Part of a series of cleanups to use new accessor methods.
* src/security/security_dac.c (virSecurityDACSetSecurityImageLabel)
(virSecurityDACRestoreSecurityImageLabelInt)
(virSecurityDACSetSecurityAllLabel): Use accessors.
* src/security/security_selinux.c
(virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabelInt)
(virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel)
(virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityAllLabel): Likewise.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Any source file which calls the logging APIs now needs
to have a VIR_LOG_INIT("source.name") declaration at
the start of the file. This provides a static variable
of the virLogSource type.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
To support passing the path of the test data to the utils, one
more argument is added to virSCSIDeviceGetSgName,
virSCSIDeviceGetDevName, and virSCSIDeviceNew, and the related
code is changed accordingly.
Later tests for the scsi utils will be based on this patch.
Signed-off-by: Osier Yang <jyang@redhat.com>
Unlike the host devices of other types, SCSI host device XML supports
"shareable" tag. This patch introduces it for the virSCSIDevice struct
for a later patch use (to detect if the SCSI device is shareable when
preparing the SCSI host device in QEMU driver).
To ensure proper processing by virGetUserID() and virGetGroupID()
of a uid/gid add a "+" prior to the uid/gid to denote it's really
a uid/gid for the label.
Merge the functions 'virSecurityDACSetUser' and
'virSecurityDACSetGroup' into 'virSecurityDACSetUserAndGroup'.
Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>
Commit 29fe5d7 (released in 1.1.1) introduced a latent problem
for any caller of virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel and where
the domain already had a uid:gid label to be parsed. Such a
setup would collect the list of supplementary groups during
virSecurityManagerPreFork, but then ignores that information,
and thus fails to call setgroups() to adjust the supplementary
groups of the process.
Upstream does not use virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel for
qemu (it uses virSecurityManagerSetChildProcessLabel instead),
so this problem remained latent until backporting the initial
commit into v0.10.2-maint (commit c061ff5, released in 0.10.2.7),
where virSecurityManagerSetChildProcessLabel has not been
backported. As a result of using a different code path in the
backport, attempts to start a qemu domain that runs as qemu:qemu
will end up with supplementary groups unchanged from the libvirtd
parent process, rather than the desired supplementary groups of
the qemu user. This can lead to failure to start a domain
(typical Fedora setup assigns user 107 'qemu' to both group 107
'qemu' and group 36 'kvm', so a disk image that is only readable
under kvm group rights is locked out). Worse, it is a security
hole (the qemu process will inherit supplemental group rights
from the parent libvirtd process, which means it has access
rights to files owned by group 0 even when such files should
not normally be visible to user qemu).
LXC does not use the DAC security driver, so it is not vulnerable
at this time. Still, it is better to plug the latent hole on
the master branch first, before cherry-picking it to the only
vulnerable branch v0.10.2-maint.
* src/security/security_dac.c (virSecurityDACGetIds): Always populate
groups and ngroups, rather than only when no label is parsed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Parsing 'user:group' is useful even outside the DAC security driver,
so expose the most abstract function which has no DAC security driver
bits in itself.
Commit 75c1256 states that virGetGroupList must not be called
between fork and exec, then commit ee777e99 promptly violated
that for lxc's use of virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel. Hoist
the supplemental group detection to the time that the security
manager needs to fork. Qemu is safe, as it uses
virSecurityManagerSetChildProcessLabel which in turn uses
virCommand to determine supplemental groups.
This does not fix the fact that virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel
calls virSecurityDACParseIds calls parseIds which eventually
calls getpwnam_r, which also violates fork/exec async-signal-safe
safety rules, but so far no one has complained of hitting
deadlock in that case.
* src/security/security_dac.c (_virSecurityDACData): Track groups
in private data.
(virSecurityDACPreFork): New function, to set them.
(virSecurityDACClose): Clean up new fields.
(virSecurityDACGetIds): Alter signature.
(virSecurityDACSetSecurityHostdevLabelHelper)
(virSecurityDACSetChardevLabel, virSecurityDACSetProcessLabel)
(virSecurityDACSetChildProcessLabel): Update callers.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=964358
POSIX states that multi-threaded apps should not use functions
that are not async-signal-safe between fork and exec, yet we
were using getpwuid_r and initgroups. Although rare, it is
possible to hit deadlock in the child, when it tries to grab
a mutex that was already held by another thread in the parent.
