Change the callback prototype and fix the callback registered in the
process code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Change the callback prototype and fix the callback registered in the
process code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Change the callback prototype and fix the callback registered in the
process code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Change the callback prototype and fix the callback registered in the
process code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Change the callback prototype and fix the callback registered in the
process code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Change the callback prototype and fix the callback registered in the
process code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Change the callback prototype and fix the callback registered in the
process code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Change the callback prototype and fix the callback registered in the
process code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Change the callback prototype and fix the callback registered in the
process code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Change the callback prototype and fix the callback registered in the
process code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Change the callback prototype and fix the callback registered in the
process code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Change the callback prototype and fix the callback registered in the
process code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Change the callback prototype and fix the callback registered in the
process code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Change the callback prototype and fix the callback registered in the
process code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Change the callback prototype and fix the callback registered in the
process code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Change the callback prototype and fix the callback registered in the
process code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Change the callback prototype and fix the callback registered in the
process code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Change the callback prototype and fix the callback registered in the
process code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Change the callback prototype and fix the callback registered in the
process code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Change the callback prototype and fix the callback registered in the
process code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Change the callback prototype and fix the callback registered in the
process code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Change the callback prototype and fix the callback registered in the
process code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Change the callback prototype and fix the callback registered in the
process code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Add launch security type 's390-pv' as well as some tests.
Signed-off-by: Boris Fiuczynski <fiuczy@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <danielhb413@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
Adding virDomainSecDef for general launch security data
and moving virDomainSEVDef as an element for SEV data.
Signed-off-by: Boris Fiuczynski <fiuczy@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <danielhb413@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
Signaling the condition before vm->def->id is reset to -1 is dangerous:
in case a waiting thread wakes up, it does not see anything interesting
(the domain is still marked as running) and just enters virDomainObjWait
where it waits forever because the condition will never be signalled
again.
Originally it was impossible to get into such situation because the vm
object was locked all the time between signaling the condition and
resetting vm->def->id, but after commit 860a999802 released in 6.8.0,
qemuDomainObjStopWorker called in qemuProcessStop between
virDomainObjBroadcast and setting vm->def->id to -1 unlocks the vm
object giving other threads a chance to wake up and possibly hang.
In real world, this can be easily reproduced by killing, destroying, or
just shutting down (from the guest OS) a domain while it is being
migrated somewhere else. The migration job would never finish.
So let's make sure we delay signaling the domain condition to the point
when a woken up thread can detect the domain is not active anymore.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1949869
Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
If the attempt to attach a device failed, we erased the
unattached device from the namespace. This resulted in erasing an
already attached device in case of a duplicate. We need to check
for existing file in the namespace in order to determine erasing
it in case of a failure.
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1780508
Signed-off-by: Kristina Hanicova <khanicov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Remember whether the user passed an explicit index when registering the
event so that we can avoid the top level event when it isn't needed.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
When qos is set or delete, we have to check if the port is an ovs managed
port. If true, call the virNetDevOpenvswitchInterfaceSetQos function when qos
is set, and call the virNetDevOpenvswitchInterfaceClearQos function when
the interface is to be destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Jinsheng Zhang <zhangjl02@inspur.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
The NVRAM label is set in qemuSecuritySetAllLabel(). There's no
need to set its label upfront. In fact, setting it twice creates
an imbalance because it's unset only once which mangles seclabel
remembering. However, plain removal of the
qemuSecurityDomainSetPathLabel() undoes the fix for the original
bug (when dynamic ownership is off then the NVRAM is not created
with cfg->user and cfg->group but as root:root). Therefore, we
have to switch to virFileOpenAs() and pass cfg->user and
cfg->group and VIR_FILE_OPEN_FORCE_OWNER flag. There's no need to
pass VIR_FILE_OPEN_FORCE_MODE because the file will be created
with the proper mode.
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1969347
Fixes: bcdaa91a27b5b2d103535270a6a287efe6cd8bfb
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <danielhb413@gmail.com>
QEMU_DOMAIN_DISK_PRIVATE(disk)->transientOverlayCreated flag
gets true unexpectedly on qemuProcessSetupDisksTransientSnapshot() when
the disk has <transient shareBacking='yes'> option.
The flag should be enabled on qemuDomainAttachDiskGeneric() after the
overlay setup is completed.
Skip enabling transientOverlayCreated for the disk here.
Fixes: 75871da0ecb8b552f9e304d0f83e216839bbf82d
Signed-off-by: Masayoshi Mizuma <m.mizuma@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Implement this behaviour by skipping the disks on traditional
commandline and hotplug them before resuming CPUs. That allows to use
the support for hotplugging of transient disks which inherently allows
sharing of the backing image as we open it read-only.
