THREADS.txt states that the contents of vm should not be read or
modified while the vm lock is not held, but that the lock must not
be held while performing a monitor command. This fixes all the
offenders that I could find.
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c (qemuProcessStartCPUs)
(qemuProcessInitPasswords, qemuProcessStart): Don't modify or
refer to vm state outside lock.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemudDomainHotplugVcpus): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c (qemuDomainChangeGraphicsPasswords):
Likewise.
This is detailed in:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=688957
Since radvd is executed by daemonizing it, the attempt to exec the
radvd binary doesn't happen until after libvirtd has already received
an exit code from the intermediate forked process, so no error is
detected or logged by __virExec().
We can't require radvd as a prerequisite for the libvirt package (many
installations don't use IPv6, so they don't need it), so instead we
add in a check to verify there is an executable radvd binary prior to
trying to exec it.
When SASL is active, it was possible that we read and decoded
more data off the wire than we initially wanted. The loop
processing this data terminated after only one message to
avoid delaying the calling thread, but this could delay
event delivery. As long as there is decoded SASL data in
memory, we must process it, before returning to the poll()
event loop.
This is a counterpart to the same kind of issue solved in
commit 68d2c3482f
in a different area of the code
* src/remote/remote_driver.c: Process all pending SASL data
virExec would only resolved the binary to $PATH if no env
variables were being set. Since there is no execvep() API
in POSIX, we use virFindFileInPath to manually resolve
the binary and then use execv() instead of execvp().
Add a new xen driver based on libxenlight [1], which is the primary
toolstack starting with Xen 4.1.0. The driver is stateful and runs
privileged only.
Like the existing xen-unified driver, the libxenlight driver is
accessed with xen:// URI. Driver selection is based on the status
of xend. If xend is running, the libxenlight driver will not load
and xen:// connections are handled by xen-unified. If xend is not
running *and* the libxenlight driver is available, xen://
connections are deferred to the libxenlight driver.
V6:
- Address several code style issues noted by Daniel Veillard
- Make drive work with xen:/// URI
- Hold domain object reference while domain is injected in
libvirt event loop. Race found and fixed by Markus Groß.
V5:
- Ensure events are unregistered when domain private data
is destroyed. Discovered and fixed by Markus Groß.
V4:
- Handle restart of libvirtd, reconnecting to previously
started domains
- Rebased to current master
- Tested against Xen 4.1 RC7-pre (c/s 22961:c5d121fd35c0)
V3:
- Reserve vnc port within driver when autoport=yes
V2:
- Update to Xen 4.1 RC6-pre (c/s 22940:5a4710640f81)
- Rebased to current master
- Plug memory leaks found by Stefano Stabellini and valgrind
- Handle SHUTDOWN_crash domain death event
[1] http://lists.xensource.com/archives/html/xen-devel/2009-11/msg00436.html
Calling most hash APIs is not safe from inside of an iterator callback.
Exceptions are APIs that do not modify the hash table and removing
current hash entry from virHashFroEach callback.
This patch make all APIs which are not safe fail instead of just relying
on the callback being nice not calling any unsafe APIs.
Steps to reproduce this bug:
# cat test.sh
#! /bin/bash -x
virsh start domain
sleep 5
virsh qemu-monitor-command domain 'cpu_set 2 online' --hmp
# while true; do ./test.sh ; done
Then libvirtd will crash.
The reason is that:
we add a reference of obj when we open the monitor. We will reduce this
reference when we free the monitor.
If the reference of monitor is 0, we will free monitor automatically and
the reference of obj is reduced.
But in the function qemuDomainObjExitMonitorWithDriver(), we reduce this
reference again when the reference of monitor is 0.
It will cause the obj be freed in the function qemuDomainObjEndJob().
Then we start the domain again, and libvirtd will crash in the function
virDomainObjListSearchName(), because we pass a null pointer(obj->def->name)
to strcmp().
