Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Michal Privoznik
23d4684640 qemu_command: Separate domain memory building into a helper
The qemuBuildMachineCommandLine() function is needlessly long.
Separate out parts that generate memory related arguments into
qemuAppendDomainMemoryMachineParams(). Unfortunately, expected
outputs for some qemuxml2argvdata cases needed to be updated
because the order in which arguments are generated is changed.
But there's no functional change.

Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
2022-08-01 10:36:37 +02:00
Michal Privoznik
b185abe9d9 qemu_command: Separate domain features building into a helper
The qemuBuildMachineCommandLine() function is needlessly long.
Separate out parts that generate arguments based on
domainDef->features[] into
qemuAppendDomainFeaturesMachineParam(). Unfortunately, expected
outputs for some qemuxml2argvdata cases needed to be updated
because the order in which features are generated is changed. But
there's no functional change.

Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
2022-08-01 10:36:27 +02:00
Andrea Bolognani
262672dbbf qemu_firmware: Enable loader.secure when requires-smm
Currently, a firmware configuration such as

  <os firmware='efi'>
    <firmware>
      <feature enabled='yes' name='enrolled-keys'/>
    </firmware>
  </os>

will correctly pick a firmware that implements the Secure Boot
feature and initialize the NVRAM file so that it contains the
keys necessary to enforce the signing requirements. However, the
lack of a

  <loader secure='yes'/>

element makes it possible for pflash writes to happen outside
of SMM mode. This means that the authenticated UEFI variables
where the keys are stored could potentially be overwritten by
malicious code running in the guest, thus making it possible to
circumvent Secure Boot.

To prevent that from happening, automatically turn on the
loader.secure feature whenever a firmware that implements Secure
Boot is chosen by the firmware autoselection logic. This is
identical to the way we already automatically enable SMM in such
a scenario.

Note that, while this is technically a guest-visible change, it
will not affect migration of existings VMs and will not prevent
legitimate guest code from running.

Signed-off-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
2022-07-01 15:10:39 +02:00
Andrea Bolognani
2ce1dcc6b5 tests: Don't set NVRAM path manually
This does the opposite of

  commit 392292cd99
  Author: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
  Date:   Wed Feb 23 12:45:51 2022 +0000

    tests: don't use auto-generated NVRAM path in tests

in order to minimize input files.

We're going to add a test case specifically covering the use of
custom NVRAM paths with firmware autoselection in an upcoming
commit.

Signed-off-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
2022-07-01 15:10:13 +02:00
Andrea Bolognani
53cdfd7994 tests: Use minimal hardware for firmware tests
When testing firmware selection, we don't really care about any
of the hardware assigned to the VM, and in fact it's better to
keep it as minimal as possible to make sure that the focus
remains on the firmware bits.

Signed-off-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
2022-07-01 15:10:12 +02:00
Andrea Bolognani
f29a8bcef1 tests: Rename and reorganize firmware tests
Group all tests related to firmware selection together and give
them consistent names that leave room for further tests to be
added in an upcoming commit.

Signed-off-by: Andrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
2022-07-01 15:10:10 +02:00