This page provides an introduction to libvirt's network filters, their goals, concepts and XML format.
The goal of the network filtering XML is to enable administrators
of a virtualized system to configure and enforce network traffic
filtering rules on virtual
machines and manage the parameters of network traffic that
virtual machines
are allowed to send or receive.
The network traffic filtering rules are
applied on the host when a virtual machine is started. Since the
filtering rules
cannot be circumvented from within
the virtual machine, it makes them mandatory from the point of
view of a virtual machine user.
The network filter subsystem allows each virtual machine's network
traffic filtering rules to be configured individually on a per
interface basis. The rules are
applied on the host when the virtual machine is started and can be modified
while the virtual machine is running. The latter can be achieved by
modifying the XML description of a network filter.
Multiple virtual machines can make use of the same generic network filter.
When such a filter is modified, the network traffic filtering rules
of all running virtual machines that reference this filter are updated.
Network filtering support is available since 0.8.1
(Qemu, KVM)
The network traffic filtering subsystem enables configuration of network traffic filtering rules on individual network interfaces that are configured for certain types of network configurations. Supported network types are
network
ethernet
-- must be used in bridging modebridge
direct
-- only protocols mac, arp, ip and ipv6
can be filtered
The interface XML is used to reference a top-level filter. In the
following example, the interface description references
the filter clean-traffic
.
... <devices> <interface type='bridge'> <mac address='00:16:3e:5d:c7:9e'/> <filterref filter='clean-traffic'/> </interface> </devices> ...
Network filters are written in XML and may either contain references
to other filters, contain rules for traffic filtering, or
hold a combination of both. The above referenced filter
clean-traffic
is a filter that only contains references to
other filters and no actual filtering rules. Since references to
other filters can be used, a tree of filters can be built.
The clean-traffic
filter can be viewed using the
command virsh nwfilter-dumpxml clean-traffic
.
As previously mentioned, a single network filter can be referenced
by multiple virtual machines. Since interfaces will typically
have individual parameters associated with their respective traffic
filtering rules, the rules described in a filter XML can
be parameterized with variables. In this case, the variable name
is used in the filter XML and the name and value are provided at the
place where the filter is referenced. In the
following example, the interface description has been extended with
the parameter IP
and a dotted IP address as value.
... <devices> <interface type='bridge'> <mac address='00:16:3e:5d:c7:9e'/> <filterref filter='clean-traffic'> <parameter name='IP' value='10.0.0.1'/> </filterref> </interface> </devices> ...
In this particular example, the clean-traffic
network
traffic filter will be instantiated with the IP address parameter
10.0.0.1 and enforce that the traffic from this interface will
always be using 10.0.0.1 as the source IP address, which is
one of the purposes of this particular filter.
Two variables names have so far been reserved for usage by the
network traffic filtering subsystem: MAC
and
IP
.
MAC
is the MAC address of the
network interface. A filtering rule that references this variable
will automatically be instantiated with the MAC address of the
interface. This works without the user having to explicitly provide
the MAC parameter. Even though it is possible to specify the MAC
parameter similar to the IP parameter above, it is discouraged
since libvirt knows what MAC address an interface will be using.
The parameter IP
represents the IP address
that the operating system inside the virtual machine is expected
to use on the given interface. The IP
parameter
is special in so far as the libvirt daemon will try to determine
the IP address (and thus the IP parameter's value) that is being
used on an interface if the parameter
is not explicitly provided but referenced.
For current limitations on IP address detection, consult the
section on limitations on how to use this
feature and what to expect when using it.
The following is the XML description of the network filer
no-arp-spoofing
. It serves as an example for
a network filter XML referencing the MAC
and
IP
parameters. This particular filter is referenced by the
clean-traffic
filter.