Signed-off-by: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com>
This bug was reported by Shi Jin(jinzishuai@gmail.com):
=============
# virsh attach-disk RHEL6RC /var/lib/libvirt/images/test3.img vdb \
--driver file --subdriver qcow2
Disk attached successfully
# virsh save RHEL6RC /var/lib/libvirt/images/memory.save
Domain RHEL6RC saved to /var/lib/libvirt/images/memory.save
# virsh restore /var/lib/libvirt/images/memory.save
error: Failed to restore domain from /var/lib/libvirt/images/memory.save
error: internal error unsupported driver name 'file'
for disk '/var/lib/libvirt/images/test3.img'
=============
We check the driver name when we start or restore VM, but we do
not check it while attaching a disk. This adds the same check on disk
driverName used in qemuBuildCommandLine to qemudDomainAttachDevice.
Signed-off-by: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com>
As pointed out, locking the buffer from the signal handler
cannot been guaranteed to be safe, so to avoid any hazard
we prefer the trade off of dumping logs possibly messed up
by concurrent logging activity rather than risk a daemon
crash.
* src/util/logging.c: change virLogEmergencyDumpAll() to not
take any lock on the log buffer but reset buffer content variables
to an empty set before starting the actual dump.
Steps to reproduce this bug:
# virsh qemu-monitor-command domain 'cpu_set 2 online' --hmp
The domain has 2 cpus, and we try to set the third cpu online.
The qemu crashes, and this command will hang.
The reason is that the refs is not 1 when we unwatch the monitor.
We lock the monitor, but we do not unlock it. So virCondWait()
will be blocked.
Signed-off-by: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com>
* Correct the documentation for cgroup: the swap_hard_limit indicates
mem+swap_hard_limit.
* Change cgroup private apis to: virCgroupGet/SetMemSwapHardLimit
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A. Dadhania <nikunj@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
I'm proposing we make use of $PCIDIR/reset in qemu-kvm to reset
devices on VM reset. We need to add it to libvirt's list of
files that get ownership for device assignment.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
xen-unstable c/s 21118:28e5409e3fb3 bumped sysctl version to 8.
xen-unstable c/s 21212:de94884a669c introduced CPU pools feature,
adding another member to xen_domctl_getdomaininfo struct. Add a
corresponding domctl v7 struct in xen hypervisor sub-driver and
detect sysctl v8 during initialization.
The virCond of the remote_thread_call struct was leaked in some
places. This results in leaking the underlying mutex. Which in turn
leaks a handle on Windows.
Reported by Aliaksandr Chabatar and Ihar Smertsin.
A bug in libnl (see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=677724
and https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=677725) makes it very
easy to create a failure to connect to the netlink socket when trying
to open a macvtap network device ("type='direct'" in domain interface
XML). When that error occurred (during a call to libnl's nl_connect()
from libvirt's nlComm(), there was no log message, leading virsh (for
example) to report "unknown error".
There were two other cases in nlComm where an error in a libnl
function might return with failure but no error reported. In all three
cases, this patch logs a message which will hopefully be more useful.
Note that more detailed information about the failure might be
available from libnl's nl_geterror() function, but it calls
strerror(), which is not threadsafe, so we can't use it.
If pool xml has no definition for "port", then "Segmentation fault"
happens when jumping to "cleanup:" to do "VIR_FREE(port)", as "port"
was not initialized in this situation.
* src/conf/storage_conf.c
POSIX states about dd:
If the bs=expr operand is specified and no conversions other than
sync, noerror, or notrunc are requested, the data returned from each
input block shall be written as a separate output block; if the read
returns less than a full block and the sync conversion is not
specified, the resulting output block shall be the same size as the
input block. If the bs=expr operand is not specified, or a conversion
other than sync, noerror, or notrunc is requested, the input shall be
processed and collected into full-sized output blocks until the end of
the input is reached.
