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0d968ad715
Currently the QEMU stdout/stderr streams are written directly to a regular file (eg /var/log/libvirt/qemu/$GUEST.log). While those can be rotated by logrotate (using copytruncate option) this is not very efficient. It also leaves open a window of opportunity for a compromised/broken QEMU to DOS the host filesystem by writing lots of text to stdout/stderr. This makes it possible to connect the stdout/stderr file handles to a pipe that is provided by virtlogd. The virtlogd daemon will read from this pipe and write data to the log file, performing file rotation whenever a pre-determined size limit is reached. Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
533 lines
19 KiB
Plaintext
533 lines
19 KiB
Plaintext
# Master configuration file for the QEMU driver.
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# All settings described here are optional - if omitted, sensible
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# defaults are used.
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# VNC is configured to listen on 127.0.0.1 by default.
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# To make it listen on all public interfaces, uncomment
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# this next option.
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#
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# NB, strong recommendation to enable TLS + x509 certificate
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# verification when allowing public access
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#
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#vnc_listen = "0.0.0.0"
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# Enable this option to have VNC served over an automatically created
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# unix socket. This prevents unprivileged access from users on the
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# host machine, though most VNC clients do not support it.
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#
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# This will only be enabled for VNC configurations that do not have
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# a hardcoded 'listen' or 'socket' value. This setting takes preference
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# over vnc_listen.
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#
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#vnc_auto_unix_socket = 1
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# Enable use of TLS encryption on the VNC server. This requires
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# a VNC client which supports the VeNCrypt protocol extension.
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# Examples include vinagre, virt-viewer, virt-manager and vencrypt
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# itself. UltraVNC, RealVNC, TightVNC do not support this
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#
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# It is necessary to setup CA and issue a server certificate
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# before enabling this.
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#
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#vnc_tls = 1
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# Use of TLS requires that x509 certificates be issued. The
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# default it to keep them in /etc/pki/libvirt-vnc. This directory
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# must contain
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#
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# ca-cert.pem - the CA master certificate
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# server-cert.pem - the server certificate signed with ca-cert.pem
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# server-key.pem - the server private key
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#
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# This option allows the certificate directory to be changed
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#
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#vnc_tls_x509_cert_dir = "/etc/pki/libvirt-vnc"
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# The default TLS configuration only uses certificates for the server
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# allowing the client to verify the server's identity and establish
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# an encrypted channel.
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#
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# It is possible to use x509 certificates for authentication too, by
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# issuing a x509 certificate to every client who needs to connect.
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#
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# Enabling this option will reject any client who does not have a
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# certificate signed by the CA in /etc/pki/libvirt-vnc/ca-cert.pem
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#
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#vnc_tls_x509_verify = 1
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# The default VNC password. Only 8 bytes are significant for
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# VNC passwords. This parameter is only used if the per-domain
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# XML config does not already provide a password. To allow
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# access without passwords, leave this commented out. An empty
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# string will still enable passwords, but be rejected by QEMU,
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# effectively preventing any use of VNC. Obviously change this
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# example here before you set this.
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#
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#vnc_password = "XYZ12345"
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# Enable use of SASL encryption on the VNC server. This requires
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# a VNC client which supports the SASL protocol extension.
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# Examples include vinagre, virt-viewer and virt-manager
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# itself. UltraVNC, RealVNC, TightVNC do not support this
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#
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# It is necessary to configure /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf to choose
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# the desired SASL plugin (eg, GSSPI for Kerberos)
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#
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#vnc_sasl = 1
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# The default SASL configuration file is located in /etc/sasl2/
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# When running libvirtd unprivileged, it may be desirable to
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# override the configs in this location. Set this parameter to
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# point to the directory, and create a qemu.conf in that location
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#
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#vnc_sasl_dir = "/some/directory/sasl2"
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# QEMU implements an extension for providing audio over a VNC connection,
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# though if your VNC client does not support it, your only chance for getting
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# sound output is through regular audio backends. By default, libvirt will
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# disable all QEMU sound backends if using VNC, since they can cause
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# permissions issues. Enabling this option will make libvirtd honor the
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# QEMU_AUDIO_DRV environment variable when using VNC.
