libvirt/src/security/security_manager.c
Jim Fehlig 2e8ebfe3fa qemu: Set label on vhostuser net device when hotplugging
Attaching a newly created vhostuser port to a VM fails due to an
apparmor denial

internal error: unable to execute QEMU command 'chardev-add': Failed
to bind socket to /run/openvswitch/vhu838c4d29-c9: Permission denied

In the case of a net device type VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_VHOSTUSER, the
underlying chardev is not labeled in qemuDomainAttachNetDevice prior
to calling qemuMonitorAttachCharDev.

A simple fix would be to call qemuSecuritySetChardevLabel using the
embedded virDomainChrSourceDef in the virDomainNetDef vhostuser data,
but this incurs the risk of incorrectly restoring the label. E.g.
consider the DAC driver behavior with a vhostuser net device, which
uses a socket for the chardev backend. The DAC driver uses XATTRS to
store original labelling information, but XATTRS are not compatible
with sockets. Without the original labelling information, the socket
labels will be restored with root ownership, preventing other
less-privileged processes from connecting to the socket.

This patch avoids overloading chardev labelling with vhostuser net
devices by introducing virSecurityManager{Set,Restore}NetdevLabel,
which is currently only implemented for the apparmor driver. The
new APIs are then used to set and restore labels for the vhostuser
net devices.

Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
2021-08-26 16:06:45 -06:00

1525 lines
39 KiB
C

/*
* security_manager.c: Internal security manager API
*
* Copyright (C) 2010-2014 Red Hat, Inc.
*
* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
* version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License along with this library. If not, see
* <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include "security_driver.h"
#include "security_stack.h"
#include "security_dac.h"
#include "virerror.h"
#include "viralloc.h"
#include "virobject.h"
#include "virlog.h"
#include "virfile.h"
#define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_SECURITY
VIR_LOG_INIT("security.security_manager");
struct _virSecurityManager {
virObjectLockable parent;
virSecurityDriver *drv;
unsigned int flags;
const char *virtDriver;
void *privateData;
};
static virClass *virSecurityManagerClass;
static
void virSecurityManagerDispose(void *obj)
{
virSecurityManager *mgr = obj;
if (mgr->drv->close)
mgr->drv->close(mgr);
g_free(mgr->privateData);
}
static int
virSecurityManagerOnceInit(void)
{
if (!VIR_CLASS_NEW(virSecurityManager, virClassForObjectLockable()))
return -1;
return 0;
}
VIR_ONCE_GLOBAL_INIT(virSecurityManager);
static virSecurityManager *
virSecurityManagerNewDriver(virSecurityDriver *drv,
const char *virtDriver,
unsigned int flags)
{
virSecurityManager *mgr = NULL;
char *privateData = NULL;
if (virSecurityManagerInitialize() < 0)
return NULL;
VIR_DEBUG("drv=%p (%s) virtDriver=%s flags=0x%x",
drv, drv->name, virtDriver, flags);
virCheckFlags(VIR_SECURITY_MANAGER_NEW_MASK, NULL);
privateData = g_new0(char, drv->privateDataLen);
if (!(mgr = virObjectLockableNew(virSecurityManagerClass)))
goto error;
mgr->drv = drv;
mgr->flags = flags;
mgr->virtDriver = virtDriver;
mgr->privateData = g_steal_pointer(&privateData);
if (drv->open(mgr) < 0)
goto error;
return mgr;
error:
VIR_FREE(privateData);
virObjectUnref(mgr);
return NULL;
}
virSecurityManager *
virSecurityManagerNewStack(virSecurityManager *primary)
{
virSecurityManager *mgr =
virSecurityManagerNewDriver(&virSecurityDriverStack,
virSecurityManagerGetVirtDriver(primary),
primary->flags);
if (!mgr)
return NULL;
if (virSecurityStackAddNested(mgr, primary) < 0)
goto error;
return mgr;
error:
virObjectUnref(mgr);
return NULL;
}
int
