemuDomainWriteMasterKeyFile
- per domain dirs via qemuProcessMakeDir
- memory backing paths via qemuProcessBuildDestroyMemoryPathsImpl
Signed-off-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
SELinux and DAC drivers already have both functions but they were not
exported as public API of security manager.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
Right-aligning backslashes when defining macros or using complex
commands in Makefiles looks cute, but as soon as any changes is
required to the code you end up with either distractingly broken
alignment or unnecessarily big diffs where most of the changes
are just pushing all backslashes a few characters to one side.
Generated using
$ git grep -El '[[:blank:]][[:blank:]]\\$' | \
grep -E '*\.([chx]|am|mk)$$' | \
while read f; do \
sed -Ei 's/[[:blank:]]*[[:blank:]]\\$/ \\/g' "$f"; \
done
Signed-off-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Until now we ignored user-provided backing chains and while detecting
the code inherited labels of the parent device. With user provided
chains we should keep this functionality, so label of the parent image
in the backing chain will be applied if an image-specific label is not
present.
Until now we ignored user-provided backing chains and while detecting
the code inherited labels of the parent device. With user provided
chains we should keep this functionality, so label of the parent image
in the backing chain will be applied if an image-specific label is not
present.
virSecuritySELinuxSetImageLabelInternal assigns different labels to
backing chain members than to the parent image. This was done via the
'first' flag. Convert it to passing in pointer to the parent
virStorageSource. This will allow us to use the parent virStorageSource
in further changes.
Some globbing chars in the domain name could be used to break out of
apparmor rules, so lets forbid these when in virt-aa-helper.
Also adding a test to ensure all those cases were detected as bad char.
Signed-off-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Hot-adding disks does not parse the full XML to generate apparmor rules.
Instead it uses -f <PATH> to append a generic rule for that file path.
580cdaa7: "virt-aa-helper: locking disk files for qemu 2.10" implemented
the qemu 2.10 requirement to allow locking on disks images that are part of
the domain xml.
But on attach-device a user will still trigger an apparmor deny by going
through virt-aa-helper -f, to fix that add the lock "k" permission to the
append file case of virt-aa-helper.
Signed-off-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Add helpers that will simplify checking if a backing file is valid or
whether it has backing store. The helper virStorageSourceIsBacking
returns true if the given virStorageSource is a valid backing store
member. virStorageSourceHasBacking returns true if the virStorageSource
has a backing store child.
Adding these functions creates a central points for further refactors.
To avoid any issues later on if paths ever change (unlikely but
possible) and to match the style of other generated rules the paths
of the static rules have to be quoted as well.
Signed-off-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
libvirt allows spaces in vm names, there were issues in the past but it
seems not removed so the assumption has to be that spaces are continuing
to be allowed.
Therefore virt-aa-helper should not reject spaces in vm names anymore if
it is going to be refused causing issues then the parser or xml schema
should do so.
Apparmor rules are in quotes, so a space in a path based on the name works.
Signed-off-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
If users only specified vendor&product (the common case) then parsing
the xml via virDomainHostdevSubsysUSBDefParseXML would only set these.
Bus and Device would much later be added when the devices are prepared
to be added.
Due to that a hot-add of a usb hostdev works as the device is prepared
and virt-aa-helper processes the new internal xml. But on an initial
guest start at the time virt-aa-helper renders the apparmor rules the
bus/device id's are not set yet:
p ctl->def->hostdevs[0]->source.subsys.u.usb
$12 = {autoAddress = false, bus = 0, device = 0, vendor = 1921, product
= 21888}
That causes rules to be wrong:
"/dev/bus/usb/000/000" rw,
The fix calls virHostdevFindUSBDevice after reading the XML from
virt-aa-helper to only add apparmor rules for devices that could be found
and now are fully known to be able to write the rule correctly.
It uncondtionally sets virHostdevFindUSBDevice mandatory attribute as
adding an apparmor rule for a device not found makes no sense no matter
what startup policy it has set.
Signed-off-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Seeing a log message saying 'flags=93' is ambiguous & confusing unless
you happen to know that libvirt always prints flags as hex. Change our
debug messages so that they always add a '0x' prefix when printing flags,
and '0' prefix when printing mode. A few other misc places gain a '0x'
prefix in error messages too.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
instead of only unloading it. This makes sure old profiles don't pile up
in /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt and we get updates to modified templates on
VM restart.
Reviewed-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
For a logged in user this a path like /dev/dri/renderD128 will have
default ownership root:video which won't work for the qemu:qemu user,
so we need to chown it.
We only do this when mount namespaces are enabled in the qemu driver,
so the chown'ing doesn't interfere with other users of the shared
render node path
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1460804
The VIR_SECURITY_MANAGER_MOUNT_NAMESPACE flag informs the DAC driver
if mount namespaces are in use for the VM. Will be used for future
changes.
Wire it up in the qemu driver
When security drivers are active but confinement is not enabled,
there is no need to autogenerate <seclabel> elements when starting
a domain def that contains no <seclabel> elements. In fact,
autogenerating the elements can result in needless save/restore and
migration failures when the security driver is not active on the
restore/migration target.
This patch changes the virSecurityManagerGenLabel function in
src/security_manager.c to only autogenerate a <seclabel> element
if none is already defined for the domain *and* default
confinement is enabled. Otherwise the needless <seclabel>
autogeneration is skipped.
Resolves: https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1051017
Testing qemu-2.10-rc3 shows issues like:
qemu-system-aarch64: -drive file=/home/ubuntu/vm-start-stop/vms/
7936-0_CODE.fd,if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1: Failed to unlock byte 100
There is an apparmor deny due to qemu now locking those files:
apparmor="DENIED" operation="file_lock" [...]
name="/home/ubuntu/vm-start-stop/vms/7936-0_CODE.fd"
name="/var/lib/uvtool/libvirt/images/kvmguest-artful-normal.qcow"
[...] comm="qemu-system-aarch64" requested_mask="k" denied_mask="k"
The profile needs to allow locking for loader and nvram files via
the locking (k) rule.
Signed-off-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Testing qemu-2.10-rc2 shows issues like:
qemu-system-x86_64: -drive file=/var/lib/uvtool/libvirt/images/kvmguest- \
artful-normal.qcow,format=qcow2,if=none,id=drive-virtio-disk0:
Failed to lock byte 100
It seems the following qemu commit changed the needs for the backing
image rules:
(qemu) commit 244a5668106297378391b768e7288eb157616f64
Author: Fam Zheng <famz@redhat.com>
file-posix: Add image locking to perm operations
The block appears as:
apparmor="DENIED" operation="file_lock" [...]
name="/var/lib/uvtool/libvirt/images/kvmguest-artful-normal.qcow"
[...] comm="qemu-system-x86" requested_mask="k" denied_mask="k"
With that qemu change in place the rules generated for the image
and backing files need the allowance to also lock (k) the files.
Disks are added via add_file_path and with this fix rules now get
that permission, but no other rules are changed, example:
- "/var/lib/uvtool/libvirt/images/kvmguest-artful-normal-a2.qcow" rw,
+ "/var/lib/uvtool/libvirt/images/kvmguest-artful-normal-a2.qcow" rwk
Signed-off-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
In commit 5e515b542d I've attempted to fix the inability to access
storage from the apparmor helper program by linking with the storage
driver. By linking with the .so the linker complains that it's not
portable. Fix this by loading the module dynamically as we are supposed
to do.
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The refactor to split up storage driver into modules broke the apparmor
helper program, since that did not initialize the storage driver
properly and thus detection of the backing chain could not work.
Register the storage driver backends explicitly. Unfortunately it's now
necessary to link with the full storage driver to satisfy dependencies
of the loadable modules.
Reviewed-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Our commit e13e8808f9 was way too generic. Currently, virtlogd is
used only for chardevs type of file and nothing else. True, we
must not relabel the path in this case, but we have to in all
other cases. For instance, if you want to have a physical console
attached to your guest:
<console type='dev'>
<source path='/dev/ttyS0'/>
<target type='virtio' port='1'/>
</console>
Starting such domain fails because qemu doesn't have access to
/dev/ttyS0 because we haven't relabelled the path.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
In the case that virtlogd is used as stdio handler we pass to QEMU
only FD to a PIPE connected to virtlogd instead of the file itself.
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1430988
Signed-off-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>
The split firmware and variables files introduced by
https://bugs.debian.org/764918 are in a different directory for
some reason. Let the virtual machine read both.
Signed-off-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
virDomainXMLOption gains driver specific callbacks for parsing and
formatting save cookies.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
While checking for ABI stability, drivers might pose additional
checks that are not valid for general case. For instance, qemu
driver might check some memory backing attributes because of how
qemu works. But those attributes may work well in other drivers.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
If the first console is just a copy of the first serial device we
don't need to iterate over the same device twice in order to perform
actions like security labeling, cgroup configuring, etc.
