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passt/test/lib/setup

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#!/bin/sh
#
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
#
# PASST - Plug A Simple Socket Transport
# for qemu/UNIX domain socket mode
#
# PASTA - Pack A Subtle Tap Abstraction
# for network namespace/tap device mode
#
# test/lib/setup - Set up and tear down passt and pasta environments
#
# Copyright (c) 2021 Red Hat GmbH
# Author: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
INITRAMFS="${BASEPATH}/mbuto.img"
VCPUS="$( [ $(nproc) -ge 8 ] && echo 6 || echo $(( $(nproc) / 2 + 1 )) )"
__mem_kib="$(sed -n 's/MemTotal:[ ]*\([0-9]*\) kB/\1/p' /proc/meminfo)"
VMEM="$((${__mem_kib} / 1024 / 4))"
NSHOLDER="${BASEPATH}/nsholder"
# setup_build() - Set up pane layout for build tests
setup_build() {
context_setup_host host
layout_host
}
# setup_distro() - Set up pane layout for distro tests
setup_distro() {
layout_host
}
# setup_passt() - Start qemu and passt
setup_passt() {
context_setup_host host
context_setup_host passt
context_setup_host qemu
layout_passt
# Ports:
#
# guest | host
# --------------|---------------------
# 10001 as server | forwarded to guest
# 10003 | as server
__opts=
[ ${PCAP} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} -p /tmp/passt.pcap"
[ ${DEBUG} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} -d"
[ ${TRACE} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} --trace"
context_run passt "make clean"
context_run passt "make valgrind"
context_run_bg passt "valgrind --max-stackframe=$((4 * 1024 * 1024)) --trace-children=yes --vgdb=no --error-exitcode=1 --suppressions=test/valgrind.supp ./passt ${__opts} -f -t 10001 -u 10001 -P passt.pid"
sleep 5
GUEST_CID=94557
context_run_bg qemu './qrap 5 qemu-system-$(uname -m)' \
' -machine accel=kvm' \
' -m '${VMEM}' -cpu host -smp '${VCPUS} \
' -kernel ' "/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)" \
' -initrd '${INITRAMFS}' -nographic -serial stdio' \
' -nodefaults' \
' -append "console=ttyS0 mitigations=off apparmor=0 ' \
'virtio-net.napi_tx=1"' \
" -device virtio-net-pci,netdev=hostnet0,x-txburst=16384" \
" -netdev socket,fd=5,id=hostnet0" \
" -pidfile passt_qemu.pid" \
" -device vhost-vsock-pci,guest-cid=$GUEST_CID"
context_setup_guest guest $GUEST_CID
}
# setup_pasta() - Create a network and user namespace, connect pasta to it
setup_pasta() {
context_setup_host host
context_setup_host passt
context_setup_host unshare
layout_pasta
context_run_bg unshare "unshare -rUnpf ${NSHOLDER} ns.hold hold"
__target_pid=$(${NSHOLDER} ns.hold pid)
context_setup_nsenter ns -U -n -p --preserve-credentials -t ${__target_pid}
# Ports:
#
# ns | host
# ------------------|---------------------
# 10002 as server | spliced to ns
# 10003 spliced to init | as server
__opts=
[ ${PCAP} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} -p /tmp/pasta.pcap"
[ ${DEBUG} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} -d"
[ ${TRACE} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} --trace"
context_run_bg passt "./pasta ${__opts} -f -t 10002 -T 10003 -u 10002 -U 10003 -P passt.pid ${__target_pid}"
sleep 1
}
# setup_passt_in_ns() - Set up namespace (with pasta), run qemu and passt into it
setup_passt_in_ns() {