I actually hit this deadlock when testing multiple domains
being started in parallel with a command hook, with the following
backtrace in the child:
Thread 1 (Thread 0x7fd56bbf2700 (LWP 3212)):
#0 __lll_lock_wait ()
at ../nptl/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/lowlevellock.S:136
#1 0x00007fd5761e7388 in _L_lock_854 () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0
#2 0x00007fd5761e7257 in __pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x7fd56be00360)
at pthread_mutex_lock.c:61
#3 0x00007fd56bbf9fc5 in _nss_files_getpwuid_r (uid=0, result=0x7fd56bbf0c70,
buffer=0x7fd55c2a65f0 "", buflen=1024, errnop=0x7fd56bbf25b8)
at nss_files/files-pwd.c:40
#4 0x00007fd575aeff1d in __getpwuid_r (uid=0, resbuf=0x7fd56bbf0c70,
buffer=0x7fd55c2a65f0 "", buflen=1024, result=0x7fd56bbf0cb0)
at ../nss/getXXbyYY_r.c:253
#5 0x00007fd578aebafc in virSetUIDGID (uid=0, gid=0) at util/virutil.c:1031
#6 0x00007fd578aebf43 in virSetUIDGIDWithCaps (uid=0, gid=0, capBits=0,
clearExistingCaps=true) at util/virutil.c:1388
#7 0x00007fd578a9a20b in virExec (cmd=0x7fd55c231f10) at util/vircommand.c:654
#8 0x00007fd578a9dfa2 in virCommandRunAsync (cmd=0x7fd55c231f10, pid=0x0)
at util/vircommand.c:2247
#9 0x00007fd578a9d74e in virCommandRun (cmd=0x7fd55c231f10, exitstatus=0x0)
at util/vircommand.c:2100
#10 0x00007fd56326fde5 in qemuProcessStart (conn=0x7fd53c000df0,
driver=0x7fd55c0dc4f0, vm=0x7fd54800b100, migrateFrom=0x0, stdin_fd=-1,
stdin_path=0x0, snapshot=0x0, vmop=VIR_NETDEV_VPORT_PROFILE_OP_CREATE,
flags=1) at qemu/qemu_process.c:3694
...
The solution is to split the work of getpwuid_r/initgroups into the
unsafe portions (getgrouplist, called pre-fork) and safe portions
(setgroups, called post-fork).
* src/util/virutil.h (virSetUIDGID, virSetUIDGIDWithCaps): Adjust
signature.
* src/util/virutil.c (virSetUIDGID): Add parameters.
(virSetUIDGIDWithCaps): Adjust clients.
* src/util/vircommand.c (virExec): Likewise.
* src/util/virfile.c (virFileAccessibleAs, virFileOpenForked)
(virDirCreate): Likewise.
* src/security/security_dac.c (virSecurityDACSetProcessLabel):
Likewise.
* src/lxc/lxc_container.c (lxcContainerSetID): Likewise.
* configure.ac (AC_CHECK_FUNCS_ONCE): Check for setgroups, not
initgroups.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Convert the type of loop iterators named 'i', 'j', k',
'ii', 'jj', 'kk', to be 'size_t' instead of 'int' or
'unsigned int', also santizing 'ii', 'jj', 'kk' to use
the normal 'i', 'j', 'k' naming
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
I realized after the fact that it's probably better in the long run to
give this function a name that matches the name of the link used in
sysfs to hold the group (iommu_group).
I'm changing it now because I'm about to add several more functions
that deal with iommu groups.
To not introduce more redundant code, helpers are added for
both "selinux", "dac", and "apparmor" backends.
Signed-off-by: Han Cheng <hanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Osier Yang <jyang@redhat>
v2.5 - v3:
* Splitted from 8/10 of v2.5
* Don't forget the other backends (DAC, and apparmor)
These all existed before virfile.c was created, and for some reason
weren't moved.
This is mostly straightfoward, although the syntax rule prohibiting
write() had to be changed to have an exception for virfile.c instead
of virutil.c.
This movement pointed out that there is a function called
virBuildPath(), and another almost identical function called
virFileBuildPath(). They really should be a single function, which
I'll take care of as soon as I figure out what the arglist should look
like.
The source code base needs to be adapted as well. Some files
include virutil.h just for the string related functions (here,
the include is substituted to match the new file), some include
virutil.h without any need (here, the include is removed), and
some require both.
If virPCIDeviceGetVFIOGroupDev() failed,
virSecurity*(Set|Restore)HostdevLabel() would fail to free a
virPCIDevice that had been allocated.
These leaks were all introduced (by me) very recently, in commit
f0bd70a.
This isn't strictly speaking a bugfix, but I realized I'd gotten a bit
too verbose when I chose the names for
VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_PCI_BACKEND_TYPE_*. This shortens them all a bit.
Legacy kvm style pci device assignment requires changes to the
labelling of several sysfs files for each device, but for vfio device
assignment, the only thing that needs to be relabelled/chowned is the
"group" device for the group that contains the device to be assigned.
There will soon be other items related to pci hostdevs that need to be
in the same part of the hostdevsubsys union as the pci address (which
is currently a single member called "pci". This patch replaces the
single member named pci with a struct named pci that contains a single
member named "addr".
Coverity found the DACGenLabel was checking for mgr == NULL after a
possible dereference; however, in order to get into the function the
virSecurityManagerGenLabel would have already dereferenced sec_managers[i]
so the check was unnecessary. Same check is made in SELinuxGenSecurityLabel.