Currently only security SELinux manager was aware of this fact.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
Namely, this patch is about virMediatedDeviceGetIOMMUGroup{Dev,Num}
functions. There's no compelling reason why these functions should take
an object, on the contrary, having to create an object every time one
needs to query the IOMMU group number, discarding the object afterwards,
seems odd.
Signed-off-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>
This patch updates all of our security driver to start labeling the
VFIO IOMMU devices under /dev/vfio/ as well.
Signed-off-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>
A mediated device will be identified by a UUID (with 'model' now being
a mandatory <hostdev> attribute to represent the mediated device API) of
the user pre-created mediated device. We also need to make sure that if
user explicitly provides a guest address for a mdev device, the address
type will be matching the device API supported on that specific mediated
device and error out with an incorrect XML message.
The resulting device XML:
<devices>
<hostdev mode='subsystem' type='mdev' model='vfio-pci'>
<source>
<address uuid='c2177883-f1bb-47f0-914d-32a22e3a8804'>
</source>
</hostdev>
</devices>
Signed-off-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>
When domain is being started up, we ought to relabel the host
side of NVDIMM so qemu has access to it.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
When domain is being started up, we ought to relabel the host
side of NVDIMM so qemu has access to it.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
If the apparmor security driver is loaded/enabled and domain config
contains a <seclabel> element whose type attribute is not 'apparmor',
starting the domain fails when attempting to label resources such
as tap FDs.
Many of the apparmor driver entry points attempt to retrieve the
apparmor security label from the domain def, returning failure if
not found. Functions such as AppArmorSetFDLabel fail even though
domain config contains an explicit 'none' secuirty driver, e.g.
<seclabel type='none' model='none'/>
Change the entry points to succeed if the domain config <seclabel>
is not apparmor. This matches the behavior of the selinux driver.
The problem is in the way how the list item is created prior to
appending it to the transaction list - the @path argument is just a
shallow copy instead of deep copy of the hostdev device's path.
Unfortunately, the hostdev devices from which the @path is extracted, in
order to add them into the transaction list, are only temporary and
freed before the buildup of the qemu namespace, thus making the @path
attribute in the transaction list NULL, causing 'permission denied' or
'double free' or 'unknown cause' errors.
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1413773
Signed-off-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>
The problem is in the way how the list item is created prior to
appending it to the transaction list - the @path attribute is just a
shallow copy instead of deep copy of the hostdev device's path.
Unfortunately, the hostdev devices from which the @path is extracted, in
order to add them into the transaction list, are only temporary and
freed before the buildup of the qemu namespace, thus making the @path
attribute in the transaction list NULL, causing 'permission denied' or
'double free' or 'unknown cause' errors.
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1413773
Signed-off-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>
There are still some systems out there that have broken
setfilecon*() prototypes. Instead of taking 'const char *tcon' it
is taking 'char *tcon'. The function should just set the context,
not modify it.
We had been bitten with this problem before which resulted in
292d3f2d and subsequently b109c09765. However, with one my latest
commits (4674fc6afd) I've changed the type of @tcon variable to
'const char *' which results in build failure on the systems from
above.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
With our new qemu namespace code in place, the relabelling of
devices is done not as good is it could: a child process is
spawned, it enters the mount namespace of the qemu process and
then runs desired API of the security driver.
Problem with this approach is that internal state transition of
the security driver done in the child process is not reflected in
the parent process. While currently it wouldn't matter that much,
it is fairly easy to forget about that. We should take the extra
step now while this limitation is still fresh in our minds.
Three new APIs are introduced here:
virSecurityManagerTransactionStart()
virSecurityManagerTransactionCommit()
virSecurityManagerTransactionAbort()
The Start() is going to be used to let security driver know that
we are starting a new transaction. During a transaction no
security labels are actually touched, but rather recorded and
only at Commit() phase they are actually updated. Should
something go wrong Abort() aborts the transaction freeing up all
memory allocated by transaction.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
The code at the very bottom of the DAC secdriver that calls
chown() should be fine with read-only data. If something needs to
be prepared it should have been done beforehand.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Since its introduction in 2012 this internal API did nothing.
Moreover we have the same API that does exactly the same:
virSecurityManagerDomainSetPathLabel.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
When virt-aa-helper parses xml content it can fail on security labels.
It fails by requiring to parse active domain content on seclabels that
are not yet filled in.
Testcase with virt-aa-helper on a minimal xml:
$ cat << EOF > /tmp/test.xml
<domain type='kvm'>
<name>test-seclabel</name>
<uuid>12345678-9abc-def1-2345-6789abcdef00</uuid>
<memory unit='KiB'>1</memory>
<os><type arch='x86_64'>hvm</type></os>
<seclabel type='dynamic' model='apparmor' relabel='yes'/>
<seclabel type='dynamic' model='dac' relabel='yes'/>
</domain>
EOF
$ /usr/lib/libvirt/virt-aa-helper -d -r -p 0 \
-u libvirt-12345678-9abc-def1-2345-6789abcdef00 < /tmp/test.xml
Current Result:
virt-aa-helper: error: could not parse XML
virt-aa-helper: error: could not get VM definition
Expected Result is a valid apparmor profile
Signed-off-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Guido Günther <agx@sigxcpu.org>
We already have a "scsi" hostdev subsys type, which refers to a single
LUN that is passed through to a guest. But what of things where
multiple LUNs are passed through via a single SCSI HBA, such as with
the vhost-scsi target? Create a new hostdev subsys type that will
carry this.
Signed-off-by: Eric Farman <farman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
As was suggested in an earlier review comment[1], we can
catch some additional code points by cleaning up how we use the
hostdev subsystem type in some switch statements.
[1] End of https://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2016-September/msg00399.html
Signed-off-by: Eric Farman <farman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
Use a pointer and the virDomainChrSourceDefNew() function in order to
allocate the structure for _virDomainSmartcardDef.
Signed-off-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
Change the virDomainChrDef to use a pointer to 'source' and allocate
that pointer during virDomainChrDefNew.
This has tremendous "fallout" in the rest of the code which mainly
has to change source.$field to source->$field.
Signed-off-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
We want to pass the proper opaque pointer instead of NULL to
virDomainDefParse and subsequently virDomainDefParseNode too.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
There is an issue with a wrong label inside vah_add_path().
The compilation fails with the error:
make[3]: Entering directory '/tmp/libvirt/src'
CC security/virt_aa_helper-virt-aa-helper.o
security/virt-aa-helper.c: In function 'vah_add_path':
security/virt-aa-helper.c:769:9: error: label 'clean' used but not defined
goto clean;
This patch moves 'clean' label to 'cleanup' label.
Signed-off-by: Julio Faracco <jcfaracco@gmail.com>
This patch fixes a segfault in virt-aa-helper caused by attempting to
modify a static string literal. It is triggered when a domain has a
<filesystem> with type='mount' configured read-only and libvirt is
using the AppArmor security driver for sVirt confinement. An "R" is
passed into the function and converted to 'r'.
The commit da665fbd introduced virStorageSourcePtr inside the structure
_virDomainFSDef. This is causing an error when libvirt is being compiled.
make[3]: Entering directory `/media/julio/8d65c59c-6ade-4740-9cdc-38016a4cb8ae
/home/julio/Desktop/virt/libvirt/src'
CC security/virt_aa_helper-virt-aa-helper.o
security/virt-aa-helper.c: In function 'get_files':
security/virt-aa-helper.c:1087:13: error: passing argument 2 of 'vah_add_path'
from incompatible pointer type [-Werror]
if (vah_add_path(&buf, fs->src, "rw", true) != 0)
^
security/virt-aa-helper.c:732:1: note: expected 'const char *' but argument is
of type 'virStorageSourcePtr'
vah_add_path(virBufferPtr buf, const char *path, const char *perms, bool
recursive)
^
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
Adding the attribute "path" from virStorageSourcePtr fixes this issue.
Signed-off-by: Julio Faracco <jcfaracco@gmail.com>
VNC graphics already supports sockets but only via 'socket' attribute.
This patch coverts that attribute into listen type 'socket'.
For backward compatibility we need to handle listen type 'socket' and 'socket'
attribute properly to support old XMLs and new XMLs. If both are provided they
have to match, if only one of them is provided we need to be able to parse that
configuration too.
To not break migration back to old libvirt if the socket is provided by user we
need to generate migratable XML without the listen element and use only 'socket'
attribute.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
Until now we weren't able to add checks that would reject configuration
once accepted by the parser. This patch adds a new callback and
infrastructure to add such checks. In this patch all the places where
rejecting a now-invalid configuration wouldn't be a good idea are marked
with a new parser flag.
fdstream.c: In function 'virFDStreamWrite':
fdstream.c:390:29: error: logical 'or' of equal expressions [-Werror=logical-op]
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
^~
Fedora rawhide now uses gcc 6.0 and there is a bug with -Wlogical-op
producing false warnings.