context_setup_host host
layout_passt_in_pasta
# Ports:
#
# guest | ns | host
# -------------|--------------------|-----------------
# 10001 as server | forwarded to guest | spliced to ns
# 10002 | as server | spliced to ns
# 10003 | spliced to init | as server
# 10011 as server | forwarded to guest | spliced to ns
# 10012 | as server | spliced to ns
# 10013 | spliced to init | as server
#
# 10021 as server | forwarded to guest |
# 10031 as server | forwarded to guest |
__opts=
[ ${PCAP} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} -p /tmp/pasta_with_passt.pcap"
[ ${DEBUG} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} -d"
[ ${TRACE} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} --trace"
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
__pid_file="$(mktemp)"
pane_run PASST "./pasta ${__opts} -t 10001,10002,10011,10012 -T 10003,10013 -u 10001,10002,10011,10012 -U 10003,10013 -P ${__pid_file}"
sleep 1
pane_run PASST ''
pane_status PASST
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
__pasta_pid="$(cat "${__pid_file}")"
__ns_pid="$(cat /proc/${__pasta_pid}/task/${__pasta_pid}/children | cut -f1 -d' ')"
rm "${__pid_file}"
pane_run GUEST "nsenter -t ${__ns_pid} -U -n --preserve-credentials"
pane_run NS "nsenter -t ${__ns_pid} -U -n -p --preserve-credentials"
pane_status GUEST
pane_status NS
pane_run NS "ip -j link show | jq -rM '.[] | select(.link_type == \"ether\").ifname'"
pane_wait NS
__ifname="$(pane_parse NS)"
pane_run NS "/sbin/dhclient -4 --no-pid ${__ifname}"
pane_status NS
sleep 2
pane_run NS "/sbin/dhclient -6 --no-pid ${__ifname}"
pane_status NS
__opts=
[ ${PCAP} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} -p /tmp/passt_in_pasta.pcap"
[ ${DEBUG} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} -d"
[ ${TRACE} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} --trace"
if [ ${VALGRIND} -eq 1 ]; then
pane_run PASST "make clean"
pane_status PASST
pane_run PASST "make valgrind"
pane_status PASST
pane_run PASST "valgrind --max-stackframe=$((4 * 1024 * 1024)) --trace-children=yes --vgdb=no --error-exitcode=1 --suppressions=test/valgrind.supp ./passt -f ${__opts} -t 10001,10011,10021,10031 -u 10001,10011,10021,10031 -P passt.pid"
else
pane_run PASST "make clean"
pane_status PASST
pane_run PASST "make"
pane_status PASST
pane_run PASST "./passt -f ${__opts} -t 10001,10011,10021,10031 -u 10001,10011,10021,10031 -P passt.pid"
fi
sleep 5
pane_run GUEST './qrap 5 qemu-system-$(uname -m)' \
' -machine accel=kvm' \
' -M accel=kvm:tcg' \
' -m '${VMEM}' -cpu host -smp '${VCPUS} \
' -kernel ' "/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)" \
' -initrd '${INITRAMFS}' -nographic -serial stdio' \
' -nodefaults' \
' -append "console=ttyS0 mitigations=off apparmor=0 ' \
'virtio-net.napi_tx=1"' \
" -device virtio-net-pci,netdev=hostnet0,x-txburst=524288" \
" -netdev socket,fd=5,id=hostnet0" \
' -pidfile passt_in_ns_qemu.pid'
pane_status GUEST
}
# setup_two_guests() - Set up two namespace, run qemu and passt in both of them
setup_two_guests() {
context_setup_host host
layout_two_guests
# Ports:
#
# guest #1 | guest #2 | ns #1 | ns #2 | host
# --------- |-----------|-----------|------------|------------
# 10001 as server | | to guest | to init | to ns #1
# 10002 | | as server | | to ns #1
# 10003 | | to init | to init | as server
# 10004 | as server | to init | to guest | to ns #2
# 10005 | | | as server | to ns #2
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
