libvirt/tools/virt-host-validate-common.c
Fabiano Fidêncio f798970b18 tools: only fail validations if VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_FAIL is set
Currently `virt-host-validate` will fail whenever one of its calls fail,
regardless of virHostValidateLevel set.

This behaviour is not optimal and makes it not exactly reliable as a
command line tool as other tools or scripts using it would have to check
its output to figure out whether something really failed or if a warning
was mistakenly treated as failure.

With this change, the behaviour of whether to fail or not, is defined by
the caller of those functions, based on the virHostValidateLevel passed
to them.

https://gitlab.com/libvirt/libvirt/-/issues/175

Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fidêncio <fabiano@fidencio.org>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
2021-06-08 08:52:07 +02:00

524 lines
15 KiB
C

/*
* virt-host-validate-common.c: Sanity check helper APIs
*
* Copyright (C) 2012, 2014 Red Hat, Inc.
*
* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
* version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License along with this library. If not, see
* <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/utsname.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include "viralloc.h"
#include "vircgroup.h"
#include "virfile.h"
#include "virt-host-validate-common.h"
#include "virstring.h"
#include "virarch.h"
#include "virutil.h"
#define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_NONE
VIR_ENUM_IMPL(virHostValidateCPUFlag,
VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_LAST,
"vmx",
"svm",
"sie",
"158",
"sev");
static bool quiet;
void virHostMsgSetQuiet(bool quietFlag)
{
quiet = quietFlag;
}
void virHostMsgCheck(const char *prefix,
const char *format,
...)
{
va_list args;
char *msg;
if (quiet)
return;
va_start(args, format);
msg = g_strdup_vprintf(format, args);
va_end(args);
fprintf(stdout, _("%6s: Checking %-60s: "), prefix, msg);
VIR_FREE(msg);
}
static bool virHostMsgWantEscape(void)
{
static bool detectTty = true;
static bool wantEscape;
if (detectTty) {
if (isatty(STDOUT_FILENO))
wantEscape = true;
detectTty = false;
}
return wantEscape;
}
void virHostMsgPass(void)
{
if (quiet)
return;
if (virHostMsgWantEscape())
fprintf(stdout, "\033[32m%s\033[0m\n", _("PASS"));
else
fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", _("PASS"));
}
static const char * failMessages[] = {
N_("FAIL"),
N_("WARN"),
N_("NOTE"),
};
G_STATIC_ASSERT(G_N_ELEMENTS(failMessages) == VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_LAST);
static const char *failEscapeCodes[] = {
"\033[31m",
"\033[33m",
"\033[34m",
};
G_STATIC_ASSERT(G_N_ELEMENTS(failEscapeCodes) == VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_LAST);
void virHostMsgFail(virHostValidateLevel level,
const char *format,
...)
{
va_list args;
char *msg;
if (quiet)
return;
va_start(args, format);
msg = g_strdup_vprintf(format, args);
va_end(args);
if (virHostMsgWantEscape())
fprintf(stdout, "%s%s\033[0m (%s)\n",
failEscapeCodes[level], _(failMessages[level]), msg);
else
fprintf(stdout, "%s (%s)\n",
_(failMessages[level]), msg);
VIR_FREE(msg);
}
int virHostValidateDeviceExists(const char *hvname,
const char *dev_name,
virHostValidateLevel level,
const char *hint)
{
virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "if device %s exists", dev_name);
if (access(dev_name, F_OK) < 0) {
virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint);
return VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_FAILURE(level);
}
virHostMsgPass();
return 0;
}
int virHostValidateDeviceAccessible(const char *hvname,
const char *dev_name,
virHostValidateLevel level,
const char *hint)
{
virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "if device %s is accessible", dev_name);
if (access(dev_name, R_OK|W_OK) < 0) {
virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint);
return VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_FAILURE(level);
}
virHostMsgPass();
return 0;
}
int virHostValidateNamespace(const char *hvname,
const char *ns_name,
virHostValidateLevel level,
const char *hint)
{
char nspath[100];
virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "for namespace %s", ns_name);
g_snprintf(nspath, sizeof(nspath), "/proc/self/ns/%s", ns_name);
if (access(nspath, F_OK) < 0) {
virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint);
return VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_FAILURE(level);
}
virHostMsgPass();