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=69602
Use GCC pragma push/pop and ignore -Wlogical-op for GCC that supports
push/pop pragma and also has this bug.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
The directory name changed in a89f05ba8d.
This unbreaks launching QEMU/KVM VMs with apparmor enabled. It also adds
the directory for the qemu guest-agent socket which is not known when
parsing the domain XML.
Since commit 7140807917 we are generating
socket path later than before -- when starting a domain. That makes one
particular inconsistent state of a chardev, which was not possible
before, currently valid. However, SELinux security driver forgot to
guard the main restoring function by a check for NULL-paths. So make it
no-op for NULL paths, as in the DAC driver.
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1300532
Signed-off-by: Martin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>
A device tree binary file specified by /domain/os/dtb element is a
read-only resource similar to kernel and initrd files. We shouldn't
restore its label when destroying a domain to avoid breaking other
domains configure with the same device tree.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
Kernel/initrd files are essentially read-only shareable images and thus
should be handled in the same way. We already use the appropriate label
for kernel/initrd files when starting a domain, but when a domain gets
destroyed we would remove the labels which would make other running
domains using the same files very unhappy.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=921135
Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
There is no need to deny writes on a readonly mount: write still
won't be accepted, even if the user remounts the folder as RW in
the guest as qemu sets the 9p mount as ro.
This deny rule was leading to problems for example with readonly /:
The qemu process had to write to a bunch of files in / like logs,
sockets, etc. This deny rule was also preventing auditing of these
denials, making it harder to debug.
Many of the functions follow the pattern:
virSecurity.*Security.*Label
Remove the second 'Security' from the names, it should be
obvious that the virSecurity* functions deal with security
labels even without it.
Many of the functions follow the pattern:
virSecurity.*Security.*Label
Remove the second 'Security' from the names, it should be obvious
that the virSecurity* functions deal with security labels even
without it.
Many of the functions follow the pattern:
virSecurity.*Security.*Label
Remove the second 'Security' from the names, it should be obvious
that the virSecurity* functions deal with security labels even
without it.
Fixes several style issues and removes "DEF" (what is it supposed to
mean anyway?) from debug messages.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
We have macros for both positive and negative string matching.
Therefore there is no need to use !STREQ or !STRNEQ. At the same
time as we are dropping this, new syntax-check rule is
introduced to make sure we won't introduce it again.
Signed-off-by: Ishmanpreet Kaur Khera <khera.ishman@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Even though the APIs are not implemented yet, they create a
skeleton that can be filled in later.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
This function should really be called only when we want to change
ownership of a file (or disk source). Lets switch to calling a
wrapper function which will eventually record the current owner
of the file and call virSecurityDACSetOwnershipInternal
subsequently.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
This is pure code adjustment. The structure is going to be needed
later as it will hold a reference that will be used to talk to
virtlockd. However, so far this is no functional change just code
preparation.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
This is pure code adjustment. The structure is going to be needed
later as it will hold a reference that will be used to talk to
virtlockd. However, so far this is no functional change just code
preparation.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
It's better if we stat() file that we are about to chown() at
first and check if there's something we need to change. Not that
it would make much difference, but for the upcoming patches we
need to be doing stat() anyway. Moreover, if we do things this
way, we can drop @chown_errno variable which will become
redundant.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Correctly mark the places where we need to remember and recall
file ownership. We don't want to mislead any potential developer.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
So imagine you want to crate new security manager:
if (!(mgr = virSecurityManagerNew("selinux", "QEMU", false, true, false, true)));
Hard to parse, right? What about this:
if (!(mgr = virSecurityManagerNew("selinux", "QEMU",
VIR_SECURITY_MANAGER_DEFAULT_CONFINED |
VIR_SECURITY_MANAGER_PRIVILEGED)));
Now that's better! This is what the commit does.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
profile_status function was not making any difference between error
cases and unconfined profiles. The problem with this approach is that
dominfo was throwing an error on unconfined domains.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1124841
If running in session mode it may happen that we fail to set
correct SELinux label, but the image may still be readable to
the qemu process. Take this into account.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
We may want to do some decisions in drivers based on fact if we
are running as privileged user or not. Propagate this info there.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
We have plenty of callbacks in the driver. Some of these
callbacks require more than one argument to be passed. For that
we currently have a data type (struct) per each callback. Well,
so far for only one - SELinuxSCSICallbackData. But lets turn it
into more general name so it can be reused in other callbacks too
instead of each one introducing a new, duplicate data type.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
So, after some movement in virt-aa-helper, I've noticed the
virt-aa-helper-test failing. I've ran gdb (it took me a while to
realize how to do that) and this showed up immediately:
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
strlen () at ../sysdeps/x86_64/strlen.S:106
106 ../sysdeps/x86_64/strlen.S: No such file or directory.
(gdb) bt
#0 strlen () at ../sysdeps/x86_64/strlen.S:106
#1 0x0000555555561a13 in array_starts_with (str=0x5555557ce910 "/tmp/tmp.6nI2Fkv0KL/1.img", arr=0x7fffffffd160, size=-1540438016) at security/virt-aa-helper.c:525
#2 0x0000555555561d49 in valid_path (path=0x5555557ce910 "/tmp/tmp.6nI2Fkv0KL/1.img", readonly=false) at security/virt-aa-helper.c:617
#3 0x0000555555562506 in vah_add_path (buf=0x7fffffffd3e0, path=0x5555557cb910 "/tmp/tmp.6nI2Fkv0KL/1.img", perms=0x555555581585 "rw", recursive=false) at security/virt-aa-helper.c:823
#4 0x0000555555562693 in vah_add_file (buf=0x7fffffffd3e0, path=0x5555557cb910 "/tmp/tmp.6nI2Fkv0KL/1.img", perms=0x555555581585 "rw") at security/virt-aa-helper.c:854
#5 0x0000555555562918 in add_file_path (disk=0x5555557d4440, path=0x5555557cb910 "/tmp/tmp.6nI2Fkv0KL/1.img", depth=0, opaque=0x7fffffffd3e0) at security/virt-aa-helper.c:931
#6 0x00007ffff78f18b1 in virDomainDiskDefForeachPath (disk=0x5555557d4440, ignoreOpenFailure=true, iter=0x5555555628a6 <add_file_path>, opaque=0x7fffffffd3e0) at conf/domain_conf.c:23286
#7 0x0000555555562b5f in get_files (ctl=0x7fffffffd670) at security/virt-aa-helper.c:982
#8 0x0000555555564100 in vahParseArgv (ctl=0x7fffffffd670, argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffd7e8) at security/virt-aa-helper.c:1277
#9 0x00005555555643d6 in main (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffd7e8) at security/virt-aa-helper.c:1332
So I've taken look at valid_path() because it is obviously
calling array_starts_with() with malformed @size. And here's the
result: there are two variables to hold the size of three arrays
and their value is recalculated before each call of
array_starts_with(). What if we just use three variables,
initialize them and do not touch them afterwards?
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
This is a cryptographically signed message in MIME format.
Some UEFI firmwares may want to use a non-volatile memory to store some
variables.
If AppArmor is enabled, and NVRAM store file is set currently
virt-aa-helper does
not add the NVRAM store file to the template. Add this file for
read/write when
this functionality is defined in domain XML.
Signed-off-by: Peter Kieser <peter@kieser.ca>
Remove unused variable, tag unused parameter and adjust return type.
introduced by 3f48345f7e
CC security/libvirt_security_manager_la-security_selinux.lo
security/security_selinux.c: In function 'virSecuritySELinuxDomainSetDirLabel':
security/security_selinux.c:2520:5: error: return makes pointer from integer without a cast [-Werror]
security/security_selinux.c:2514:9: error: unused variable 'ret' [-Werror=unused-variable]
security/security_selinux.c:2509:59: error: unused parameter 'mgr' [-Werror=unused-parameter]
We forbid access to /usr/share/, but (at least on Debian-based systems)
the Open Virtual Machine Firmware files needed for booting UEFI virtual
machines in QEMU live in /usr/share/ovmf/. Therefore, we need to add
that directory to the list of read only paths.
A similar patch was suggested by Jamie Strandboge <jamie@canonical.com>
on https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libvirt/+bug/1483071.
First check overrides, then read only files then restricted access
itself.
This allows us to mark files for read only access whose parents were
already restricted for read write.
Based on a proposal by Martin Kletzander
SELinux security driver already does that, but DAC driver somehow missed
the memo. Let's fix it so it works the same way.