Since we aren't using conv=sync, there is no zero-padding, but our
use of bs= means that a short read results in a short write. If
instead we use ibs= and obs=, then short reads are collected and dd
only has to do a single write, which can make dd more efficient.
* src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c (qemuMonitorMigrateToFile):
Avoid 'dd bs=', since it can cause short writes.
The virCommandNewArgs() method would free the virCommandPtr
if it failed to add the args. This meant errors reported in
virCommandAddArgSet() were lost. Simply removing the check
for errors from the constructor means they can be reported
correctly later
The virCommandAddEnvPassCommon() method failed to check for
errors before reallocating the cmd->env array, causing a
potential SEGV if cmd was NULL
The virCommandAddArgSet() method needs to validate that at
least 1 element in 'val's parameter is non-NULL, otherwise
code like
cmd = virCommandNew(binary)
virCommandAddAtg(cmd, "foo")
Would end up trying todo execve("foo"), if binary was
NULL.
The virSetNonBlock() API only allows enabling non-blocking
operations. It doesn't allow turning blocking back on. Add
a new API to allow arbitrary toggling.
* src/libvirt_private.syms, src/util/util.h
src/util/util.c: Add virSetBlocking
This patch fix a simple bug in virDomainSetMemoryFlags function.
The patch sent before lacks the consideration of the case
where the driver doesn't support virDomainSetMemoryFlags API.
Signed-off-by: Taku Izumi <izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com>
The current LXC I/O controller looks for HUP to detect
when a guest has quit. This isn't reliable as during
initial bootup it is possible that 'init' will close
the console and let mingetty re-open it. The shutdown
of containers was also flakey because it only killed
the libvirt I/O controller and expected container
processes to gracefully follow.
Change the I/O controller such that when it see HUP
or an I/O error, it uses kill($PID, 0) to see if the
process has really quit.
Change the container shutdown sequence to use the
virCgroupKillPainfully function to ensure every
really goes away
This change makes the use of the 'cpu', 'devices'
and 'memory' cgroups controllers compulsory with
LXC
* docs/drvlxc.html.in: Document that certain cgroups
controllers are now mandatory
* src/lxc/lxc_controller.c: Check if PID is still
alive before quitting on I/O error/HUP
* src/lxc/lxc_driver.c: Use virCgroupKillPainfully
This is the part allowing to dynamically resize the debug log
buffer from it's default 64kB size. The buffer is now dynamically
allocated.
It adds a new API virLogSetBufferSize() which resizes the buffer
If passed a zero size, the buffer is deallocated and we do the small
optimization of not formatting messages which are not output anymore.
On the daemon side, it just adds a new option log_buffer_size to
libvirtd.conf and call virLogSetBufferSize() if needed
* src/util/logging.h src/util/logging.c src/libvirt_private.syms:
make buffer dynamic and add virLogSetBufferSize() internal API
* daemon/libvirtd.conf: document the new log_buffer_size option
* daemon/libvirtd.c: read and use the new log_buffer_size option
Outgoing migration still uses a Unix socket and or exec netcat until
the next patch.
* src/qemu/qemu_migration.c (qemuMigrationPrepareTunnel):
Replace Unix socket with simpler pipe.
Suggested by Paolo Bonzini.
The newly added call to qemuAuditNetDevice in qemuPhysIfaceConnect was
assuming that res_ifname (the name of the macvtap device) was always
valid, but this isn't the case. If openMacvtapTap fails, it always
returns NULL, which would result in a segv.
Since the audit log only needs a record of devices that are actually
sent to qemu, and a failure to open the macvtap device means that no
device will be sent to qemu, we can solve this problem by only doing
the audit if openMacvtapTap is successful (in which case res_ifname is
guaranteed valid).
Normally dnsmasq will send a default route (the address of the host in
the network definition) to any client requesting an address via
DHCP. On an isolated network this makes no sense, as we have iptables
to prevent any traffic going out via that interface, so anything sent
that way would be dropped anyway.
