For the real-capabilities test cases testing 'latest' capabilities we
strip off the alias from 'pc' to the appropriate versioned machine type
to prevent update to all tests when bumping qemu capabilities.
Recenly we also started caching the capabilities to prevent re-parsing
the XML all the time. The commit adding the caching kept the alias
stripping prior to cache insertion, thus the cache contains the stripped
alias.
This leads to problem when a test case is added where the 'latest'
equals to the selected version.
Move the machine alias stripping after we create a local copy thus
stripping it only for 'latest' tests.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
The initial variant of libxlDomainChangeEjectableMedia could just leave
the function earlier. With refcounting this does not work anymore.
Fixes commit a5bf06ba34
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Reviewed-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
This strictens the parser to disallow negative values (interpreted as
`UINT_MAX + value + 1`) for attribute `number`. Allowing negative
numbers to be interpreted this way makes no sense for this attribute.
Signed-off-by: Tim Wiederhake <twiederh@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
This strictens the parser to disallow negative values (interpreted as
`UINT_MAX + value + 1`) for attribute `bufferCount`. Allowing negative
numbers to be interpreted this way makes no sense for this attribute.
Signed-off-by: Tim Wiederhake <twiederh@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
This strictens the parser to disallow negative values (interpreted as
`UINT_MAX + value + 1`) for attribute `bufferCount`. Allowing negative
numbers to be interpreted this way makes no sense for this attribute.
Signed-off-by: Tim Wiederhake <twiederh@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
This strictens the parser to disallow negative values (interpreted as
`UINT_MAX + value + 1`) for attribute `port`. Allowing negative
numbers to be interpreted this way makes no sense for this attribute.
Signed-off-by: Tim Wiederhake <twiederh@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
This strictens the parser to disallow negative values (interpreted as
`UINT_MAX + value + 1`) for attribute `timeout`. Allowing negative
numbers to be interpreted this way makes no sense for this attribute.
Signed-off-by: Tim Wiederhake <twiederh@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
This strictens the parser to disallow negative values (interpreted as
`UINT_MAX + value + 1`) for attributes `cyls`, `heads` and `secs`.
Allowing negative numbers to be interpreted this way makes no sense for
these attributes.
Signed-off-by: Tim Wiederhake <twiederh@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
This strictens the parser to disallow negative values (interpreted as
`UINT_MAX + value + 1`) for attribute `startport`. Allowing negative
numbers to be interpreted this way makes no sense for this attribute.
Signed-off-by: Tim Wiederhake <twiederh@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
Since Xen 4.5 libxl allows to set affinities during domain creation.
This enables Xen to allocate the domain memory on NUMA systems close to
the specified pcpus.
Libvirt can now handle <domain/cputune/vcpupin> in domU.xml correctly.
Without this change, Xen will create the domU and assign NUMA memory and
vcpu affinities on its own. Later libvirt will adjust the affinity,
which may move the vcpus away from the assigned NUMA node.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <danielhb413@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
The aim of this function is to return whether domain definition
and/or memory device that user intents to hotplug needs a private
path inside cfg->memoryBackingDir. The rule for the memory device
that's being hotplug includes checking whether corresponding
guest NUMA node needs memoryBackingDir. Well, while the rationale
behind makes sense it is not necessary to check for that really -
just a few lines above every guest NUMA node was checked exactly
for that.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
The aim of qemuProcessNeedHugepagesPath() is to return whether
guest needs private path inside HugeTLBFS mounts (deducted from
domain definition @def) or whether the memory device that user is
hotplugging in needs the private path (deducted from the @mem
argument). The actual creation of the path is done in the only
caller qemuProcessBuildDestroyMemoryPaths().
The rule for the first case (@def) and the second case (@mem) is
the same (domain has a DIMM device that has HP requested) and is
written twice. Move the logic into a function to deduplicate the
code.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
The minimal version of QEMU is 2.11.0 which means we can drop
test cases for older versions.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
As of b4cbdbe90b (and friends) the
minimal QEMU version required is 2.11.0. Let's update our
QEMU_MIN_* macros to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
The Xen-related unit tests are failing against the recently released
Xen 4.15. Xen commit 90c9f9f4dd changed the implementation of
libxl_ctx_alloc to use xs_open instead of xs_daemon_open. libvirt has
already mocked xs_daemon-{open,close} and others to allow using libxl
in confined build environments. This patch adds xs_{open,close} to the
list of functions mocked in libxlmock.c
90c9f9f4dd
Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
If this looks familiar, that's because it's literally *the
same code* that we used to work around *the same issue* in
readline before 1635dca26f :)
Note that the issue only really affects people building from
source on Apple Silicon: on Intel, Homebrew installs header
files under directories that are part of the default search
path, which explains why our CI pipeline never ran into it.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Bolshakov <r.bolshakov@yadro.com>
Tested-by: Roman Bolshakov <r.bolshakov@yadro.com>
There is a case where qemusecuritytest is skipped - on MacOS and
MinGW. In such case, EXIT_AM_SKIP should be returned. However,
my recent patch of 5d99b157bc completely missed that and made the
test return EXIT_FAILURE even though the test exited early
without performing any test case.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
This fixes compiler warnings when building with libtasn1 4.17.0.
Signed-off-by: Luke Yue <lukedyue@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
The basic use case of VIR_IDENTITY_AUTORESTORE() is in
conjunction with virIdentityElevateCurrent(). What happens is
that virIdentityElevateCurrent() gets current identity (which
increases the refcounter of thread local virIdentity object) and
returns a pointer to it. Later, when the variable goes out of
scope the virIdentityRestoreHelper() is called which calls
virIdentitySetCurrent() over the old identity. But this means
that the refcounter is increased again.
