Since the wait is done during migration (still inside
QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_MIGRATION_OUT), the code should enter the monitor as such
in order to prohibit all other jobs from interfering in the meantime.
This patch fixes bug #1009886 in which qemuDomainGetBlockInfo was
waiting on the monitor condition and after GetSpiceMigrationStatus
mangled its internal data, the daemon crashed.
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1009886
(cherry picked from commit 484cc3217b73b865f00bf42a9c12187b37200699)
The fix for CVE-2013-4311 had a pre-requisite enhancement
to the identity code
commit db7a5688c05f3fd60d9d2b74c72427eb9ee9c176
Author: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Thu Aug 22 16:00:01 2013 +0100
Also store user & group ID values in virIdentity
This had a typo which caused the group ID to overwrite the
user ID string. This meant any checks using this would have
the wrong ID value. This only affected the ACL code, not the
initial polkit auth. It also leaked memory.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit e4697b92abaad16e8e6b41a1e55be9b084d48d5a)
With the existing pkcheck (pid, start time) tuple for identifying
the process, there is a race condition, where a process can make
a libvirt RPC call and in another thread exec a setuid application,
causing it to change to effective UID 0. This in turn causes polkit
to do its permission check based on the wrong UID.
To address this, libvirt must get the UID the caller had at time
of connect() (from SO_PEERCRED) and pass a (pid, start time, uid)
triple to the pkcheck program.
This fix requires that libvirt is re-built against a version of
polkit that has the fix for its CVE-2013-4288, so that libvirt
can see 'pkg-config --variable pkcheck_supports_uid polkit-gobject-1'
Signed-off-by: Colin Walters <walters@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 922b7fda77b094dbf022d625238262ea05335666)
The polkit access driver will want to use the process start
time field. This was already set for network identities, but
not for the system identity.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit e65667c0c6e016d42abea077e31628ae43f57b74)
Future improvements to the polkit code will require access to
the numeric user ID, not merely user name.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit db7a5688c05f3fd60d9d2b74c72427eb9ee9c176)
Bother those kernel developers. In the latest rawhide, kernel
and glibc have now been unified so that <netinet/in.h> and
<linux/in6.h> no longer clash; but <linux/if_bridge.h> is still
not self-contained. Because of the latest header change, the
build is failing with:
checking for linux/param.h... no
configure: error: You must install kernel-headers in order to compile libvirt with QEMU or LXC support
with details:
In file included from conftest.c:561:0:
/usr/include/linux/in6.h:71:18: error: field 'flr_dst' has incomplete type
struct in6_addr flr_dst;
We need a workaround to avoid our workaround :)
* configure.ac (NETINET_LINUX_WORKAROUND): New test.
* src/util/virnetdevbridge.c (includes): Use it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit e62e0094dcd0ca1484491a9cc62919473b647f11)
Since virtlockd is only built when libvirtd is built, we should
not install its auxiliary files unconditionally. This solves
two failures. 1. 'make distcheck' complains:
rm -f Makefile
ERROR: files left in build directory after distclean:
./src/virtlockd.8
2. './autobuild.sh' complains:
Checking for unpackaged file(s): /usr/lib/rpm/check-files
/home/eblake/rpmbuild/BUILDROOT/mingw-libvirt-1.1.1-1.fc19.eblake1377879911.x86_64
error: Installed (but unpackaged) file(s) found:
/usr/i686-w64-mingw32/sys-root/mingw/etc/libvirt/virtlockd.conf
/usr/i686-w64-mingw32/sys-root/mingw/share/augeas/lenses/tests/test_virtlockd.aug
/usr/i686-w64-mingw32/sys-root/mingw/share/augeas/lenses/virtlockd.aug
/usr/i686-w64-mingw32/sys-root/mingw/share/man/man8/virtlockd.8
/usr/x86_64-w64-mingw32/sys-root/mingw/etc/libvirt/virtlockd.conf
/usr/x86_64-w64-mingw32/sys-root/mingw/share/augeas/lenses/tests/test_virtlockd.aug
/usr/x86_64-w64-mingw32/sys-root/mingw/share/augeas/lenses/virtlockd.aug
/usr/x86_64-w64-mingw32/sys-root/mingw/share/man/man8/virtlockd.8
* src/Makefile.am (CLEANFILES): Add virtlockd.8.
