Forgetting to use the VIR_MIGRATE_TLS flag with migration can lead to
leak of sensitive information. Add an administrative knob to force use
of the flag.
Note that without VIR_MIGRATE_PEER2PEER, the migration is driven by an
instance of the client library which doesn't necessarily run on either
of the hosts so the flag can't be used to assume VIR_MIGRATE_TLS even
if it wasn't provided by the user instead of rejecting if it's not.
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/libvirt/libvirt/-/issues/67
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
The NBD server used to export pull-mode backups doesn't have any other
form of client authentication on top of the TLS transport, so the only
way to authenticate clients is to verify their certificate.
Enable this option by defauilt when both 'backup_tls_x509_verify' and
'default_tls_x509_verify' were not configured.
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1879477
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
The migration stream connection and also the NBD server for non-shared
storage migration don't have any other form of client authentication on
top of the TLS transport, so the only way to authenticate clients is to
verify their certificate.
Enable this option by defauilt when both 'migrate_tls_x509_verify' and
'default_tls_x509_verify' were not configured.
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1879477
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Chardevs don't have any other form of client authentication on top of
the TLS transport, so the only way to authenticate clients is to verify
their certificate.
Enable this option by defauilt when both 'chardev_tls_x509_verify' and
'default_tls_x509_verify' were not configured.
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1879477
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
If both "vnc_tls_x509_verify" and "default_tls_x509_verify" are missing
from the config file the client certificate validation is disabled. VNC
provides a layer of authentication so client certificate validation is
not strictly required.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Store whether "default_tls_x509_verify" was provided and enhance the
SET_TLS_VERIFY_DEFAULT macro so that indiviual users can provide their
own default if "default_tls_x509_verify" config option was not provided.
For now we keep setting it to 'false'.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
The original descirption for *_tls_x509_verify is a little misleading
by saying that "Enabling this option will reject any client who does
not have a ca-cert.pem certificate".
Signed-off-by: Fangge Jin <fjin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
TLS is required to transport backed-up data securely when using
pull-mode backups.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Until now libvirt didn't allow using encrypted TLS key for disk clients.
Add fields for configuring the secret and propagate defaults.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
There's no such parameter. Reword the sentence to account for enabling
TLS-encrypted migration using API flags.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
The term "access control list" better describes the concept involved.
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
The qemu.conf change broke our augeas test:
qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug:96.3-203.1:exception thrown in test
qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug:96.8-.34:exception: Iterated lens matched less than it should
Lens: ../../src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug:170.13-.43:
Last match: ../../src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug:18.52-.113:
Not matching: ../../src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug:12.19-.31:
Error encountered at 48:27 (1615 characters into string)
<\n "/dev/ptmx", "/dev/kvm"|=|,\n]\nsave_image_format = "raw>
Fixes: ab5ba57012
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
The RTC and HPET modes for the QEMU emulation tick have been dropped
almost 9 years ago, in commit 25f3151ece1d5881826232bebccc21b588d4e03e.
Do not allow them in the devices cgroup policy.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Add a 'virtiofsd_debug' option for tuning whether to run virtiofsd
in debug mode.
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
When QEMU uid/gid is set to non-root this is pointless as if we just
used a regular setuid/setgid call, the process will have all its
capabilities cleared anyway by the kernel.
When QEMU uid/gid is set to root, this is almost (always?) never
what people actually want. People make QEMU run as root in order
to access some privileged resource that libvirt doesn't support
yet and this often requires capabilities. As a result they have
to go find the qemu.conf param to turn this off. This is not
viable for libguestfs - they want to control everything via the
XML security label to request running as root regardless of the
qemu.conf settings for user/group.
Clearing capabilities was implemented originally because there
was a proposal in Fedora to change permissions such that root,
with no capabilities would not be able to compromise the system.
ie a locked down root account. This never went anywhere though,
and as a result clearing capabilities when running as root does
not really get us any security benefit AFAICT. The root user
can easily do something like create a cronjob, which will then
faithfully be run with full capabilities, trivially bypassing
the restriction we place.