return 0;
}
virBitmap *virHostValidateGetCPUFlags(void)
{
FILE *fp;
virBitmap *flags = NULL;
if (!(fp = fopen("/proc/cpuinfo", "r")))
return NULL;
flags = virBitmapNew(VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_LAST);
do {
char line[1024];
char *start;
g_auto(GStrv) tokens = NULL;
GStrv next;
if (!fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp))
break;
/* The line we're interested in is marked differently depending
* on the architecture, so check possible prefixes */
if (!STRPREFIX(line, "flags") &&
!STRPREFIX(line, "Features") &&
!STRPREFIX(line, "features") &&
!STRPREFIX(line, "facilities"))
continue;
/* fgets() includes the trailing newline in the output buffer,
* so we need to clean that up ourselves. We can safely access
* line[strlen(line) - 1] because the checks above would cause
* us to skip empty strings */
line[strlen(line) - 1] = '\0';
/* Skip to the separator */
if (!(start = strchr(line, ':')))
continue;
/* Split the line using " " as a delimiter. The first token
* will always be ":", but that's okay */
if (!(tokens = g_strsplit(start, " ", 0)))
continue;
/* Go through all flags and check whether one of those we
* might want to check for later on is present; if that's
* the case, set the relevant bit in the bitmap */
for (next = tokens; *next; next++) {
int value;
if ((value = virHostValidateCPUFlagTypeFromString(*next)) >= 0)
ignore_value(virBitmapSetBit(flags, value));
}
} while (1);
VIR_FORCE_FCLOSE(fp);
return flags;
}
int virHostValidateLinuxKernel(const char *hvname,
int version,
virHostValidateLevel level,
const char *hint)
{
struct utsname uts;
unsigned long thisversion;
uname(&uts);
virHostMsgCheck(hvname, _("for Linux >= %d.%d.%d"),
((version >> 16) & 0xff),
((version >> 8) & 0xff),
(version & 0xff));
if (STRNEQ(uts.sysname, "Linux")) {
virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint);
return VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_FAILURE(level);
}
if (virParseVersionString(uts.release, &thisversion, true) < 0) {
virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint);
return VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_FAILURE(level);
}
if (thisversion < version) {
virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint);
return VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_FAILURE(level);
} else {
virHostMsgPass();
return 0;
}
}
#ifdef __linux__
int virHostValidateCGroupControllers(const char *hvname,
int controllers,
virHostValidateLevel level)
{
g_autoptr(virCgroup) group = NULL;
int ret = 0;
size_t i;
if (virCgroupNew("/", -1, &group) < 0)
return VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_FAILURE(level);
for (i = 0; i < VIR_CGROUP_CONTROLLER_LAST; i++) {
int flag = 1 << i;
const char *cg_name = virCgroupControllerTypeToString(i);
if (!(controllers & flag))
continue;
virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "for cgroup '%s' controller support", cg_name);
if (!virCgroupHasController(group, i)) {
ret = VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_FAILURE(level);
virHostMsgFail(level, "Enable '%s' in kernel Kconfig file or "
"mount/enable cgroup controller in your system",
cg_name);
} else {
virHostMsgPass();
}
}
return ret;
}
#else /* !__linux__ */
int virHostValidateCGroupControllers(const char *hvname G_GNUC_UNUSED,
int controllers G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virHostValidateLevel level)
{
virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", "This platform does not support cgroups");
return VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_FAILURE(level);
}
#endif /* !__linux__ */
int virHostValidateIOMMU(const char *hvname,
virHostValidateLevel level)
{
virBitmap *flags;
struct stat sb;
const char *bootarg = NULL;
bool isAMD = false, isIntel = false;
virArch arch = virArchFromHost();
struct dirent *dent;
int rc;
flags = virHostValidateGetCPUFlags();
if (flags && virBitmapIsBitSet(flags, VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_VMX))
isIntel = true;
else if (flags && virBitmapIsBitSet(flags, VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_SVM))
isAMD = true;
virBitmapFree(flags);
if (isIntel) {
virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "%s", _("for device assignment IOMMU support"));
if (access("/sys/firmware/acpi/tables/DMAR", F_OK) == 0) {
virHostMsgPass();
bootarg = "intel_iommu=on";
} else {
virHostMsgFail(level,
"No ACPI DMAR table found, IOMMU either "
"disabled in BIOS or not supported by this "
"hardware platform");
return VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_FAILURE(level);
}
} else if (isAMD) {
virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "%s", _("for device assignment IOMMU support"));
if (access("/sys/firmware/acpi/tables/IVRS", F_OK) == 0) {
virHostMsgPass();
bootarg = "iommu=pt iommu=1";
} else {
virHostMsgFail(level,
"No ACPI IVRS table found, IOMMU either "
"disabled in BIOS or not supported by this "
"hardware platform");
return VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_FAILURE(level);
}
} else if (ARCH_IS_PPC64(arch)) {
/* Empty Block */
} else if (ARCH_IS_S390(arch)) {
g_autoptr(DIR) dir = NULL;
/* On s390x, we skip the IOMMU check if there are no PCI
* devices (which is quite usual on s390x). If there are
* no PCI devices the directory is still there but is
* empty. */
if (!virDirOpen(&dir, "/sys/bus/pci/devices"))
return 0;
rc = virDirRead(dir, &dent, NULL);
if (rc <= 0)
return 0;
} else {
virHostMsgFail(level,
"Unknown if this platform has IOMMU support");
return VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_FAILURE(level);
}
/* We can only check on newer kernels with iommu groups & vfio */
if (stat("/sys/kernel/iommu_groups", &sb) < 0)
return 0;
if (!S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode))
return 0;
virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "%s", _("if IOMMU is enabled by kernel"));
if (sb.st_nlink <= 2) {
if (bootarg)
virHostMsgFail(level,
"IOMMU appears to be disabled in kernel. "
"Add %s to kernel cmdline arguments", bootarg);
else
virHostMsgFail(level, "IOMMU capability not compiled into kernel.");
return VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_FAILURE(level);
}
virHostMsgPass();
return 0;
}
bool virHostKernelModuleIsLoaded(const char *module)
{
FILE *fp;
bool ret = false;
if (!(fp = fopen("/proc/modules", "r")))
return false;
do {
char line[1024];
if (!fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp))
break;
if (STRPREFIX(line, module)) {
ret = true;
break;
}
} while (1);
VIR_FORCE_FCLOSE(fp);
return ret;
}
int virHostValidateSecureGuests(const char *hvname,
virHostValidateLevel level)
{
virBitmap *flags;
bool hasFac158 = false;
bool hasAMDSev = false;
virArch arch = virArchFromHost();
g_autofree char *cmdline = NULL;
static const char *kIBMValues[] = {"y", "Y", "on", "ON", "oN", "On", "1"};
g_autofree char *mod_value = NULL;
flags = virHostValidateGetCPUFlags();
if (flags && virBitmapIsBitSet(flags, VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_FACILITY_158))
hasFac158 = true;
else if (flags && virBitmapIsBitSet(flags, VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_SEV))
hasAMDSev = true;
virBitmapFree(flags);
virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "%s", _("for secure guest support"));
if (ARCH_IS_S390(arch)) {
if (hasFac158) {
if (!virFileIsDir("/sys/firmware/uv")) {
virHostMsgFail(level, "IBM Secure Execution not supported by "
"the currently used kernel");
return 0;
}
if (virFileReadValueString(&cmdline, "/proc/cmdline") < 0)
return VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_FAILURE(level);
/* we're prefix matching rather than equality matching here, because
* kernel would treat even something like prot_virt='yFOO' as
* enabled
*/
if (virKernelCmdlineMatchParam(cmdline, "prot_virt", kIBMValues,
G_N_ELEMENTS(kIBMValues),
VIR_KERNEL_CMDLINE_FLAGS_SEARCH_FIRST |
VIR_KERNEL_CMDLINE_FLAGS_CMP_PREFIX)) {
virHostMsgPass();
return 1;
} else {
virHostMsgFail(level,
"IBM Secure Execution appears to be disabled "
"in kernel. Add prot_virt=1 to kernel cmdline "
"arguments");
}
} else {
virHostMsgFail(level, "Hardware or firmware does not provide "
"support for IBM Secure Execution");
}
} else if (hasAMDSev) {
if (virFileReadValueString(&mod_value, "/sys/module/kvm_amd/parameters/sev") < 0) {
virHostMsgFail(level, "AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization not "
"supported by the currently used kernel");
return 0;
}
if (mod_value[0] != '1') {
virHostMsgFail(level,
"AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization appears to be "
"disabled in kernel. Add kvm_amd.sev=1 "
"to the kernel cmdline arguments");
return 0;
}
if (virFileExists("/dev/sev")) {
virHostMsgPass();
return 1;
} else {
virHostMsgFail(level,
"AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization appears to be "
"disabled in firemare.");
}
} else {
virHostMsgFail(level,
"Unknown if this platform has Secure Guest support");
return VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_FAILURE(level);
}
return 0;
}