virSecurityManagerStackAddNested(virSecurityManager *stack,
virSecurityManager *nested)
{
if (STRNEQ("stack", stack->drv->name))
return -1;
return virSecurityStackAddNested(stack, nested);
}
virSecurityManager *
virSecurityManagerNewDAC(const char *virtDriver,
uid_t user,
gid_t group,
unsigned int flags,
virSecurityManagerDACChownCallback chownCallback)
{
virSecurityManager *mgr;
virCheckFlags(VIR_SECURITY_MANAGER_NEW_MASK |
VIR_SECURITY_MANAGER_DYNAMIC_OWNERSHIP |
VIR_SECURITY_MANAGER_MOUNT_NAMESPACE, NULL);
mgr = virSecurityManagerNewDriver(&virSecurityDriverDAC,
virtDriver,
flags & VIR_SECURITY_MANAGER_NEW_MASK);
if (!mgr)
return NULL;
if (virSecurityDACSetUserAndGroup(mgr, user, group) < 0) {
virSecurityManagerDispose(mgr);
return NULL;
}
virSecurityDACSetDynamicOwnership(mgr, flags & VIR_SECURITY_MANAGER_DYNAMIC_OWNERSHIP);
virSecurityDACSetMountNamespace(mgr, flags & VIR_SECURITY_MANAGER_MOUNT_NAMESPACE);
virSecurityDACSetChownCallback(mgr, chownCallback);
return mgr;
}
virSecurityManager *
virSecurityManagerNew(const char *name,
const char *virtDriver,
unsigned int flags)
{
virSecurityDriver *drv = virSecurityDriverLookup(name, virtDriver);
if (!drv)
return NULL;
/* driver "none" needs some special handling of *Confined bools */
if (STREQ(drv->name, "none")) {
if (flags & VIR_SECURITY_MANAGER_REQUIRE_CONFINED) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
_("Security driver \"none\" cannot create confined guests"));
return NULL;
}
if (flags & VIR_SECURITY_MANAGER_DEFAULT_CONFINED) {
if (name != NULL) {
VIR_WARN("Configured security driver \"none\" disables default"
" policy to create confined guests");
} else {
VIR_DEBUG("Auto-probed security driver is \"none\";"
" confined guests will not be created");
}
flags &= ~VIR_SECURITY_MANAGER_DEFAULT_CONFINED;
}
}
return virSecurityManagerNewDriver(drv,
virtDriver,
flags);
}
/*
* Must be called before fork()'ing to ensure mutex state
* is sane for the child to use. A negative return means the
* child must not be forked; a successful return must be
* followed by a call to virSecurityManagerPostFork() in both
* parent and child.
*/
int
virSecurityManagerPreFork(virSecurityManager *mgr)
{
int ret = 0;
virObjectLock(mgr);
if (mgr->drv->preFork) {
ret = mgr->drv->preFork(mgr);
if (ret < 0)
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
}
return ret;
}
/*
* Must be called after fork()'ing in both parent and child
* to ensure mutex state is sane for the child to use
*/
void
virSecurityManagerPostFork(virSecurityManager *mgr)
{
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
}
/**
* virSecurityManagerTransactionStart:
* @mgr: security manager
*
* Starts a new transaction. In transaction nothing is changed security
* label until virSecurityManagerTransactionCommit() is called.
*
* Returns 0 on success,
* -1 otherwise.
*/
int
virSecurityManagerTransactionStart(virSecurityManager *mgr)
{
int ret = 0;
virObjectLock(mgr);
if (mgr->drv->transactionStart)
ret = mgr->drv->transactionStart(mgr);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
/**
* virSecurityManagerTransactionCommit:
* @mgr: security manager
* @pid: domain's PID
* @lock: lock and unlock paths that are relabeled
*
* If @pid is not -1 then enter the @pid namespace (usually @pid refers
* to a domain) and perform all the operations on the transaction list.
* If @pid is -1 then the transaction is performed in the namespace of
* the caller.
*
* If @lock is true then all the paths that transaction would
* touch are locked before and unlocked after it is done so.
*
* Note that the transaction is also freed, therefore new one has to be
* started after successful return from this function. Also it is
* considered as error if there's no transaction set and this function
* is called.
*
* Returns: 0 on success,
* -1 otherwise.
