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28209ca05e
Until now, user namespaces have not done much, but (for that reason) have been innocuous to glob in with other CLONE_ flags. Upcoming userns development, however, will make tasks cloned with CLONE_NEWUSER far more restricted. In particular, for some time they will be unable to access files with anything other than the world access perms. This patch assumes that noone really needs the user namespaces to be enabled. If that is wrong, then we can try a more baroque patch where we create a file owned by a test userid with 700 perms and, if we can't access it after setuid'ing to that userid, then return 0. Otherwise, assume we are using an older, 'harmless' user namespace implementation. Comments appreciated. Is it ok to do this? Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> |
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| .. | ||
| conf | ||
| cpu | ||
| esx | ||
| interface | ||
| lxc | ||
| network | ||
| node_device | ||
| nwfilter | ||
| opennebula | ||
| openvz | ||
| phyp | ||
| qemu | ||
| remote | ||
| secret | ||
| security | ||
| storage | ||
| test | ||
| uml | ||
| util | ||
| vbox | ||
| vmware | ||
| vmx | ||
| xen | ||
| xenapi | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| datatypes.c | ||
| datatypes.h | ||
| driver.c | ||
| driver.h | ||
| fdstream.c | ||
| fdstream.h | ||
| gnutls_1_0_compat.h | ||
| internal.h | ||
| libvirt_bridge.syms | ||
| libvirt_daemon.syms | ||
| libvirt_driver_modules.syms | ||
| libvirt_internal.h | ||
| libvirt_linux.syms | ||
| libvirt_macvtap.syms | ||
| libvirt_nwfilter.syms | ||
| libvirt_private.syms | ||
| libvirt_public.syms | ||
| libvirt_qemu.syms | ||
| libvirt_vmx.syms | ||
| libvirt-qemu.c | ||
| libvirt.c | ||
| Makefile.am | ||
| nodeinfo.c | ||
| nodeinfo.h | ||
| README | ||
| remote_protocol-structs | ||
libvirt library code README
===========================
The directory provides the bulk of the libvirt codebase. Everything
except for the libvirtd daemon and client tools. The build uses a
large number of libtool convenience libraries - one for each child
directory, and then links them together for the final libvirt.so,
although some bits get linked directly to libvirtd daemon instead.
The files directly in this directory are supporting the public API
entry points & data structures.
There are two core shared modules to be aware of:
* util/ - a collection of shared APIs that can be used by any
code. This directory is always in the include path
for all things built
* conf/ - APIs for parsing / manipulating all the official XML
files used by the public API. This directory is only
in the include path for driver implementation modules
Then there are the hypervisor implementations:
* esx/ - VMware ESX and GSX support using vSphere API over SOAP
* lxc/ - Linux Native Containers
* opennebula/ - Open Nebula using XMLRPC
* openvz/ - OpenVZ containers using cli tools
* phyp/ - IBM Power Hypervisor using CLI tools over SSH
* qemu/ - QEMU / KVM using qemu CLI/monitor
* remote/ - Generic libvirt native RPC client
* test/ - A "mock" driver for testing
* uml/ - User Mode Linux
* vbox/ - Virtual Box using native API
* xen/ - Xen using hypercalls, XenD SEXPR & XenStore
Finally some secondary drivers that are shared for several HVs.
Currently these are used by LXC, OpenVZ, QEMU, UML and Xen drivers.
The ESX, OpenNebula, Power Hypervisor, Remote, Test & VirtualBox
drivers all implement the secondary drivers directly
* interface/ - Host network interface management
* network/ - Virtual NAT networking
* node_device/ - Host device enumeration
* secret/ - Secret management
* security/ - Mandatory access control drivers
* storage/ - Storage management drivers
Since both the hypervisor and secondary drivers can be built as
dlopen()able modules, it is *FORBIDDEN* to have build dependencies
between these directories. Drivers are only allowed to depend on
the public API, and the internal APIs in the util/ and conf/
directories