This extra/unusable default route becomes problematic if you have
setup a guest with multiple network interfaces, with one connected to
an isolated network and another that provides connectivity to the
outside (example - one interface directly connecting to a physical
interface via macvtap, with a second connected to an isolated network
so that the host and guest can communicate (macvtap doesn't support
guest<->host communication without an external switch that supports
vepa, or reflecting all traffic back)). In this case, if the guest
chooses the default route of the isolated network, the guest will not
be able to get network traffic beyond the host.
To prevent dnsmasq from sending a default route, you can tell it to
send 0 bytes of data for the default route option (option number 3)
with --dhcp-option=3 (normally the data to send for the option would
follow the option number; no extra data means "don't send this option").
I have checked on RHEL5 (a good representative of the oldest supported
libvirt platforms) and its version of dnsmasq (2.45) does support
--dhcp-option, so this shouldn't create any compatibility problems.
As pointed on CVE-2011-1146, some API forgot to check the read-only
status of the connection for entry point which modify the state
of the system or may lead to a remote execution using user data.
The entry points concerned are:
- virConnectDomainXMLToNative
- virNodeDeviceDettach
- virNodeDeviceReAttach
- virNodeDeviceReset
- virDomainRevertToSnapshot
- virDomainSnapshotDelete
* src/libvirt.c: fix the above set of entry points to error on read-only
connections
By default, all dnsmasq processes share the same leases file. libvirt
also uses the --dhcp-lease-max option to control the maximum number of
leases allowed. The problem is that libvirt puts in a number equal to
the number of addresses in the range for the one network handled by a
single instance of dnsmasq, but dnsmasq checks the total number of
leases in the file (which could potentially contain many more).
The solution is to tell each instance of dnsmasq to create and use its
own leases file. (/var/lib/libvirt/network/<net-name>.leases).
This file is created by dnsmasq when it starts, but not deleted when
it exists. This is fine when the network is just being stopped, but if
the leases file was left around when a network was undefined, we could
end up with an ever-increasing number of dead files - instead, we
explicitly unlink the leases file when a network is undefined.
Note that Ubuntu carries a patch against an older version of libvirt for this:
hhttps://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libvirt/+bug/713071
ttp://bazaar.launchpad.net/~serge-hallyn/ubuntu/maverick/libvirt/bugall/revision/109
I was certain I'd also seen discussion of this on libvir-list or
libvirt-users, but couldn't find it.
This fixes a regression introduced in commit ad48df, and reported on
the libvirt-users list:
https://www.redhat.com/archives/libvirt-users/2011-March/msg00018.html
The problem in that commit was that we began searching a list of ip
address definitions (rather than just having one) to look for a dhcp
range or static host; when we didn't find any, our pointer (ipdef) was
left at NULL, and when ipdef was NULL, we returned without starting up
dnsmasq.
Previously dnsmasq was started even without any dhcp ranges or static
entries, because it's still useful for DNS services.
Another problem I noticed while investigating was that, if there are
IPv6 addresses, but no IPv4 addresses of any kind, we would jump out
at an ever higher level in the call chain.
This patch does the following:
1) networkBuildDnsmasqArgv() = all uses of ipdef are protected from
NULL dereference. (this patch doesn't change indentation, to make
review easier. The next patch will change just the
indentation). ipdef is intended to point to the first IPv4 address
with DHCP info (or the first IPv4 address if none of them have any
dhcp info).
2) networkStartDhcpDaemon() = if the loop looking for an ipdef with
DHCP info comes up empty, we then grab the first IPv4 def from the
list. Also, instead of returning if there are no IPv4 defs, we just
return if there are no IP defs at all (either v4 or v6). This way a
network that is IPv6-only will still get dnsmasq listening for DNS
queries.
3) in networkStartNetworkDaemon() - we will startup dhcp not just if there
are any IPv4 addresses, but also if there are any IPv6 addresses.
Currently a single storage volume with a broken backing file will disable the
whole storage pool. This can happen when the backing file is on some
unavailable network storage or if the backing volume is deleted, while the
storage volumes using it remain.