(man8_MANS, conf_DATA, augeas_DATA, augeastest_DATA): Only install
virtlockd files when daemon is built.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
vhost only works in KVM mode at the moment, and is infact compiled
out if the emulator is built for non-native architecture. While it
may work at some point in the future for plain qemu, for now it's
just noise on the command line (and which contributes to arm cli
breakage).
FreeBSD 10 recently changed their definition of RAND_MAX, to try
and cover the fact that their evenly distributed results of rand()
really are a smaller range than a full power of 2. As a result,
I did some investigation, and learned:
1. POSIX requires random() to be evenly distributed across exactly
31 bits. glibc also guarantees this for rand(), but the two are
unrelated, and POSIX only associates RAND_MAX with rand().
Avoiding RAND_MAX altogether thus avoids a build failure on
FreeBSD 10.
2. Concatenating random bits from a PRNG will NOT provide uniform
coverage over the larger value UNLESS the period of the original
PRNG is at least as large as the number of bits being concatenated.
Simple example: suppose that RAND_MAX were 1 with a period of 2**1
(which means that the PRNG merely alternates between 0 and 1).
Concatenating two successive rand() calls would then invariably
result in 01 or 10, which is a rather non-uniform distribution
(00 and 11 are impossible) and an even worse period (2**0, since
our second attempt will get the same number as our first attempt).
But a RAND_MAX of 1 with a period of 2**2 (alternating between
0, 1, 1, 0) provides sane coverage of all four values, if properly
tempered. (Back-to-back calls would still only see half the values
if we don't do some tempering). We therefore want to guarantee a
period of at least 2**64, preferably larger (as a tempering factor);
POSIX only makes this guarantee for random() with 256 bytes of info.
* src/util/virrandom.c (virRandomBits): Use constants that are
accurate for the PRNG we are using, not an unrelated PRNG.
(randomState): Ensure the period of our PRNG exceeds our usage.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Commit 29fe5d7 (released in 1.1.1) introduced a latent problem
for any caller of virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel and where
the domain already had a uid:gid label to be parsed. Such a
setup would collect the list of supplementary groups during
virSecurityManagerPreFork, but then ignores that information,
and thus fails to call setgroups() to adjust the supplementary
groups of the process.
Upstream does not use virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel for
qemu (it uses virSecurityManagerSetChildProcessLabel instead),
so this problem remained latent until backporting the initial
commit into v0.10.2-maint (commit c061ff5, released in 0.10.2.7),
where virSecurityManagerSetChildProcessLabel has not been
backported. As a result of using a different code path in the
backport, attempts to start a qemu domain that runs as qemu:qemu
will end up with supplementary groups unchanged from the libvirtd
parent process, rather than the desired supplementary groups of
the qemu user. This can lead to failure to start a domain
(typical Fedora setup assigns user 107 'qemu' to both group 107
'qemu' and group 36 'kvm', so a disk image that is only readable
under kvm group rights is locked out). Worse, it is a security
hole (the qemu process will inherit supplemental group rights
from the parent libvirtd process, which means it has access
rights to files owned by group 0 even when such files should
not normally be visible to user qemu).
LXC does not use the DAC security driver, so it is not vulnerable
at this time. Still, it is better to plug the latent hole on
the master branch first, before cherry-picking it to the only
vulnerable branch v0.10.2-maint.
