* src/qemu/qemu_process.c (qemuFindAgentConfig): avoid crash libvirtd due to
deref a NULL pointer.
* How to reproduce?
1. virsh edit the following xml into guest configuration:
<channel type='pty'>
<target type='virtio'/>
</channel>
2. virsh start <domain>
or
% virt-install -n foo -r 1024 --disk path=/var/lib/libvirt/images/foo.img,size=1 \
--channel pty,target_type=virtio -l <installation tree>
Signed-off-by: Alex Jia <ajia@redhat.com>
When migrating a qemu domain, we enter the monitor, send some commands,
try to connect to destination qemu, send other commands, end exit the
monitor. However, if we couldn't connect to destination qemu we forgot
to exit the monitor.
Bug introduced by commit d9d518b1c8.
In case libvirtd cannot detect host CPU model (which may happen if it
runs inside a virtual machine), the daemon is likely to segfault when
starting a new qemu domain. It segfaults when domain XML asks for host
(either model or passthrough) CPU or does not ask for any specific CPU
model at all.
Currently, if scrub (used for wiping algorithms) is not present
at compile time, we don't support any other wiping algorithms than
zeroing, even if it was installed later. Switch to runtime detection
instead.
Bug introduced in commit 35abced. On an inactive domain,
$ virsh snapshot-create-as dom snap
$ virsh snapshot-create dom
$ virsh snapshot-create dom
$ virsh snapshot-delete --children dom snap
could crash libvirtd, due to a use-after-free that results
when the callback freed the current element in the iteration.
* src/conf/domain_conf.c (virDomainSnapshotForEachChild)
(virDomainSnapshotActOnDescendant): Allow iteration to delete
current child.
This patch allows libvirt to add interfaces to already
existing Open vSwitch bridges. The following syntax in
domain XML file can be used:
<interface type='bridge'>
<mac address='52:54:00:d0:3f:f2'/>
<source bridge='ovsbr'/>
<virtualport type='openvswitch'>
<parameters interfaceid='921a80cd-e6de-5a2e-db9c-ab27f15a6e1d'/>
</virtualport>
<address type='pci' domain='0x0000' bus='0x00'
slot='0x03' function='0x0'/>
</interface>
or if libvirt should auto-generate the interfaceid use
following syntax:
<interface type='bridge'>
<mac address='52:54:00:d0:3f:f2'/>
<source bridge='ovsbr'/>
<virtualport type='openvswitch'>
</virtualport>
<address type='pci' domain='0x0000' bus='0x00'
slot='0x03' function='0x0'/>
</interface>
It is also possible to pass an optional profileid. To do that
use following syntax:
<interface type='bridge'>
<source bridge='ovsbr'/>
<mac address='00:55:1a:65:a2:8d'/>
<virtualport type='openvswitch'>
<parameters interfaceid='921a80cd-e6de-5a2e-db9c-ab27f15a6e1d'
profileid='test-profile'/>
</virtualport>
</interface>
To create Open vSwitch bridge install Open vSwitch and
run the following command:
ovs-vsctl add-br ovsbr
The current default method of terminating the qemu process is to send
a SIGTERM, wait for up to 1.6 seconds for it to cleanly shutdown, then
send a SIGKILL and wait for up to 1.4 seconds more for the process to
terminate. This is problematic because occasionally 1.6 seconds is not
long enough for the qemu process to flush its disk buffers, so the
guest's disk ends up in an inconsistent state.
Since this only occasionally happens when the timeout prior to SIGKILL
is 1.6 seconds, this patch increases that timeout to 10 seconds. At
the very least, this should reduce the occurrence from "occasionally"
to "extremely rarely". (Once SIGKILL is sent, it waits another 5
seconds for the process to die before returning).
Note that in the cases where it takes less than this for qemu to
shutdown cleanly, libvirt will *not* wait for any longer than it would
without this patch - qemuProcessKill polls the process and returns as
soon as it is gone.
This patch is based on an earlier patch by Eric Blake which was never
committed:
https://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2011-November/msg00243.html
Aside from rebasing, this patch only drops the driver lock once (prior
to the first time the function sleeps), then leaves it dropped until
it returns (Eric's patch would drop and re-acquire the lock around
each call to sleep).
At the time Eric sent his patch, the response (from Dan Berrange) was
that, while it wasn't a good thing to be holding the driver lock while
sleeping, we really need to rethink locking wrt the driver object,
switching to a finer-grained approach that locks individual items
within the driver object separately to allow for greater concurrency.
