Since Xen 4.5 libxl allows to set affinities during domain creation.
This enables Xen to allocate the domain memory on NUMA systems close to
the specified pcpus.
Libvirt can now handle <domain/cputune/vcpupin> in domU.xml correctly.
Without this change, Xen will create the domU and assign NUMA memory and
vcpu affinities on its own. Later libvirt will adjust the affinity,
which may move the vcpus away from the assigned NUMA node.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <danielhb413@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
The aim of this function is to return whether domain definition
and/or memory device that user intents to hotplug needs a private
path inside cfg->memoryBackingDir. The rule for the memory device
that's being hotplug includes checking whether corresponding
guest NUMA node needs memoryBackingDir. Well, while the rationale
behind makes sense it is not necessary to check for that really -
just a few lines above every guest NUMA node was checked exactly
for that.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
The aim of qemuProcessNeedHugepagesPath() is to return whether
guest needs private path inside HugeTLBFS mounts (deducted from
domain definition @def) or whether the memory device that user is
hotplugging in needs the private path (deducted from the @mem
argument). The actual creation of the path is done in the only
caller qemuProcessBuildDestroyMemoryPaths().
The rule for the first case (@def) and the second case (@mem) is
the same (domain has a DIMM device that has HP requested) and is
written twice. Move the logic into a function to deduplicate the
code.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
As of b4cbdbe90bbf85eaf687f532d5a52a11e664b781 (and friends) the
minimal QEMU version required is 2.11.0. Let's update our
QEMU_MIN_* macros to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
The basic use case of VIR_IDENTITY_AUTORESTORE() is in
conjunction with virIdentityElevateCurrent(). What happens is
that virIdentityElevateCurrent() gets current identity (which
increases the refcounter of thread local virIdentity object) and
returns a pointer to it. Later, when the variable goes out of
scope the virIdentityRestoreHelper() is called which calls
virIdentitySetCurrent() over the old identity. But this means
that the refcounter is increased again.
Therefore, we have to explicitly decrease the refcounter by
calling g_object_unref().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Recently, a new code was added to virGetConnectGeneric() that
saves the original error into a variable so that it's not lost in
virConnectClose() called under the 'error' label.
However, the error saving code uses virSaveLastError() +
virSetError() combo which leaks the memory allocated for the
error copy. Using virErrorPreserveLast() + virErrorRestore() does
the same job without the memleak.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
A secret can be marked with the "private" attribute. The intent was that
it is not possible for any libvirt client to be able to read the secret
value, it would only be accesible from within libvirtd. eg the QEMU
driver can read the value to launch a guest.
With the modular daemons, the QEMU, storage and secret drivers are all
running in separate daemons. The QEMU and storage drivers thus appear to
be normal libvirt client's from the POV of the secret driver, and thus
they are not able to read a private secret. This is unhelpful.
With the previous patches that introduced a "system token" to the
identity object, we can now distinguish APIs invoked by libvirt daemons
from those invoked by client applications.
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
When fetching the value of a private secret, we need to use an elevated
identity otherwise the secret driver will deny access.
When using the modular daemons, the elevated identity needs to be active
before the secret driver connection is opened, and it will apply to all
APIs calls made on that conncetion.
When using the monolithic daemon, the identity at time of opening the
connection is ignored, and the elevated identity needs to be active
precisely at the time the virSecretGetValue API call is made.
After acquiring the secret value, the elevated identity should be
cleared.
This sounds complex, but is fairly straightfoward with the automatic
cleanup callbacks.
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
The drivers can all call virGetConnectXXX to open a connection to a
secondary driver. For example, when creating a encrypted storage volume,
the storage driver has to open a secret driver connection, or when
starting a guest, the QEMU driver has to open the network driver to
lookup a virtual network.
When using monolithic libvirtd, the connection has the same effective
identity as the client, since everything is still in the same process.
When using the modular daemons, however, the remote daemon sees the
identity of the calling daemon. This is a mistake as it results in
the modular daemons seeing the client with elevated privileges.
We need to pass on the current identity explicitly when opening the
secondary drivers. This is the same thing that is done by daemon RPC
dispatcher code when it is directly forwarding top level API calls
from virtproxyd and other daemons.
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
This is essentially a way to determine if the current identity
is that of another libvirt daemon.
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
When talking to the secret driver, the callers inside libvirt daemons
need to be able to run with an elevated privileges that prove the API
calls are made by a libvirt daemon, not an end user application.
The virIdentityElevateCurrent method will take the current identity
and, if not already present, add the system token. The old current
identity is returned to the caller. With the VIR_IDENTITY_AUTORESTORE
annotation, the old current identity will be restored upon leaving
the codeblock scope.
... early work with regular privileges ...
if (something needing elevated privs) {
VIR_IDENTITY_AUTORESTORE virIdentity *oldident =
virIdentityElevateCurrent();
if (!oldident)
return -1;
... do something with elevated privileges ...
}
... later work with regular privileges ...
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
When creating the system identity set the system token. The system
token is currently stored in a local path
/var/run/libvirt/common/system.token
Obviously with only traditional UNIX DAC in effect, this is largely
security through obscurity, if the client is running at the same
privilege level as the daemon. It does, however, reliably distinguish
an unprivileged client from the system daemons.
With a MAC system like SELinux though, or possible use of containers,
access can be further restricted.
A possible future improvement for Linux would be to populate the
kernel keyring with a secret for libvirt daemons to share.
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
We want a way to distinguish between calls from a libvirt daemon, and a
regular client application when both are running as the same user
account. This is not possible with the current set of attributes
recorded against an identity, as there is nothing that is common to all
of the modular libvirt daemons, while distinct to all other processes.
We thus introduce the idea of a system token, which is simply a random
hex string that is only known by the libvirt daemons, to be recorded
against the system identity.
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
A random token is simply a string of random bytes formatted in
hexidecimal.
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
The width of `unsigned long` differs on 32 bit and 64 bit architectures.
There is no compelling reason why the maximum DHCP lease time should
depend on the architecture.
Signed-off-by: Tim Wiederhake <twiederh@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
When QEMU introduces new firmware features libvirt will fail until we
list that feature in our code as well which doesn't sound right.
We should simply ignore the new feature until we add a proper support
for it.
Reported-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Some variables are needed only inside for() loop. They were
declared at the beginning of the function because of VIR_FREE()
calls, but since they are auto-freed they can be declared inside
the loop.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
What this function really does it takes ownership of all pointers
passed (well, except for the first one - caps - to which it
registers new NUMA node). But since all info is passed as a
single pointer it's hard to tell (and use g_auto*). Let's use
double pointers to make the ownership transfer obvious.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
The @cpus variable is an array of structs in which each item
contains a virBitmap member. As such it is not enough to just
VIR_FREE() the array - each bitmap has to be freed too.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
The rest of virCapabilities format functions take virBuffer as
the first argument and struct to format as the second. Also, they
accept NULL (as the second argument). Fix
virCapabilitiesHostNUMAFormat() so that it follows this logic.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Since its introduction in v0.9.1~65 the virOnce() was expected to
follow the usual retval logic (0 for success, a negative number
for failure). However, that was never the case.
On the other hand, looking into glibc and musl the pthread_once()
never returns anything other than zero (uclibc-ng seems to not
implement pthread_once()), therefore we never really hit any
problem. But for code cleanliness (and to match POSIX
documentation), let's change to code so that our retval logic is
honoured.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Compilers aren't able to see whether @result is set or not and thus
don't warn of a potential use of uninitialized value. Always set @result
to prevent uninitialized use.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
