If veth device allocation has a fatal error, the veths
array may contain NULL device names. Avoid calling the
virNetDevVethDelete function on such names.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
During container cleanup there is a race where the kernel may
have destroyed the veth device before we try to set it offline.
This causes log error messages. Given that we're about to
delete the device entirely, setting it offline is pointless.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
We forgot to do cleanup when lxcContainerMountFSTmpfs
failed to bind fs as read-only.
Signed-off-by: Chen Hanxiao <chenhanxiao@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
The problem is described by [0] but its effect on libvirt is that
starting a container with a full distro running systemd after having
stopped it simply fails.
The container cleanup now calls the machined Terminate function to make
sure that everything is in order for the next run.
[0]: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=68370
If a dir does not exist, raise an immediate error in logs
rather than letting virFileResolveAllLinks fail, since this
gives better error reporting to the user.
Signed-off-by: Chen Hanxiao <chenhanxiao@cn.fujitsu.com>
When FUSE is enabled, the LXC container is setup with
a custom /proc/meminfo file. This file uses "KB" as a
suffix, rather than "kB" which is the kernel's style.
Fix this inconsistency to avoid confusing apps.
Signed-off-by: Chen Hanxiao <chenhanxiao@cn.fujitsu.com>
Right now we mount selinuxfs even user namespace is enabled and
ignore the error. But we shouldn't ignore these errors when user
namespace is not enabled.
This patch skips mounting selinuxfs when user namespace enabled.
Signed-off-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
If the guest is configured with
<filesystem type='mount'>
<source dir='/'/>
<target dir='/'/>
<readonly/>
</filesystem>
Then any submounts under / should also end up readonly, except
for those setup as basic mounts. eg if the user has /home on a
separate volume, they'd expect /home to be readonly, but we
should not touch the /sys, /proc, etc dirs we setup ourselves.
Users can selectively make sub-mounts read-write again by
simply listing them as new mounts without the <readonly>
flag set
<filesystem type='mount'>
<source dir='/home'/>
<target dir='/home'/>
</filesystem>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Move the array of basic mounts out of the lxcContainerMountBasicFS
function, to a global variable. This is to allow it to be referenced
by other methods wanting to know what the basic mount paths are.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The devpts, dev and fuse filesystems are mounted temporarily.
there is no need to export them to container if container shares
the root directory with host.
Signed-off-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Right now, securityfs is disallowed to be mounted in non-initial
user namespace, so we must avoid trying to mount securityfs in
a container which has user namespace enabled.
Signed-off-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
If booting a container with a root FS that isn't the host's
root, we must ensure that the /dev mount point exists.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The lxcContainerMountFSBlockAuto method can be used to mount the
initial root filesystem, so it cannot assume a prefix of /.oldroot.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
If securityfs is available on the host, we should ensure to
mount it read-only in the container. This will avoid systemd
trying to mount it during startup causing SELinux AVCs.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
This configuration knob lets user to set the length of queue of
connection requests waiting to be accept()-ed by the daemon. IOW, it
just controls the @backlog passed to listen:
int listen(int sockfd, int backlog);
If upgrading from a libvirt that is older than 1.0.5, we can
not assume that vm->def->resource is non-NULL. This bogus
assumption caused libvirtd to crash
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Make the virCgroupNewMachine method try to use systemd-machined
first. If that fails, then fallback to using the traditional
cgroup setup code path.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
By setting the default partition in libvirt_lxc it is not
visible when querying the live XML. Move setting of the
default partition into libvirtd virLXCProcessStart
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Instead of requiring drivers to use a combination of calls
to virCgroupNewDetect and virCgroupIsValidMachine, combine
the two into virCgroupNewDetectMachine
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
There's a race in lxc driver causing a deadlock. If a domain is
destroyed immediately after started, the deadlock can occur. When domain
is started, the even loop tries to connect to the monitor. If the
connecting succeeds, virLXCProcessMonitorInitNotify() is called with
@mon->client locked. The first thing that callee does, is
virObjectLock(vm). So the order of locking is: 1) @mon->client, 2) @vm.
However, if there's another thread executing virDomainDestroy on the
very same domain, the first thing done here is locking the @vm. Then,
the corresponding libvirt_lxc process is killed and monitor is closed
via calling virLXCMonitorClose(). This callee tries to lock @mon->client
too. So the order is reversed to the first case. This situation results
in deadlock and unresponsive libvirtd (since the eventloop is involved).