* src/security/security_dac.c (virSecurityDACGetIds): Always populate
groups and ngroups, rather than only when no label is parsed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
The return values for the virConnectListAllSecrets call were not
bounds checked. This is a robustness issue for clients if
something where to cause corruption of the RPC stream data.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The return values for the virConnectListAllNWFilters call were not
bounds checked. This is a robustness issue for clients if
something where to cause corruption of the RPC stream data.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The return values for the virConnectListAllNodeDevices call were not
bounds checked. This is a robustness issue for clients if
something where to cause corruption of the RPC stream data.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The return values for the virConnectListAllInterfaces call were not
bounds checked. This is a robustness issue for clients if
something where to cause corruption of the RPC stream data.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The return values for the virConnectListAllNetworks call were not
bounds checked. This is a robustness issue for clients if
something where to cause corruption of the RPC stream data.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The return values for the virStoragePoolListAllVolumes call were not
bounds checked. This is a robustness issue for clients if
something where to cause corruption of the RPC stream data.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The return values for the virConnectListAllStoragePools call were not
bounds checked. This is a robustness issue for clients if
something where to cause corruption of the RPC stream data.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The return values for the virConnectListAllDomains call were not
bounds checked. This is a robustness issue for clients if
something where to cause corruption of the RPC stream data.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The return values for the virDomain{SnapshotListAllChildren,ListAllSnapshots}
calls were not bounds checked. This is a robustness issue for clients if
something where to cause corruption of the RPC stream data.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The return values for the virDomainGetJobStats call were not
bounds checked. This is a robustness issue for clients if
something where to cause corruption of the RPC stream data.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The parameters for the virDomainMigrate*Params RPC calls were
not bounds checks, meaning a malicious client can cause libvirtd
to consume arbitrary memory
This issue was introduced in the 1.1.0 release of libvirt
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Similarly to qemu_driver.c, we can join often repeating code of looking
up network into one function: networkObjFromNetwork.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
When using a <interface type="network"> that points to a network with
hostdev forwarding mode a hostdev alias is created for the network. This
allias is inserted into the hostdev list, but is backed with a part of
the network object that it is connected to.
When a VM is being stopped qemuProcessStop() calls
networkReleaseActualDevice() which eventually frees the memory for the
hostdev object. Afterwards when the domain definition is being freed by
virDomainDefFree() an invalid pointer is accessed by
virDomainHostdevDefFree() and may cause a crash of the daemon.
This patch removes the entry in the hostdev list before freeing the
depending memory to avoid this issue.
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1000973
QEMU commit 3984890 introduced the "pci-hole64-size" property,
to i440FX-pcihost and q35-pcihost with a default setting of 2 GB.
Translate <pcihole64>x<pcihole64/> to:
-global q35-pcihost.pci-hole64-size=x for q35 machines and
-global i440FX-pcihost.pci-hole64-size=x for i440FX-based machines.
Error out on other machine types or if the size was specified
but the pcihost device lacks 'pci-hole64-size' property.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=990418
<controller type='pci' index='0' model='pci-root'>
<pcihole64 unit='KiB'>1048576</pcihole64>
</controller>
It can be used to adjust (or disable) the size of the 64-bit
PCI hole. The size attribute is in kilobytes (different unit
can be specified on input), but it gets rounded up to
the nearest GB by QEMU.
Disabling it will be needed for guests that crash with the
64-bit PCI hole (like Windows XP), see:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=990418
The ftp protocol is already recognized by qemu/KVM so add this support to
libvirt as well.
The xml should be as following:
<disk type='network' device='cdrom'>
<source protocol='ftp' name='/url/path'>
<host name='host.name' port='21'/>
</source>
</disk>
Signed-off-by: Aline Manera <alinefm@br.ibm.com>
QEMU/KVM already allows a HTTP URL for the cdrom ISO image so add this support
to libvirt as well.
The xml should be as following:
<disk type='network' device='cdrom'>
<source protocol='http' name='/url/path'>
<host name='host.name' port='80'/>
</source>
</disk>
Signed-off-by: Aline Manera <alinefm@br.ibm.com>
qemu-img is going to switch the default for QCOW2
to QCOW2v3 (compat=1.1)
Extend the probing for qemu-img command line options to check
if -o compat is supported. If the volume definition specifies
the qcow2 format but no compat level and -o compat is supported,
specify -o compat=0.10 to create a QCOW2v2 image.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=997977
If there's no hard_limit set and domain uses VFIO we still must lock
the guest memory (prerequisite from qemu). Hence, we should compute
the amount to be locked from max_balloon.
When cpu hotplug fails without reporting an error, we would fail the
command but update the count of vCPUs anyways.
Commit 761fc481365703b861429d73a341bde352ba8d41 fixed the case when CPU
hot-unplug failed silently, but forgot to fix up the value in this case.
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1000357
The virDomainOpenGraphics method accepts a UNIX socket FD from
the client app. It must set the label on this FD otherwise QEMU
will be prevented from receiving it with recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
If user requested multiqueue networking, beside multiple /dev/tap and
/dev/vhost-net openings, we forgot to pass mq=on onto the -device
virtio-net-pci command line. This is advised at:
http://www.linux-kvm.org/page/Multiqueue#Enable_MQ_feature