<filter name='no-arp-spoofing' chain='arp'> <uuid>f88f1932-debf-4aa1-9fbe-f10d3aa4bc95</uuid> <rule action='drop' direction='out' priority='300'> <mac match='no' srcmacaddr='$MAC'/> </rule> <rule action='drop' direction='out' priority='350'> <arp match='no' arpsrcmacaddr='$MAC'/> </rule> <rule action='drop' direction='out' priority='400'> <arp match='no' arpsrcipaddr='$IP'/> </rule> <rule action='drop' direction='in' priority='450'> <arp opcode='Reply'/> <arp match='no' arpdstmacaddr='$MAC'/> </rule> <rule action='drop' direction='in' priority='500'> <arp match='no' arpdstipaddr='$IP'/> </rule> <rule action='accept' direction='inout' priority='600'> <arp opcode='Request'/> </rule> <rule action='accept' direction='inout' priority='650'> <arp opcode='Reply'/> </rule> <rule action='drop' direction='inout' priority='1000'/> </filter>
Note that referenced variables are always prefixed with the
$ (dollar) sign. The format of the value of a variable
must be of the type expected by the filter attribute in the
XML. In the above example, the IP
parameter
must hold a dotted IP address in decimal numbers format.
Failure to provide the correct
value type will result in the filter not being instantiatable
and will prevent a virtual machine from starting or the
interface from attaching when hotplugging is used. The types
that are expected for each XML attribute are shown
below.
The root element required for all network filters is
named filter
with two possible attributes. The
name
attribute provides a unique name of the
given filter. The chain
attribute is optional but
allows certain filters to be better organized for more efficient
processing by the firewall subsystem of the underlying host.
Currently the system only supports the chains root,
ipv4, ipv6, arp and rarp
.
Any filter may hold references to other filters. Individual
filters may be referenced multiple times in a filter tree but
references between filters must not introduce loops (directed
acyclic graph).
The following shows the XML of the clean-traffic
network filter referencing several other filters.
<filter name='clean-traffic'> <uuid>6ef53069-ba34-94a0-d33d-17751b9b8cb1</uuid> <filterref filter='no-mac-spoofing'/> <filterref filter='no-ip-spoofing'/> <filterref filter='allow-incoming-ipv4'/> <filterref filter='no-arp-spoofing'/> <filterref filter='no-other-l2-traffic'/> <filterref filter='qemu-announce-self'/> </filter>
To reference another filter, the XML node filterref
needs to be provided inside a filter
node. This
node must have the attribute filter
whose value contains
the name of the filter to be referenced.
New network filters can be defined at any time and
may contain references to network filters that are
not known to libvirt, yet. However, once a virtual machine
is started or a network interface
referencing a filter is to be hotplugged, all network filters
in the filter tree must be available. Otherwise the virtual
machine will not start or the network interface cannot be
attached.
The following XML shows a simple example of a network traffic filter implementing a rule to drop traffic if the IP address (provided through the value of the variable IP) in an outgoing IP packet is not the expected one, thus preventing IP address spoofing by the VM.
<filter name='no-ip-spoofing' chain='ipv4'> <uuid>fce8ae33-e69e-83bf-262e-30786c1f8072</uuid> <rule action='drop' direction='out' priority='500'> <ip match='no' srcipaddr='$IP'/> </rule> </filter>
A traffic filtering rule starts with the rule
node. This node may contain up to three attributes
drop
or accept
if
the evaluation of the filtering rule is supposed to drop or accept
a packet
in
, out
or
inout
if the rule is for incoming,
outgoing or incoming-and-outgoing traffic
The above example indicates that the traffic of type ip
will be asscociated with the chain 'ipv4' and the rule will have
priority 500. If for example another filter is referenced whose
traffic of type ip
is also associated with the chain
'ipv4' then that filter's rules will be ordered relative to the priority
500 of the shown rule.
A rule may contain a single rule for filtering of traffic. The
above example shows that traffic of type ip
is to be
filtered.
The following sections enumerate the list of protocols that
are supported by the network filtering subsystem. The
type of traffic a rule is supposed to filter on is provided
in the rule
node as a nested node. Depending
on the traffic type a rule is filtering, the attributes are
different. The above example showed the single
attribute srcipaddr
that is valid inside the
ip
traffic filtering node. The following sections
show what attributes are valid and what type of data they are
expecting. The following datatypes are available:
Every attribute except for those of type IP_MASK or IPV6_MASK can
be negated using the match
attribute with value no
. Multiple negated attributes
may be grouped together. The following
XML fragment shows such an example using abstract attributes.
[...] <rule action='drop' direction='in'> <protocol match='no' attribute1='value1' attribute2='value2'/> <protocol attribute3='value3'/> </rule> [...]