The existing virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() API is designed so
that it must be called after forking the child process, but before
exec'ing the child. Due to the way the virCommand API works, that
means it needs to be put in a "hook" function that virCommand is told
to call out to at that time.
Setting the child process label is a basic enough need when executing
any process that virCommand should have a method of doing that. But
virCommand must be told what label to set, and only the security
driver knows the answer to that question.
The new virSecurityManagerSet*Child*ProcessLabel() API is the way to
transfer the knowledge about what label to set from the security
driver to the virCommand object. It is given a virCommandPtr, and each
security driver calls the appropriate virCommand* API to tell
virCommand what to do between fork and exec.
1) in the case of the DAC security driver, it calls
virCommandSetUID/GID() to set a uid and gid that must be set for the
child process.
2) for the SELinux security driver, it calls
virCommandSetSELinuxLabel() to save a copy of the char* that will be
sent to setexeccon_raw() *after forking the child process*.
3) for the AppArmor security drivers, it calls
virCommandSetAppArmorProfile() to save a copy of the char* that will
be sent to aa_change_profile() *after forking the child process*.
With this new API in place, we will be able to remove
virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() from any virCommand pre-exec
hooks.
(Unfortunately, the LXC driver uses clone() rather than virCommand, so
it can't take advantage of this new security driver API, meaning that
we need to keep around the older virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel(),
at least for now.)
When LXC labels USB devices during hotplug, it is running in
host context, so it needs to pass in a vroot path to the
container root.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The libvirt coding standard is to use 'function(...args...)'
instead of 'function (...args...)'. A non-trivial number of
places did not follow this rule and are fixed in this patch.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Fixes a build failure on cygwin:
cc1: warnings being treated as errors
security/security_dac.c: In function 'virSecurityDACSetProcessLabel':
security/security_dac.c:862:5: error: format '%u' expects type 'unsigned int', but argument 7 has type 'uid_t' [-Wformat]
security/security_dac.c:862:5: error: format '%u' expects type 'unsigned int', but argument 8 has type 'gid_t' [-Wformat]
* src/security/security_dac.c (virSecurityDACSetProcessLabel)
(virSecurityDACGenLabel): Use proper casts.
We used to walk the backing file chain at least twice per disk,
once to set up cgroup device whitelisting, and once to set up
security labeling. Rather than walk the chain every iteration,
which possibly includes calls to fork() in order to open root-squashed
NFS files, we can exploit the cache of the previous patch.
* src/conf/domain_conf.h (virDomainDiskDefForeachPath): Alter
signature.
* src/conf/domain_conf.c (virDomainDiskDefForeachPath): Require caller
to supply backing chain via disk, if recursion is desired.
* src/security/security_dac.c
(virSecurityDACSetSecurityImageLabel): Adjust caller.
* src/security/security_selinux.c
(virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel): Likewise.
* src/security/virt-aa-helper.c (get_files): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c (qemuSetupDiskCgroup)
(qemuTeardownDiskCgroup): Likewise.
(qemuSetupCgroup): Pre-populate chain.
BZ:https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=851981
When using macvtap, a character device gets first created by
kernel with name /dev/tapN, its selinux context is:
system_u:object_r:device_t:s0
Shortly, when udev gets notification when new file is created
in /dev, it will then jump in and relabel this file back to the
expected default context:
system_u:object_r:tun_tap_device_t:s0
There is a time gap happened.
Sometimes, it will have migration failed, AVC error message:
type=AVC msg=audit(1349858424.233:42507): avc: denied { read write } for
pid=19926 comm="qemu-kvm" path="/dev/tap33" dev=devtmpfs ino=131524
scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0:c598,c908
tcontext=system_u:object_r:device_t:s0 tclass=chr_file
This patch will label the tapfd device before qemu process starts:
system_u:object_r:tun_tap_device_t:MCS(MCS from seclabel->label)
All USB device lookup functions emit an error when they cannot find the
requested device. With this patch, their caller can choose if a missing
device is an error or normal condition.
The functions virGetUserID and virGetGroupID are now able to parse
user/group names and IDs in a similar way to coreutils' chown. So, user
and group parsing in security_dac can be simplified.
The DAC driver is missing parsing of group and user names for DAC labels
and currently just parses uid and gid. This patch extends it to support
names, so the following security label definition is now valid:
<seclabel type='static' model='dac' relabel='yes'>
<label>qemu:qemu</label>
<imagelabel>qemu:qemu</imagelabel>
</seclabel>
When it tries to parse an owner or a group, it first tries to resolve it as
a name, if it fails or it's an invalid user/group name then it tries to
parse it as an UID or GID. A leading '+' can also be used for both owner and
group to force it to be parsed as IDs, so the following example is also
valid:
<seclabel type='static' model='dac' relabel='yes'>
<label>+101:+101</label>
<imagelabel>+101:+101</imagelabel>
</seclabel>
This ensures that UID 101 and GUI 101 will be used instead of an user or
group named "101".
