There are two functions virDomainNumaDefCPUFormatXML() and
virDomainNumaDefCPUParseXML() which format and parse domain's
<numa/>. There is nothing CPU specific about them. Drop the
infix.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <danielhb413@gmail.com>
There is nothing domain specific about the function, thus it
should not have virDomain prefix. Also, the fact that it is a
static function makes it impossible to use from other files.
Move the function to virxml.c and drop the 'Domain' infix.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <danielhb413@gmail.com>
Commit 82576d8f35e used a string "on" to enable the 'pmem' property.
This is okay for the command line visitor, but the property is declared
as boolean in qemu and thus it will not work when using QMP.
Modify the type to boolean. This changes the command line, but
fortunately the command line visitor in qemu parses both 'yes' and 'on'
as true for the property.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1854684
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Previous commit removed the last usage of the function. Drop
virQEMUCapsCompareArch as well since virQEMUCapsCacheLookupByArch was
its only caller.
Signed-off-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Firstly, SEV is present only on AMD, so we can safely assume x86.
Secondly, the problem with looking up capabilities in the cache by arch
is that it's using virHashSearch with a callback to find the right
capabilities and get the binary name from it as well, but since the
cache is empty, it will return NULL and we won't get the corresponding
binary name out of the lookup either. Then, during the cache validation
we try to create a new cache entry for the emulator, but since we don't
have the binary name, nothing gets created.
Therefore, virQEMUCapsCacheLookupDefault is used to fix this issue,
because it doesn't rely on the capabilities cache to construct the
emulator binary name.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1852311
Signed-off-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
The semantics of the backup operation don't strictly require that all
disks being backed up are part of the same incremental part (when a disk
was checkpointed/backed up separately or in a different VM), or even
they may not have a previous checkpoint at all (e.g. when the disk
was freshly hotplugged to the vm).
In such cases we can still create a common checkpoint for all of them
and backup differences according to configuration.
This patch adds a per-disk configuration of the checkpoint to do the
incremental backup from via the 'incremental' attribute and allows
perform full backups via the 'backupmode' attribute.
Note that no changes to the qemu driver are necessary to take advantage
of this as we already obey the per-disk 'incremental' field.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1829829
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Use the configured TLS env to setup encryption of the TLS transport.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1822631
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Allow enabling TLS for the NBD server used to do pull-mode backups. Note
that documentation already mentions 'tls', so this just implements the
schema and XML bits.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
TLS is required to transport backed-up data securely when using
pull-mode backups.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Add fields for storing the aliases necessary to clean up the TLS env for
a backup job after it finishes.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Data is valid only when queried as guest writes may increase the backup
size.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Introduce code which merges the appropriate bitmaps and queries the
final size of the backup, so that we can print the XML with size
information.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Avoid printing '0' size in case when we weren't able to determine the
backup size by adding a flag whether the size is valid and interlock
printing of the field according to the flag.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Merge the bitmaps when finalizing a block pull job so that backups work
properly afterwards.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1799010
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Users may want to use this to create a full backup or even incremental
if the checkpoints are pre-existing. We still will not allow to create a
checkpoint on a read-only disk as that makes no sense.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1840053
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Setup the TLS secret when preparing a virStorageSource for use.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1602328
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Until now libvirt didn't allow using encrypted TLS key for disk clients.
Add fields for configuring the secret and propagate defaults.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Add infrastructure for hot- and cold-plug of the secret object holding
decryption key for the TLS key.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Store the required data in the private data of a storage source and
ensure that the 'alias' of the secret is formatted in the status XML.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
The '*_tls_x509_verify' options are relevant only when we are going to
expose a server socket as client sockets always enable verification.
Split up the macro to separate the common bits from the server bits so
that when we'll later extend support of 'nbd' and 'vxhs' disks which are
client only we can reuse the existing macros.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Move the extraction of the config value so that it makes more sense
after upcoming refactors.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
There's no such parameter. Reword the sentence to account for enabling
TLS-encrypted migration using API flags.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Add a helper which will always return the storage source private data
even if it was not allocated before.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
The strings allocated in virGetHostnameImpl() are all allocated via
g_strdup(), which will exit on OOM anyway, so the call to
virReportOOMError() is redundant, and removing it allows slight
modification to the code, in particular the cleanup label can be
eliminated.
Signed-off-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
The error: label in this function just does "return -1", so replace
all the "goto error" in the function with "return -1".
Signed-off-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
hostsfilestr was not being freed. This will be turned into g_autofree
in an upcoming patch converting a lot more of the same file to using
g_auto*, but I wanted to make a separate patch for this first so the
other patch is simpler to review (and to make backporting easier).
The leak was introduced in commit 97a0aa246799c97d0a9ca9ecd6b4fd932ae4756c
Signed-off-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC is set to xmlBufferFree() in util/virxml.h (This
is actually new - added accidentally (but fortunately harmlessly!) in
commit 257aba2dafe. I had added it along with the hunks in this patch,
then decided to remove it and submit separately, but missed taking out
the hunk in virxml.h)
Signed-off-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Although libvirt itself uses g_malloc0() and friends, which exit when
there isn't enouogh memory, libxml2 uses standard malloc(), which just
returns NULL on OOM - this means we must check for NULL on return from
any libxml2 functions that allocate memory.
xmlBufferCreate(), for example, might return NULL, and we don't always
check for it. This patch adds checks where it isn't already done.