Signed-off-by: Martin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>
In virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityChardevLabel() we are labelling unix
socket path, but accessing another structure of the union. This does
not pose a problem currently as both paths are at the same offset, but
this should be fixed for the future.
Signed-off-by: Martin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>
With commit 3f9868a virt-aa-helper stopped working due to missing
DomainGuest in the caps.
The test with -c without arch also needs to be
removed since the new capabilities code uses the host arch when none is
provided.
Initializing libvirt log in virt-aa-helper and getting it to output
libvirt log to stderr. This will help debugging problems happening in
libvirt functions called from within virt-aa-helper
QEMU working in vhost-user mode communicates with the other end (i.e.
some virtual router application) via unix domain sockets. This requires
that permissions for the socket files are correctly written into
/etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/libvirt-UUID.files.
Signed-off-by: Michal Dubiel <md@semihalf.com>
This needs to specified in way too many places for a simple validation
check. The ostype/arch/virttype validation checks later in
DomainDefParseXML should catch most of the cases that this was covering.
if (mgr == NULL || mgr->drv == NULL)
return ret;
This check isn't really necessary, security manager cannot be a NULL
pointer as it is either selinux (by default) or 'none', if no other driver is
set in the config. Even with no config file driver name yields 'none'.
The other hunk checks for domain's security model validity, but we should
also check devices' security model as well, therefore this hunk is moved into
a separate function which is called by virSecurityManagerCheckAllLabel that
checks both the domain's security model and devices' security model.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1165485
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
We do have a check for valid per-domain security model, however we still
do permit an invalid security model for a domain's device (those which
are specified with <source> element).
This patch introduces a new function virSecurityManagerCheckAllLabel
which compares user specified security model against currently
registered security drivers. That being said, it also permits 'none'
being specified as a device security model.
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1165485
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
The virDomainDefParse* and virDomainDefFormat* methods both
accept the VIR_DOMAIN_XML_* flags defined in the public API,
along with a set of other VIR_DOMAIN_XML_INTERNAL_* flags
defined in domain_conf.c.
This is seriously confusing & error prone for a number of
reasons:
- VIR_DOMAIN_XML_SECURE, VIR_DOMAIN_XML_MIGRATABLE and
VIR_DOMAIN_XML_UPDATE_CPU are only relevant for the
formatting operation
- Some of the VIR_DOMAIN_XML_INTERNAL_* flags only apply
to parse or to format, but not both.
This patch cleanly separates out the flags. There are two
distint VIR_DOMAIN_DEF_PARSE_* and VIR_DOMAIN_DEF_FORMAT_*
flags that are used by the corresponding methods. The
VIR_DOMAIN_XML_* flags received via public API calls must
be converted to the VIR_DOMAIN_DEF_FORMAT_* flags where
needed.
The various calls to virDomainDefParse which hardcoded the
use of the VIR_DOMAIN_XML_INACTIVE flag change to use the
VIR_DOMAIN_DEF_PARSE_INACTIVE flag.
When using qemuProcessAttach to attach a qemu process,
the DAC label is not filled correctly.
Introduce a new function to get the uid:gid from the system
and fill the label.
This fixes the daemon crash when 'virsh screenshot' is called:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1161831
It also fixes qemu-attach after the prerequisite of this patch
(commit f8c1fb3) was pushed out of order.
Signed-off-by: Luyao Huang <lhuang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1082521
Support for shared hostdev's was added in a number of commits, initially
starting with 'f2c1d9a80' and most recently commit id 'fd243fc4' to fix
issues with the initial implementation. Missed in all those changes was
the need to mimic the virSELinux{Set|Restore}SecurityDiskLabel code to
handle the "shared" (or shareable) and readonly options when Setting
or Restoring the SELinux labels.
This patch will adjust the virSecuritySELinuxSetSecuritySCSILabel to not
use the virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityHostdevLabelHelper in order to set
the label. Rather follow what the Disk code does by setting the label
differently based on whether shareable/readonly is set. This patch will
also modify the virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecuritySCSILabel to follow
the same logic as virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabelInt and not
restore the label if shared/readonly
Commit 'c264eeaa' didn't do the prerequisite 'make syntax-check' before
pushing. There was a <tab> in the whitespace for the comment. Replaced
with spaces and aligned.
pushed as build breaker since Jenkins complained loudly
Rule sc_prohibit_newline_at_end_of_diagnostic for syntax-check does
check for passing strings ending with '\n' two lines after known
functions. This is, of course subject to false positives, so for the
sake of future changes, trick that syntax-check by adding one more line
with a comment.
Signed-off-by: Martin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1147057
The code for relabelling the TAP FD is there due to a race. When
libvirt creates a /dev/tapN device it's labeled as
'system_u:object_r:device_t:s0' by default. Later, when
udev/systemd reacts to this device, it's relabelled to the
expected label 'system_u:object_r:tun_tap_device_t:s0'. Hence, we
have a code that relabels the device, to cut the race down. For
more info see ae368ebfcc.
But the problem is, the relabel function is called on all TUN/TAP
devices. Yes, on /dev/net/tun too. This is however a special kind
of device - other processes uses it too. We shouldn't touch it's
label then.
Ideally, there would an API in SELinux that would label just the
passed FD and not the underlying path. That way, we wouldn't need
to care as we would be not labeling /dev/net/tun but the FD
passed to the domain. Unfortunately, there's no such API so we
have to workaround until then.
Tested-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
The check for ISCSI devices was missing a check of subsys type, which
meant we could skip labelling of other host devices as well. This fixes
USB hotplug on F21
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1145968
Add a new parameter to virStorageFileGetMetadata that will break the
backing chain detection process and report useful error message rather
than having to use virStorageFileChainGetBroken.
This patch just introduces the option, usage will be provided
separately.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1141879
A long time ago I've implemented support for so called multiqueue
net. The idea was to let guest network traffic be processed by
multiple host CPUs and thus increasing performance. However, this
behavior is enabled by QEMU via special ioctl() iterated over the
all tap FDs passed in by libvirt. Unfortunately, SELinux comes in
and disallows the ioctl() call because the /dev/net/tun has label
system_u:object_r:tun_tap_device_t:s0 and 'attach_queue' ioctl()
is not allowed on tun_tap_device_t type. So after discussion with
a SELinux developer we've decided that the FDs passed to the QEMU
should be labelled with svirt_t type and SELinux policy will
allow the ioctl(). Therefore I've made a patch
(cf976d9dcf) that does exactly this. The patch
was fixed then by a443193139 and
b635b7a1af. However, things are not
that easy - even though the API to label FD is called
(fsetfilecon_raw) the underlying file is labelled too! So
effectively we are mangling /dev/net/tun label. Yes, that broke
dozen of other application from openvpn, or boxes, to qemu
running other domains.
The best solution would be if SELinux provides a way to label an
FD only, which could be then labeled when passed to the qemu.
However that's a long path to go and we should fix this
regression AQAP. So I went to talk to the SELinux developer again
and we agreed on temporary solution that:
1) All the three patches are reverted
2) SELinux temporarily allows 'attach_queue' on the
tun_tap_device_t
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
I've noticed two problem with the automatically created NVRAM varstore
file. The first, even though I run qemu as root:root for some reason I
get Permission denied when trying to open the _VARS.fd file. The
problem is, the upper directory misses execute permissions, which in
combination with us dropping some capabilities result in EPERM.
The next thing is, that if I switch SELinux to enforcing mode, I get
another EPERM because the vars file is not labeled correctly. It is
passed to qemu as disk and hence should be labelled as disk. QEMU may
write to it eventually, so this is different to kernel or initrd.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
After a4431931 the TAP FDs ale labeled with image label instead
of the process label. On the other hand, the commit was
incomplete as a few lines above, there's still old check for the
process label presence while it should be check for the image
label instead.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
QEMU now supports UEFI with the following command line:
-drive file=/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_CODE.fd,if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,readonly=on \
-drive file=/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_VARS.fd,if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1 \
where the first line reflects <loader> and the second one <nvram>.
Moreover, these two lines obsolete the -bios argument.
Note that UEFI is unusable without ACPI. This is handled properly now.
Among with this extension, the variable file is expected to be
writable and hence we need security drivers to label it.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Up to now, users can configure BIOS via the <loader/> element. With
the upcoming implementation of UEFI this is not enough as BIOS and
UEFI are conceptually different. For instance, while BIOS is ROM, UEFI
is programmable flash (although all writes to code section are
denied). Therefore we need new attribute @type which will
differentiate the two. Then, new attribute @readonly is introduced to
reflect the fact that some images are RO.
Moreover, the OVMF (which is going to be used mostly), works in two
modes:
1) Code and UEFI variable store is mixed in one file.