*/
int
virSecurityManagerTransactionCommit(virSecurityManager *mgr,
pid_t pid,
bool lock)
{
int ret = 0;
virObjectLock(mgr);
if (mgr->drv->transactionCommit)
ret = mgr->drv->transactionCommit(mgr, pid, lock);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
/**
* virSecurityManagerTransactionAbort:
* @mgr: security manager
*
* Cancels and frees any out standing transaction.
*/
void
virSecurityManagerTransactionAbort(virSecurityManager *mgr)
{
virObjectLock(mgr);
if (mgr->drv->transactionAbort)
mgr->drv->transactionAbort(mgr);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
}
void *
virSecurityManagerGetPrivateData(virSecurityManager *mgr)
{
return mgr->privateData;
}
const char *
virSecurityManagerGetVirtDriver(virSecurityManager *mgr)
{
return mgr->virtDriver;
}
const char *
virSecurityManagerGetDriver(virSecurityManager *mgr)
{
return mgr->drv->name;
}
const char *
virSecurityManagerGetDOI(virSecurityManager *mgr)
{
if (mgr->drv->getDOI) {
const char *ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->getDOI(mgr);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return NULL;
}
const char *
virSecurityManagerGetModel(virSecurityManager *mgr)
{
if (mgr->drv->getModel) {
const char *ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->getModel(mgr);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return NULL;
}
/* return NULL if a base label is not present */
const char *
virSecurityManagerGetBaseLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
int virtType)
{
if (mgr->drv->getBaseLabel) {
const char *ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->getBaseLabel(mgr, virtType);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
return NULL;
}
bool
virSecurityManagerGetDefaultConfined(virSecurityManager *mgr)
{
return mgr->flags & VIR_SECURITY_MANAGER_DEFAULT_CONFINED;
}
bool
virSecurityManagerGetRequireConfined(virSecurityManager *mgr)
{
return mgr->flags & VIR_SECURITY_MANAGER_REQUIRE_CONFINED;
}
bool
virSecurityManagerGetPrivileged(virSecurityManager *mgr)
{
return mgr->flags & VIR_SECURITY_MANAGER_PRIVILEGED;
}
/**
* virSecurityManagerRestoreImageLabel:
* @mgr: security manager object
* @vm: domain definition object
* @src: disk source definition to operate on
* @flags: bitwise or of 'virSecurityDomainImageLabelFlags'
*
* Removes security label from @src according to @flags.
*
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error.
*/
int
virSecurityManagerRestoreImageLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm,
virStorageSource *src,
virSecurityDomainImageLabelFlags flags)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainRestoreSecurityImageLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainRestoreSecurityImageLabel(mgr, vm, src, flags);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return -1;
}
/**
* virSecurityManagerMoveImageMetadata:
* @mgr: security manager
* @pid: domain's PID
* @src: source of metadata
* @dst: destination to move metadata to
*
* For given source @src, metadata is moved to destination @dst.
*
* If @dst is NULL then metadata is removed from @src and not
* stored anywhere.
*
* If @pid is not -1 enter the @pid mount namespace (usually
* @pid refers to a domain) and perform the move from there. If
* @pid is -1 then the move is performed from the caller's
* namespace.
*
* Returns: 0 on success,
* -1 otherwise.
*/
int
virSecurityManagerMoveImageMetadata(virSecurityManager *mgr,
pid_t pid,
virStorageSource *src,
virStorageSource *dst)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainMoveImageMetadata) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainMoveImageMetadata(mgr, pid, src, dst);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
int
virSecurityManagerSetDaemonSocketLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityDaemonSocketLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityDaemonSocketLabel(mgr, vm);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return -1;
}
int
virSecurityManagerSetSocketLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainSetSecuritySocketLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainSetSecuritySocketLabel(mgr, vm);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return -1;
}
int
virSecurityManagerClearSocketLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainClearSecuritySocketLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainClearSecuritySocketLabel(mgr, vm);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return -1;
}
/**
* virSecurityManagerSetImageLabel:
* @mgr: security manager object
* @vm: domain definition object
* @src: disk source definition to operate on
* @flags: bitwise or of 'virSecurityDomainImageLabelFlags'
*
* Labels a storage image with the configured security label according to @flags.
*
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error.