__pid1_file="$(mktemp)"
__pid2_file="$(mktemp)"
__opts=
[ ${PCAP} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} -p /tmp/pasta_1.pcap"
[ ${DEBUG} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} -d"
[ ${TRACE} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} --trace"
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
pane_run PASST_1 "./pasta ${__opts} -P ${__pid1_file} -t 10001,10002 -T 10003,10004 -u 10001,10002 -U 10003,10004"
__opts=
[ ${PCAP} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} -p /tmp/pasta_2.pcap"
[ ${DEBUG} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} -d"
[ ${TRACE} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} --trace"
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
pane_run PASST_2 "./pasta ${__opts} -P ${__pid2_file} -t 10004,10005 -T 10003,10001 -u 10004,10005 -U 10003,10001"
sleep 1
pane_run PASST_1 ''
pane_run PASST_2 ''
pane_status PASST_1
pane_status PASST_2
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
__pasta1_pid="$(cat "${__pid1_file}")"
__ns1_pid="$(cat /proc/${__pasta1_pid}/task/${__pasta1_pid}/children | cut -f1 -d' ')"
rm "${__pid1_file}"
__pasta2_pid="$(cat "${__pid2_file}")"
__ns2_pid="$(cat /proc/${__pasta2_pid}/task/${__pasta2_pid}/children | cut -f1 -d' ')"
rm "${__pid2_file}"
pane_run GUEST_1 "nsenter -t ${__ns1_pid} -U -n --preserve-credentials"
pane_run GUEST_2 "nsenter -t ${__ns2_pid} -U -n --preserve-credentials"
pane_run PASST_1 "ip -j link show | jq -rM '.[] | select(.link_type == \"ether\").ifname'"
pane_wait PASST_1
__ifname="$(pane_parse PASST_1)"
pane_run GUEST_1 "/sbin/dhclient -4 --no-pid ${__ifname}"
pane_run GUEST_2 "/sbin/dhclient -4 --no-pid ${__ifname}"
pane_status GUEST_1
pane_status GUEST_2
sleep 2
pane_run GUEST_1 "/sbin/dhclient -6 --no-pid ${__ifname}"
pane_run GUEST_2 "/sbin/dhclient -6 --no-pid ${__ifname}"
pane_status GUEST_1
pane_status GUEST_2
__opts=
[ ${PCAP} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} -p /tmp/passt_1.pcap"
[ ${DEBUG} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} -d"
[ ${TRACE} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} --trace"
pane_run PASST_1 "./passt -f ${__opts} -t 10001 -u 10001"
sleep 1
__opts=
[ ${PCAP} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} -p /tmp/passt_2.pcap"
[ ${DEBUG} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} -d"
[ ${TRACE} -eq 1 ] && __opts="${__opts} --trace"
pane_run PASST_2 "./passt -f ${__opts} -t 10004 -u 10004"
pane_run GUEST_1 './qrap 5 qemu-system-$(uname -m)' \
' -M accel=kvm:tcg' \
' -m '${VMEM}' -cpu host -smp '${VCPUS} \
' -kernel ' "/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)" \
' -initrd '${INITRAMFS}' -nographic -serial stdio' \
' -nodefaults' \
' -append "console=ttyS0 mitigations=off apparmor=0 ' \
'virtio-net.napi_tx=1"' \
" -device virtio-net-pci,netdev=hostnet0,x-txburst=16384" \
" -netdev socket,fd=5,id=hostnet0" \
' -pidfile two_guests_qemu_1.pid'
pane_run GUEST_2 './qrap 5 qemu-system-$(uname -m)' \
' -M accel=kvm:tcg' \
' -m '${VMEM}' -cpu host -smp '${VCPUS} \