IOW, our clearing of capabilities is both useless from a security
POV, and breaks valid use cases when people need to run as root.
This removes the clear_emulator_capabilities configuration
option from qemu.conf, and always runs QEMU with capabilities
when root. The behaviour when non-root is unchanged.
Reviewed-by: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
There are two ways for specifying loader:nvram pairs:
1) --with-loader-nvram configure option
2) nvram variable in qemu.conf
Since we have FW descriptors, using this old style is
discouraged, but not as strong as one would expect. Produce more
warnings:
1) produce a warning if somebody tries the configure option
2) produce a warning if somebody sets nvram variable and at
least on FW descriptor was found
The reason for producing warning in case 1) is that package
maintainers, who set the configure option in the first place
should start moving towards FW descriptors and abandon the
configure option. After all, the warning is printed into config
output only in this case.
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1763477
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
A slirp helper is a process that provides user-mode networking through
a unix domain socket. It is expected to follow the following
specification:
https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/slirp/libslirp-rs/blob/master/src/bin/README.rst
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Some VM configurations may result in a large number of threads created by
the associated qemu process which can exceed the system default limit. The
maximum number of threads allowed per process is controlled by the pids
cgroup controller and is set to 16k when creating VMs with systemd's
machined service. The maximum number of threads per process is recorded
in the pids.max file under the machine's pids controller cgroup hierarchy,
e.g.
$cgrp-mnt/pids/machine.slice/machine-qemu\\x2d1\\x2dtest.scope/pids.max
Maximum threads per process is controlled with the TasksMax property of
the systemd scope for the machine. This patch adds an option to qemu.conf
which can be used to override the maximum number of threads allowed per
qemu process. If the value of option is greater than zero, it will be set
in the TasksMax property of the machine's scope after creating the machine.
Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
This reverts commit fc3990c7e6.
Now that all the reported bugs are fixed let's turn the feature
back on.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
In cases when e.g. a new feature breaks upstream behaviour it's useful
to allow users to disable the new feature to verify the regression and
possibly use it as a workaround until a fix is available.
The new qemu.conf option named "capability_filters" allows to remove
qemu capabilities from the detected bitmap.
This patch introduces the configuration infrastructure to parse the
option and pass it around.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Now that libvirt has firmware auto selection feature the nvram
config knob is more or less obsolete. It still makes sense in
cases where distro users are using does not provide FW descriptor
files, therefore I'm not removing it.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
We dropped support in commit 8e91a40 (November 2015), but some
occurrences still remained, even in live code.
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>
We should not give domains access to something they don't necessarily
need by default. Remove it from the qemu driver docs too.
Signed-off-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Add an option that lets the user specify the secret
that unlocks the server TLS key.
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
Turns out, that there are few bugs that are not that trivial to
fix (e.g. around block jobs). Instead of rushing in not
thoroughly tested fixes disable the feature temporarily for the
release.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
ACKed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Turns out, there are couple of bugs that prevent this feature
from being operational. Given how close to the release we are
disable the feature temporarily. Hopefully, it can be enabled
back after all the bugs are fixed.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
This config option allows users to set and enable lock manager
for domain metadata. The lock manager is going to be used by
security drivers to serialize each other when changing a file
ownership or changing the SELinux label. The only supported lock
manager is 'lockd' for now.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
QEMU uses /dev/sev device while creating the SEV guest, lets add /dev/sev
in the list of devices allowed to be accessed by the QEMU.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>
The option is insecure and it has been long enough for users to migrate
their disk files to use explicit format. Drop the option and related
code.
The config parser still parses it and rejects statup if it's still
present in the config in enabled state.
The augeas lens is also kept so that users can disable it.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Extend qemu_conf with user and group for running the tpm-emulator
and add directories to the configuration for the locations of the
log, state, and socket of the tpm-emulator.