This is a good plan, and at the time it made sense to not apply the
patch because there was no known bug related to the driver lock being
held in this function.
However, we now know that the length of the wait in qemuProcessKill is
sometimes too short to allow the qemu process to fully flush its disk
cache before SIGKILL is sent, so we need to lengthen the timeout (in
order to improve the situation with management applications until they
can be updated to use the new VIR_DOMAIN_DESTROY_GRACEFUL flag added
in commit 72f8a7f197). But, if we
lengthen the timeout, we also lengthen the amount of time that all
other threads in libvirtd are essentially blocked from doing anything
(since just about everything needs to acquire the driver lock, if only
for long enough to get a pointer to a domain).
The solution is to modify qemuProcessKill to drop the driver lock
while sleeping, as proposed in Eric's patch. Then we can increase the
timeout with a clear conscience, and thus at least lower the chances
that someone running with existing management software will suffer the
consequence's of qemu's disk cache not being flushed.
In the meantime, we still should work on Dan's proposal to make
locking within the driver object more fine grained.
(NB: although I couldn't find any instance where qemuProcessKill() was
called with no jobs active for the domain (or some other guarantee
that the current thread had at least one refcount on the domain
object), this patch still follows Eric's method of temporarily adding
a ref prior to unlocking the domain object, because I couldn't
convince myself 100% that this was the case.)
In the future (my next patch in fact) we may want to make
decisions depending on qemu having a monitor command or not.
Therefore, we want to set qemuCaps flag instead of querying
on the monitor each time we are about to make that decision.
When blkdeviotune was first committed in 0.9.8, we had the limitation
that setting one value reset all others. But bytes and iops should
be relatively independent. Furthermore, setting tuning values on
a live domain followed by dumpxml did not output the new settings.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemuDiskPathToAlias): Add parameter, and
update callers.
(qemuDomainSetBlockIoTune): Don't lose previous unrelated
settings. Make live changes reflect to dumpxml output.
* tools/virsh.pod (blkdeviotune): Update documentation.
Detected by valgrind. Leaks are introduced in commit c1b2264.
* src/remote/remote_driver.c (doRemoteOpen): free client program memory in failure path.
* How to reproduce?
% valgrind -v --leak-check=full virsh -c qemu:
* Actual result
==3969== 40 bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 8 of 28
==3969== at 0x4A04A28: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:467)
==3969== by 0x4C89C41: virAlloc (memory.c:101)
==3969== by 0x4D5A236: virNetClientProgramNew (virnetclientprogram.c:60)
==3969== by 0x4D47AB4: doRemoteOpen (remote_driver.c:658)
==3969== by 0x4D49FFF: remoteOpen (remote_driver.c:871)
==3969== by 0x4D13373: do_open (libvirt.c:1196)
==3969== by 0x4D14535: virConnectOpenAuth (libvirt.c:1422)
==3969== by 0x425627: main (virsh.c:18537)
==3969==
==3969== 40 bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 9 of 28
==3969== at 0x4A04A28: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:467)
==3969== by 0x4C89C41: virAlloc (memory.c:101)
==3969== by 0x4D5A236: virNetClientProgramNew (virnetclientprogram.c:60)
==3969== by 0x4D47AD7: doRemoteOpen (remote_driver.c:664)
==3969== by 0x4D49FFF: remoteOpen (remote_driver.c:871)
==3969== by 0x4D13373: do_open (libvirt.c:1196)
==3969== by 0x4D14535: virConnectOpenAuth (libvirt.c:1422)
==3969== by 0x425627: main (virsh.c:18537)
==3969==
==3969== LEAK SUMMARY:
==3969== definitely lost: 80 bytes in 2 blocks
Signed-off-by: Alex Jia <ajia@redhat.com>
The auto-generated WWN comply with the new addressing schema of WWN:
<quote>
the first nibble is either hex 5 or 6 followed by a 3-byte vendor
identifier and 36 bits for a vendor-specified serial number.
</quote>
We choose hex 5 for the first nibble. And for the 3-bytes vendor ID,
we uses the OUI according to underlying hypervisor type, (invoking
virConnectGetType to get the virt type). e.g. If virConnectGetType
returns "QEMU", we use Qumranet's OUI (00:1A:4A), if returns
ESX|VMWARE, we use VMWARE's OUI (00:05:69). Currently it only
supports qemu|xen|libxl|xenapi|hyperv|esx|vmware drivers. The last
36 bits are auto-generated.