The proper solution is to unlock the @vm in virLXCMonitorClose prior
entering virNetClientClose(). See the backtrace as follows:
Thread 25 (Thread 0x7f1b7c9b8700 (LWP 16312)):
0 0x00007f1b80539714 in __lll_lock_wait () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0
1 0x00007f1b8053516c in _L_lock_516 () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0
2 0x00007f1b80534fbb in pthread_mutex_lock () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0
3 0x00007f1b82a637cf in virMutexLock (m=0x7f1b3c0038d0) at util/virthreadpthread.c:85
4 0x00007f1b82a4ccf2 in virObjectLock (anyobj=0x7f1b3c0038c0) at util/virobject.c:320
5 0x00007f1b82b861f6 in virNetClientCloseInternal (client=0x7f1b3c0038c0, reason=3) at rpc/virnetclient.c:696
6 0x00007f1b82b862f5 in virNetClientClose (client=0x7f1b3c0038c0) at rpc/virnetclient.c:721
7 0x00007f1b6ee12500 in virLXCMonitorClose (mon=0x7f1b3c007210) at lxc/lxc_monitor.c:216
8 0x00007f1b6ee129f0 in virLXCProcessCleanup (driver=0x7f1b68100240, vm=0x7f1b680ceb70, reason=VIR_DOMAIN_SHUTOFF_DESTROYED) at lxc/lxc_process.c:174
9 0x00007f1b6ee14106 in virLXCProcessStop (driver=0x7f1b68100240, vm=0x7f1b680ceb70, reason=VIR_DOMAIN_SHUTOFF_DESTROYED) at lxc/lxc_process.c:710
10 0x00007f1b6ee1aa36 in lxcDomainDestroyFlags (dom=0x7f1b5c002560, flags=0) at lxc/lxc_driver.c:1291
11 0x00007f1b6ee1ab1a in lxcDomainDestroy (dom=0x7f1b5c002560) at lxc/lxc_driver.c:1321
12 0x00007f1b82b05be5 in virDomainDestroy (domain=0x7f1b5c002560) at libvirt.c:2303
13 0x00007f1b835a7e85 in remoteDispatchDomainDestroy (server=0x7f1b857419d0, client=0x7f1b8574ae40, msg=0x7f1b8574acf0, rerr=0x7f1b7c9b7c30, args=0x7f1b5c004a50) at remote_dispatch.h:3143
14 0x00007f1b835a7d78 in remoteDispatchDomainDestroyHelper (server=0x7f1b857419d0, client=0x7f1b8574ae40, msg=0x7f1b8574acf0, rerr=0x7f1b7c9b7c30, args=0x7f1b5c004a50, ret=0x7f1b5c0029e0) at remote_dispatch.h:3121
15 0x00007f1b82b93704 in virNetServerProgramDispatchCall (prog=0x7f1b8573af90, server=0x7f1b857419d0, client=0x7f1b8574ae40, msg=0x7f1b8574acf0) at rpc/virnetserverprogram.c:435
16 0x00007f1b82b93263 in virNetServerProgramDispatch (prog=0x7f1b8573af90, server=0x7f1b857419d0, client=0x7f1b8574ae40, msg=0x7f1b8574acf0) at rpc/virnetserverprogram.c:305
17 0x00007f1b82b8c0f6 in virNetServerProcessMsg (srv=0x7f1b857419d0, client=0x7f1b8574ae40, prog=0x7f1b8573af90, msg=0x7f1b8574acf0) at rpc/virnetserver.c:163
18 0x00007f1b82b8c1da in virNetServerHandleJob (jobOpaque=0x7f1b8574dca0, opaque=0x7f1b857419d0) at rpc/virnetserver.c:184
19 0x00007f1b82a64158 in virThreadPoolWorker (opaque=0x7f1b8573cb10) at util/virthreadpool.c:144
20 0x00007f1b82a63ae5 in virThreadHelper (data=0x7f1b8574b9f0) at util/virthreadpthread.c:161
21 0x00007f1b80532f4a in start_thread () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0
22 0x00007f1b7fc4f20d in clone () from /lib64/libc.so.6
Thread 1 (Thread 0x7f1b83546740 (LWP 16297)):
0 0x00007f1b80539714 in __lll_lock_wait () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0
1 0x00007f1b8053516c in _L_lock_516 () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0
2 0x00007f1b80534fbb in pthread_mutex_lock () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0
3 0x00007f1b82a637cf in virMutexLock (m=0x7f1b680ceb80) at util/virthreadpthread.c:85
4 0x00007f1b82a4ccf2 in virObjectLock (anyobj=0x7f1b680ceb70) at util/virobject.c:320
5 0x00007f1b6ee13bd7 in virLXCProcessMonitorInitNotify (mon=0x7f1b3c007210, initpid=4832, vm=0x7f1b680ceb70) at lxc/lxc_process.c:601
6 0x00007f1b6ee11fd3 in virLXCMonitorHandleEventInit (prog=0x7f1b3c001f10, client=0x7f1b3c0038c0, evdata=0x7f1b8574a7d0, opaque=0x7f1b3c007210) at lxc/lxc_monitor.c:109
7 0x00007f1b82b8a196 in virNetClientProgramDispatch (prog=0x7f1b3c001f10, client=0x7f1b3c0038c0, msg=0x7f1b3c003928) at rpc/virnetclientprogram.c:259
8 0x00007f1b82b87030 in virNetClientCallDispatchMessage (client=0x7f1b3c0038c0) at rpc/virnetclient.c:1019