2) Code and UEFI variable store is separated in two files
The latter has advantage of updating the UEFI code without losing the
configuration. However, in order to represent the latter case we need
yet another XML element: <nvram/>. Currently, it has no additional
attributes, it's just a bare element containing path to the variable
store file.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
For security type='none' libvirt according to the docs should not
generate seclabel be it for selinux or any model. So, skip the
reservation of labels when type is none.
Signed-off-by: Shivaprasad G Bhat <sbhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The cleanup in commit cf976d9d used secdef->label to label the tap
FDs, but that is not possible since it's process-only label (svirt_t)
and not a object label (e.g. svirt_image_t). Starting a domain failed
with EPERM, but simply using secdef->imagelabel instead of
secdef->label fixes it.
Signed-off-by: Martin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1095636
When starting up the domain the domain's NICs are allocated. As of
1f24f682 (v1.0.6) we are able to use multiqueue feature on virtio
NICs. It breaks network processing into multiple queues which can be
processed in parallel by different host CPUs. The queues are, however,
created by opening /dev/net/tun several times. Unfortunately, only the
first FD in the row is labelled so when turning the multiqueue feature
on in the guest, qemu will get AVC denial. Make sure we label all the
FDs needed.
Moreover, the default label of /dev/net/tun doesn't allow
attaching a queue:
type=AVC msg=audit(1399622478.790:893): avc: denied { attach_queue }
for pid=7585 comm="qemu-kvm"
scontext=system_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0:c638,c877
tcontext=system_u:system_r:virtd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tclass=tun_socket
And as suggested by SELinux maintainers, the tun FD should be labeled
as svirt_t. Therefore, we don't need to adjust any range (as done
previously by Guannan in ae368ebf) rather set the seclabel of the
domain directly.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Create the structures and API's to hold and manage the iSCSI host device.
This extends the 'scsi_host' definitions added in commit id '5c811dce'.
A future patch will add the XML parsing, but that code requires some
infrastructure to be in place first in order to handle the differences
between a 'scsi_host' and an 'iSCSI host' device.
Split virDomainHostdevSubsysSCSI further. In preparation for having
either SCSI or iSCSI data, create a union in virDomainHostdevSubsysSCSI
to contain just a virDomainHostdevSubsysSCSIHost to describe the
'scsi_host' host device
To integrate the security driver with the storage driver we need to
pass a callback for a function that will chown storage volumes.
Introduce and document the callback prototype.
When restoring security labels in the dac driver the code would resolve
the file path and use the resolved one to be chown-ed. The setting code
doesn't do that. Remove the unnecessary code.
Rework the apparmor lxc profile abstraction to mimic ubuntu's container-default.
This profile allows quite a lot, but strives to restrict access to
dangerous resources.
Removing the explicit authorizations to bash, systemd and cron files,
forces them to keep the lxc profile for all applications inside the
container. PUx permissions where leading to running systemd (and others
tasks) unconfined.
Put the generic files, network and capabilities restrictions directly
in the TEMPLATE.lxc: this way, users can restrict them on a per
container basis.
Don't fail when there is nothing to do, as a tweak to the previous
patch regarding output of libvirt-UUID.files for LXC apparmor profiles
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
This negation in names of boolean variables is driving me insane. The
code is much more readable if we drop the 'no-' prefix. Well, at least
for me.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Add security driver functions to label separate storage images using the
virStorageSource definition. This will help to avoid the need to do ugly
changes to the disk struct and use the source directly.
In the future we might need to track state of individual images. Move
the readonly and shared flags to the virStorageSource struct so that we
can keep them in a per-image basis.
The function headers contain type on the same line as the name. When
combined with usage of ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, the function headers were very
long. Shorten them by breaking the line after the type.
virSecurityManagerSetDiskLabel and virSecurityManagerRestoreDiskLabel
don't have complementary semantics. Document the semantics to avoid
possible problems.
I'm going to add functions that will deal with individual image files
rather than whole disks. Rename the security function to make room for
the new one.
I'm going to add functions that will deal with individual image files
rather than whole disks. Rename the security function to make room for
the new one.
The image labels are stored in the virStorageSource struct. Convert the
virDomainDiskDefGetSecurityLabelDef helper not to use the full disk def
and move it appropriately.
A network disk might actually be backed by local storage. Also the path
iterator actually handles networked disks well now so remove the code
that skips the labelling in dac and selinux security driver.
As part of the work on backing chains, I'm finding that it would
be easier to directly manipulate chains of pointers (adding a
snapshot merely adjusts pointers to form the correct list) rather
than copy data from one struct to another. This patch converts
domain disk source to be a pointer.
In this patch, the pointer is ALWAYS allocated (thanks in part to
the previous patch forwarding all disk def allocation through a
common point), and all other changse are just mechanical fallout of
the new type; there should be no functional change. It is possible
that we may want to leave the pointer NULL for a cdrom with no
medium in a later patch, but as that requires a closer audit of the
source to ensure we don't fault on a null dereference, I didn't do
it here.
* src/conf/domain_conf.h (_virDomainDiskDef): Change type of src.
* src/conf/domain_conf.c: Adjust all clients.
* src/security/security_selinux.c: Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_domain.c: Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_command.c: Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_conf.c: Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c: Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_migration.c: Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Likewise.
* src/lxc/lxc_driver.c: Likewise.
* src/lxc/lxc_controller.c: Likewise.
* tests/securityselinuxlabeltest.c: Likewise.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
My future work will modify the metadata crawler function to use the
storage driver file APIs to access the files instead of accessing them
directly so that we will be able to request the metadata for remote
files too. To avoid linking the storage driver to every helper file
using the utils code, the backing chain traversal function needs to be
moved to the storage driver source.
Additionally the virt-aa-helper and virstoragetest programs need to be
linked with the storage driver as a result of this change.
In "src/conf/domain_conf.h" there are many enum declarations. The
cleanup in this header filer was started, but it wasn't enough and
there are many other files that has enum variables declared. So, the
commit was starting to be big. This commit finish the cleanup in this
header file and in other files that has enum variables, parameters,
or functions declared.
Signed-off-by: Julio Faracco <jcfaracco@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
In "src/conf/domain_conf.h" there are many enumerations (enum)
declarations to be converted as a typedef too. As mentioned before,
it's better to use a typedef for variable types, function types and
other usages. I think this file has most of those enum declarations
at "src/conf/". So, me and Eric Blake plan to keep the cleanups all
over the source code. This time, most of the files changed in this
commit are related to part of one file: "src/conf/domain_conf.h".
Signed-off-by: Julio Faracco <jcfaracco@gmail.com>
With dynamic_ownership = 1 but no seclabels, RestoreChardevLabel
dereferences the NULL seclabel when checking if norelabel is set.
Remove this check, since it is already done in RestoreSecurityAllLabel
and if norelabel is set, RestoreChardevLabel is never called.
The domain definition is clearly used a few lines
below so there's no need to mark @def as unused.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
The DAC driver ignores the relabel='no' attribute in chardev config
<serial type='file'>
<source path='/tmp/jim/test.file'>
<seclabel model='dac' relabel='no'/>
</source>
<target port='0'/>
</serial>
This patch avoids labeling chardevs when relabel='no' is specified.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
When relabel='no' at the domain level, there is no need to call
the hostdev relabeling functions.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=999301
The DAC driver ignores the relabel='no' attribute in disk config
<disk type='file' device='floppy'>
<driver name='qemu' type='raw'/>
<source file='/some/path/floppy.img'>
<seclabel model='dac' relabel='no'/>
</source>
<target dev='fda' bus='fdc'/>
<readonly/>
</disk>
This patch avoid labeling disks when relabel='no' is specified.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
If relabel='no' at the domain level, no need to attempt relabeling
in virSecurityDAC{Set,Restore}SecurityAllLabel().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Currently, the DAC security driver passes callback data as
void params[2];
params[0] = mgr;
params[1] = def;
Clean this up by defining a structure for passing the callback
data. Moreover, there's no need to pass the whole virDomainDef
in the callback as the only thing needed in the callbacks is
virSecurityLabelDefPtr.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
In switch statements, use enum types since it is safer when
adding new items to the enum.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Annotate some static function parameters with ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL
and remove checks for NULL inputs.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
To avoid having the root of a backing chain present twice in the list we
need to invert the working of virStorageFileGetMetadataRecurse.
Until now the recursive worker created a new backing chain element from
the name and other information passed as arguments. This required us to
pass the data of the parent in a deconstructed way and the worker
created a new entry for the parent.
This patch converts this function so that it just fills in metadata
about the parent and creates a backing chain element from those. This
removes the duplication of the first element.
To avoid breaking the test suite, virstoragetest now calls a wrapper
that creates the parent structure explicitly and pre-fills it with the
test data with same function signature as previously used.
