This isn't strictly speaking a bugfix, but I realized I'd gotten a bit
too verbose when I chose the names for
VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_PCI_BACKEND_TYPE_*. This shortens them all a bit.
Legacy kvm style pci device assignment requires changes to the
labelling of several sysfs files for each device, but for vfio device
assignment, the only thing that needs to be relabelled/chowned is the
"group" device for the group that contains the device to be assigned.
There will soon be other items related to pci hostdevs that need to be
in the same part of the hostdevsubsys union as the pci address (which
is currently a single member called "pci". This patch replaces the
single member named pci with a struct named pci that contains a single
member named "addr".
Since cbe67ff9b0a5a94911afd4d12388bf182bcca86c
virSecuritySELinuxGenNewContext reports good error messages. Fix callers
that mask the errors by generic error message.
Detected by a simple Shell script:
for i in $(git ls-files -- '*.[ch]'); do
awk 'BEGIN {
fail=0
}
/# *include.*\.h/{
match($0, /["<][^">]*[">]/)
arr[substr($0, RSTART+1, RLENGTH-2)]++
}
END {
for (key in arr) {
if (arr[key] > 1) {
fail=1
printf("%d %s\n", arr[key], key)
}
}
if (fail == 1)
exit 1
}' $i
if test $? != 0; then
echo "Duplicate header(s) in $i"
fi
done;
A later patch will add the syntax-check to avoid duplicate
headers.
The virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef was modifying the domain XML.
It tried to find a seclabel corresponding to given sec driver. If the
label wasn't found, the function created one which is wrong. In fact
it's security manager which should modify this part of domain XML.
Normally libvirtd should run with a SELinux label
system_u:system_r:virtd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
If a user manually runs libvirtd though, it is sometimes
possible to get into a situation where it is running
system_u:system_r:init_t:s0
The SELinux security driver isn't expecting this and can't
parse the security label since it lacks the ':c0.c1023' part
causing it to complain
internal error Cannot parse sensitivity level in s0
This updates the parser to cope with this, so if no category
is present, libvirtd will hardcode the equivalent of c0.c1023.
Now this won't work if SELinux is in Enforcing mode, but that's
not an issue, because the user can only get into this problem
if in Permissive mode. This means they can now start VMs in
Permissive mode without hitting that parsing error
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Pull the code which parses the current process MCS range
out of virSecuritySELinuxMCSFind and into a new method
virSecuritySELinuxMCSGetProcessRange.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The body of the loop in virSecuritySELinuxMCSFind would
directly 'return NULL' on OOM, instead of jumping to the
cleanup label. This caused a leak of several local vars.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Coverity found the DACGenLabel was checking for mgr == NULL after a
possible dereference; however, in order to get into the function the
virSecurityManagerGenLabel would have already dereferenced sec_managers[i]
so the check was unnecessary. Same check is made in SELinuxGenSecurityLabel.
The existing virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() API is designed so
that it must be called after forking the child process, but before
exec'ing the child. Due to the way the virCommand API works, that
means it needs to be put in a "hook" function that virCommand is told
to call out to at that time.
Setting the child process label is a basic enough need when executing
any process that virCommand should have a method of doing that. But
virCommand must be told what label to set, and only the security
driver knows the answer to that question.
The new virSecurityManagerSet*Child*ProcessLabel() API is the way to
transfer the knowledge about what label to set from the security
driver to the virCommand object. It is given a virCommandPtr, and each
security driver calls the appropriate virCommand* API to tell
virCommand what to do between fork and exec.
1) in the case of the DAC security driver, it calls
virCommandSetUID/GID() to set a uid and gid that must be set for the
child process.
2) for the SELinux security driver, it calls
virCommandSetSELinuxLabel() to save a copy of the char* that will be
sent to setexeccon_raw() *after forking the child process*.
3) for the AppArmor security drivers, it calls
virCommandSetAppArmorProfile() to save a copy of the char* that will
be sent to aa_change_profile() *after forking the child process*.
With this new API in place, we will be able to remove
virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() from any virCommand pre-exec
hooks.
(Unfortunately, the LXC driver uses clone() rather than virCommand, so
it can't take advantage of this new security driver API, meaning that
we need to keep around the older virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel(),
at least for now.)
On RHEL 5, I got:
security/security_selinux.c: In function 'getContext':
security/security_selinux.c:971: warning: unused parameter 'mgr' [-Wunused-parameter]
* src/security/security_selinux.c (getContext): Mark potentially
unused parameter.
The security manager drivers are not allowed to call back
out to top level security manager APIs, since that results
in recursive mutex acquisition and thus deadlock. Remove
calls to virSecurityManagerGetModel from SELinux / AppArmor
drivers
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Commit id a994ef2d1 changed the mechanism to store/update the default
security label from using disk->seclabels[0] to allocating one on the
fly. That change allocated the label, but never saved it. This patch
will save the label. The new virDomainDiskDefAddSecurityLabelDef() is
a copy of the virDomainDefAddSecurityLabelDef().