*/
int
virSecurityManagerSetImageLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm,
virStorageSource *src,
virSecurityDomainImageLabelFlags flags)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityImageLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityImageLabel(mgr, vm, src, flags);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return -1;
}
int
virSecurityManagerRestoreHostdevLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm,
virDomainHostdevDef *dev,
const char *vroot)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainRestoreSecurityHostdevLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainRestoreSecurityHostdevLabel(mgr, vm, dev, vroot);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return -1;
}
int
virSecurityManagerSetHostdevLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm,
virDomainHostdevDef *dev,
const char *vroot)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel(mgr, vm, dev, vroot);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return -1;
}
int
virSecurityManagerSetSavedStateLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm,
const char *savefile)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainSetSavedStateLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainSetSavedStateLabel(mgr, vm, savefile);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
int
virSecurityManagerRestoreSavedStateLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm,
const char *savefile)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainRestoreSavedStateLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainRestoreSavedStateLabel(mgr, vm, savefile);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
int
virSecurityManagerGenLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm)
{
int ret = -1;
size_t i;
virSecurityManager ** sec_managers = NULL;
virSecurityLabelDef *seclabel;
bool generated = false;
if ((sec_managers = virSecurityManagerGetNested(mgr)) == NULL)
return ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
for (i = 0; sec_managers[i]; i++) {
generated = false;
seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(vm, sec_managers[i]->drv->name);
if (seclabel == NULL) {
/* Only generate seclabel if confinement is enabled */
if (!virSecurityManagerGetDefaultConfined(sec_managers[i])) {
VIR_DEBUG("Skipping auto generated seclabel");
continue;
} else {
if (!(seclabel = virSecurityLabelDefNew(sec_managers[i]->drv->name)))
goto cleanup;
generated = seclabel->implicit = true;
seclabel->type = VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC;
}
} else {
if (seclabel->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DEFAULT) {
if (virSecurityManagerGetDefaultConfined(sec_managers[i])) {
seclabel->type = VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC;
} else {
seclabel->type = VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_NONE;
seclabel->relabel = false;
}
}
if (seclabel->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_NONE) {
if (virSecurityManagerGetRequireConfined(sec_managers[i])) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
_("Unconfined guests are not allowed on this host"));
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
if (!sec_managers[i]->drv->domainGenSecurityLabel) {
virReportUnsupportedError();
virSecurityLabelDefFree(seclabel);
seclabel = NULL;
} else {
/* The seclabel must be added to @vm prior calling domainGenSecurityLabel
* which may require seclabel to be presented already */
if (generated)
VIR_APPEND_ELEMENT(vm->seclabels, vm->nseclabels, seclabel);
if (sec_managers[i]->drv->domainGenSecurityLabel(sec_managers[i], vm) < 0) {
if (VIR_DELETE_ELEMENT(vm->seclabels,
vm->nseclabels -1, vm->nseclabels) < 0)
vm->nseclabels--;
goto cleanup;
}
seclabel = NULL;
}
}
ret = 0;
cleanup:
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
if (generated)
virSecurityLabelDefFree(seclabel);
VIR_FREE(sec_managers);
return ret;
}
int
virSecurityManagerReserveLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm,
pid_t pid)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainReserveSecurityLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainReserveSecurityLabel(mgr, vm, pid);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return -1;
}
int
virSecurityManagerReleaseLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainReleaseSecurityLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainReleaseSecurityLabel(mgr, vm);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return -1;
}
static int virSecurityManagerCheckModel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
char *secmodel)
{
int ret = -1;
size_t i;
virSecurityManager **sec_managers = NULL;
if (STREQ_NULLABLE(secmodel, "none"))
return 0;
if ((sec_managers = virSecurityManagerGetNested(mgr)) == NULL)
return -1;
for (i = 0; sec_managers[i]; i++) {
if (STREQ_NULLABLE(secmodel, sec_managers[i]->drv->name)) {
ret = 0;
goto cleanup;
}
}
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED,
_("Security driver model '%s' is not available"),
secmodel);
cleanup:
VIR_FREE(sec_managers);
return ret;
}
static int
virSecurityManagerCheckDomainLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *def)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < def->nseclabels; i++) {
if (virSecurityManagerCheckModel(mgr, def->seclabels[i]->model) < 0)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
virSecurityManagerCheckDiskLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDiskDef *disk)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < disk->src->nseclabels; i++) {