Some audit records generated by libvirt contain fields enclosed by single
quotes. Since those fields are inside the msg field, which is enclosed by
single quotes, these records generated by libvirt are not correctly parsed by
libauparse.
Some tools, such as virt-manager, prefers having the default USB
controller explicit in the XML document. This patch makes sure there
is one. With this patch, it is now possible to switch from USB1 to
USB2 from the release 0.9.1 of virt-manager.
Fix tests to pass with this change.
virsh blkiotune dom --device-weights /dev/sda,400 --config
wasn't working correctly.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemuDomainSetBlkioParameters): Use
correct definition.
Now that no one is relying on the return value being a pointer to
somewhere inside of the passed-in argument, we can simplify the
callers to simply return success or failure. Also wrap some long
lines and add some const-correctness.
* src/util/sysinfo.c (virSysinfoParseBIOS, virSysinfoParseSystem)
(virSysinfoParseProcessor, virSysinfoParseMemory): Change return.
(virSysinfoRead): Adjust caller.
Reported by Alex Jia:
==21503== 112 (32 direct, 80 indirect) bytes in 1 blocks are
definitely lost in loss record 37 of 40
==21503== at 0x4A04A28: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:467)
==21503== by 0x4A8991: virAlloc (memory.c:101)
==21503== by 0x505A6C: x86DataCopy (cpu_x86.c:247)
==21503== by 0x507B34: x86Compute (cpu_x86.c:1225)
==21503== by 0x43103C: qemuBuildCommandLine (qemu_command.c:3561)
==21503== by 0x41C9F7: testCompareXMLToArgvHelper
(qemuxml2argvtest.c:183)
==21503== by 0x41E10D: virtTestRun (testutils.c:141)
==21503== by 0x41B942: mymain (qemuxml2argvtest.c:705)
==21503== by 0x41D7E7: virtTestMain (testutils.c:696)
In case the caller specifies that confined guests are required but the
security driver turns out to be 'none', we should return an error since
this driver clearly cannot meet that requirement. As a result of this
error, libvirtd fails to start when the host admin explicitly sets
confined guests are required but there is no security driver available.
Since security driver 'none' cannot create confined guests, we override
default confined setting so that hypervisor drivers do not thing they
should create confined guests.
Security label type 'none' requires relabel to be set to 'no' so there's
no reason to output this extra attribute. Moreover, since relabel is
internally stored in a negative from (norelabel), the default value for
relabel would be 'yes' in case there is no <seclabel> element in domain
configuration. In case VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DEFAULT turns into
VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_NONE, we would incorrectly output relabel='yes' for
seclabel type 'none'.
Qemu uses non-blocking I/O which doesn't play nice with regular file
descriptors. We need to pass a pipe to qemu instead, which can easily be
done using iohelper.
virFileDirectFd was used for accessing files opened with O_DIRECT using
libvirt_iohelper. We will want to use the helper for accessing files
regardless on O_DIRECT and thus virFileDirectFd was generalized and
renamed to virFileWrapperFd.
dmidecode displays processor information, followed by BIOS, system and
memory-DIMM details.
Calls to virSysinfoParseBIOS(), virSysinfoParseSystem() would update
the buffer pointer 'base', so the processor information would be lost
before virSysinfoParseProcessor() was called. Sysinfo would therefore
not be able to display processor details -- It only described <bios>,
<system> and <memory_device> details.
This patch attempts to insulate sysinfo from ordering of dmidecode
output.
Before the fix:
---------------
virsh # sysinfo
<sysinfo type='smbios'>
<bios>
....
</bios>
<system>
....
</system>
<memory_device>
....
</memory_device>
After the fix:
-------------
virsh # sysinfo
<sysinfo type='smbios'>
<bios>
....
</bios>
<system>
....
</system>
<processor>
....
</processor>
<memory_device>
....
</memory_device>
Input to the volume cloning code is a source volume and an XML
descriptor for the new volume. It is possible for the new volume
to have a greater size than source volume, at which point libvirt
will just stick 0s on the end of the new image (for raw format
anyways).
Unfortunately a logic error messed up our tracking of the of the
excess amount that needed to be written: end result is that sparse
clones were made very much non-sparse, and cloning regular disk
images could end up excessively sized (though data unaltered).