Rules perform a logical AND evaluation on all values of the given
protocol attributes. Thus, if a single attribute's value does not match
the one given in the rule, the whole rule will be skipped during
evaluation. Therefore, in the above example incoming traffic
will only be dropped if
the protocol property attribute1 does not match value1 AND
the protocol property attribute2 does not match value2 AND
the protocol property attribute3 matches value3.
Protocol ID: mac
Note: Rules of this type should go into the root
chain.
Attribute | Datatype | Semantics |
---|---|---|
srcmacaddr | MAC_ADDR | MAC address of sender |
srcmacmask | MAC_MASK | Mask applied to MAC address of sender |
dstmacaddr | MAC_ADDR | MAC address of destination |
dstmacmask | MAC_MASK | Mask applied to MAC address of destination |
protocolid | UINT16 (0x600-0xffff), STRING | Layer 3 protocol ID |
Valid Strings for protocolid
are: arp, rarp, ipv4, ipv6
[...] <mac match='no' srcmacaddr='$MAC'/> [...]
Protocol ID: arp
or rarp
Note: Rules of this type should either go into the
root
or arp/rarp
chain.
Attribute | Datatype | Semantics |
---|---|---|
srcmacaddr | MAC_ADDR | MAC address of sender |
srcmacmask | MAC_MASK | Mask applied to MAC address of sender |
dstmacaddr | MAC_ADDR | MAC address of destination |
dstmacmask | MAC_MASK | Mask applied to MAC address of destination |
hwtype | UINT16 | Hardware type |
protocoltype | UINT16 | Protocol type |
opcode | UINT16, STRING | Opcode |
arpsrcmacaddr | MAC_ADDR | Source MAC address in ARP/RARP packet |
arpdstmacaddr | MAC_ADDR | Destination MAC address in ARP/RARP packet |
arpsrcipaddr | IP_ADDR | Source IP address in ARP/RARP packet |
arpdstipaddr | IP_ADDR | Destination IP address in ARP/RARP packet |
Valid strings for the Opcode
field are:
Request, Reply, Request_Reverse, Reply_Reverse, DRARP_Request,
DRARP_Reply, DRARP_Error, InARP_Request, ARP_NAK
Protocol ID: ip
Note: Rules of this type should either go into the
root
or ipv4
chain.
Attribute | Datatype | Semantics |
---|---|---|
srcmacaddr | MAC_ADDR | MAC address of sender |
srcmacmask | MAC_MASK | Mask applied to MAC address of sender |
dstmacaddr | MAC_ADDR | MAC address of destination |
dstmacmask | MAC_MASK | Mask applied to MAC address of destination |
srcipaddr | IP_ADDR | Source IP address |
srcipmask | IP_MASK | Mask applied to source IP address |
dstipaddr | IP_ADDR | Destination IP address |
dstipmask | IP_MASK | Mask applied to destination IP address |
protocol | UINT8, STRING | Layer 4 protocol identifier |
srcportstart | UINT16 | Start of range of valid source ports; requires protocol |
srcportend | UINT16 | End of range of valid source ports; requires protocol |
dstportstart | UINT16 | Start of range of valid destination ports; requires protocol |
dstportend | UINT16 | End of range of valid destination ports; requires protocol |
Valid strings for protocol
are:
tcp, udp, udplite, esp, ah, icmp, igmp, sctp
Protocol ID: ipv6
Note: Rules of this type should either go into the
root
or ipv6
chain.
Attribute | Datatype | Semantics |
---|---|---|
srcmacaddr | MAC_ADDR | MAC address of sender |
srcmacmask | MAC_MASK | Mask applied to MAC address of sender |
dstmacaddr | MAC_ADDR | MAC address of destination |
dstmacmask | MAC_MASK | Mask applied to MAC address of destination |
srcipaddr | IPV6_ADDR | Source IPv6 address |
srcipmask | IPV6_MASK | Mask applied to source IPv6 address |
dstipaddr | IPV6_ADDR | Destination IPv6 address |
dstipmask | IPV6_MASK | Mask applied to destination IPv6 address |
protocol | UINT8 | Layer 4 protocol identifier |
srcportstart | UINT16 | Start of range of valid source ports; requires protocol |
srcportend | UINT16 | End of range of valid source ports; requires protocol |
dstportstart | UINT16 | Start of range of valid destination ports; requires protocol |
dstportend | UINT16 | End of range of valid destination ports; requires protocol |
Valid strings for protocol
are:
tcp, udp, udplite, esp, ah, icmpv6, sctp
Protocol ID: tcp
, udp
, sctp
Note: The chain parameter is ignored for this type of traffic
and should either be omitted or set to root
.