if (virSecurityManagerCheckModel(mgr, disk->src->seclabels[i]->model) < 0)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
virSecurityManagerCheckChardevLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainChrDef *dev)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < dev->source->nseclabels; i++) {
if (virSecurityManagerCheckModel(mgr, dev->source->seclabels[i]->model) < 0)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
virSecurityManagerCheckChardevCallback(virDomainDef *def G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainChrDef *dev,
void *opaque)
{
virSecurityManager *mgr = opaque;
return virSecurityManagerCheckChardevLabel(mgr, dev);
}
int virSecurityManagerCheckAllLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm)
{
size_t i;
if (virSecurityManagerCheckDomainLabel(mgr, vm) < 0)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < vm->ndisks; i++) {
if (virSecurityManagerCheckDiskLabel(mgr, vm->disks[i]) < 0)
return -1;
}
if (virDomainChrDefForeach(vm,
true,
virSecurityManagerCheckChardevCallback,
mgr) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
int
virSecurityManagerSetAllLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm,
const char *incomingPath,
bool chardevStdioLogd,
bool migrated)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityAllLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityAllLabel(mgr, vm, incomingPath,
chardevStdioLogd,
migrated);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return -1;
}
int
virSecurityManagerRestoreAllLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm,
bool migrated,
bool chardevStdioLogd)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainRestoreSecurityAllLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainRestoreSecurityAllLabel(mgr, vm, migrated,
chardevStdioLogd);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return -1;
}
int
virSecurityManagerGetProcessLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm,
pid_t pid,
virSecurityLabelPtr sec)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainGetSecurityProcessLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainGetSecurityProcessLabel(mgr, vm, pid, sec);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return -1;
}
int
virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityProcessLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityProcessLabel(mgr, vm);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return -1;
}
int
virSecurityManagerSetChildProcessLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm,
virCommand *cmd)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityChildProcessLabel)
return mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityChildProcessLabel(mgr, vm, cmd);
virReportUnsupportedError();
return -1;
}
int
virSecurityManagerVerify(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *def)
{
virSecurityLabelDef *secdef;
if (mgr == NULL || mgr->drv == NULL)
return 0;
/* NULL model == dynamic labelling, with whatever driver
* is active, so we can short circuit verify check to
* avoid drivers de-referencing NULLs by accident
*/
secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, mgr->drv->name);
if (secdef == NULL || secdef->model == NULL)
return 0;
if (mgr->drv->domainSecurityVerify) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainSecurityVerify(mgr, def);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return -1;
}
int
virSecurityManagerSetImageFDLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm,
int fd)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityImageFDLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityImageFDLabel(mgr, vm, fd);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return -1;
}
int
virSecurityManagerSetTapFDLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm,
int fd)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityTapFDLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityTapFDLabel(mgr, vm, fd);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return -1;
}
char *
virSecurityManagerGetMountOptions(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainGetSecurityMountOptions) {
char *ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainGetSecurityMountOptions(mgr, vm);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return NULL;
}
virSecurityManager **
virSecurityManagerGetNested(virSecurityManager *mgr)
{
virSecurityManager ** list = NULL;
if (STREQ("stack", mgr->drv->name))
return virSecurityStackGetNested(mgr);
list = g_new0(virSecurityManager *, 2);
list[0] = mgr;
list[1] = NULL;
return list;
}
/**
* virSecurityManagerDomainSetPathLabel:
* @mgr: security manager object
* @vm: domain definition object
* @path: path to label
* @allowSubtree: whether to allow just @path or its subtree too
*
* This function relabels given @path so that @vm can access it.
* If @allowSubtree is set to true the manager will grant access
* to @path and its subdirectories at any level (currently
* implemented only by AppArmor).
*
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error.
*/
int
virSecurityManagerDomainSetPathLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm,
const char *path,
bool allowSubtree)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainSetPathLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainSetPathLabel(mgr, vm, path, allowSubtree);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* virSecurityManagerDomainSetPathLabelRO:
* @mgr: security manager object
* @vm: domain definition object
* @path: path to label
*
* This function relabels given @path for read only access, which
* is in contrast with virSecurityManagerDomainSetPathLabel() which
* gives read write access.
