libvirt/src/security/security_selinux.c
Eric Blake 8e22e08935 build: rename files.h to virfile.h
In preparation for a future patch adding new virFile APIs.

* src/util/files.h, src/util/files.c: Move...
* src/util/virfile.h, src/util/virfile.c: ...here, and rename
functions to virFile prefix.  Macro names are intentionally
left alone.
* *.c: All '#include "files.h"' uses changed.
* src/Makefile.am (UTIL_SOURCES): Reflect rename.
* cfg.mk (exclude_file_name_regexp--sc_prohibit_close): Likewise.
* src/libvirt_private.syms: Likewise.
* docs/hacking.html.in: Likewise.
* HACKING: Regenerate.
2011-07-21 10:34:51 -06:00

1337 lines
38 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (C) 2008-2011 Red Hat, Inc.
*
* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
* version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* Authors:
* James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
*
* SELinux security driver.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <selinux/selinux.h>
#include <selinux/context.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#if HAVE_SELINUX_LABEL_H
# include <selinux/label.h>
#endif
#include "security_driver.h"
#include "security_selinux.h"
#include "virterror_internal.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "memory.h"
#include "logging.h"
#include "pci.h"
#include "hostusb.h"
#include "storage_file.h"
#include "virfile.h"
#define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_SECURITY
static char default_domain_context[1024];
static char default_content_context[1024];
static char default_image_context[1024];
#define SECURITY_SELINUX_VOID_DOI "0"
#define SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME "selinux"
/* TODO
The data struct of used mcs should be replaced with a better data structure in the future
*/
struct MCS {
char *mcs;
struct MCS *next;
};
static struct MCS *mcsList = NULL;
static int
mcsAdd(const char *mcs)
{
struct MCS *ptr;
for (ptr = mcsList; ptr; ptr = ptr->next) {
if (STREQ(ptr->mcs, mcs))
return -1;
}
if (VIR_ALLOC(ptr) < 0)
return -1;
ptr->mcs = strdup(mcs);
ptr->next = mcsList;
mcsList = ptr;
return 0;
}
static int
mcsRemove(const char *mcs)
{
struct MCS *prevptr = NULL;
struct MCS *ptr = NULL;
for (ptr = mcsList; ptr; ptr = ptr->next) {
if (STREQ(ptr->mcs, mcs)) {
if (prevptr)
prevptr->next = ptr->next;
else {
mcsList = ptr->next;
}
VIR_FREE(ptr->mcs);
VIR_FREE(ptr);
return 0;
}
prevptr = ptr;
}
return -1;
}
static char *
SELinuxGenNewContext(const char *oldcontext, const char *mcs)
{
char *newcontext = NULL;
char *scontext = strdup(oldcontext);
context_t con;
if (!scontext) goto err;
con = context_new(scontext);
if (!con) goto err;
context_range_set(con, mcs);
newcontext = strdup(context_str(con));
context_free(con);
err:
freecon(scontext);
return (newcontext);
}
static int
SELinuxInitialize(void)
{
char *ptr = NULL;
int fd = 0;
fd = open(selinux_virtual_domain_context_path(), O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("cannot open SELinux virtual domain context file '%s'"),
selinux_virtual_domain_context_path());
return -1;
}
if (saferead(fd, default_domain_context, sizeof(default_domain_context)) < 0) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("cannot read SELinux virtual domain context file %s"),
selinux_virtual_domain_context_path());
VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(fd);
return -1;
}
VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(fd);
ptr = strchrnul(default_domain_context, '\n');
*ptr = '\0';
if ((fd = open(selinux_virtual_image_context_path(), O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("cannot open SELinux virtual image context file %s"),
selinux_virtual_image_context_path());
return -1;
}
if (saferead(fd, default_image_context, sizeof(default_image_context)) < 0) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("cannot read SELinux virtual image context file %s"),
selinux_virtual_image_context_path());
VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(fd);
return -1;
}
VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(fd);
ptr = strchrnul(default_image_context, '\n');
if (*ptr == '\n') {
*ptr = '\0';
strcpy(default_content_context, ptr+1);
ptr = strchrnul(default_content_context, '\n');
if (*ptr == '\n')
*ptr = '\0';
}
return 0;
}
static int
SELinuxGenSecurityLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
int rc = -1;
char *mcs = NULL;
char *scontext = NULL;
