Legacy kvm style pci device assignment requires changes to the
labelling of several sysfs files for each device, but for vfio device
assignment, the only thing that needs to be relabelled/chowned is the
"group" device for the group that contains the device to be assigned.
There will soon be other items related to pci hostdevs that need to be
in the same part of the hostdevsubsys union as the pci address (which
is currently a single member called "pci". This patch replaces the
single member named pci with a struct named pci that contains a single
member named "addr".
Detected by a simple Shell script:
for i in $(git ls-files -- '*.[ch]'); do
awk 'BEGIN {
fail=0
}
/# *include.*\.h/{
match($0, /["<][^">]*[">]/)
arr[substr($0, RSTART+1, RLENGTH-2)]++
}
END {
for (key in arr) {
if (arr[key] > 1) {
fail=1
printf("%d %s\n", arr[key], key)
}
}
if (fail == 1)
exit 1
}' $i
if test $? != 0; then
echo "Duplicate header(s) in $i"
fi
done;
A later patch will add the syntax-check to avoid duplicate
headers.
This patch refactors various places to allow removing of the
defaultConsoleTargetType callback from the virCaps structure.
A new console character device target type is introduced -
VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_CONSOLE_TARGET_TYPE_NONE - to mark that no type was
specified in the XML. This type is at the end converted to the standard
VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_CONSOLE_TARGET_TYPE_SERIAL. Other types that are
different from this default have to be processed separately in the
device post parse callback.
This patch adds instrumentation that will allow hypervisor drivers to
fill and validate domain and device definitions after parsed by the XML
parser.
With this patch, after the XML is parsed, a callback to the driver is
issued requesting to fill and validate driver specific details of the
configuration. This allows to use sensible defaults and checks on a per
driver basis at the time the XML is parsed.
Two callback pointers are stored in the new virDomainXMLConf object:
* virDomainDeviceDefPostParseCallback (devicesPostParseCallback)
- called for a single device parsed and for every single device in a
domain config. A virDomainDeviceDefPtr is passed along with the
domain definition and virCaps.
* virDomainDefPostParseCallback, (domainPostParseCallback)
- A callback that is meant to process the domain config after it's
parsed. A virDomainDefPtr is passed along with virCaps.
Both types of callbacks support arbitrary opaque data passed for the
callback functions.
Errors may be reported in those callbacks resulting in a XML parsing
failure.
This patch is the result of running:
for i in $(git ls-files | grep -v html | grep -v \.po$ ); do
sed -i -e "s/virDomainXMLConf/virDomainXMLOption/g" -e "s/xmlconf/xmlopt/g" $i
done
and a few manual tweaks.
otherwise we crash later on if we don't find a match like:
#0 0xb72c2b4f in virSecurityManagerGenLabel (mgr=0xb8e42d20, vm=0xb8ef40c0) at security/security_manager.c:424
#1 0xb18811f3 in qemuProcessStart (conn=conn@entry=0xb8eed880, driver=driver@entry=0xb8e3b1e0, vm=vm@entry=0xb8ef58f0,
migrateFrom=migrateFrom@entry=0xb18f6088 "stdio", stdin_fd=18,
stdin_path=stdin_path@entry=0xb8ea7798 "/var/lib/jenkins/jobs/libvirt-tck-build/workspace/tck.img", snapshot=snapshot@entry=0x0,
vmop=vmop@entry=VIR_NETDEV_VPORT_PROFILE_OP_RESTORE, flags=flags@entry=2) at qemu/qemu_process.c:3364
#2 0xb18d6cb2 in qemuDomainSaveImageStartVM (conn=conn@entry=0xb8eed880, driver=driver@entry=0xb8e3b1e0, vm=0xb8ef58f0, fd=fd@entry=0xb6bf3f98,
header=header@entry=0xb6bf3fa0, path=path@entry=0xb8ea7798 "/var/lib/jenkins/jobs/libvirt-tck-build/workspace/tck.img",
start_paused=start_paused@entry=false) at qemu/qemu_driver.c:4843
#3 0xb18d7eeb in qemuDomainRestoreFlags (conn=conn@entry=0xb8eed880,
path=path@entry=0xb8ea7798 "/var/lib/jenkins/jobs/libvirt-tck-build/workspace/tck.img", dxml=dxml@entry=0x0, flags=flags@entry=0)
at qemu/qemu_driver.c:4962
#4 0xb18d8123 in qemuDomainRestore (conn=0xb8eed880, path=0xb8ea7798 "/var/lib/jenkins/jobs/libvirt-tck-build/workspace/tck.img")
at qemu/qemu_driver.c:4987
#5 0xb718d186 in virDomainRestore (conn=0xb8eed880, from=0xb8ea87d8 "/var/lib/jenkins/jobs/libvirt-tck-build/workspace/tck.img") at libvirt.c:2768
#6 0xb7736363 in remoteDispatchDomainRestore (args=<optimized out>, rerr=0xb6bf41f0, client=0xb8eedaf0, server=<optimized out>, msg=<optimized out>)
at remote_dispatch.h:4679
#7 remoteDispatchDomainRestoreHelper (server=0xb8e1a3e0, client=0xb8eedaf0, msg=0xb8ee72c8, rerr=0xb6bf41f0, args=0xb8ea8968, ret=0xb8ef5330)
at remote_dispatch.h:4661
#8 0xb720db01 in virNetServerProgramDispatchCall (msg=0xb8ee72c8, client=0xb8eedaf0, server=0xb8e1a3e0, prog=0xb8e216b0)
at rpc/virnetserverprogram.c:439