Since the storage pool can not be re-activated, re-creating the missing
or deleting the now useless volumes using libvirt only is not possible.
Fixing this is a little bit tricky:
1. virStorageBackendProbeTarget() only detects the missing backing file,
if the backing file format is not explicitly specified. If the
backing file is created using
kvm-img create -f qcow2 -o backing_fmt=qcow2,backing_file=... ...
no error is detected at this stage.
The new return code -3 signals that the backing file could not be
opened.
2. The backingStore.format must be >= 0, since values < 0 would break
virStorageVolTargetDefFormat() when dumping the XML data such as
<format type='...'/>
Because of this the format is faked as VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW.
3. virStorageBackendUpdateVolTargetInfo() always opens the backing file
and thus always detects a missing backing file.
Since it "only" updates the capacity, allocation, owner, group, mode
and SELinux label, just ignore errors at this stage, print an error
message and continue.
4. Using vol-dump on a broken volume still doesn't work, but at least
vol-destroy and pool-refresh do work now.
To reproduce:
dir=$(mktemp -d)
virsh pool-create-as tmp dir '' '' '' '' "$dir"
virsh vol-create-as --format qcow2 tmp back 1G
virsh vol-create-as --format qcow2 --backing-vol-format qcow2 --backing-vol back tmp cow 1G
virsh vol-delete --pool tmp back
virsh pool-refresh tmp
After the last step, the pool will be gone (because it was not persistent). As
long as the now broken image stays in the directory, you will not be able to
re-create or re-start the pool.
Signed-off-by: Philipp Hahn <hahn@univention.de>
This patch introduces a new libvirt API (virDomainSetMemoryFlags) and
a flag (virDomainMemoryModFlags).
Signed-off-by: Taku Izumi <izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com>
Opening raw network devices with the intent of passing those fds to
qemu is worth an audit point. This makes a multi-part audit: first,
we audit the device(s) that libvirt opens on behalf of the MAC address
of a to-be-created interface (which can independently succeed or
fail), then we audit whether qemu actually started the network device
with the same MAC (so searching backwards for successful audits with
the same MAC will show which fd(s) qemu is actually using). Note that
it is possible for the fd to be successfully opened but no attempt
made to pass the fd to qemu (for example, because intermediate
nwfilter operations failed) - no interface start audit will occur in
that case; so the audit for a successful opened fd does not imply
rights given to qemu unless there is a followup audit about the
attempt to start a new interface.
Likewise, when a network device is hot-unplugged, there is only one
audit message about the MAC being discontinued; again, searching back
to the earlier device open audits will show which fds that qemu quits
using (and yes, I checked via /proc/<qemu-pid>/fd that qemu _does_
close out the fds associated with an interface on hot-unplug). The
code would require much more refactoring to be able to definitively
state which device(s) were discontinued at that point, since we
currently don't record anywhere in the XML whether /dev/vhost-net was
opened for a given interface.
* src/qemu/qemu_audit.h (qemuAuditNetDevice): New prototype.
* src/qemu/qemu_audit.c (qemuAuditNetDevice): New function.
* src/qemu/qemu_command.h (qemuNetworkIfaceConnect)
(qemuPhysIfaceConnect, qemuOpenVhostNet): Adjust prototype.
* src/qemu/qemu_command.c (qemuNetworkIfaceConnect)
(qemuPhysIfaceConnect, qemuOpenVhostNet): Add audit points and
adjust parameters.
(qemuBuildCommandLine): Adjust caller.
* src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c (qemuDomainAttachNetDevice): Likewise.
Since libvirt always passes /dev/net/tun to qemu via fd, we should
never trigger the cases where qemu tries to directly open the
device. Therefore, it is safer to deny the cgroup device ACL.
* src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c (defaultDeviceACL): Remove /dev/net/tun.