int c1 = 0;
int c2 = 0;
context_t ctx = NULL;
if ((vm->def->seclabel.type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC) &&
!vm->def->seclabel.baselabel &&
vm->def->seclabel.model) {
virSecurityReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"%s", _("security model already defined for VM"));
return rc;
}
if (vm->def->seclabel.type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC &&
vm->def->seclabel.label) {
virSecurityReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"%s", _("security label already defined for VM"));
return rc;
}
if (vm->def->seclabel.imagelabel) {
virSecurityReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"%s", _("security image label already defined for VM"));
return rc;
}
if (vm->def->seclabel.model &&
STRNEQ(vm->def->seclabel.model, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME)) {
virSecurityReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("security label model %s is not supported with selinux"),
vm->def->seclabel.model);
return rc;
}
if (vm->def->seclabel.type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC) {
if (!(ctx = context_new(vm->def->seclabel.label)) ) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("unable to allocate socket security context '%s'"),
vm->def->seclabel.label);
return rc;
}
const char *range = context_range_get(ctx);
if (!range ||
!(mcs = strdup(range))) {
virReportOOMError();
goto cleanup;
}
} else {
do {
c1 = virRandom(1024);
c2 = virRandom(1024);
if ( c1 == c2 ) {
if (virAsprintf(&mcs, "s0:c%d", c1) < 0) {
virReportOOMError();
goto cleanup;
}
} else {
if (c1 > c2) {
c1 ^= c2;
c2 ^= c1;
c1 ^= c2;
}
if (virAsprintf(&mcs, "s0:c%d,c%d", c1, c2) < 0) {
virReportOOMError();
goto cleanup;
}
}
} while (mcsAdd(mcs) == -1);
vm->def->seclabel.label =
SELinuxGenNewContext(vm->def->seclabel.baselabel ?
vm->def->seclabel.baselabel :
default_domain_context, mcs);
if (! vm->def->seclabel.label) {
virSecurityReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("cannot generate selinux context for %s"), mcs);
goto cleanup;
}
}
vm->def->seclabel.imagelabel = SELinuxGenNewContext(default_image_context, mcs);
if (!vm->def->seclabel.imagelabel) {
virSecurityReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("cannot generate selinux context for %s"), mcs);
goto cleanup;
}
if (!vm->def->seclabel.model &&
!(vm->def->seclabel.model = strdup(SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME))) {
virReportOOMError();
goto cleanup;
}
rc = 0;
cleanup:
if (rc != 0) {
if (vm->def->seclabel.type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC)
VIR_FREE(vm->def->seclabel.label);
VIR_FREE(vm->def->seclabel.imagelabel);
if (vm->def->seclabel.type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC &&
!vm->def->seclabel.baselabel)
VIR_FREE(vm->def->seclabel.model);
}
if (ctx)
context_free(ctx);
VIR_FREE(scontext);
VIR_FREE(mcs);
VIR_DEBUG("model=%s label=%s imagelabel=%s baselabel=%s",
NULLSTR(vm->def->seclabel.model),
NULLSTR(vm->def->seclabel.label),
NULLSTR(vm->def->seclabel.imagelabel),
NULLSTR(vm->def->seclabel.baselabel));
return rc;
}
static int
SELinuxReserveSecurityLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
security_context_t pctx;
context_t ctx = NULL;
const char *mcs;
if (vm->def->seclabel.type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC)
return 0;
if (getpidcon(vm->pid, &pctx) == -1) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("unable to get PID %d security context"), vm->pid);
return -1;
}
ctx = context_new(pctx);
freecon(pctx);
if (!ctx)
goto err;
mcs = context_range_get(ctx);
if (!mcs)
goto err;
mcsAdd(mcs);
context_free(ctx);
return 0;
err:
context_free(ctx);
return -1;
}
static int
SELinuxSecurityDriverProbe(void)
{
return is_selinux_enabled() ? SECURITY_DRIVER_ENABLE : SECURITY_DRIVER_DISABLE;
}
static int
SELinuxSecurityDriverOpen(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
{
return SELinuxInitialize();
}
static int
SELinuxSecurityDriverClose(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
{
return 0;
}
static const char *SELinuxSecurityGetModel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
{
return SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME;
}
static const char *SELinuxSecurityGetDOI(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
{
/*
* Where will the DOI come from? SELinux configuration, or qemu
* configuration? For the moment, we'll just set it to "0".