Prepare to support different types of hostdevs by refactoring
the current SELinux security driver code
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
When LXC labels USB devices during hotplug, it is running in
host context, so it needs to pass in a vroot path to the
container root.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The virSecurityManager{Set,Restore}AllLabel methods are invoked
at domain startup/shutdown to relabel resources associated with
a domain. This works fine with QEMU, but with LXC they are in
fact both currently no-ops since LXC does not support disks,
hostdevs, or kernel/initrd files. Worse, when LXC gains support
for disks/hostdevs, they will do the wrong thing, since they
run in host context, not container context. Thus this patch
turns then into a formal no-op when used with LXC. The LXC
controller will call out to specific security manager labelling
APIs as required during startup.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The current SELinux policy only works for KVM guests, since
TCG requires the 'execmem' privilege. There is a 'virt_use_execmem'
boolean to turn this on globally, but that is unpleasant for users.
This changes libvirt to automatically use a new 'svirt_tcg_t'
context for TCG based guests. This obsoletes the previous
boolean tunable and makes things 'just work(tm)'
Since we can't assume we run with new enough policy, I also
make us log a warning message (once only) if we find the policy
lacks support. In this case we fallback to the normal label and
expect users to set the boolean tunable
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The impls of virSecurityManagerGetMountOptions had no way to
return errors, since the code was treating 'NULL' as a success
value. This is somewhat pointless, since the calling code did
not want NULL in the first place and has to translate it into
the empty string "". So change the code so that the impls can
return "" directly, allowing use of NULL for error reporting
once again
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The libvirt coding standard is to use 'function(...args...)'
instead of 'function (...args...)'. A non-trivial number of
places did not follow this rule and are fixed in this patch.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
When restoring selinux labels after a VM is stopped, any non-standard
path that doesn't have a default selinux label causes the process
to stop and exit early. This isn't really an error condition IMO.
Of course the selinux API could be erroring for some other reason
but hopefully that's rare enough to not need explicit handling.
Common example here is storing disk images in a non-standard location
like under /mnt.
We used to walk the backing file chain at least twice per disk,
once to set up cgroup device whitelisting, and once to set up
security labeling. Rather than walk the chain every iteration,
which possibly includes calls to fork() in order to open root-squashed
NFS files, we can exploit the cache of the previous patch.
* src/conf/domain_conf.h (virDomainDiskDefForeachPath): Alter
signature.
* src/conf/domain_conf.c (virDomainDiskDefForeachPath): Require caller
to supply backing chain via disk, if recursion is desired.
* src/security/security_dac.c
(virSecurityDACSetSecurityImageLabel): Adjust caller.
* src/security/security_selinux.c
(virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel): Likewise.
* src/security/virt-aa-helper.c (get_files): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c (qemuSetupDiskCgroup)
(qemuTeardownDiskCgroup): Likewise.
(qemuSetupCgroup): Pre-populate chain.
BZ:https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=851981
When using macvtap, a character device gets first created by
kernel with name /dev/tapN, its selinux context is:
system_u:object_r:device_t:s0
Shortly, when udev gets notification when new file is created
in /dev, it will then jump in and relabel this file back to the
expected default context:
system_u:object_r:tun_tap_device_t:s0
There is a time gap happened.
Sometimes, it will have migration failed, AVC error message:
type=AVC msg=audit(1349858424.233:42507): avc: denied { read write } for
pid=19926 comm="qemu-kvm" path="/dev/tap33" dev=devtmpfs ino=131524
scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0:c598,c908
tcontext=system_u:object_r:device_t:s0 tclass=chr_file
This patch will label the tapfd device before qemu process starts:
system_u:object_r:tun_tap_device_t:MCS(MCS from seclabel->label)
We are currently able to work only with non-translated SELinux
contexts, but we are using functions that work with translated
contexts throughout the code. This patch swaps all SELinux context
translation relative calls with their raw sisters to avoid parsing
problems.
The problems can be experienced with mcstrans for example. The
difference is that if you have translations enabled (yum install
mcstrans; service mcstrans start), fgetfilecon_raw() will get you
something like 'system_u:object_r:virt_image_t:s0', whereas
fgetfilecon() will return 'system_u:object_r:virt_image_t:SystemLow'
that we cannot parse.
I was trying to confirm that the _raw variants were here since the dawn of
time, but the only thing I see now is that it was imported together in
the upstream repo [1] from svn, so before 2008.
Thanks Laurent Bigonville for finding this out.
[1] http://oss.tresys.com/git/selinux.git
All USB device lookup functions emit an error when they cannot find the
requested device. With this patch, their caller can choose if a missing
device is an error or normal condition.
This allows the user to control labelling of each character device
separately (the default is to inherit from the VM).
Signed-off-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-howto.html recommends that
the 'If not, see <url>.' phrase be a separate sentence.
* tests/securityselinuxhelper.c: Remove doubled line.
* tests/securityselinuxtest.c: Likewise.
* globally: s/; If/. If/
Currently the dynamic label generation code will create labels
with a sensitivity of s0, and a category pair in the range
0-1023. This is fine when running a standard MCS policy because
libvirtd will run with a label
system_u:system_r:virtd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
With custom policies though, it is possible for libvirtd to have
a different sensitivity, or category range. For example
system_u:system_r:virtd_t:s2-s3:c512.c1023
In this case we must assign the VM a sensitivity matching the
current lower sensitivity value, and categories in the range
512-1023
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The code to refactor sec label handling accidentally changed the
SELinux driver to use the 'domain_context' when generating the
image label instead of the 'file_context'
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
These changes make the security drivers able to find and handle the
correct security label information when more than one label is
available. They also update the DAC driver to be used as an usual
security driver.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch updates the structures that store information about each
domain and each hypervisor to support multiple security labels and
drivers. It also updates all the remaining code to use the new fields.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