Attribute | Datatype | Semantics |
---|---|---|
srcmacaddr | MAC_ADDR | MAC address of sender |
srcipaddr | IP_ADDR | Source IP address |
srcipmask | IP_MASK | Mask applied to source IP address |
dstipaddr | IP_ADDR | Destination IP address |
dstipmask | IP_MASK | Mask applied to destination IP address |
srcipfrom | IP_ADDR | Start of range of source IP address |
srcipto | IP_ADDR | End of range of source IP address |
dstipfrom | IP_ADDR | Start of range of destination IP address |
dstipto | IP_ADDR | End of range of destination IP address |
srcportstart | UINT16 | Start of range of valid source ports |
srcportend | UINT16 | End of range of valid source ports |
dstportstart | UINT16 | Start of range of valid destination ports |
dstportend | UINT16 | End of range of valid destination ports |
Protocol ID: icmp
Note: The chain parameter is ignored for this type of traffic
and should either be omitted or set to root
.
Attribute | Datatype | Semantics |
---|---|---|
srcmacaddr | MAC_ADDR | MAC address of sender |
srcmacmask | MAC_MASK | Mask applied to MAC address of sender |
dstmacaddr | MAC_ADDR | MAC address of destination |
dstmacmask | MAC_MASK | Mask applied to MAC address of destination |
srcipaddr | IP_ADDR | Source IP address |
srcipmask | IP_MASK | Mask applied to source IP address |
dstipaddr | IP_ADDR | Destination IP address |
dstipmask | IP_MASK | Mask applied to destination IP address |
srcipfrom | IP_ADDR | Start of range of source IP address |
srcipto | IP_ADDR | End of range of source IP address |
dstipfrom | IP_ADDR | Start of range of destination IP address |
dstipto | IP_ADDR | End of range of destination IP address |
type | UINT16 | ICMP type |
code | UINT16 | ICMP code |
Protocol ID: igmp
, esp
, ah
, udplite
, all
Note: The chain parameter is ignored for this type of traffic
and should either be omitted or set to root
.
Attribute | Datatype | Semantics |
---|---|---|
srcmacaddr | MAC_ADDR | MAC address of sender |
srcmacmask | MAC_MASK | Mask applied to MAC address of sender |
dstmacaddr | MAC_ADDR | MAC address of destination |
dstmacmask | MAC_MASK | Mask applied to MAC address of destination |
srcipaddr | IP_ADDR | Source IP address |
srcipmask | IP_MASK | Mask applied to source IP address |
dstipaddr | IP_ADDR | Destination IP address |
dstipmask | IP_MASK | Mask applied to destination IP address |
srcipfrom | IP_ADDR | Start of range of source IP address |
srcipto | IP_ADDR | End of range of source IP address |
dstipfrom | IP_ADDR | Start of range of destination IP address |
dstipto | IP_ADDR | End of range of destination IP address |
Protocol ID: tcp-ipv6
, udp-ipv6
, sctp-ipv6
Note: The chain parameter is ignored for this type of traffic
and should either be omitted or set to root
.
Attribute | Datatype | Semantics |
---|---|---|
srcmacaddr | MAC_ADDR | MAC address of sender |
srcipaddr | IPV6_ADDR | Source IP address |
srcipmask | IPV6_MASK | Mask applied to source IP address |
dstipaddr | IPV6_ADDR | Destination IP address |
dstipmask | IPV6_MASK | Mask applied to destination IP address |
srcipfrom | IPV6_ADDR | Start of range of source IP address |
srcipto | IPV6_ADDR | End of range of source IP address |
dstipfrom | IPV6_ADDR | Start of range of destination IP address |
dstipto | IPV6_ADDR | End of range of destination IP address |
srcportstart | UINT16 | Start of range of valid source ports |
srcportend | UINT16 | End of range of valid source ports |
dstportstart | UINT16 | Start of range of valid destination ports |
dstportend | UINT16 | End of range of valid destination ports |
Protocol ID: icmpv6
Note: The chain parameter is ignored for this type of traffic
and should either be omitted or set to root
.