*/
return SECURITY_SELINUX_VOID_DOI;
}
static int
SELinuxGetSecurityProcessLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
virSecurityLabelPtr sec)
{
security_context_t ctx;
if (getpidcon(vm->pid, &ctx) == -1) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("unable to get PID %d security context"),
vm->pid);
return -1;
}
if (strlen((char *) ctx) >= VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN) {
virSecurityReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("security label exceeds "
"maximum length: %d"),
VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN - 1);
freecon(ctx);
return -1;
}
strcpy(sec->label, (char *) ctx);
freecon(ctx);
sec->enforcing = security_getenforce();
if (sec->enforcing == -1) {
virReportSystemError(errno, "%s",
_("error calling security_getenforce()"));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
SELinuxSetFilecon(const char *path, char *tcon)
{
security_context_t econ;
VIR_INFO("Setting SELinux context on '%s' to '%s'", path, tcon);
if (setfilecon(path, tcon) < 0) {
int setfilecon_errno = errno;
if (getfilecon(path, &econ) >= 0) {
if (STREQ(tcon, econ)) {
freecon(econ);
/* It's alright, there's nothing to change anyway. */
return 0;
}
freecon(econ);
}
/* if the error complaint is related to an image hosted on
* an nfs mount, or a usbfs/sysfs filesystem not supporting
* labelling, then just ignore it & hope for the best.
* The user hopefully set one of the necessary SELinux
* virt_use_{nfs,usb,pci} boolean tunables to allow it...
*/
if (setfilecon_errno != EOPNOTSUPP) {
virReportSystemError(setfilecon_errno,
_("unable to set security context '%s' on '%s'"),
tcon, path);
if (security_getenforce() == 1)
return -1;
} else {
VIR_INFO("Setting security context '%s' on '%s' not supported",
tcon, path);
}
}
return 0;
}
static int
SELinuxFSetFilecon(int fd, char *tcon)
{
security_context_t econ;
VIR_INFO("Setting SELinux context on fd %d to '%s'", fd, tcon);
if (fsetfilecon(fd, tcon) < 0) {
int fsetfilecon_errno = errno;
if (fgetfilecon(fd, &econ) >= 0) {
if (STREQ(tcon, econ)) {
freecon(econ);
/* It's alright, there's nothing to change anyway. */
return 0;
}
freecon(econ);
}
/* if the error complaint is related to an image hosted on
* an nfs mount, or a usbfs/sysfs filesystem not supporting
* labelling, then just ignore it & hope for the best.
* The user hopefully set one of the necessary SELinux
* virt_use_{nfs,usb,pci} boolean tunables to allow it...
*/
if (fsetfilecon_errno != EOPNOTSUPP) {
virReportSystemError(fsetfilecon_errno,
_("unable to set security context '%s' on fd %d"),
tcon, fd);
if (security_getenforce() == 1)
return -1;
} else {
VIR_INFO("Setting security context '%s' on fd %d not supported",
tcon, fd);
}
}
return 0;
}
/* Set fcon to the appropriate label for path and mode, or return -1. */
static int
getContext(const char *newpath, mode_t mode, security_context_t *fcon)
{
#if HAVE_SELINUX_LABEL_H
struct selabel_handle *handle = selabel_open(SELABEL_CTX_FILE, NULL, 0);
int ret;
if (handle == NULL)
return -1;
ret = selabel_lookup(handle, fcon, newpath, mode);
selabel_close(handle);
return ret;
#else
return matchpathcon(newpath, mode, fcon);
#endif
}
/* This method shouldn't raise errors, since they'll overwrite
* errors that the caller(s) are already dealing with */
static int
SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(const char *path)
{
struct stat buf;
security_context_t fcon = NULL;
int rc = -1;
char *newpath = NULL;
char ebuf[1024];
VIR_INFO("Restoring SELinux context on '%s'", path);
if (virFileResolveLink(path, &newpath) < 0) {
VIR_WARN("cannot resolve symlink %s: %s", path,
virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof(ebuf)));
goto err;
}
if (stat(newpath, &buf) != 0) {
VIR_WARN("cannot stat %s: %s", newpath,
virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof(ebuf)));
goto err;
}
if (getContext(newpath, buf.st_mode, &fcon) < 0) {
VIR_WARN("cannot lookup default selinux label for %s", newpath);
} else {
rc = SELinuxSetFilecon(newpath, fcon);
}
err:
freecon(fcon);
VIR_FREE(newpath);
return rc;
}
static int
SELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabelInt(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
int migrated)
{
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
if (secdef->norelabel)
return 0;
/* Don't restore labels on readoly/shared disks, because
* other VMs may still be accessing these
* Alternatively we could iterate over all running
* domains and try to figure out if it is in use, but
* this would not work for clustered filesystems, since
* we can't see running VMs using the file on other nodes
* Safest bet is thus to skip the restore step.