*
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error.
*/
int
virSecurityManagerDomainSetPathLabelRO(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm,
const char *path)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainSetPathLabelRO) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainSetPathLabelRO(mgr, vm, path);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* virSecurityManagerDomainRestorePathLabel:
* @mgr: security manager object
* @vm: domain definition object
* @path: path to restore labels one
*
* This function is a counterpart to virSecurityManagerDomainSetPathLabel() and
* virSecurityManagerDomainSetPathLabelRO() as it restores any labels set by them.
*
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error.
*/
int
virSecurityManagerDomainRestorePathLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm,
const char *path)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainRestorePathLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainRestorePathLabel(mgr, vm, path);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* virSecurityManagerSetMemoryLabel:
* @mgr: security manager object
* @vm: domain definition object
* @mem: memory module to operate on
*
* Labels the host part of a memory module.
*
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error.
*/
int
virSecurityManagerSetMemoryLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm,
virDomainMemoryDef *mem)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityMemoryLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityMemoryLabel(mgr, vm, mem);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return -1;
}
/**
* virSecurityManagerRestoreMemoryLabel:
* @mgr: security manager object
* @vm: domain definition object
* @mem: memory module to operate on
*
* Removes security label from the host part of a memory module.
*
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error.
*/
int
virSecurityManagerRestoreMemoryLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm,
virDomainMemoryDef *mem)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainRestoreSecurityMemoryLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainRestoreSecurityMemoryLabel(mgr, vm, mem);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return -1;
}
int
virSecurityManagerSetInputLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm,
virDomainInputDef *input)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityInputLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityInputLabel(mgr, vm, input);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return -1;
}
int
virSecurityManagerRestoreInputLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm,
virDomainInputDef *input)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainRestoreSecurityInputLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainRestoreSecurityInputLabel(mgr, vm, input);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return -1;
}
int
virSecurityManagerSetChardevLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *def,
virDomainChrSourceDef *dev_source,
bool chardevStdioLogd)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityChardevLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityChardevLabel(mgr, def, dev_source,
chardevStdioLogd);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return -1;
}
int
virSecurityManagerRestoreChardevLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *def,
virDomainChrSourceDef *dev_source,
bool chardevStdioLogd)
{
if (mgr->drv->domainRestoreSecurityChardevLabel) {
int ret;
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainRestoreSecurityChardevLabel(mgr, def, dev_source,
chardevStdioLogd);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
return -1;
}
int
virSecurityManagerSetTPMLabels(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm)
{
int ret;
if (mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityTPMLabels) {
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityTPMLabels(mgr, vm);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
int
virSecurityManagerRestoreTPMLabels(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm)
{
int ret;
if (mgr->drv->domainRestoreSecurityTPMLabels) {
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainRestoreSecurityTPMLabels(mgr, vm);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
int
virSecurityManagerSetNetdevLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm,
virDomainNetDef *net)
{
int ret;
if (mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityNetdevLabel) {
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainSetSecurityNetdevLabel(mgr, vm, net);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
int
virSecurityManagerRestoreNetdevLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virDomainDef *vm,
virDomainNetDef *net)
{
int ret;
if (mgr->drv->domainRestoreSecurityNetdevLabel) {
virObjectLock(mgr);
ret = mgr->drv->domainRestoreSecurityNetdevLabel(mgr, vm, net);
virObjectUnlock(mgr);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
static int
cmpstringp(const void *p1, const void *p2)
{
const char *s1 = *(char * const *) p1;
const char *s2 = *(char * const *) p2;
if (!s1 && !s2)
return 0;
if (!s1 || !s2)
return s2 ? -1 : 1;
/* from man 3 qsort */
return strcmp(s1, s2);
}
#define METADATA_OFFSET 1
#define METADATA_LEN 1
/**
* virSecurityManagerMetadataLock:
* @mgr: security manager object
* @paths: paths to lock
* @npaths: number of items in @paths array
*
* Lock passed @paths for metadata change. The returned state
* should be passed to virSecurityManagerMetadataUnlock.