Therefore, we have to explicitly decrease the refcounter by
calling g_object_unref().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
The original virNumaGetNodeCPUs() returns an empty virBitmap if
given NUMA node has no CPUs. But that's not how our mock behaves
- it looks under $fakesysfs/node/node$N/cpulist only to find an
empty file which is then passed to virBitmapParseUnlimited()
which threats such input as error.
Fortunately, we don't have any fake sysfs data where this path is
hit, but we might soon.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Recently, a new code was added to virGetConnectGeneric() that
saves the original error into a variable so that it's not lost in
virConnectClose() called under the 'error' label.
However, the error saving code uses virSaveLastError() +
virSetError() combo which leaks the memory allocated for the
error copy. Using virErrorPreserveLast() + virErrorRestore() does
the same job without the memleak.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
When a test has a wrapper over main() (e.g. because it's
preloading some mock libraries). the main() is renamed to
something else (usually mymain()), and main() is generated by
calling one of VIR_TEST_MAIN() or VIR_TEST_MAIN_PRELOAD() macros.
This has a neat side effect - if mymain() returns an error a
short summary is printed, e.g.:
Some tests failed. Run them using:
VIR_TEST_DEBUG=1 VIR_TEST_RANGE=5-6 ./virtest
However, this detection only works if EXIT_FAILURE is returned by
mymain(). Document and enforce this limitation.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
When using VIR_TEST_MAIN() or VIR_TEST_MAIN_PRELOAD() macros, the
retval of mymain() will become retval of main(). Hence, mymain()
should use EXIT_FAILURE and EXIT_SUCCESS return values for
greater portability. Another reason is that otherwise our summary
printing of failed tests doesn't work (see following commit for
more info).
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Back in the old days, we used to use libtool to run compiled
libraries. That meant we had to deal with "lt-" prefix for our
binaries. With meson that's no longer the case.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
A secret can be marked with the "private" attribute. The intent was that
it is not possible for any libvirt client to be able to read the secret
value, it would only be accesible from within libvirtd. eg the QEMU
driver can read the value to launch a guest.
With the modular daemons, the QEMU, storage and secret drivers are all
running in separate daemons. The QEMU and storage drivers thus appear to
be normal libvirt client's from the POV of the secret driver, and thus
they are not able to read a private secret. This is unhelpful.
With the previous patches that introduced a "system token" to the
identity object, we can now distinguish APIs invoked by libvirt daemons
from those invoked by client applications.
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
When fetching the value of a private secret, we need to use an elevated
identity otherwise the secret driver will deny access.
When using the modular daemons, the elevated identity needs to be active
before the secret driver connection is opened, and it will apply to all
APIs calls made on that conncetion.
When using the monolithic daemon, the identity at time of opening the
connection is ignored, and the elevated identity needs to be active
precisely at the time the virSecretGetValue API call is made.
After acquiring the secret value, the elevated identity should be
cleared.
This sounds complex, but is fairly straightfoward with the automatic
cleanup callbacks.
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
The drivers can all call virGetConnectXXX to open a connection to a
secondary driver. For example, when creating a encrypted storage volume,
the storage driver has to open a secret driver connection, or when
starting a guest, the QEMU driver has to open the network driver to
lookup a virtual network.
When using monolithic libvirtd, the connection has the same effective
identity as the client, since everything is still in the same process.
When using the modular daemons, however, the remote daemon sees the
identity of the calling daemon. This is a mistake as it results in
the modular daemons seeing the client with elevated privileges.
We need to pass on the current identity explicitly when opening the
secondary drivers. This is the same thing that is done by daemon RPC
dispatcher code when it is directly forwarding top level API calls
from virtproxyd and other daemons.
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
This is essentially a way to determine if the current identity
is that of another libvirt daemon.
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
When talking to the secret driver, the callers inside libvirt daemons
need to be able to run with an elevated privileges that prove the API
calls are made by a libvirt daemon, not an end user application.
The virIdentityElevateCurrent method will take the current identity
and, if not already present, add the system token. The old current
identity is returned to the caller. With the VIR_IDENTITY_AUTORESTORE
annotation, the old current identity will be restored upon leaving
the codeblock scope.
... early work with regular privileges ...
if (something needing elevated privs) {
VIR_IDENTITY_AUTORESTORE virIdentity *oldident =
virIdentityElevateCurrent();
if (!oldident)
return -1;
... do something with elevated privileges ...
}
... later work with regular privileges ...
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
When creating the system identity set the system token. The system
token is currently stored in a local path
/var/run/libvirt/common/system.token
Obviously with only traditional UNIX DAC in effect, this is largely
security through obscurity, if the client is running at the same
privilege level as the daemon. It does, however, reliably distinguish
an unprivileged client from the system daemons.
With a MAC system like SELinux though, or possible use of containers,
access can be further restricted.
A possible future improvement for Linux would be to populate the
kernel keyring with a secret for libvirt daemons to share.
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
We want a way to distinguish between calls from a libvirt daemon, and a
regular client application when both are running as the same user
account. This is not possible with the current set of attributes
recorded against an identity, as there is nothing that is common to all
of the modular libvirt daemons, while distinct to all other processes.
We thus introduce the idea of a system token, which is simply a random
hex string that is only known by the libvirt daemons, to be recorded
against the system identity.
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
A random token is simply a string of random bytes formatted in
hexidecimal.
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
The libvirt-daemon package now provides the 'libvirt-admin' virtual
name, but the Provides stanza doesn't declare version information,
which breaks things depending on that package using a versioned
dependency. Fix this by setting the version-release of libvirt to
that name to mimic the previous state.
Fixes: 2244ac168d
Signed-off-by: Neal Gompa <ngompa13@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