Attribute | Datatype | Semantics |
---|---|---|
srcmacaddr | MAC_ADDR | MAC address of sender |
srcipaddr | IPV6_ADDR | Source IPv6 address |
srcipmask | IPV6_MASK | Mask applied to source IPv6 address |
dstipaddr | IPV6_ADDR | Destination IPv6 address |
dstipmask | IPV6_MASK | Mask applied to destination IPv6 address |
srcipfrom | IPV6_ADDR | Start of range of source IP address |
srcipto | IPV6_ADDR | End of range of source IP address |
dstipfrom | IPV6_ADDR | Start of range of destination IP address |
dstipto | IPV6_ADDR | End of range of destination IP address |
type | UINT16 | ICMPv6 type |
code | UINT16 | ICMPv6 code |
Protocol ID: igmp-ipv6
, esp-ipv6
, ah-ipv6
, udplite-ipv6
, all-ipv6
Note: The chain parameter is ignored for this type of traffic
and should either be omitted or set to root
.
Attribute | Datatype | Semantics |
---|---|---|
srcmacaddr | MAC_ADDR | MAC address of sender |
srcipaddr | IPV6_ADDR | Source IPv6 address |
srcipmask | IPV6_MASK | Mask applied to source IPv6 address |
dstipaddr | IPV6_ADDR | Destination IPv6 address |
dstipmask | IPV6_MASK | Mask applied to destination IPv6 address |
srcipfrom | IPV6_ADDR | Start of range of source IP address |
srcipto | IPV6_ADDR | End of range of source IP address |
dstipfrom | IPV6_ADDR | Start of range of destination IP address |
dstipto | IPV6_ADDR | End of range of destination IP address |
The following sections discuss advanced filter configuration topics.
The network filtering subsystem (on Linux) makes use of the connection
tracking support of iptables. This helps in enforcing the
directionality of network traffic (state match) as well as
counting and limiting the number of simultaneous connections towards
a VM. As an example, if a VM has TCP port 8080
open as a server, clients may connect to the VM on port 8080.
Connection tracking and enforcement of directionality then prevents
the VM from initiating a connection from
(TCP client) port 8080 to the host back to a remote host.
More importantly, tracking helps to prevent
remote attackers from establishing a connection back to a VM. For example,
if the user inside the VM established a connection to
port 80 on an attacker site, then the attacker will not be able to
initiate a connection from TCP port 80 back towards the VM.
By default the connection state match that enables connection tracking
and then enforcement of directionality of traffic is turned on.
The following shows an example XML fragement where this feature has been
turned off for incoming connections to TCP port 12345.
[...] <rule direction='in' action='accept' statematch='false'> <tcp dstportstart='12345'/> </rule> [...]
This now allows incoming traffic to TCP port 12345, but would also enable the initiation from (client) TCP port 12345 within the VM, which may or may not be desirable.
To limit the number of connections a VM may establish, a rule must be provided that sets a limit of connections for a given type of traffic. If for example a VM is supposed to be allowed to only ping one other IP address at a time and is supposed to have only one active incoming ssh connection at a time, the following XML fragment can be used to achieve this.
[...] <rule action='drop' direction='in' priority='400'> <tcp connlimit-above='1'/> </rule> <rule action='accept' direction='in' priority='500'> <tcp dstportstart='22'/> </rule> <rule action='drop' direction='out' priority='400'> <icmp connlimit-above='1'/> </rule> <rule action='accept' direction='out' priority='500'> <icmp/> </rule> <rule action='accept' direction='out' priority='500'> <udp dstportstart='53'/> </rule> <rule action='drop' direction='inout' priority='1000'> <all/> </rule> [...]
Note that the rule for the limit has to logically appear
before the rule for accepting the traffic.
An additional rule for letting DNS traffic to port 22
go out the VM has been added to avoid ssh sessions not
getting established for reasons related to DNS lookup failures
by the ssh daemon. Leaving this rule out may otherwise lead to
fun-filled debugging joy (symptom: ssh client seems to hang
while trying to connect).