Drop the 'remain' variable entriely here since it's redundant, and
track actual allocation directly against the desired 'total'.
gcc 4.7 complains:
util/virhashcode.c:49:17: error: always_inline function might not be inlinable [-Werror=attributes]
util/virhashcode.c:35:17: error: always_inline function might not be inlinable [-Werror=attributes]
Normal 'inline' is a hint that the compiler may ignore; the fact
that the function is static is good enough. We don't care if the
compiler decided not to inline after all.
* src/util/virhashcode.c (getblock, fmix): Relax attribute.
On CentOS5:
If "virsh edit $DOM" is used and an error happens (for example changing
any live cycle action to a non-existing value), libvirt forgets that
$DOM exists, since it is already removed from the internal hash tables,
which are used for domain lookup.
In once case (unreproducible) even the persistent configuration
/etc/xen/$DOM was deleted.
Instead of using the compound function xenXMConfigSaveFile() explicitly
use xenFomatXM() and virConfWriteFile() to distinguish between a failure
in converting the libvirt definition to the xen-xm format and a problem
when writing the file.
Signed-off-by: Philipp Hahn <hahn@univention.de>
Commit b170eb99 introduced a bug: domains that had an explicit
<seclabel type='none'/> when started would not be reparsed if
libvirtd restarted. It turns out that our testsuite was not
exercising this because it never tried anything but inactive
parsing. Additionally, the live XML for such a domain failed
to re-validate. Applying just the tests/ portion of this patch
will expose the bugs that are fixed by the other two files.
* docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng (seclabel): Allow relabel under
type='none'.
* src/conf/domain_conf.c (virSecurityLabelDefParseXML): Per RNG,
presence of <seclabel> with no type implies dynamic. Don't
require sub-elements for type='none'.
* tests/qemuxml2xmltest.c (mymain): Add test.
* tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c (mymain): Likewise.
* tests/qemuxml2argvdata/qemuxml2argv-seclabel-none.xml: Add file.
* tests/qemuxml2argvdata/qemuxml2argv-seclabel-none.args: Add file.
Reported by Ansis Atteka.
On CentOS5 with xen-3.0.3:
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
virFree (ptrptr=0x8) at util/memory.c:310
310 free(*(void**)ptrptr);
(gdb) bt
#0 virFree (ptrptr=0x8) at util/memory.c:310
#1 0x00002aaaaae167c8 in xenXMDomainDefineXML (conn=0x694e80, xml=0x6b2ce0 "P\fk") at xen/xm_internal.c:1199
#2 0x00002aaaaae070d7 in xenUnifiedDomainDefineXML (conn=0x8,
xml=0x6ac040 "<domain type='xen'>\n <name>pv</name>\n <uuid>20291bc0-453a-4d6c-c6ac-4e5af63b932c</uuid>\n <memory>1048576</memory>\n <currentMemory>1048576</currentMemory>\n <vcpu>1</vcpu>\n <os>\n <type arch='x8"...) at xen/xen_driver.c:1524
#3 0x00002aaaaada7803 in virDomainDefineXML (conn=0x694e80,
xml=0x6ac040 "<domain type='xen'>\n <name>pv</name>\n <uuid>20291bc0-453a-4d6c-c6ac-4e5af63b932c</uuid>\n <memory>1048576</memory>\n <currentMemory>1048576</currentMemory>\n <vcpu>1</vcpu>\n <os>\n <type arch='x8"...) at libvirt.c:7823
#4 0x0000000000426173 in cmdEdit (ctl=0x7fffffffb8e0, cmd=<value optimized out>) at virsh.c:14882
#5 0x000000000041c9ce in vshCommandRun (ctl=0x7fffffffb8e0, cmd=0x658c50) at virsh.c:17712
#6 0x000000000042c3b9 in main (argc=1, argv=<value optimized out>) at virsh.c:19317
Signed-off-by: Philipp Hahn <hahn@univention.de>
Calling qemuDomainMigrateGraphicsRelocate notifies spice clients to
connect to destination qemu so that they can seamlessly switch streams
once migration is done. Unfortunately, current qemu is not able to
accept any connections while incoming migration connection is open.
Thus, we need to delay opening the migration connection to the point
spice client is already connected to the destination qemu.
Unlike .cvsignore under CVS, git allows for ignoring nested
names. We weren't very consistent where new tests were
being ignored (some in .gitignore, some in tests/.gitignore),
and I found it easier to just consolidate everything.