* Passed @paths must not be freed until the corresponding unlock call.
*
* NOTE: this function is not thread safe (because of usage of
* POSIX locks).
*
* Returns: state on success,
* NULL on failure.
*/
virSecurityManagerMetadataLockState *
virSecurityManagerMetadataLock(virSecurityManager *mgr G_GNUC_UNUSED,
const char **paths,
size_t npaths)
{
size_t i = 0;
size_t nfds = 0;
int *fds = NULL;
const char **locked_paths = NULL;
virSecurityManagerMetadataLockState *ret = NULL;
fds = g_new0(int, npaths);
locked_paths = g_new0(const char *, npaths);
/* Sort paths to lock in order to avoid deadlocks with other
* processes. For instance, if one process wants to lock
* paths A B and there's another that is trying to lock them
* in reversed order a deadlock might occur. But if we sort
* the paths alphabetically then both processes will try lock
* paths in the same order and thus no deadlock can occur.
* Lastly, it makes searching for duplicate paths below
* simpler. */
if (paths)
qsort(paths, npaths, sizeof(*paths), cmpstringp);
for (i = 0; i < npaths; i++) {
const char *p = paths[i];
struct stat sb;
size_t j;
int retries = 10 * 1000;
int fd;
if (!p)
continue;
/* If there's a duplicate path on the list, skip it over.
* Not only we would fail open()-ing it the second time,
* we would deadlock with ourselves trying to lock it the
* second time. After all, we've locked it when iterating
* over it the first time. */
for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
if (STREQ_NULLABLE(p, paths[j]))
break;
}
if (i != j)
continue;
if (stat(p, &sb) < 0)
continue;
if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) {
/* We need to open the path for writing because we need exclusive
* (write) lock. But directories can't be opened for writing. */
continue;
}
if ((fd = open(p, O_RDWR)) < 0) {
if (errno == EROFS) {
/* There is nothing we can do for RO filesystem. */
continue;
}
#ifndef WIN32
if (S_ISSOCK(sb.st_mode)) {
/* Sockets can be opened only if there exists the
* other side that listens. */
continue;
}
#endif /* !WIN32 */
if (virFileIsSharedFS(p)) {
/* Probably a root squashed NFS. */
continue;
}
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("unable to open %s"),
p);
goto cleanup;
}
do {
if (virFileLock(fd, false,
METADATA_OFFSET, METADATA_LEN, false) < 0) {
if (retries && (errno == EACCES || errno == EAGAIN)) {
/* File is locked. Try again. */
retries--;
g_usleep(1000);
continue;
} else {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("unable to lock %s for metadata change"),
p);
VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(fd);
goto cleanup;
}
}
break;
} while (1);
locked_paths[nfds] = p;
VIR_APPEND_ELEMENT_COPY_INPLACE(fds, nfds, fd);
}
ret = g_new0(virSecurityManagerMetadataLockState, 1);
ret->paths = g_steal_pointer(&locked_paths);
ret->fds = g_steal_pointer(&fds);
ret->nfds = nfds;
nfds = 0;
cleanup:
for (i = nfds; i > 0; i--)
VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(fds[i - 1]);
VIR_FREE(fds);
VIR_FREE(locked_paths);
return ret;
}
void
virSecurityManagerMetadataUnlock(virSecurityManager *mgr G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virSecurityManagerMetadataLockState **state)
{
size_t i;
if (!state)
return;
for (i = 0; i < (*state)->nfds; i++) {
const char *path = (*state)->paths[i];
int fd = (*state)->fds[i];
/* Technically, unlock is not needed because it will
* happen on VIR_CLOSE() anyway. But let's play it nice. */
if (virFileUnlock(fd, METADATA_OFFSET, METADATA_LEN) < 0) {
VIR_WARN("Unable to unlock fd %d path %s: %s",
fd, path, g_strerror(errno));
}
if (VIR_CLOSE(fd) < 0) {
VIR_WARN("Unable to close fd %d path %s: %s",
fd, path, g_strerror(errno));
}
}
VIR_FREE((*state)->fds);
VIR_FREE((*state)->paths);
VIR_FREE(*state);
}