Lot of care must be taken with timeouts related
to tracking of traffic. An ICMP ping that
the user may have terminated inside the VM may have a long
timeout in the host's connection tracking system and therefore
not allow another ICMP ping to go through for a while. Therefore,
the timeouts have to be tuned in the host's sysfs, i.e.,
echo 3 > /proc/sys/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_icmp_timeout
sets the ICMP connection tracking timeout to 3 seconds. The
effect of this is that once one ping is terminated, another
one can start after 3 seconds.
Further, we want to point out that a client that for whatever
reason has not properly closed a TCP connection may cause a
connection to be held open for a longer period of time,
depending to what timeout the TCP established
state
timeout has been set to on the host. Also, idle connections may time
out in the connection tracking system but can be reactivated once
packets are exchanged. However, a newly initiated connection may force
an idle connection into TCP backoff if the number of allowed connections
is set to a too low limit, the new connection is established
and hits (not exceeds) the limit of allowed connections and for
example a key is pressed on the old ssh session, which now has become
unresponsive due to its traffic being dropped.
Therefore, the limit of connections should be rather high so that
fluctuations in new TCP connections don't cause odd
traffic behavior in relaton to idle connections.
The libvirt command line tool virsh
has been extended
with life-cycle support for network filters. All commands related
to the network filtering subsystem start with the prefix
nwfilter
. The following commands are available:
The following is a list of example network filters that are automatically installed with libvirt.
Name | Description |
---|---|
no-arp-spoofing | Prevent a VM from spoofing ARP traffic; this filter only allows ARP request and reply messages and enforces that those packets contain the MAC and IP addresses of the VM. |
allow-dhcp | Allow a VM to request an IP address via DHCP (from any DHCP server) |
allow-dhcp-server | Allow a VM to request an IP address from a specified DHCP server. The dotted decimal IP address of the DHCP server must be provided in a reference to this filter. The name of the variable must be DHCPSERVER. |
no-ip-spoofing | Prevent a VM from sending of IP packets with a source IP address different from the one in the packet. |
no-ip-multicast | Prevent a VM from sending IP multicast packets. |
clean-traffic | Prevent MAC, IP and ARP spoofing. This filter references several other filters as building blocks. |
Note that most of the above filters are only building blocks and require a combination with other filters to provide useful network traffic filtering. The most useful one in the above list is the clean-traffic filter. This filter itself can for example be combined with the no-ip-multicast filter to prevent virtual machines from sending IP multicast traffic on top of the prevention of packet spoofing.
Since libvirt only provides a couple of example networking filters, you
may consider writing your own. When planning on doing so
there are a couple of things
you may need to know regarding the network filtering subsystem and how
it works internally. Certainly you also have to know and understand
the protocols very well that you want to be filtering on so that
no further traffic than what you want can pass and that in fact the
traffic you want to allow does pass.
The network filtering subsystem is currently only available on
Linux hosts and only works for Qemu and KVM type of virtual machines.
On Linux
it builds upon the support for ebtables
, iptables
and ip6tables
and makes use of their features.
From the above list of supported protocols the following ones are
implemented using ebtables
:
All other protocols over IPv4 are supported using iptables, those over
IPv6 are implemented using ip6tables.
On a Linux host, all traffic filtering instantiated by libvirt's network
filter subsystem first passes through the filtering support implemented
by ebtables and only then through iptables or ip6tables filters. If
a filter tree has rules with the protocols mac
,
arp
, rarp
, ip
, or ipv6
ebtables rules will automatically be instantiated.
The role of the chain
attribute in the network filter
XML is that internally a new user-defined ebtables table is created
that then for example receives all arp
traffic coming
from or going to a virtual machine, if the chain arp
has been specified. Further, a rule is generated in an interface's
root
chain that directs all ipv4 traffic into the
user-defined chain. Therefore, all ARP traffic rules should then be
placed into filters specifying this chain. This type of branching
into user-defined tables is only supported with filtering on the ebtables
layer.
As an example, it is
possible to filter on UDP traffic by source and destination ports using
the ip
protocol filter and specifying attributes for the
protocol, source and destination IP addresses and ports of UDP packets
that are to be accepted. This allows
early filtering of UDP traffic with ebtables. However, once an IP or IPv6
packet, such as a UDP packet,
has passed the ebtables layer and there is at least one rule in a filter
tree that instantiates iptables or ip6tables rules, a rule to let
the UDP packet pass will also be necessary to be provided for those
filtering layers. This can be
achieved with a rule containing an approriate udp
or
udp-ipv6
traffic filtering node.