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#
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#vnc_allow_host_audio = 0
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# SPICE is configured to listen on 127.0.0.1 by default.
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# To make it listen on all public interfaces, uncomment
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# this next option.
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#
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# NB, strong recommendation to enable TLS + x509 certificate
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# verification when allowing public access
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#
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#spice_listen = "0.0.0.0"
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# Enable use of TLS encryption on the SPICE server.
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#
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# It is necessary to setup CA and issue a server certificate
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# before enabling this.
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#
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#spice_tls = 1
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# Use of TLS requires that x509 certificates be issued. The
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# default it to keep them in /etc/pki/libvirt-spice. This directory
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# must contain
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#
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# ca-cert.pem - the CA master certificate
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# server-cert.pem - the server certificate signed with ca-cert.pem
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# server-key.pem - the server private key
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#
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# This option allows the certificate directory to be changed.
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#
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#spice_tls_x509_cert_dir = "/etc/pki/libvirt-spice"
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# The default SPICE password. This parameter is only used if the
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# per-domain XML config does not already provide a password. To
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# allow access without passwords, leave this commented out. An
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# empty string will still enable passwords, but be rejected by
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# QEMU, effectively preventing any use of SPICE. Obviously change
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# this example here before you set this.
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#
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#spice_password = "XYZ12345"
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# Enable use of SASL encryption on the SPICE server. This requires
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# a SPICE client which supports the SASL protocol extension.
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#
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# It is necessary to configure /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf to choose
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# the desired SASL plugin (eg, GSSPI for Kerberos)
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#
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#spice_sasl = 1
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# The default SASL configuration file is located in /etc/sasl2/
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# When running libvirtd unprivileged, it may be desirable to
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# override the configs in this location. Set this parameter to
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# point to the directory, and create a qemu.conf in that location
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#
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#spice_sasl_dir = "/some/directory/sasl2"
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# By default, if no graphical front end is configured, libvirt will disable
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# QEMU audio output since directly talking to alsa/pulseaudio may not work
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# with various security settings. If you know what you're doing, enable
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# the setting below and libvirt will passthrough the QEMU_AUDIO_DRV
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# environment variable when using nographics.
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#
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#nographics_allow_host_audio = 1
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# Override the port for creating both VNC and SPICE sessions (min).
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# This defaults to 5900 and increases for consecutive sessions
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# or when ports are occupied, until it hits the maximum.
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#
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# Minimum must be greater than or equal to 5900 as lower number would
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# result into negative vnc display number.
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#
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# Maximum must be less than 65536, because higher numbers do not make
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# sense as a port number.
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#
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#remote_display_port_min = 5900
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#remote_display_port_max = 65535
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# VNC WebSocket port policies, same rules apply as with remote display
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# ports. VNC WebSockets use similar display <-> port mappings, with
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# the exception being that ports start from 5700 instead of 5900.
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#
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#remote_websocket_port_min = 5700
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#remote_websocket_port_max = 65535
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# The default security driver is SELinux. If SELinux is disabled
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# on the host, then the security driver will automatically disable
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# itself. If you wish to disable QEMU SELinux security driver while
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# leaving SELinux enabled for the host in general, then set this
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# to 'none' instead. It's also possible to use more than one security
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# driver at the same time, for this use a list of names separated by
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# comma and delimited by square brackets. For example:
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#
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# security_driver = [ "selinux", "apparmor" ]
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#
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# Notes: The DAC security driver is always enabled; as a result, the
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# value of security_driver cannot contain "dac". The value "none" is
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# a special value; security_driver can be set to that value in
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# isolation, but it cannot appear in a list of drivers.
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#
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#security_driver = "selinux"
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# If set to non-zero, then the default security labeling
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# will make guests confined. If set to zero, then guests
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# will be unconfined by default. Defaults to 1.
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#security_default_confined = 1
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# If set to non-zero, then attempts to create unconfined
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# guests will be blocked. Defaults to 0.