#9 virNetServerProgramDispatch (prog=0xb8e216b0, server=server@entry=0xb8e1a3e0, client=0xb8eedaf0, msg=0xb8ee72c8) at rpc/virnetserverprogram.c:305
#10 0xb7206e97 in virNetServerProcessMsg (msg=<optimized out>, prog=<optimized out>, client=<optimized out>, srv=0xb8e1a3e0) at rpc/virnetserver.c:162
#11 virNetServerHandleJob (jobOpaque=0xb8ea7720, opaque=0xb8e1a3e0) at rpc/virnetserver.c:183
#12 0xb70f9f78 in virThreadPoolWorker (opaque=opaque@entry=0xb8e1a540) at util/virthreadpool.c:144
#13 0xb70f94a5 in virThreadHelper (data=0xb8e0e558) at util/virthreadpthread.c:161
#14 0xb705d954 in start_thread (arg=0xb6bf4b70) at pthread_create.c:304
#15 0xb6fd595e in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/i386/clone.S:130
This unbreaks libvirt-tck's domain/100-transient-save-restore.t with
qemu:///session and selinux compiled in but disabled.
Introduced by 8d68cbeaa8
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=947387
If a user configures a domain to use a seclabel of a specific type,
but the appropriate driver is not accessible, we should refuse to
start the domain. For instance, if user requires selinux, but it is
either non present in the system, or is just disabled, we should not
start the domain. Moreover, since we are touching only those labels we
have a security driver for, the other labels may confuse libvirt when
reconnecting to a domain on libvirtd restart. In our selinux example,
when starting up a domain, missing security label is okay, as we
auto-generate one. But later, when libvirt is re-connecting to a live
qemu instance, we parse a state XML, where security label is required
and it is an error if missing:
error : virSecurityLabelDefParseXML:3228 : XML error: security label
is missing
This results in a qemu process left behind without any libvirt control.
With my previous patches, we unconditionally appended a seclabel,
even if it wasn't generated but found in array of defined seclabels.
This resulted in double free later when doing virDomainDefFree
and iterating over the array of defined seclabels.
Moreover, there was another possibility of double free, if the
seclabel was generated in the last iteration of the process of
walking trough security managers array.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=923946
The <seclabel type='none'/> should be added iff there is no other
seclabel defined within a domain. This bug can be easily reproduced:
1) configure selinux seclabel for a domain
2) disable system's selinux and restart libvirtd
3) observe <seclabel type='none'/> being appended to a domain on its
startup
The virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef was modifying the domain XML.
It tried to find a seclabel corresponding to given sec driver. If the
label wasn't found, the function created one which is wrong. In fact
it's security manager which should modify this part of domain XML.
Normally libvirtd should run with a SELinux label
system_u:system_r:virtd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
If a user manually runs libvirtd though, it is sometimes
possible to get into a situation where it is running
system_u:system_r:init_t:s0
The SELinux security driver isn't expecting this and can't
parse the security label since it lacks the ':c0.c1023' part
causing it to complain
internal error Cannot parse sensitivity level in s0
This updates the parser to cope with this, so if no category
is present, libvirtd will hardcode the equivalent of c0.c1023.
Now this won't work if SELinux is in Enforcing mode, but that's
not an issue, because the user can only get into this problem
if in Permissive mode. This means they can now start VMs in
Permissive mode without hitting that parsing error
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Pull the code which parses the current process MCS range
out of virSecuritySELinuxMCSFind and into a new method
virSecuritySELinuxMCSGetProcessRange.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The body of the loop in virSecuritySELinuxMCSFind would
directly 'return NULL' on OOM, instead of jumping to the
cleanup label. This caused a leak of several local vars.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The virCaps structure gathered a ton of irrelevant data over time that.
The original reason is that it was propagated to the XML parser
functions.
This patch aims to create a new data structure virDomainXMLConf that
will contain immutable data that are used by the XML parser. This will
allow two things we need:
1) Get rid of the stuff from virCaps
2) Allow us to add callbacks to check and add driver specific stuff
after domain XML is parsed.
This first attempt removes pointers to private data allocation functions
to this new structure and update all callers and function that require
them.
Rename AppArmorSetImageFDLabel to AppArmorSetFDLabel which could
be used as a common function for *ALL* fd relabelling in Linux.