9 0x00007f1b82b876bb in virNetClientCallDispatch (client=0x7f1b3c0038c0) at rpc/virnetclient.c:1140
10 0x00007f1b82b87d41 in virNetClientIOHandleInput (client=0x7f1b3c0038c0) at rpc/virnetclient.c:1312
11 0x00007f1b82b88f51 in virNetClientIncomingEvent (sock=0x7f1b3c0044e0, events=1, opaque=0x7f1b3c0038c0) at rpc/virnetclient.c:1832
12 0x00007f1b82b9e1c8 in virNetSocketEventHandle (watch=3321, fd=54, events=1, opaque=0x7f1b3c0044e0) at rpc/virnetsocket.c:1695
13 0x00007f1b82a272cf in virEventPollDispatchHandles (nfds=21, fds=0x7f1b8574ded0) at util/vireventpoll.c:498
14 0x00007f1b82a27af2 in virEventPollRunOnce () at util/vireventpoll.c:645
15 0x00007f1b82a25a61 in virEventRunDefaultImpl () at util/virevent.c:273
16 0x00007f1b82b8e97e in virNetServerRun (srv=0x7f1b857419d0) at rpc/virnetserver.c:1097
17 0x00007f1b8359db6b in main (argc=2, argv=0x7ffff98dbaa8) at libvirtd.c:1512
Commit 'c8695053' resulted in the following:
Coverity error seen in the output:
ERROR: REVERSE_INULL
FUNCTION: lxcProcessAutoDestroy
Due to the 'dom' being checked before 'dom->persistent' since 'dom'
is already dereferenced prior to that.
Currently the LXC driver creates the VM's cgroup prior to
forking, and then libvirt_lxc moves the child process
into the cgroup. This won't work with systemd whose APIs
do the creation of cgroups + attachment of processes atomically.
Fortunately we simply move the entire cgroups setup into
the libvirt_lxc child process. We make it take place before
fork'ing into the background, so by the time virCommandRun
returns in the LXC driver, the cgroup is guaranteed to be
present.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Use the new virCgroupNewDetect function to determine cgroup
placement of existing running VMs. This will allow the legacy
cgroups creation APIs to be removed entirely
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Convert the remaining methods in vircgroup.c to report errors
instead of returning errno values.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
If no explicit driver is set for an image backed filesystem,
set it to use the loop driver (if raw) or nbd driver (if
non-raw)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
A couple of places in LXC setup for filesystems did not do
a "goto cleanup" after reporting errors. While fixing this,
also add in many more debug statements to aid troubleshooting
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
With the majority of fields in the virLXCDriverPtr struct
now immutable or self-locking, there is no need for practically
any methods to be using the LXC driver lock. Only a handful
of helper APIs now need it.
The activeUsbHostdevs item in LXCDriver are lockable, but the lock has
to be called explicitly. Call the virObject(Un)Lock() in order to
achieve mutual exclusion once lxcDriverLock is removed.
The 'driver->caps' pointer can be changed on the fly. Accessing
it currently requires the global driver lock. Isolate this
access in a single helper, so a future patch can relax the
locking constraints.
Currently the virLXCDriverPtr struct contains an wide variety
of data with varying access needs. Move all the static config
data into a dedicated virLXCDriverConfigPtr object. The only
locking requirement is to hold the driver lock, while obtaining
an instance of virLXCDriverConfigPtr. Once a reference is held
on the config object, it can be used completely lockless since
it is immutable.
NB, not all APIs correctly hold the driver lock while getting
a reference to the config object in this patch. This is safe
for now since the config is never updated on the fly. Later
patches will address this fully.
Merge the virCommandPreserveFD / virCommandTransferFD methods
into a single virCommandPasFD method, and use a new
VIR_COMMAND_PASS_FD_CLOSE_PARENT to indicate their difference
in behaviour
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