*/
if (disk->readonly || disk->shared)
return 0;
if (!disk->src || disk->type == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_TYPE_NETWORK)
return 0;
/* If we have a shared FS & doing migrated, we must not
* change ownership, because that kills access on the
* destination host which is sub-optimal for the guest
* VM's I/O attempts :-)
*/
if (migrated) {
int rc = virStorageFileIsSharedFS(disk->src);
if (rc < 0)
return -1;
if (rc == 1) {
VIR_DEBUG("Skipping image label restore on %s because FS is shared",
disk->src);
return 0;
}
}
return SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(disk->src);
}
static int
SELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
{
return SELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabelInt(mgr, vm, disk, 0);
}
static int
SELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
const char *path,
size_t depth,
void *opaque)
{
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = opaque;
int ret;
if (depth == 0) {
if (disk->shared) {
ret = SELinuxSetFilecon(path, default_image_context);
} else if (disk->readonly) {
ret = SELinuxSetFilecon(path, default_content_context);
} else if (secdef->imagelabel) {
ret = SELinuxSetFilecon(path, secdef->imagelabel);
} else {
ret = 0;
}
} else {
ret = SELinuxSetFilecon(path, default_content_context);
}
if (ret < 0 &&
virStorageFileIsSharedFSType(path,
VIR_STORAGE_FILE_SHFS_NFS) == 1)
ret = 0;
return ret;
}
static int
SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
{
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
bool allowDiskFormatProbing = virSecurityManagerGetAllowDiskFormatProbing(mgr);
if (secdef->norelabel)
return 0;
return virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(disk,
allowDiskFormatProbing,
true,
SELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel,
secdef);
}
static int
SELinuxSetSecurityPCILabel(pciDevice *dev ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
const char *file, void *opaque)
{
virDomainObjPtr vm = opaque;
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
return SELinuxSetFilecon(file, secdef->imagelabel);
}
static int
SELinuxSetSecurityUSBLabel(usbDevice *dev ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
const char *file, void *opaque)
{
virDomainObjPtr vm = opaque;
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
return SELinuxSetFilecon(file, secdef->imagelabel);
}
static int
SELinuxSetSecurityHostdevLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
virDomainHostdevDefPtr dev)
{
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
int ret = -1;
if (secdef->norelabel)
return 0;
if (dev->mode != VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_MODE_SUBSYS)
return 0;
switch (dev->source.subsys.type) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_USB: {
usbDevice *usb = usbGetDevice(dev->source.subsys.u.usb.bus,
dev->source.subsys.u.usb.device);
if (!usb)
goto done;
ret = usbDeviceFileIterate(usb, SELinuxSetSecurityUSBLabel, vm);
usbFreeDevice(usb);
break;
}
case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_PCI: {
pciDevice *pci = pciGetDevice(dev->source.subsys.u.pci.domain,
dev->source.subsys.u.pci.bus,
dev->source.subsys.u.pci.slot,
dev->source.subsys.u.pci.function);
if (!pci)
goto done;
ret = pciDeviceFileIterate(pci, SELinuxSetSecurityPCILabel, vm);
pciFreeDevice(pci);
break;
}
default:
ret = 0;
break;
}
done:
return ret;
}
static int
SELinuxRestoreSecurityPCILabel(pciDevice *dev ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
const char *file,
void *opaque ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
{
return SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(file);
}
static int
SELinuxRestoreSecurityUSBLabel(usbDevice *dev ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
const char *file,
void *opaque ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
{
return SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(file);
}
static int
SELinuxRestoreSecurityHostdevLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
virDomainHostdevDefPtr dev)
{
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
int ret = -1;
if (secdef->norelabel)
return 0;
if (dev->mode != VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_MODE_SUBSYS)
return 0;
switch (dev->source.subsys.type) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_USB: {
usbDevice *usb = usbGetDevice(dev->source.subsys.u.usb.bus,
dev->source.subsys.u.usb.device);
if (!usb)
goto done;