Switch over to storing of the backing chain as a recursive
virStorageSource structure.
This is a string based move. Currently the first element will be present
twice in the backing chain as currently the retrieval function stores
the parent in the newly detected chain. This will be fixed later.
Since it is an abbreviation, PCI should always be fully
capitalized or full lower case, never Pci.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
I noticed that the apparmor code could request metadata even
for a cdrom with no media, which would cause a memory leak of
the hash table used to look for loops in the backing chain.
But even before that, we blindly dereferenced the path for
printing a debug statement, so it is just better to enforce
that this is only used on non-NULL names.
* src/util/virstoragefile.c (virStorageFileGetMetadata): Assume
non-NULL path.
* src/util/virstoragefile.h: Annotate this.
* src/security/virt-aa-helper.c (get_files): Fix caller.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Coverity complains about a possible leak of seclabel if
!sec_managers[i]->drv->domainGenSecurityLabel is true
and the seclabel might be overwritten by the next iteration
of the loop.
This leak should never happen, because every security driver
has domainGenSecurityLabel defined.
The code in virstoragefile.c is getting more complex as I
consolidate backing chain handling code. But for the setuid
virt-login-shell, we don't need to crawl backing chains. It's
easier to audit things for setuid security if there are fewer
files involved, so this patch moves the one function that
virFileOpen() was actually relying on to also live in virfile.c.
* src/util/virstoragefile.c (virStorageFileIsSharedFS)
(virStorageFileIsSharedFSType): Move...
* src/util/virfile.c (virFileIsSharedFS, virFileIsSharedFSType):
...to here, and rename.
(virFileOpenAs): Update caller.
* src/security/security_selinux.c
(virSecuritySELinuxSetFileconHelper)
(virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityAllLabel)
(virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabelInt): Likewise.
* src/security/security_dac.c
(virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityImageLabelInt): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemuOpenFileAs): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_migration.c (qemuMigrationIsSafe): Likewise.
* src/util/virstoragefile.h: Adjust declarations.
* src/util/virfile.h: Likewise.
* src/libvirt_private.syms (virfile.h, virstoragefile.h): Move
symbols as appropriate.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
In order to reuse the newly-created host-side disk struct in
the virstoragefile backing chain code, I first have to move
it to util/. This starts the process, by first moving the
security label structures.
* src/conf/domain_conf.h (virDomainDefGenSecurityLabelDef)
(virDomainDiskDefGenSecurityLabelDef, virSecurityLabelDefFree)
(virSecurityDeviceLabelDefFree, virSecurityLabelDef)
(virSecurityDeviceLabelDef): Move...
* src/util/virseclabel.h: ...to new file.
(virSecurityLabelDefNew, virSecurityDeviceLabelDefNew): Rename the
GenSecurity functions.
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c (qemuProcessAttach): Adjust callers.
* src/security/security_manager.c (virSecurityManagerGenLabel):
Likewise.
* src/security/security_selinux.c
(virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel): Likewise.
* src/util/virseclabel.c: New file.
* src/conf/domain_conf.c: Move security code, and fix fallout.
* src/Makefile.am (UTIL_SOURCES): Build new file.
* src/libvirt_private.syms (domain_conf.h): Move symbols...
(virseclabel.h): ...to new section.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
See lp#1276719 for the bug description. As virt-aa-helper doesn't know
the VFIO groups to use for the guest, allow access to all
/dev/vfio/[0-9]* and /dev/vfio/vfio files if there is a potential need
for vfio
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
It's finally time to start tracking disk backing chains in
<domain> XML. The first step is to start refactoring code
so that we have an object more convenient for representing
each host source resource in the context of a single guest
<disk>. Ultimately, I plan to move the new type into src/util
where it can be reused by virStorageFile, but to make the
transition easier to review, this patch just creates the
new type then fixes everything until it compiles again.
* src/conf/domain_conf.h (_virDomainDiskDef): Split...
(_virDomainDiskSourceDef): ...to new struct.
(virDomainDiskAuthClear): Use new type.
* src/conf/domain_conf.c (virDomainDiskDefFree): Split...
(virDomainDiskSourceDefClear): ...to new function.
(virDomainDiskGetType, virDomainDiskSetType)
(virDomainDiskGetSource, virDomainDiskSetSource)
(virDomainDiskGetDriver, virDomainDiskSetDriver)
(virDomainDiskGetFormat, virDomainDiskSetFormat)
(virDomainDiskAuthClear, virDomainDiskGetActualType)
(virDomainDiskDefParseXML, virDomainDiskSourceDefFormat)
(virDomainDiskDefFormat, virDomainDiskDefForeachPath)
(virDomainDiskDefGetSecurityLabelDef)
(virDomainDiskSourceIsBlockType): Adjust all users.
* src/lxc/lxc_controller.c (virLXCControllerSetupDisk):
Likewise.
* src/lxc/lxc_driver.c (lxcDomainAttachDeviceMknodHelper):
Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_command.c (qemuAddRBDHost, qemuParseRBDString)
(qemuParseDriveURIString, qemuParseGlusterString)
(qemuParseISCSIString, qemuParseNBDString)
(qemuDomainDiskGetSourceString, qemuBuildDriveStr)
(qemuBuildCommandLine, qemuParseCommandLineDisk)
(qemuParseCommandLine): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_conf.c (qemuCheckSharedDevice)
(qemuAddISCSIPoolSourceHost, qemuTranslateDiskSourcePool):
Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemuDomainUpdateDeviceConfig)
(qemuDomainPrepareDiskChainElement)
(qemuDomainSnapshotCreateInactiveExternal)
(qemuDomainSnapshotPrepareDiskExternalBackingInactive)
(qemuDomainSnapshotPrepareDiskInternal)
(qemuDomainSnapshotPrepare)
(qemuDomainSnapshotCreateSingleDiskActive)
(qemuDomainSnapshotUndoSingleDiskActive)
(qemuDomainBlockPivot, qemuDomainBlockJobImpl)
(qemuDomainBlockCopy, qemuDomainBlockCommit): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_migration.c (qemuMigrationIsSafe): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c (qemuProcessGetVolumeQcowPassphrase)
(qemuProcessInitPasswords): Likewise.
* src/security/security_selinux.c
(virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel): Likewise.
* src/storage/storage_driver.c (virStorageFileInitFromDiskDef):
Likewise.
* tests/securityselinuxlabeltest.c (testSELinuxLoadDef):
Likewise.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Part of a series of cleanups to use new accessor methods.
* src/security/security_dac.c (virSecurityDACSetSecurityImageLabel)
(virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityImageLabelInt)
(virSecurityDACSetSecurityAllLabel): Use accessors.
* src/security/security_selinux.c
(virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabelInt)
(virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel)
(virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityAllLabel): Likewise.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Per the documentation, is_selinux_enabled() returns -1 on error.
Account for this. Previously when -1 was being returned the condition
would still be true. I was noticing this because on my system that has
selinux disabled I was getting this in the libvirt.log every 5
seconds:
error : virIdentityGetSystem:173 : Unable to lookup SELinux process context: Invalid argument
With this patch applied, I no longer get these messages every 5
seconds. I am submitting this in case its deemed useful for inclusion.
Anyone have any comments on this change? This is a patch off current
master.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Any source file which calls the logging APIs now needs
to have a VIR_LOG_INIT("source.name") declaration at
the start of the file. This provides a static variable
of the virLogSource type.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
If there should be some sort of separator it is better to use comment
with the filename, copyright, description, license information and
authors.
Found by:
git grep -nH '^$' | grep '\.[ch]:1:'
Signed-off-by: Martin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>
Make virt-aa-helper create rules to allow VMs access to filesystem
mounts from the host.
Signed-off-by: Felix Geyer <debfx@fobos.de>
Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Miura <miurahr@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Guido Günther <agx@sigxcpu.org>
use_apparmor() was first designed to be called from withing libvirtd,
but libvirt_lxc also uses it. in libvirt_lxc, there is no need to check
whether to use apparmor or not: just use it if possible.
Commit 2ce63c1 added imagelabel generation when relabeling is turned
off. But we weren't filling out the sensitivity for type 'none' labels,
resulting in an invalid label:
$ virsh managedsave domain
error: unable to set security context 'system_u:object_r:svirt_image_t'
on fd 28: Invalid argument
To support passing the path of the test data to the utils, one
more argument is added to virSCSIDeviceGetSgName,
virSCSIDeviceGetDevName, and virSCSIDeviceNew, and the related
code is changed accordingly.
Later tests for the scsi utils will be based on this patch.
Signed-off-by: Osier Yang <jyang@redhat.com>
Unlike the host devices of other types, SCSI host device XML supports
"shareable" tag. This patch introduces it for the virSCSIDevice struct
for a later patch use (to detect if the SCSI device is shareable when
preparing the SCSI host device in QEMU driver).