* src/qemu/qemu.conf (cgroup_device_acl): Reflect this change.
qemu driver in libvirt gained support for creating domain snapshots
almost a year ago in libvirt 0.8.0. Since then we enabled QMP support
for qemu >= 0.13.0 but QMP equivalents of {save,load,del}vm commands are
not implemented in current qemu (0.14.0) so the domain snapshot support
is not very useful.
This patch detects when the appropriate QMP command is not implemented
and tries to use human-monitor-command (aka HMP passthrough) to run
it's HMP equivalent.
JSON monitor command implementation can now just directly call text
monitor implementation and it will be automatically encapsulated into
QMP's human-monitor-command.
Some qemu monitor event handlers were issuing inadequate warning when
virDomainSaveStatus() failed. They copied the message from I/O error
handler without customizing it to provide better information on why
virDomainSaveStatus() was called.
For newer qemu-img, the help string for "backing file format" is
"[-F backing_fmt]".
Fix the wrong logic error by commit e997c268.
* src/storage/storage_backend.c
Adding audit points showed that we were granting too much privilege
to qemu; it should not need any mknod rights to recreate any
devices. On the other hand, lxc should have all device privileges.
The solution is adding a flag parameter.
This also lets us restrict write access to read-only disks.
* src/util/cgroup.h (virCgroup*Device*): Adjust prototypes.
* src/util/cgroup.c (virCgroupAllowDevice)
(virCgroupAllowDeviceMajor, virCgroupAllowDevicePath)
(virCgroupDenyDevice, virCgroupDenyDeviceMajor)
(virCgroupDenyDevicePath): Add parameter.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemudDomainSaveFlag): Update clients.
* src/lxc/lxc_controller.c (lxcSetContainerResources): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c: Likewise.
(qemuSetupDiskPathAllow): Also, honor read-only disks.
Although the cgroup device ACL controller path can be worked out
by researching the code, it is more efficient to include that
information directly in the audit message.
* src/util/cgroup.h (virCgroupPathOfController): New prototype.
* src/util/cgroup.c (virCgroupPathOfController): Export.
* src/libvirt_private.syms: Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_audit.c (qemuAuditCgroup): Use it.
Device names can be manipulated, so it is better to also log
the major/minor device number corresponding to the cgroup ACL
changes that libvirt made. This required some refactoring
of the relatively new qemu cgroup audit code.
Also, qemuSetupChardevCgroup was only auditing on failure, not success.
* src/qemu/qemu_audit.h (qemuDomainCgroupAudit): Delete.
(qemuAuditCgroup, qemuAuditCgroupMajor, qemuAuditCgroupPath): New
prototypes.
* src/qemu/qemu_audit.c (qemuDomainCgroupAudit): Rename...
(qemuAuditCgroup): ...and drop a parameter.
(qemuAuditCgroupMajor, qemuAuditCgroupPath): New functions, to
allow listing device major/minor in audit.
(qemuAuditGetRdev): New helper function.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemudDomainSaveFlag): Adjust callers.
* src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c (qemuSetupDiskPathAllow)
(qemuSetupHostUsbDeviceCgroup, qemuSetupCgroup)
(qemuTeardownDiskPathDeny): Likewise.
(qemuSetupChardevCgroup): Likewise, fixing missing audit.
* src/qemu/qemu_audit.c (qemuDomainHostdevAudit): Avoid use of
"type", which has a pre-defined meaning.
(qemuDomainCgroupAudit): Likewise, as well as "item".
I noticed these while testing 'make dist'.
Parsing ./../src/util/event.c
Function comment for virEventRegisterDefaultImpl lacks description of return value
Function comment for virEventRunDefaultImpl lacks description of return value
Parsing ./../src/util/virterror.c
Missing comment for function virSetErrorLogPriorityFunc
* src/util/event.c (virEventRegisterDefaultImpl)
(virEventRunDefaultImpl): Document return types.