* .gitignore: Subsume entries from subdirectories.
* daemon/.gitignore: Delete.
* docs/.gitignore: Likewise.
* docs/devhelp/.gitignore: Likewise.
* docs/html/.gitignore: Likewise.
* examples/dominfo/.gitignore: Likewise.
* examples/domsuspend/.gitignore: Likewise.
* examples/hellolibvirt/.gitignore: Likewise.
* examples/openauth/.gitignore: Likewise.
* examples/domain-events/events-c/.gitignore: Likewise.
* include/libvirt/.gitignore: Likewise.
* src/.gitignore: Likewise.
* src/esx/.gitignore: Likewise.
* tests/.gitignore: Likewise.
* tools/.gitignore: Likewise.
This eliminates the warning message reported in:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=624447
It was caused by a failure to open an image file that is not
accessible by root (the uid libvirtd is running as) because it's on a
root-squash NFS share, owned by a different user, with permissions of
660 (or maybe 600).
The solution is to use virFileOpenAs() rather than open(). The
codepath that generates the error is during qemuSetupDiskCGroup(), but
the actual open() is in a lower-level generic function called from
many places (virDomainDiskDefForeachPath), so some other pieces of the
code were touched just to add dummy (or possibly useful) uid and gid
arguments.
Eliminating this warning message has the nice side effect that the
requested operation may even succeed (which in this case isn't
necessary, but shouldn't hurt anything either).
virFileOpenAs previously would only try opening a file as the current
user, or as a different user, but wouldn't try both methods in a
single call. This made it cumbersome to use as a replacement for
open(2). Additionally, it had a lot of historical baggage that led to
it being difficult to understand.
This patch refactors virFileOpenAs in the following ways:
* reorganize the code so that everything dealing with both the parent
and child sides of the "fork+setuid+setgid+open" method are in a
separate function. This makes the public function easier to understand.
* Allow a single call to virFileOpenAs() to first attempt the open as
the current user, and if that fails to automatically re-try after
doing fork+setuid (if deemed appropriate, i.e. errno indicates it
would now be successful, and the file is on a networkFS). This makes
it possible (in many, but possibly not all, cases) to drop-in
virFileOpenAs() as a replacement for open(2).
(NB: currently qemuOpenFile() calls virFileOpenAs() twice, once
without forking, then again with forking. That unfortunately can't
be changed without at least some discussion of the ramifications,
because the requested file permissions are different in each case,
which is something that a single call to virFileOpenAs() can't deal
with.)
* Add a flag so that any fchown() of the file to a different uid:gid
is explicitly requested when the function is called, rather than it
being implied by the presence of the O_CREAT flag. This just makes
for less subtle surprises to consumers. (Commit
b1643dc15c added the check for O_CREAT
before forcing ownership. This patch just makes that restriction
more explicit.)
* If either the uid or gid is specified as "-1", virFileOpenAs will
interpret this to mean "the current [gu]id".
All current consumers of virFileOpenAs should retain their present
behavior (after a few minor changes to their setup code and
arguments).
Rename the src/util/netlink files to src/util/virnetlink to
better fit the naming scheme. Also rename nlComm to virNetlinkCommand.
Signed-off-by: D. Herrendoerfer <d.herrendoerfer@herrendoerfer.name>
When libvirt's virDomainDestroy API is shutting down the qemu process,
it first sends SIGTERM, then waits for 1.6 seconds and, if it sees the
process still there, sends a SIGKILL.
There have been reports that this behavior can lead to data loss
because the guest running in qemu doesn't have time to flush its disk
cache buffers before it's unceremoniously whacked.
This patch maintains that default behavior, but provides a new flag
VIR_DOMAIN_DESTROY_GRACEFUL to alter the behavior. If this flag is set
in the call to virDomainDestroyFlags, SIGKILL will never be sent to
the qemu process; instead, if the timeout is reached and the qemu
process still exists, virDomainDestroy will return an error.
Once this patch is in, the recommended method for applications to call
virDomainDestroyFlags will be with VIR_DOMAIN_DESTROY_GRACEFUL
included. If that fails, then the application can decide if and when
to call virDomainDestroyFlags again without
VIR_DOMAIN_DESTROY_GRACEFUL (to force the issue with SIGKILL).
(Note that this does not address the issue of existing applications
that have not yet been modified to use VIR_DOMAIN_DESTROY_GRACEFUL.
That is a separate patch.)