(NB: Although libxml2 has a provision for changing behavior on OOM (by
calling xmlMemSetup() to change what functions are used to
allocating/freeing memory), we can't use that, since parts of libvirt
code end up in libvirt.so, which is linked and called directly by
applications that may themselves use libxml2 (and may have already set
their own alternate malloc()), e.g. drivers like esx which live totally
in the library rather than a separate process.)
Signed-off-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
When introducing vcpu.<num>.wait (v1.3.2-rc1~301) and
vcpu.<num>.halted (v2.4.0-rc1~36) the documentation was
not written.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>
Since feb83c1e710b9ea8044a89346f4868d03b31b0f1 libvirtd will abort on
startup if run as non-root
2020-07-01 16:30:30.738+0000: 1647444: error : virDirOpenInternal:2869 : cannot open directory '/etc/libvirt/hooks/daemon.d': Permission denied
The root cause flaw is that non-root libvirtd is using /etc/libvirt for
its hooks. Traditionally that has been harmless though since we checked
whether we could access the hook file and degraded gracefully. We need
the same access check for iterating over the hook directory.
Long term we should make it possible to have an unprivileged hook dir
under $HOME.
Reviewed-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <danielhb413@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
In 076591009ad a validation code was added to
virDomainDeviceInfoFormat() which reports an error if zPCI
address entered in was incomplete. But, there are two problems
with this approach.
The first problem is the placement of the code - it doesn't
belong into XML formatter rather than XML validator.
The second one is that at the point of formatting XML the post
parse callback has run and thus filled in required info.
Therefore this check can never do something useful and instead of
moving it into validator, it's removed completely.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
To make the code future proof, the rest of the
qemuValidateDomainDeviceDefAddress() has to be executed (even
though there is nothing there yet) instead of returning directly.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Commit 076591009ad1 ("conf: fix zPCI address auto-generation on
s390") is doing a check for virZPCIDeviceAddressIsIncomplete()
prior to checking if the device has a ZPCI address at all. This
results in errors like these when starting libvirt:
error : virDomainDeviceInfoFormat:7527 : internal error:
Missing uid or fid attribute of zPCI address
Fix it by moving virZPCIDeviceAddressIsIncomplete() after the
check done by virZPCIDeviceAddressIsPresent().
Fixes: 076591009ad11ec108521b52a4945d0f895fa160
Signed-off-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <danielhb413@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
The ZPCI device validation is specific to qemu. So, let us move the
ZPCI uid validation out of domain xml parsing into qemu domain device
validation.
Signed-off-by: Shalini Chellathurai Saroja <shalini@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Bjoern Walk <bwalk@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Fiuczynski <fiuczy@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Let us fix the issues with zPCI address validation and auto-generation
on s390.
Currently, there are two issues with handling the ZPCI address
extension. Firstly, when the uid is to be auto-generated with a
specified fid, .i.e.:
...
<address type='pci'>
<zpci fid='0x0000001f'/>
</address>
...
we expect uid='0x0001' (or the next available uid for the domain).
However, we get a parsing error:
$ virsh define zpci.xml
error: XML error: Invalid PCI address uid='0x0000', must be > 0x0000
and <= 0xffff
Secondly, when the uid is specified explicitly with the invalid
numerical value '0x0000', we actually expect the parsing error above.
However, the domain is being defined and the uid value is silently
changed to a valid value.
The first issue is a bug and the second one is undesired behaviour, and
both issues are related to how we (in-band) signal invalid values for
uid and fid. So let's fix the XML parsing to do validation based on what
is actually specified in the XML.
The first issue is also related to the current code behaviour, which
is, if either uid or fid is specified by the user, it is incorrectly
assumed that both uid and fid are specified. This bug is fixed by
identifying when the user specified ZPCI address is incomplete and
auto-generating the missing ZPCI address.
Signed-off-by: Bjoern Walk <bwalk@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Fiuczynski <fiuczy@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Shalini Chellathurai Saroja <shalini@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Refer to the notion of mount propagation instead which describes
the actual behaviour more clearly.
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
The two sides of a PTY can be referred to as primary and secondary
TTYs.
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
When querying QEMU we have to iterate over two nested sets
of CPUs. The terms "main vcpu" and "sub vcpu" are a good
representation.
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
The two sides of a PTY can be referred to as primary and secondary
TTYs.
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
The term "ignored" is a better choice for the filtering performed
on devices from udev.
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
This new naming matches the terminology used in the error
messages that the callers report.
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
When listing CPU models, we need to filter the data based on sets
of permitted and forbidden CPU models.
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
The term "access control list" better describes the concept involved.
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
The term "access control list" better describes the concept involved.
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