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=996543
When starting up a domain, the SELinux labeling is done depending on
current configuration. If the labeling fails we check for possible
causes, as not all labeling failures are fatal. For example, if the
labeled file is on NFS which lacks SELinux support, the file can still
be readable to qemu process. These cases are distinguished by the errno
code: NFS without SELinux support returns EOPNOTSUPP. However, we were
missing one scenario. In case there's a read-only disk on a read-only
NFS (and possibly any FS) and the labeling is just optional (not
explicitly requested in the XML) there's no need to make the labeling
error fatal. In other words, read-only file on read-only NFS can fail to
be labeled, but be readable at the same time.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
We weren't very consistent in our use of VIR_ERR_NO_SUPPORT; many
users just passed __FUNCTION__ on, while others passed "%s" to
silence over-eager compilers that warn about __FUNCTION__ not
containing any %. It's nicer to route all these uses through
a single macro, so that if we ever need to change the reporting,
we can do it in one place.
I verified that 'virsh -c test:///default qemu-monitor-command test foo'
gives the same error message before and after this patch:
error: this function is not supported by the connection driver: virDomainQemuMonitorCommand
Note that in libvirt.c, we were inconsistent on whether virDomain*
API used virLibConnError() (with VIR_FROM_NONE) or virLibDomainError()
(with VIR_FROM_DOMAIN); this patch unifies these errors to all use
VIR_FROM_NONE, on the grounds that it is unlikely that a caller
learning that a call is unimplemented can do anything in particular
with extra knowledge of which error domain it belongs to.
One particular change to note is virDomainOpenGraphics which was
trying to fail with VIR_ERR_NO_SUPPORT after a failed
VIR_DRV_SUPPORTS_FEATURE check; all other places that fail a
feature check report VIR_ERR_ARGUMENT_UNSUPPORTED.
* src/util/virerror.h (virReportUnsupportedError): New macro.
* src/libvirt-qemu.c: Use new macro.
* src/libvirt-lxc.c: Likewise.
* src/lxc/lxc_driver.c: Likewise.
* src/security/security_manager.c: Likewise.
* src/util/virinitctl.c: Likewise.
* src/libvirt.c: Likewise.
(virDomainOpenGraphics): Use correct error for unsupported feature.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
For a while we're have random failures of 'securityselinuxtest'
which were not at all reproducible. Fortunately we finally
caught a failure with VIR_TEST_DEBUG=1 enabled. This revealed
TEST: securityselinuxtest
1) GenLabel "dynamic unconfined, s0, c0.c1023" ... OK
2) GenLabel "dynamic unconfined, s0, c0.c1023" ... OK
3) GenLabel "dynamic unconfined, s0, c0.c1023" ... OK
4) GenLabel "dynamic virtd, s0, c0.c1023" ... OK
5) GenLabel "dynamic virtd, s0, c0.c10" ... OK
6) GenLabel "dynamic virtd, s2-s3, c0.c1023" ... OK
7) GenLabel "dynamic virtd, missing range" ... Category two 1024 is out of range 0-1023
FAILED
FAIL: securityselinuxtest
And sure enough we had an off-by-1 in the MCS range code when
the current process has no range set. The test suite randomly
allocates 2 categories from 0->1024 so the chances of hitting
this in the test suite were slim indeed :-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
To make it easier to forbid future attempts at a confusing typedef
name ending in Ptr that isn't actually a pointer, insist that we
follow our preferred style of 'typedef foo *fooPtr'.
* cfg.mk (sc_forbid_const_pointer_typedef): Enforce consistent
style, to prevent issue fixed in previous storage patch.
* src/conf/capabilities.h (virCapsPtr): Fix offender.
* src/security/security_stack.c (virSecurityStackItemPtr):
Likewise.
* tests/qemucapabilitiestest.c (testQemuDataPtr): Likewise.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
To ensure proper processing by virGetUserID() and virGetGroupID()
of a uid/gid add a "+" prior to the uid/gid to denote it's really
a uid/gid for the label.
Merge the functions 'virSecurityDACSetUser' and
'virSecurityDACSetGroup' into 'virSecurityDACSetUserAndGroup'.
Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>
'const fooPtr' is the same as 'foo * const' (the pointer won't
change, but it's contents can). But in general, if an interface
is trying to be const-correct, it should be using 'const foo *'
(the pointer is to data that can't be changed).
Fix up offenders in src/security.
* src/security/security_apparmor.c (reload_profile)
(AppArmorSetSecurityHostdevLabelHelper)
(AppArmorReleaseSecurityLabel, AppArmorRestoreSecurityAllLabel)
(AppArmorSetSecurityProcessLabel)
(AppArmorSetSecurityChildProcessLabel)
(AppArmorSetSecurityImageLabel, AppArmorSecurityVerify)
(AppArmorSetSecurityHostdevLabel)
(AppArmorRestoreSecurityHostdevLabel, AppArmorSetFDLabel): Drop
needless const.
* src/security/security_selinux.c
(virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel): Likewise.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Commit 29fe5d7 (released in 1.1.1) introduced a latent problem
for any caller of virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel and where
the domain already had a uid:gid label to be parsed. Such a
setup would collect the list of supplementary groups during
virSecurityManagerPreFork, but then ignores that information,
and thus fails to call setgroups() to adjust the supplementary
groups of the process.
Upstream does not use virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel for
qemu (it uses virSecurityManagerSetChildProcessLabel instead),
so this problem remained latent until backporting the initial
commit into v0.10.2-maint (commit c061ff5, released in 0.10.2.7),
where virSecurityManagerSetChildProcessLabel has not been
backported. As a result of using a different code path in the
backport, attempts to start a qemu domain that runs as qemu:qemu
will end up with supplementary groups unchanged from the libvirtd
parent process, rather than the desired supplementary groups of
the qemu user. This can lead to failure to start a domain
(typical Fedora setup assigns user 107 'qemu' to both group 107
'qemu' and group 36 'kvm', so a disk image that is only readable
under kvm group rights is locked out). Worse, it is a security
hole (the qemu process will inherit supplemental group rights
from the parent libvirtd process, which means it has access
rights to files owned by group 0 even when such files should
not normally be visible to user qemu).
LXC does not use the DAC security driver, so it is not vulnerable
at this time. Still, it is better to plug the latent hole on
the master branch first, before cherry-picking it to the only
vulnerable branch v0.10.2-maint.
* src/security/security_dac.c (virSecurityDACGetIds): Always populate
groups and ngroups, rather than only when no label is parsed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=924153
Commit 904e05a2 (v0.9.9) added a per-<disk> seclabel element with
an attribute relabel='no' in order to try and minimize the
impact of shutdown delays when an NFS server disappears. The idea
was that if a disk is on NFS and can't be labeled in the first
place, there is no need to attempt the (no-op) relabel on domain
shutdown. Unfortunately, the way this was implemented was by
modifying the domain XML so that the optimization would survive
libvirtd restart, but in a way that is indistinguishable from an
explicit user setting. Furthermore, once the setting is turned
on, libvirt avoids attempts at labeling, even for operations like
snapshot or blockcopy where the chain is being extended or pivoted
onto non-NFS, where SELinux labeling is once again possible. As
a result, it was impossible to do a blockcopy to pivot from an
NFS image file onto a local file.
The solution is to separate the semantics of a chain that must
not be labeled (which the user can set even on persistent domains)
vs. the optimization of not attempting a relabel on cleanup (a
live-only annotation), and using only the user's explicit notation
rather than the optimization as the decision on whether to skip
a label attempt in the first place. When upgrading an older
libvirtd to a newer, an NFS volume will still attempt the relabel;
but as the avoidance of a relabel was only an optimization, this
shouldn't cause any problems.
In the ideal future, libvirt will eventually have XML describing
EVERY file in the backing chain, with each file having a separate
<seclabel> element. At that point, libvirt will be able to track
more closely which files need a relabel attempt at shutdown. But
until we reach that point, the single <seclabel> for the entire
<disk> chain is treated as a hint - when a chain has only one
file, then we know it is accurate; but if the chain has more than
one file, we have to attempt relabel in spite of the attribute,
in case part of the chain is local and SELinux mattered for that
portion of the chain.
* src/conf/domain_conf.h (_virSecurityDeviceLabelDef): Add new
member.
* src/conf/domain_conf.c (virSecurityDeviceLabelDefParseXML):
Parse it, for live images only.
(virSecurityDeviceLabelDefFormat): Output it.
(virDomainDiskDefParseXML, virDomainChrSourceDefParseXML)
(virDomainDiskSourceDefFormat, virDomainChrDefFormat)
(virDomainDiskDefFormat): Pass flags on through.
