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e4cb850081
Inspired by the recent GIT / Mercurial security flaws (http://blog.recurity-labs.com/2017-08-10/scm-vulns), consider someone/something manages to feed libvirt a bogus URI such as: virsh -c qemu+ssh://-oProxyCommand=gnome-calculator/system In this case, the hosname "-oProxyCommand=gnome-calculator" will get interpreted as an argument to ssh, not a hostname. Fortunately, due to the set of args we have following the hostname, SSH will then interpret our bit of shell script that runs 'nc' on the remote host as a cipher name, which is clearly invalid. This makes ssh exit during argv parsing and so it never tries to run gnome-calculator. We are lucky this time, but lets be more paranoid, by using '--' to explicitly tell SSH when it has finished seeing command line options. This forces it to interpret "-oProxyCommand=gnome-calculator" as a hostname, and thus see a fail from hostname lookup. Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> |
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| .. | ||
| gendispatch.pl | ||
| genprotocol.pl | ||
| gensystemtap.pl | ||
| virkeepalive.c | ||
| virkeepalive.h | ||
| virkeepaliveprotocol.x | ||
| virnetclient.c | ||
| virnetclient.h | ||
| virnetclientprogram.c | ||
| virnetclientprogram.h | ||
| virnetclientstream.c | ||
| virnetclientstream.h | ||
| virnetdaemon.c | ||
| virnetdaemon.h | ||
| virnetlibsshsession.c | ||
| virnetlibsshsession.h | ||
| virnetmessage.c | ||
| virnetmessage.h | ||
| virnetprotocol.x | ||
| virnetsaslcontext.c | ||
| virnetsaslcontext.h | ||
| virnetserver.c | ||
| virnetserver.h | ||
| virnetserverclient.c | ||
| virnetserverclient.h | ||
| virnetservermdns.c | ||
| virnetservermdns.h | ||
| virnetserverprogram.c | ||
| virnetserverprogram.h | ||
| virnetserverservice.c | ||
| virnetserverservice.h | ||
| virnetsocket.c | ||
| virnetsocket.h | ||
| virnetsshsession.c | ||
| virnetsshsession.h | ||
| virnettlscontext.c | ||
| virnettlscontext.h | ||