' -kernel ' "/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)" \
' -initrd '${INITRAMFS}' -nographic -serial stdio' \
' -nodefaults' \
' -append "console=ttyS0 mitigations=off apparmor=0 ' \
'virtio-net.napi_tx=1"' \
" -device virtio-net-pci,netdev=hostnet0,x-txburst=16384" \
" -netdev socket,fd=5,id=hostnet0" \
' -pidfile two_guests_qemu_2.pid'
pane_status GUEST_1
pane_status GUEST_2
}
# teardown_context_watch() - Remove contexts and stop panes watching them
# $1: Pane number watching
# $@: Context names
teardown_context_watch() {
__pane="$1"
shift
for __c; do
context_teardown "${__c}"
done
tmux send-keys -t ${__pane} "C-c"
}
# teardown_build() - Nothing to do, yet
teardown_build() {
teardown_context_watch ${PANE_HOST} host
}
# teardown_distro() - Nothing to do, yet
teardown_distro() {
:
}
# teardown_passt() - Kill qemu, remove passt PID file
teardown_passt() {
kill $(cat passt_qemu.pid)
rm passt.pid
teardown_context_watch ${PANE_HOST} host
teardown_context_watch ${PANE_PASST} passt
teardown_context_watch ${PANE_GUEST} qemu guest
}
# teardown_passt() - Exit namespace, kill pasta process
teardown_pasta() {
${NSHOLDER} ns.hold stop
context_wait unshare
teardown_context_watch ${PANE_HOST} host
teardown_context_watch ${PANE_PASST} passt
teardown_context_watch ${PANE_NS} unshare ns
}
# teardown_passt_in_ns() - Exit namespace, kill qemu and pasta, remove pid file
teardown_passt_in_ns() {
kill $(cat passt_in_ns_qemu.pid)
pane_wait GUEST
tmux send-keys -t ${PANE_GUEST} "C-d"
tmux send-keys -t ${PANE_PASST} "C-d"
pane_wait GUEST
pane_wait NS
pane_wait PASST
rm passt.pid
teardown_context_watch ${PANE_HOST} host
}
# teardown_two_guests() - Exit namespaces, kill qemu processes, passt and pasta
teardown_two_guests() {
kill $(cat two_guests_qemu_1.pid)
pane_wait GUEST_1
tmux send-keys -t ${PANE_GUEST_1} "C-d"
kill $(cat two_guests_qemu_2.pid)
pane_wait GUEST_2
tmux send-keys -t ${PANE_GUEST_2} "C-d"
tmux send-keys -t ${PANE_PASST_1} "C-c"
pane_wait PASST_1
tmux send-keys -t ${PANE_PASST_1} "C-d"
tmux send-keys -t ${PANE_PASST_2} "C-c"
pane_wait PASST_2
tmux send-keys -t ${PANE_PASST_2} "C-d"
pane_wait GUEST_1
pane_wait GUEST_2
pane_wait PASST_1
pane_wait PASST_2
teardown_context_watch ${PANE_HOST} host
}
# teardown_demo_passt() - Exit namespace, kill qemu, passt and pasta
teardown_demo_passt() {
tmux send-keys -t ${PANE_GUEST} "C-c"
pane_wait GUEST
tmux send-keys -t ${PANE_GUEST} "C-d"
tmux send-keys -t ${PANE_PASST} "C-c"
pane_wait GUEST
pane_wait HOST
pane_wait PASST
tmux kill-pane -a -t 0
tmux send-keys -t 0 "C-c"
}
# teardown_demo_pasta() - Exit perf and namespace from remaining pane
teardown_demo_pasta() {
tmux send-keys -t ${PANE_NS} "q"
pane_wait NS
tmux send-keys -t ${PANE_NS} "C-d"
pane_wait NS
tmux kill-pane -a -t 0
tmux send-keys -t 0 "C-c"
}
# teardown_demo_podman() - Exit namespaces
teardown_demo_podman() {
tmux send-keys -t ${PANE_NS1} "C-d"
tmux send-keys -t ${PANE_NS2} "C-d"
pane_wait NS1
pane_wait NS2
tmux kill-pane -a -t 0
tmux send-keys -t 0 "C-c"
}
# setup() - Run setup_*() functions
# $*: Suffix list of setup_*() functions to be called
setup() {
for arg do
eval setup_${arg}
done
}
# teardown() - Run teardown_*() functions
# $*: Suffix list of teardown_*() functions to be called
teardown() {
for arg do
eval teardown_${arg}
done
}