In apparmor profile for specific vm with uuid cdbebdfa-1d6d-65c3-be0f-fd74b978a773
Path: /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/libvirt-cdbebdfa-1d6d-65c3-be0f-fd74b978a773.files
The last line is for the tapfd relabelling.
# DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE DIRECTLY. IT IS MANAGED BY LIBVIRT.
"/var/log/libvirt/**/rhel6qcow2.log" w,
"/var/lib/libvirt/**/rhel6qcow2.monitor" rw,
"/var/run/libvirt/**/rhel6qcow2.pid" rwk,
"/run/libvirt/**/rhel6qcow2.pid" rwk,
"/var/run/libvirt/**/*.tunnelmigrate.dest.rhel6qcow2" rw,
"/run/libvirt/**/*.tunnelmigrate.dest.rhel6qcow2" rw,
"/var/lib/libvirt/images/rhel6u3qcow2.img" rw,
"/dev/tap45" rw,
With the apparmor security driver enabled, qemu instances fail
to start
# grep ^security_driver /etc/libvirt/qemu.conf
security_driver = "apparmor"
# virsh start test-kvm
error: Failed to start domain test-kvm
error: internal error security label already defined for VM
The model field of virSecurityLabelDef object is always populated
by virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(), so remove the check for a
NULL model when verifying if a label is already defined for the
instance.
Checking for a NULL model and populating it later in
AppArmorGenSecurityLabel() has been left in the code to be
consistent with virSecuritySELinuxGenSecurityLabel().
Coverity found the DACGenLabel was checking for mgr == NULL after a
possible dereference; however, in order to get into the function the
virSecurityManagerGenLabel would have already dereferenced sec_managers[i]
so the check was unnecessary. Same check is made in SELinuxGenSecurityLabel.
The existing virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() API is designed so
that it must be called after forking the child process, but before
exec'ing the child. Due to the way the virCommand API works, that
means it needs to be put in a "hook" function that virCommand is told
to call out to at that time.
Setting the child process label is a basic enough need when executing
any process that virCommand should have a method of doing that. But
virCommand must be told what label to set, and only the security
driver knows the answer to that question.
The new virSecurityManagerSet*Child*ProcessLabel() API is the way to
transfer the knowledge about what label to set from the security
driver to the virCommand object. It is given a virCommandPtr, and each
security driver calls the appropriate virCommand* API to tell
virCommand what to do between fork and exec.
1) in the case of the DAC security driver, it calls
virCommandSetUID/GID() to set a uid and gid that must be set for the
child process.
2) for the SELinux security driver, it calls
virCommandSetSELinuxLabel() to save a copy of the char* that will be
sent to setexeccon_raw() *after forking the child process*.
3) for the AppArmor security drivers, it calls
virCommandSetAppArmorProfile() to save a copy of the char* that will
be sent to aa_change_profile() *after forking the child process*.
With this new API in place, we will be able to remove
virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() from any virCommand pre-exec
hooks.
(Unfortunately, the LXC driver uses clone() rather than virCommand, so
it can't take advantage of this new security driver API, meaning that
we need to keep around the older virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel(),
at least for now.)
The hook scripts used by virCommand must be careful wrt
accessing any mutexes that may have been held by other
threads in the parent process. With the recent refactoring
there are 2 potential flaws lurking, which will become real
deadlock bugs once the global QEMU driver lock is removed.
Remove use of the QEMU driver lock from the hook function
by passing in the 'virQEMUDriverConfigPtr' instance directly.
Add functions to the virSecurityManager to be invoked before
and after fork, to ensure the mutex is held by the current
thread. This allows it to be safely used in the hook script
in the child process.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
On RHEL 5, I got:
security/security_selinux.c: In function 'getContext':
security/security_selinux.c:971: warning: unused parameter 'mgr' [-Wunused-parameter]
* src/security/security_selinux.c (getContext): Mark potentially
unused parameter.
The security manager drivers are not allowed to call back
out to top level security manager APIs, since that results
in recursive mutex acquisition and thus deadlock. Remove
calls to virSecurityManagerGetModel from SELinux / AppArmor
drivers
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Add locking to virSecurityManagerXXX APIs, so that use of the
security drivers is internally serialized. This avoids the need
to rely on the global driver locks to achieve serialization
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
To enable locking to be introduced to the security manager
objects later, turn virSecurityManager into a virObjectLockable
class
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
To enable virCapabilities instances to be reference counted,
turn it into a virObject. All cases of virCapabilitiesFree
turn into virObjectUnref
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Commit id a994ef2d1 changed the mechanism to store/update the default
security label from using disk->seclabels[0] to allocating one on the
fly. That change allocated the label, but never saved it. This patch
will save the label. The new virDomainDiskDefAddSecurityLabelDef() is
a copy of the virDomainDefAddSecurityLabelDef().