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#security_require_confined = 1
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# The user for QEMU processes run by the system instance. It can be
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# specified as a user name or as a user id. The qemu driver will try to
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# parse this value first as a name and then, if the name doesn't exist,
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# as a user id.
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#
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# Since a sequence of digits is a valid user name, a leading plus sign
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# can be used to ensure that a user id will not be interpreted as a user
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# name.
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#
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# Some examples of valid values are:
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#
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# user = "qemu" # A user named "qemu"
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# user = "+0" # Super user (uid=0)
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# user = "100" # A user named "100" or a user with uid=100
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#
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#user = "root"
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# The group for QEMU processes run by the system instance. It can be
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# specified in a similar way to user.
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#group = "root"
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# Whether libvirt should dynamically change file ownership
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# to match the configured user/group above. Defaults to 1.
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# Set to 0 to disable file ownership changes.
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#dynamic_ownership = 1
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# What cgroup controllers to make use of with QEMU guests
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#
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# - 'cpu' - use for schedular tunables
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# - 'devices' - use for device whitelisting
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# - 'memory' - use for memory tunables
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# - 'blkio' - use for block devices I/O tunables
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# - 'cpuset' - use for CPUs and memory nodes
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# - 'cpuacct' - use for CPUs statistics.
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#
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# NB, even if configured here, they won't be used unless
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# the administrator has mounted cgroups, e.g.:
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#
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# mkdir /dev/cgroup
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# mount -t cgroup -o devices,cpu,memory,blkio,cpuset none /dev/cgroup
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#
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# They can be mounted anywhere, and different controllers
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# can be mounted in different locations. libvirt will detect
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# where they are located.
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#
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#cgroup_controllers = [ "cpu", "devices", "memory", "blkio", "cpuset", "cpuacct" ]
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# This is the basic set of devices allowed / required by
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# all virtual machines.
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#
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# As well as this, any configured block backed disks,
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# all sound device, and all PTY devices are allowed.
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#
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# This will only need setting if newer QEMU suddenly
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# wants some device we don't already know about.
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#
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#cgroup_device_acl = [
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# "/dev/null", "/dev/full", "/dev/zero",
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# "/dev/random", "/dev/urandom",
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# "/dev/ptmx", "/dev/kvm", "/dev/kqemu",
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# "/dev/rtc","/dev/hpet", "/dev/vfio/vfio"
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#]
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#
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# RDMA migration requires the following extra files to be added to the list:
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# "/dev/infiniband/rdma_cm",
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# "/dev/infiniband/issm0",
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# "/dev/infiniband/issm1",
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# "/dev/infiniband/umad0",
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# "/dev/infiniband/umad1",
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# "/dev/infiniband/uverbs0"
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# The default format for Qemu/KVM guest save images is raw; that is, the
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# memory from the domain is dumped out directly to a file. If you have
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# guests with a large amount of memory, however, this can take up quite
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# a bit of space. If you would like to compress the images while they
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# are being saved to disk, you can also set "lzop", "gzip", "bzip2", or "xz"
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# for save_image_format. Note that this means you slow down the process of
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# saving a domain in order to save disk space; the list above is in descending
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# order by performance and ascending order by compression ratio.
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#
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# save_image_format is used when you use 'virsh save' or 'virsh managedsave'
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# at scheduled saving, and it is an error if the specified save_image_format
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# is not valid, or the requested compression program can't be found.
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#
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# dump_image_format is used when you use 'virsh dump' at emergency
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# crashdump, and if the specified dump_image_format is not valid, or
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# the requested compression program can't be found, this falls
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# back to "raw" compression.
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#
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# snapshot_image_format specifies the compression algorithm of the memory save
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# image when an external snapshot of a domain is taken. This does not apply
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# on disk image format. It is an error if the specified format isn't valid,
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# or the requested compression program can't be found.