This commit implements the validation code to allow it only with buses
supporting hotplug and the hotplug code while starting up the VM.
When we have such disk we need to issue a system-reset so that firmware
tables are regenerated to allow booting from such device.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
In preparation for hotplug of <transient> disks we'll need to track
whether the overlay file was created individually per-disk.
Add 'transientOverlayCreated' to 'struct _qemuDomainDiskPrivate' and
remove 'inhibitDiskTransientDelete' from 'qemuDomainObjPrivate' and
adjust the code for the change.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
The logic assigning the bootindices from the legacy boot order
configuration was spread through the command line formatters for the
disk device and for the floppy controller.
This patch adds 'effectiveBootindex' property to the disk private data
which holds the calculated boot index and moves the logic of determining
the boot index into 'qemuProcessPrepareDomainDiskBootorder' called from
'qemuProcessPrepareDomainStorage'.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
Later patches will implement sharing of the backing file, so we'll need
to be able to discriminate the overlays per VM.
Signed-off-by: Masayoshi Mizuma <m.mizuma@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
The code deals with the startup of the VM and just uses the snapshot
code to achieve the desired outcome.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
Creating the overlay for the disk is needed when starting a new VM only.
Additionally for now migration with transient disks is forbidden
anyways.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
None of them are currently needed to pass our upstream CI, most were
either for ancient clang versions or coverity for silencing false
positives.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
They were added mostly randomly and we don't really want to keep working
around of false positives.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Previously, nvram file was created with user/group owner as
'root', rather than specifications defined in libvirtd.conf. The
solution is to call qemuDomainOpenFile(), which creates file with
defined permissions and qemuSecurityDomainSetPathLabel() to set
security label for created nvram file.
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1783255
Signed-off-by: Kristina Hanicova <khanicov@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
When building a commandline for a DIMM memory device with
non-default access mode, the qemuBuildMemoryBackendProps() will
tell QEMU to allocate memory from per-domain memory backing dir.
But later, when preparing the host, the
qemuProcessNeedMemoryBackingPath() does not check for memory
devices at all resulting in per-domain memory backing dir not
being created which upsets QEMU.
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1961114
Signed-off-by: Kristina Hanicova <khanicov@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
The aim of this function is to return whether domain definition
and/or memory device that user intents to hotplug needs a private
path inside cfg->memoryBackingDir. The rule for the memory device
that's being hotplug includes checking whether corresponding
guest NUMA node needs memoryBackingDir. Well, while the rationale
behind makes sense it is not necessary to check for that really -
just a few lines above every guest NUMA node was checked exactly
for that.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
The aim of qemuProcessNeedHugepagesPath() is to return whether
guest needs private path inside HugeTLBFS mounts (deducted from
domain definition @def) or whether the memory device that user is
hotplugging in needs the private path (deducted from the @mem
argument). The actual creation of the path is done in the only
caller qemuProcessBuildDestroyMemoryPaths().
The rule for the first case (@def) and the second case (@mem) is
the same (domain has a DIMM device that has HP requested) and is
written twice. Move the logic into a function to deduplicate the
code.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
When placing vCPUs into CGroups the qemuProcessSetupPid() is
called which then enters a for() loop (around its middle) where
it calls virDomainNumaGetNodeCpumask() for each guest NUMA node.
But the latter returns only a pointer not new reference/copy and
thus the caller must not free it. But the variable is decorated
with g_autoptr() which leads to a double free.
Fixes: 2d37d8dbc987d1998b4ad8029ba324b6bfe49799
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Historically, we declared pointer type to our types:
typedef struct _virXXX virXXX;
typedef virXXX *virXXXPtr;
But usefulness of such declaration is questionable, at best.
Unfortunately, we can't drop every such declaration - we have to
carry some over, because they are part of public API (e.g.
virDomainPtr). But for internal types - we can do drop them and
use what every other C project uses 'virXXX *'.
This change was generated by a very ugly shell script that
generated sed script which was then called over each file in the
repository. For the shell script refer to the cover letter:
https://listman.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2021-March/msg00537.html
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
virQEMUCapsGet checks for qemuCaps itself, no need to do it explicitly.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>
When the backup job is terminated normally the security label is
restored by the blockjob finishing handler.
If the VM dies or is destroyed that wouldn't happen as the blockjob
handler wouldn't be called.
Restore the security label on disk store where we remember that the job
was running at the point when 'qemuBackupJobTerminate' was called.
Not resetting the security label means that we also leak the xattr
attributes remembering the label which prevents any further use of the
file, which is a problem for block devices.
This also requires that the call to 'qemuBackupJobTerminate' from
'qemuProcessStop' happens only after 'vm->pid' was reset as otherwise
the security subdrivers attempt to enter the process namespace which
fails if the process isn't running any more.
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1939082
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