Also add these new directories to the QEMU Makefile.inc.am and
the RPM spec file libvirt.spec.in.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Just like we allow users overriding path to bridge-helper
detected at compile time we can allow them to override path to
qemu-pr-helper.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
If QEMU uses a seccomp blacklist (since 2.11), -sandbox on
no longer tries to whitelist all the calls, but uses sets
of blacklists:
default (always blacklisted with -sandbox on)
obsolete (defaults to deny)
elevateprivileges (setuid & co, default: allow)
spawn (fork & execve, default: allow)
resourcecontrol (setaffinity, setscheduler, default: allow)
If these are supported, default to sandbox with all four
categories blacklisted.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1492597
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
This reverts commit 038eb472a0.
On reflection adding defaults for arbitrary guest XML device config
settings to the qemu.conf is not a sustainable path. Removing the
support for rx/tx queue size so that it doesn't set a bad precedent.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
In 2074ef6cd4 and c56cdf259 (and friends) we've added two
attributes to virtio NICs: rx_queue_size and tx_queue_size.
However, sysadmins might want to set these on per-host basis but
don't necessarily have an access to domain XML (e.g. because they
are generated by some other app). So let's expose them under
qemu.conf (the settings from domain XML still take precedence as
they are more specific ones).
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
Add a new TLS X.509 certificate type - "vxhs". This will handle the
creation of a TLS certificate capability for properly configured
VxHS network block device clients.
The following describes the behavior of TLS for VxHS block device:
(1) Two new options have been added in /etc/libvirt/qemu.conf
to control TLS behavior with VxHS block devices
"vxhs_tls" and "vxhs_tls_x509_cert_dir".
(2) Setting "vxhs_tls=1" in /etc/libvirt/qemu.conf will enable
TLS for VxHS block devices.
(3) "vxhs_tls_x509_cert_dir" can be set to the full path where the
TLS CA certificate and the client certificate and keys are saved.
If this value is missing, the "default_tls_x509_cert_dir" will be
used instead. If the environment is not configured properly the
authentication to the VxHS server will fail.
Signed-off-by: Ashish Mittal <Ashish.Mittal@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1458630
Introduce virQEMUDriverConfigTLSDirResetDefaults in order to check
if the defaultTLSx509certdir was changed, then change the default
for any other *TLSx509certdir that was not set to the default default.
Introduce virQEMUDriverConfigValidate to validate the existence of
any of the *_tls_x509_cert_dir values that were uncommented/set,
incuding the default.
Update the qemu.conf description for default to describe the consequences
if the default directory path does not exist.
Signed-off-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
Add a path for UEFI VMs for AArch32 VMs, based on the path Debian is using.
libvirt is the de facto canonical location for defining where distros
should place these firmware images, so let's define this path here to try
and minimize distro fragmentation.
Add a new TLS X.509 certificate type - "migrate". This will handle the
creation of a TLS certificate capability (and possibly repository) to
be used for migrations. Similar to chardev's, credentials will be handled
via a libvirt secrets; however, unlike chardev's enablement and usage
will be via a CLI flag instead of a conf flag and a domain XML attribute.
The migrations using the *x509_verify flag require the client-cert.pem
and client-key.pem files to be present in the TLS directory - so let's
also be sure to note that in the qemu.conf file.
Signed-off-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
So far, we are allowing /dev/vfio/vfio in the devices cgroup
unconditionally (and creating it in the namespace too). Even if
domain has no hostdev assignment configured. This is potential
security hole. Therefore, when starting the domain (or
hotplugging a hostdev) create & allow /dev/vfio/vfio too (if
needed).
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Add new parameter memory_backing_dir where files will be stored when memoryBacking
source is selected as file.
Value is stored inside char* memoryBackingDir
Given how intrusive previous patches are, it might happen that
there's a bug or imperfection. Lets give users a way out: if they
set 'namespaces' to an empty array in qemu.conf the feature is
suppressed.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
After a944bd92 we gained support for setting gluster debug level.
However, due to a space we haven't tested whether augeas file
actually works.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