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#
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#save_image_format = "raw"
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#dump_image_format = "raw"
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#snapshot_image_format = "raw"
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# When a domain is configured to be auto-dumped when libvirtd receives a
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# watchdog event from qemu guest, libvirtd will save dump files in directory
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# specified by auto_dump_path. Default value is /var/lib/libvirt/qemu/dump
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#
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#auto_dump_path = "/var/lib/libvirt/qemu/dump"
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# When a domain is configured to be auto-dumped, enabling this flag
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# has the same effect as using the VIR_DUMP_BYPASS_CACHE flag with the
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# virDomainCoreDump API. That is, the system will avoid using the
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# file system cache while writing the dump file, but may cause
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# slower operation.
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#
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#auto_dump_bypass_cache = 0
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# When a domain is configured to be auto-started, enabling this flag
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# has the same effect as using the VIR_DOMAIN_START_BYPASS_CACHE flag
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# with the virDomainCreateWithFlags API. That is, the system will
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# avoid using the file system cache when restoring any managed state
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# file, but may cause slower operation.
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#
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#auto_start_bypass_cache = 0
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# If provided by the host and a hugetlbfs mount point is configured,
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# a guest may request huge page backing. When this mount point is
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# unspecified here, determination of a host mount point in /proc/mounts
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# will be attempted. Specifying an explicit mount overrides detection
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# of the same in /proc/mounts. Setting the mount point to "" will
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# disable guest hugepage backing. If desired, multiple mount points can
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# be specified at once, separated by comma and enclosed in square
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# brackets, for example:
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#
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# hugetlbfs_mount = ["/dev/hugepages2M", "/dev/hugepages1G"]
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#
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# The size of huge page served by specific mount point is determined by
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# libvirt at the daemon startup.
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#
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# NB, within these mount points, guests will create memory backing
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# files in a location of $MOUNTPOINT/libvirt/qemu
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#
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#hugetlbfs_mount = "/dev/hugepages"
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# Path to the setuid helper for creating tap devices. This executable
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# is used to create <source type='bridge'> interfaces when libvirtd is
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# running unprivileged. libvirt invokes the helper directly, instead
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# of using "-netdev bridge", for security reasons.
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#bridge_helper = "/usr/libexec/qemu-bridge-helper"
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# If clear_emulator_capabilities is enabled, libvirt will drop all
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# privileged capabilities of the QEmu/KVM emulator. This is enabled by
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# default.
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#
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# Warning: Disabling this option means that a compromised guest can
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# exploit the privileges and possibly do damage to the host.
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#
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#clear_emulator_capabilities = 1
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# If enabled, libvirt will have QEMU set its process name to
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# "qemu:VM_NAME", where VM_NAME is the name of the VM. The QEMU
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# process will appear as "qemu:VM_NAME" in process listings and
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# other system monitoring tools. By default, QEMU does not set
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# its process title, so the complete QEMU command (emulator and
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# its arguments) appear in process listings.
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#
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#set_process_name = 1
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# If max_processes is set to a positive integer, libvirt will use
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# it to set the maximum number of processes that can be run by qemu
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# user. This can be used to override default value set by host OS.
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# The same applies to max_files which sets the limit on the maximum
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# number of opened files.
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#
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#max_processes = 0
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#max_files = 0
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# mac_filter enables MAC addressed based filtering on bridge ports.
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# This currently requires ebtables to be installed.
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#
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#mac_filter = 1
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# By default, PCI devices below non-ACS switch are not allowed to be assigned
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# to guests. By setting relaxed_acs_check to 1 such devices will be allowed to
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# be assigned to guests.
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#
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#relaxed_acs_check = 1
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# If allow_disk_format_probing is enabled, libvirt will probe disk
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# images to attempt to identify their format, when not otherwise
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# specified in the XML. This is disabled by default.
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#
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# WARNING: Enabling probing is a security hole in almost all
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# deployments. It is strongly recommended that users update their
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# guest XML <disk> elements to include <driver type='XXXX'/>
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# elements instead of enabling this option.
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#
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#allow_disk_format_probing = 1
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# In order to prevent accidentally starting two domains that
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# share one writable disk, libvirt offers two approaches for
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# locking files. The first one is sanlock, the other one,
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# virtlockd, is then our own implementation. Accepted values
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# are "sanlock" and "lockd".