As an example we want to now build a filter that fulfills the following list of requirements:
The requirement to prevent spoofing is fulfilled by the existing
clean-traffic
network filter, thus we will reference this
filter from our custom filter.
To enable traffic for TCP ports 22 and 80 we will add 2 rules to
enable this type of traffic. To allow the VM to send ping traffic
we will add a rule for ICMP traffic. For simplicity reasons
we allow general ICMP traffic to be initated from the VM, not
just ICMP echo request and response messages. To then
disallow all other traffic to reach or be initated by the
VM we will then need to add a rule that drops all other traffic.
Assuming our VM is called test and
the interface we want to associate our filter with is called eth0,
we name our filter test-eth0.
The result of these considerations is the following network filter XML:
<filter name='test-eth0'> <!-- reference the clean traffic filter to prevent MAC, IP and ARP spoofing. By not providing and IP address parameter, libvirt will detect the IP address the VM is using. --> <filterref filter='clean-traffic'/> <!-- enable TCP ports 22 (ssh) and 80 (http) to be reachable --> <rule action='accept' direction='in'> <tcp dstportstart='22'/> </rule> <rule action='accept' direction='in'> <tcp dstportstart='80'/> </rule> <!-- enable general ICMP traffic to be initiated by the VM; this includes ping traffic --> <rule action='accept' direction='out'> <icmp/> </rule> <!-- drop all other traffic --> <rule action='drop' direction='inout'> <all/> </rule> </filter>
Note that none of the rules in the above XML contain the
IP address of the VM as either source or destination address, yet
the filtering of the traffic works correctly. The reason is that
the evaluation of the rules internally happens on a
per-interface basis and the rules are evaluated based on the knowledge
about which (tap) interface has sent or will receive the packet rather
than what their source or destination IP address may be.
An XML fragment for a possible network interface description inside
the domain XML of the test
VM could then look like this:
[...] <interface type='bridge'> <source bridge='mybridge'/> <filterref filter='test-eth0'/> </interface> [...]
To more strictly control the ICMP traffic and enforce that only
ICMP echo requests can be sent from the VM
and only ICMP echo responses be received by the VM, the above
ICMP
rule can be replaced with the following two rules:
<!-- enable outgoing ICMP echo requests--> <rule action='accept' direction='out'> <icmp type='8'/> </rule> <!-- enable incoming ICMP echo replies--> <rule action='accept' direction='in'> <icmp type='0'/> </rule>
The following sections list (current) limitations of the network filtering subsystem.
In case a network filter references the variable
IP and no variable was defined in any higher layer
references to the filter, IP address detection will automatically
be started when the filter is to be instantiated (VM start, interface
hotplug event). Only IPv4
addresses can be detected and only a single IP address
legitimately in use by a VM on a single interface will be detected.
In case a VM was to use multiple IP address on a single interface
(IP aliasing),
the IP addresses would have to be provided explicitly either
in the network filter itself or as variables used in attributes'
values. These
variables must then be defined in a higher level reference to the filter
and each assigned the value of the IP address that the VM is expected
to be using.
Different IP addresses in use by multiple interfaces of a VM
(one IP address each) will be independently detected.
Once a VM's IP address has been detected, its IP network traffic
may be locked to that address, if for example IP address spoofing
is prevented by one of its filters. In that case the user of the VM
will not be able to change the IP address on the interface inside
the VM, which would be considered IP address spoofing.
In case a VM is resumed after suspension or migrated, IP address
detection will be restarted.
VM migration is only supported if the whole filter tree
that is referenced by a virtual machine's top level filter
is also available on the target host. The network filter
clean-traffic
for example should be available on all libvirt installations
of version 0.8.1 or later and thus enable migration of VMs that
for example reference this filter. All other
custom filters must be migrated using higher layer software. It is
outside the scope of libvirt to ensure that referenced filters
on the source system are equivalent to those on the target system
and vice versa.
Migration must occur between libvirt insallations of version
0.8.1 or later in order not to lose the network traffic filters
associated with an interface.