ret = usbDeviceFileIterate(usb, SELinuxRestoreSecurityUSBLabel, NULL);
usbFreeDevice(usb);
break;
}
case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_PCI: {
pciDevice *pci = pciGetDevice(dev->source.subsys.u.pci.domain,
dev->source.subsys.u.pci.bus,
dev->source.subsys.u.pci.slot,
dev->source.subsys.u.pci.function);
if (!pci)
goto done;
ret = pciDeviceFileIterate(pci, SELinuxRestoreSecurityPCILabel, NULL);
pciFreeDevice(pci);
break;
}
default:
ret = 0;
break;
}
done:
return ret;
}
static int
SELinuxSetSecurityChardevLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm,
virDomainChrSourceDefPtr dev)
{
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
char *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
int ret = -1;
if (secdef->norelabel)
return 0;
switch (dev->type) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_DEV:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_FILE:
ret = SELinuxSetFilecon(dev->data.file.path, secdef->imagelabel);
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_PIPE:
if (virFileExists(dev->data.file.path)) {
if (SELinuxSetFilecon(dev->data.file.path, secdef->imagelabel) < 0)
goto done;
} else {
if ((virAsprintf(&in, "%s.in", dev->data.file.path) < 0) ||
(virAsprintf(&out, "%s.out", dev->data.file.path) < 0)) {
virReportOOMError();
goto done;
}
if ((SELinuxSetFilecon(in, secdef->imagelabel) < 0) ||
(SELinuxSetFilecon(out, secdef->imagelabel) < 0))
goto done;
}
ret = 0;
break;
default:
ret = 0;
break;
}
done:
VIR_FREE(in);
VIR_FREE(out);
return ret;
}
static int
SELinuxRestoreSecurityChardevLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm,
virDomainChrSourceDefPtr dev)
{
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
char *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
int ret = -1;
if (secdef->norelabel)
return 0;
switch (dev->type) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_DEV:
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_FILE:
if (SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(dev->data.file.path) < 0)
goto done;
ret = 0;
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_PIPE:
if ((virAsprintf(&out, "%s.out", dev->data.file.path) < 0) ||
(virAsprintf(&in, "%s.in", dev->data.file.path) < 0)) {
virReportOOMError();
goto done;
}
if ((SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(out) < 0) ||
(SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(in) < 0))
goto done;
ret = 0;
break;
default:
ret = 0;
break;
}
done:
VIR_FREE(in);
VIR_FREE(out);
return ret;
}
static int
SELinuxRestoreSecurityChardevCallback(virDomainDefPtr def ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
virDomainChrDefPtr dev,
void *opaque)
{
virDomainObjPtr vm = opaque;
return SELinuxRestoreSecurityChardevLabel(vm, &dev->source);
}
static int
SELinuxRestoreSecuritySmartcardCallback(virDomainDefPtr def ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
virDomainSmartcardDefPtr dev,
void *opaque)
{
virDomainObjPtr vm = opaque;
const char *database;
switch (dev->type) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_SMARTCARD_TYPE_HOST:
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_SMARTCARD_TYPE_HOST_CERTIFICATES:
database = dev->data.cert.database;
if (!database)
database = VIR_DOMAIN_SMARTCARD_DEFAULT_DATABASE;
return SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(database);
case VIR_DOMAIN_SMARTCARD_TYPE_PASSTHROUGH:
return SELinuxRestoreSecurityChardevLabel(vm, &dev->data.passthru);
default:
virSecurityReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("unknown smartcard type %d"),
dev->type);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
SELinuxRestoreSecurityAllLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
int migrated ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
{
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
int i;
int rc = 0;
VIR_DEBUG("Restoring security label on %s", vm->def->name);
if (secdef->norelabel)
return 0;
for (i = 0 ; i < vm->def->nhostdevs ; i++) {
if (SELinuxRestoreSecurityHostdevLabel(mgr,
vm,
vm->def->hostdevs[i]) < 0)
rc = -1;
}
for (i = 0 ; i < vm->def->ndisks ; i++) {
if (SELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabelInt(mgr,
vm,
vm->def->disks[i],
migrated) < 0)
rc = -1;
}
if (virDomainChrDefForeach(vm->def,
false,
SELinuxRestoreSecurityChardevCallback,
vm) < 0)
rc = -1;
if (virDomainSmartcardDefForeach(vm->def,
false,
SELinuxRestoreSecuritySmartcardCallback,
vm) < 0)
rc = -1;
if (vm->def->os.kernel &&
SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(vm->def->os.kernel) < 0)
rc = -1;
if (vm->def->os.initrd &&
SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(vm->def->os.initrd) < 0)
rc = -1;
return rc;
}
static int
SELinuxReleaseSecurityLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
if (secdef->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC) {
if (secdef->label != NULL) {
context_t con = context_new(secdef->label);
if (con) {
mcsRemove(context_range_get(con));
context_free(con);
}
}
VIR_FREE(secdef->label);
if (!secdef->baselabel)
VIR_FREE(secdef->model);
}
VIR_FREE(secdef->imagelabel);
return 0;
}
static int
SELinuxSetSavedStateLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *savefile)
{
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
if (secdef->norelabel)
return 0;
return SELinuxSetFilecon(savefile, secdef->imagelabel);
}
static int
SELinuxRestoreSavedStateLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *savefile)
{
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
if (secdef->norelabel)
return 0;
return SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(savefile);
}
static int
SELinuxSecurityVerify(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
virDomainDefPtr def)
{
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &def->seclabel;
if (!STREQ(virSecurityManagerGetModel(mgr), secdef->model)) {
virSecurityReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("security label driver mismatch: "
"'%s' model configured for domain, but "
"hypervisor driver is '%s'."),
secdef->model, virSecurityManagerGetModel(mgr));
return -1;
}
if (secdef->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC) {
if (security_check_context(secdef->label) != 0) {
virSecurityReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR,
_("Invalid security label %s"), secdef->label);
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int
SELinuxSetSecurityProcessLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
/* TODO: verify DOI */
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
if (vm->def->seclabel.label == NULL)
return 0;
if (!STREQ(virSecurityManagerGetModel(mgr), secdef->model)) {
virSecurityReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("security label driver mismatch: "
"'%s' model configured for domain, but "
"hypervisor driver is '%s'."),
secdef->model, virSecurityManagerGetModel(mgr));
if (security_getenforce() == 1)
return -1;
}
if (setexeccon(secdef->label) == -1) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("unable to set security context '%s'"),
secdef->label);
if (security_getenforce() == 1)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
SELinuxSetSecuritySocketLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
/* TODO: verify DOI */
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
context_t execcon = NULL;
context_t proccon = NULL;
security_context_t scon = NULL;
int rc = -1;
if (vm->def->seclabel.label == NULL)
return 0;
if (!STREQ(virSecurityManagerGetModel(mgr), secdef->model)) {
virSecurityReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("security label driver mismatch: "
"'%s' model configured for domain, but "
"hypervisor driver is '%s'."),
secdef->model, virSecurityManagerGetModel(mgr));
goto done;
}
if ( !(execcon = context_new(secdef->label)) ) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("unable to allocate socket security context '%s'"),
secdef->label);
goto done;
}
if (getcon(&scon) == -1) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("unable to get current process context '%s'"),
secdef->label);
goto done;
}
if ( !(proccon = context_new(scon)) ) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("unable to set socket security context '%s'"),
secdef->label);
goto done;
}
if (context_range_set(proccon, context_range_get(execcon)) == -1) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("unable to set socket security context range '%s'"),
secdef->label);
goto done;
}
VIR_DEBUG("Setting VM %s socket context %s",
vm->def->name, context_str(proccon));
if (setsockcreatecon(context_str(proccon)) == -1) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("unable to set socket security context '%s'"),
context_str(proccon));
goto done;
}
rc = 0;
done:
if (security_getenforce() != 1)
rc = 0;
if (execcon) context_free(execcon);
if (proccon) context_free(proccon);
freecon(scon);
return rc;
}
static int
SELinuxClearSecuritySocketLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