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#
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#lock_manager = "lockd"
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# Set limit of maximum APIs queued on one domain. All other APIs
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# over this threshold will fail on acquiring job lock. Specially,
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# setting to zero turns this feature off.
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# Note, that job lock is per domain.
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#
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#max_queued = 0
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###################################################################
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# Keepalive protocol:
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# This allows qemu driver to detect broken connections to remote
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# libvirtd during peer-to-peer migration. A keepalive message is
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# sent to the daemon after keepalive_interval seconds of inactivity
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# to check if the daemon is still responding; keepalive_count is a
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# maximum number of keepalive messages that are allowed to be sent
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# to the daemon without getting any response before the connection
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# is considered broken. In other words, the connection is
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# automatically closed approximately after
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# keepalive_interval * (keepalive_count + 1) seconds since the last
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# message received from the daemon. If keepalive_interval is set to
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# -1, qemu driver will not send keepalive requests during
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# peer-to-peer migration; however, the remote libvirtd can still
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# send them and source libvirtd will send responses. When
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# keepalive_count is set to 0, connections will be automatically
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# closed after keepalive_interval seconds of inactivity without
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# sending any keepalive messages.
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#
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#keepalive_interval = 5
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#keepalive_count = 5
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# Use seccomp syscall whitelisting in QEMU.
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# 1 = on, 0 = off, -1 = use QEMU default
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# Defaults to -1.
|
|
#
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|
#seccomp_sandbox = 1
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Override the listen address for all incoming migrations. Defaults to
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|
# 0.0.0.0, or :: if both host and qemu are capable of IPv6.
|
|
#migration_address = "0.0.0.0"
|
|
|
|
|
|
# The default hostname or IP address which will be used by a migration
|
|
# source for transferring migration data to this host. The migration
|
|
# source has to be able to resolve this hostname and connect to it so
|
|
# setting "localhost" will not work. By default, the host's configured
|
|
# hostname is used.
|
|
#migration_host = "host.example.com"
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Override the port range used for incoming migrations.
|
|
#
|
|
# Minimum must be greater than 0, however when QEMU is not running as root,
|
|
# setting the minimum to be lower than 1024 will not work.
|
|
#
|
|
# Maximum must not be greater than 65535.
|
|
#
|
|
#migration_port_min = 49152
|
|
#migration_port_max = 49215
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Timestamp QEMU's log messages (if QEMU supports it)
|
|
#
|
|
# Defaults to 1.
|
|
#
|
|
#log_timestamp = 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Location of master nvram file
|
|
#
|
|
# When a domain is configured to use UEFI instead of standard
|
|
# BIOS it may use a separate storage for UEFI variables. If
|
|
# that's the case libvirt creates the variable store per domain
|
|
# using this master file as image. Each UEFI firmware can,
|
|
# however, have different variables store. Therefore the nvram is
|
|
# a list of strings when a single item is in form of:
|
|
# ${PATH_TO_UEFI_FW}:${PATH_TO_UEFI_VARS}.
|
|
# Later, when libvirt creates per domain variable store, this list is
|
|
# searched for the master image. The UEFI firmware can be called
|
|
# differently for different guest architectures. For instance, it's OVMF
|
|
# for x86_64 and i686, but it's AAVMF for aarch64. The libvirt default
|
|
# follows this scheme.
|
|
#nvram = [
|
|
# "/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_CODE.fd:/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_VARS.fd",
|
|
# "/usr/share/AAVMF/AAVMF_CODE.fd:/usr/share/AAVMF/AAVMF_VARS.fd"
|
|
#]
|
|
|
|
# The backend to use for handling stdout/stderr output from
|
|
# QEMU processes.
|
|
#
|
|
# 'file': QEMU writes directly to a plain file. This is the
|
|
# historical default, but allows QEMU to inflict a
|
|
# denial of service attack on the host by exhausting
|
|
# filesystem space
|
|
#
|
|
# 'logd': QEMU writes to a pipe provided by virtlogd daemon.
|
|
# This is the current default, providing protection
|
|
# against denial of service by performing log file
|
|
# rollover when a size limit is hit.
|
|
#
|
|
#stdio_handler = "logd"
|