* src/security/security_selinux.c
(virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabelInt): Honor labelskip
when possible.
(virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel): Set labelskip, not
norelabel, if labeling fails.
(virSecuritySELinuxSetFileconHelper): Fix indentation.
* docs/formatdomain.html.in (seclabel): Document new xml.
* docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng (devSeclabel): Allow it in RNG.
* tests/qemuxml2argvdata/qemuxml2argv-seclabel-*-labelskip.xml:
* tests/qemuxml2argvdata/qemuxml2argv-seclabel-*-labelskip.args:
* tests/qemuxml2xmloutdata/qemuxml2xmlout-seclabel-*-labelskip.xml:
New test files.
* tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c (mymain): Run the new tests.
* tests/qemuxml2xmltest.c (mymain): Likewise.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Parsing 'user:group' is useful even outside the DAC security driver,
so expose the most abstract function which has no DAC security driver
bits in itself.
Attempts to start a domain with both SELinux and DAC security
modules loaded will deadlock; latent problem introduced in commit
fdb3bde and exposed in commit 29fe5d7. Basically, when recursing
into the security manager for other driver's prefork, we have to
undo the asymmetric lock taken at the manager level.
Reported by Jiri Denemark, with diagnosis help from Dan Berrange.
* src/security/security_stack.c (virSecurityStackPreFork): Undo
extra lock grabbed during recursion.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Commit 75c1256 states that virGetGroupList must not be called
between fork and exec, then commit ee777e99 promptly violated
that for lxc's use of virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel. Hoist
the supplemental group detection to the time that the security
manager needs to fork. Qemu is safe, as it uses
virSecurityManagerSetChildProcessLabel which in turn uses
virCommand to determine supplemental groups.
This does not fix the fact that virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel
calls virSecurityDACParseIds calls parseIds which eventually
calls getpwnam_r, which also violates fork/exec async-signal-safe
safety rules, but so far no one has complained of hitting
deadlock in that case.
* src/security/security_dac.c (_virSecurityDACData): Track groups
in private data.
(virSecurityDACPreFork): New function, to set them.
(virSecurityDACClose): Clean up new fields.
(virSecurityDACGetIds): Alter signature.
(virSecurityDACSetSecurityHostdevLabelHelper)
(virSecurityDACSetChardevLabel, virSecurityDACSetProcessLabel)
(virSecurityDACSetChildProcessLabel): Update callers.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
A future patch wants the DAC security manager to be able to safely
get the supplemental group list for a given uid, but at the time
of a fork rather than during initialization so as to pick up on
live changes to the system's group database. This patch adds the
framework, including the possibility of a pre-fork callback
failing.
For now, any driver that implements a prefork callback must be
robust against the possibility of being part of a security stack
where a later element in the chain fails prefork. This means
that drivers cannot do any action that requires a call to postfork
for proper cleanup (no grabbing a mutex, for example). If this
is too prohibitive in the future, we would have to switch to a
transactioning sequence, where each driver has (up to) 3 callbacks:
PreForkPrepare, PreForkCommit, and PreForkAbort, to either clean
up or commit changes made during prepare.
* src/security/security_driver.h (virSecurityDriverPreFork): New
callback.
* src/security/security_manager.h (virSecurityManagerPreFork):
Change signature.
* src/security/security_manager.c (virSecurityManagerPreFork):
Optionally call into driver, and allow returning failure.
* src/security/security_stack.c (virSecurityDriverStack):
Wrap the handler for the stack driver.
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c (qemuProcessStart): Adjust caller.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
While generating seclabels, we check the seclabel stack if required
driver is in the stack. If not, an error is returned. However, it is
possible for a seclabel to not have any model set (happens with LXC
domains that have just <seclabel type='none'>). If that's the case,
we should just skip the iteration instead of calling STREQ(NULL, ...)
and SIGSEGV-ing subsequently.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=964358
POSIX states that multi-threaded apps should not use functions
that are not async-signal-safe between fork and exec, yet we
were using getpwuid_r and initgroups. Although rare, it is
possible to hit deadlock in the child, when it tries to grab
a mutex that was already held by another thread in the parent.
I actually hit this deadlock when testing multiple domains
being started in parallel with a command hook, with the following
backtrace in the child:
Thread 1 (Thread 0x7fd56bbf2700 (LWP 3212)):
#0 __lll_lock_wait ()
at ../nptl/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/lowlevellock.S:136
#1 0x00007fd5761e7388 in _L_lock_854 () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0
#2 0x00007fd5761e7257 in __pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x7fd56be00360)
at pthread_mutex_lock.c:61
#3 0x00007fd56bbf9fc5 in _nss_files_getpwuid_r (uid=0, result=0x7fd56bbf0c70,
buffer=0x7fd55c2a65f0 "", buflen=1024, errnop=0x7fd56bbf25b8)
at nss_files/files-pwd.c:40
#4 0x00007fd575aeff1d in __getpwuid_r (uid=0, resbuf=0x7fd56bbf0c70,
buffer=0x7fd55c2a65f0 "", buflen=1024, result=0x7fd56bbf0cb0)
at ../nss/getXXbyYY_r.c:253
#5 0x00007fd578aebafc in virSetUIDGID (uid=0, gid=0) at util/virutil.c:1031
#6 0x00007fd578aebf43 in virSetUIDGIDWithCaps (uid=0, gid=0, capBits=0,
clearExistingCaps=true) at util/virutil.c:1388
#7 0x00007fd578a9a20b in virExec (cmd=0x7fd55c231f10) at util/vircommand.c:654
#8 0x00007fd578a9dfa2 in virCommandRunAsync (cmd=0x7fd55c231f10, pid=0x0)
at util/vircommand.c:2247
#9 0x00007fd578a9d74e in virCommandRun (cmd=0x7fd55c231f10, exitstatus=0x0)
at util/vircommand.c:2100
#10 0x00007fd56326fde5 in qemuProcessStart (conn=0x7fd53c000df0,
driver=0x7fd55c0dc4f0, vm=0x7fd54800b100, migrateFrom=0x0, stdin_fd=-1,
stdin_path=0x0, snapshot=0x0, vmop=VIR_NETDEV_VPORT_PROFILE_OP_CREATE,
flags=1) at qemu/qemu_process.c:3694
...
The solution is to split the work of getpwuid_r/initgroups into the
unsafe portions (getgrouplist, called pre-fork) and safe portions
(setgroups, called post-fork).
* src/util/virutil.h (virSetUIDGID, virSetUIDGIDWithCaps): Adjust
signature.
* src/util/virutil.c (virSetUIDGID): Add parameters.
(virSetUIDGIDWithCaps): Adjust clients.
* src/util/vircommand.c (virExec): Likewise.
* src/util/virfile.c (virFileAccessibleAs, virFileOpenForked)
(virDirCreate): Likewise.
* src/security/security_dac.c (virSecurityDACSetProcessLabel):
Likewise.
* src/lxc/lxc_container.c (lxcContainerSetID): Likewise.
* configure.ac (AC_CHECK_FUNCS_ONCE): Check for setgroups, not
initgroups.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Convert the type of loop iterators named 'i', 'j', k',
'ii', 'jj', 'kk', to be 'size_t' instead of 'int' or
'unsigned int', also santizing 'ii', 'jj', 'kk' to use
the normal 'i', 'j', 'k' naming
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The imagelabel SELinux label was only generated when relabeling was
enabled. This prohibited labeling of files created by libvirt that need
to be labeled even if relabeling is turned off.
The only codepath this change has direct impact on is labeling of FDs
passed to qemu which is always safe in current state.
I realized after the fact that it's probably better in the long run to
give this function a name that matches the name of the link used in
sysfs to hold the group (iommu_group).
I'm changing it now because I'm about to add several more functions
that deal with iommu groups.
I noticed several unusual spacings in for loops, and decided to
fix them up. See the next commit for the syntax check that found
all of these.
* examples/domsuspend/suspend.c (main): Fix spacing.
* python/libvirt-override.c: Likewise.
* src/conf/interface_conf.c: Likewise.
* src/security/virt-aa-helper.c: Likewise.
* src/util/virconf.c: Likewise.
* src/util/virhook.c: Likewise.
* src/util/virlog.c: Likewise.
* src/util/virsocketaddr.c: Likewise.
* src/util/virsysinfo.c: Likewise.
* src/util/viruuid.c: Likewise.
* src/vbox/vbox_tmpl.c: Likewise.
* src/xen/xen_hypervisor.c: Likewise.
* tools/virsh-domain-monitor.c (vshDomainStateToString): Drop
default case, to let compiler check us.
* tools/virsh-domain.c (vshDomainVcpuStateToString): Likewise.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