/* TODO: verify DOI */
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
if (vm->def->seclabel.label == NULL)
return 0;
if (!STREQ(virSecurityManagerGetModel(mgr), secdef->model)) {
virSecurityReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("security label driver mismatch: "
"'%s' model configured for domain, but "
"hypervisor driver is '%s'."),
secdef->model, virSecurityManagerGetModel(mgr));
if (security_getenforce() == 1)
return -1;
}
if (setsockcreatecon(NULL) == -1) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("unable to clear socket security context '%s'"),
secdef->label);
if (security_getenforce() == 1)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
SELinuxSetSecurityChardevCallback(virDomainDefPtr def ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
virDomainChrDefPtr dev,
void *opaque)
{
virDomainObjPtr vm = opaque;
return SELinuxSetSecurityChardevLabel(vm, &dev->source);
}
static int
SELinuxSetSecuritySmartcardCallback(virDomainDefPtr def ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
virDomainSmartcardDefPtr dev,
void *opaque)
{
virDomainObjPtr vm = opaque;
const char *database;
switch (dev->type) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_SMARTCARD_TYPE_HOST:
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_SMARTCARD_TYPE_HOST_CERTIFICATES:
database = dev->data.cert.database;
if (!database)
database = VIR_DOMAIN_SMARTCARD_DEFAULT_DATABASE;
return SELinuxSetFilecon(database, default_content_context);
case VIR_DOMAIN_SMARTCARD_TYPE_PASSTHROUGH:
return SELinuxSetSecurityChardevLabel(vm, &dev->data.passthru);
default:
virSecurityReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("unknown smartcard type %d"),
dev->type);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
SELinuxSetSecurityAllLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *stdin_path)
{
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
int i;
if (secdef->norelabel)
return 0;
for (i = 0 ; i < vm->def->ndisks ; i++) {
/* XXX fixme - we need to recursively label the entire tree :-( */
if (vm->def->disks[i]->type == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_TYPE_DIR) {
VIR_WARN("Unable to relabel directory tree %s for disk %s",
vm->def->disks[i]->src, vm->def->disks[i]->dst);
continue;
}
if (SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(mgr,
vm, vm->def->disks[i]) < 0)
return -1;
}
/* XXX fixme process vm->def->fss if relabel == true */
for (i = 0 ; i < vm->def->nhostdevs ; i++) {
if (SELinuxSetSecurityHostdevLabel(mgr,
vm,
vm->def->hostdevs[i]) < 0)
return -1;
}
if (virDomainChrDefForeach(vm->def,
true,
SELinuxSetSecurityChardevCallback,
vm) < 0)
return -1;
if (virDomainSmartcardDefForeach(vm->def,
true,
SELinuxSetSecuritySmartcardCallback,
vm) < 0)
return -1;
if (vm->def->os.kernel &&
SELinuxSetFilecon(vm->def->os.kernel, default_content_context) < 0)
return -1;
if (vm->def->os.initrd &&
SELinuxSetFilecon(vm->def->os.initrd, default_content_context) < 0)
return -1;
if (stdin_path) {
if (SELinuxSetFilecon(stdin_path, default_content_context) < 0 &&
virStorageFileIsSharedFSType(stdin_path,
VIR_STORAGE_FILE_SHFS_NFS) != 1)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
SELinuxSetImageFDLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
int fd)
{
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
if (secdef->imagelabel == NULL)
return 0;
return SELinuxFSetFilecon(fd, secdef->imagelabel);
}
static int
SELinuxSetProcessFDLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
int fd)
{
const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
if (secdef->label == NULL)
return 0;
return SELinuxFSetFilecon(fd, secdef->label);
}
virSecurityDriver virSecurityDriverSELinux = {
0,
SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME,
SELinuxSecurityDriverProbe,
SELinuxSecurityDriverOpen,
SELinuxSecurityDriverClose,
SELinuxSecurityGetModel,
SELinuxSecurityGetDOI,
SELinuxSecurityVerify,
SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel,
SELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabel,
SELinuxSetSecuritySocketLabel,
SELinuxClearSecuritySocketLabel,
SELinuxGenSecurityLabel,
SELinuxReserveSecurityLabel,
SELinuxReleaseSecurityLabel,
SELinuxGetSecurityProcessLabel,
SELinuxSetSecurityProcessLabel,
SELinuxSetSecurityAllLabel,
SELinuxRestoreSecurityAllLabel,
SELinuxSetSecurityHostdevLabel,
SELinuxRestoreSecurityHostdevLabel,
SELinuxSetSavedStateLabel,
SELinuxRestoreSavedStateLabel,
SELinuxSetImageFDLabel,
SELinuxSetProcessFDLabel,
};