* src/util/virterror.c (virSetErrorLogPriorityFunc): Provide docs.
virRun gives pretty useful error output, let's not overwrite it unless there
is a good reason. Some places were providing more information about what
the commands were _attempting_ to do, however that's usually less useful from
a debugging POV than what actually happened.
as described at
http://wiki.debian.org/ToolChain/DSOLinkinghttps://fedoraproject.org/wiki/UnderstandingDSOLinkChange
otherwise the build fails on current Debian unstable with:
CCLD libvirtd
/usr/bin/ld: ../src/.libs/libvirt_driver_lxc.a(libvirt_driver_lxc_la-lxc_container.o): undefined reference to symbol 'capng_apply'
/usr/bin/ld: note: 'capng_apply' is defined in DSO //usr/lib/libcap-ng.so.0 so try adding it to the linker command line
CCLD libvirtd
/usr/bin/ld: ../src/.libs/libvirt_driver_storage.a(libvirt_driver_storage_la-storage_backend.o): undefined reference to symbol 'fgetfilecon'
/usr/bin/ld: note: 'fgetfilecon' is defined in DSO //lib/libselinux.so.1 so try adding it to the linker command line
//lib/libselinux.so.1: could not read symbols: Invalid operation
and similar errors.
On cygwin:
CC libvirt_driver_security_la-security_dac.lo
security/security_dac.c: In function 'virSecurityDACSetProcessLabel':
security/security_dac.c:618: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 7 has type 'uid_t' [-Wformat]
We've done this before (see src/util/util.c).
* src/security/security_dac.c (virSecurityDACSetProcessLabel): On
cygwin, uid_t is a 32-bit long.
On cygwin:
CC libvirt_util_la-cgroup.lo
util/cgroup.c: In function 'virCgroupKillRecursiveInternal':
util/cgroup.c:1458: warning: implicit declaration of function 'virCgroupNew' [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
* src/util/cgroup.c (virCgroupKill): Don't build on platforms
where virCgroupNew is unsupported.
Apparently some signals found on Unix are not exposed, this led
to a compilation failure
* src/util/logging.c: make code related to each signal dependant
upon the definition of that signal
The way to detach a USB disk is the same as that to detach a SCSI
disk. Rename this function and we can use it to detach a USB disk.
Signed-off-by: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com>
When I use newest libvirt to save a domain, libvirtd will be deadlock.
Here is the output of gdb:
(gdb) thread 3
[Switching to thread 3 (Thread 0x7f972a1fc710 (LWP 30265))]#0 0x000000351fe0e034 in __lll_lock_wait () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0
(gdb) bt
at qemu/qemu_driver.c:2074
ret=0x7f972a1fbbe0) at remote.c:2273
(gdb) thread 7
[Switching to thread 7 (Thread 0x7f9730bcd710 (LWP 30261))]#0 0x000000351fe0e034 in __lll_lock_wait () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0
(gdb) bt
(gdb) p *(virMutexPtr)0x6fdd60
$2 = {lock = {__data = {__lock = 2, __count = 0, __owner = 30261, __nusers = 1, __kind = 0, __spins = 0, __list = {__prev = 0x0, __next = 0x0}},
__size = "\002\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\065v\000\000\001", '\000' <repeats 26 times>, __align = 2}}
(gdb) p *(virMutexPtr)0x1a63ac0
$3 = {lock = {__data = {__lock = 2, __count = 0, __owner = 30265, __nusers = 1, __kind = 0, __spins = 0, __list = {__prev = 0x0, __next = 0x0}},
__size = "\002\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\071v\000\000\001", '\000' <repeats 26 times>, __align = 2}}
(gdb) info threads
7 Thread 0x7f9730bcd710 (LWP 30261) 0x000000351fe0e034 in __lll_lock_wait () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0
6 Thread 0x7f972bfff710 (LWP 30262) 0x000000351fe0b43c in pthread_cond_wait@@GLIBC_2.3.2 () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0
5 Thread 0x7f972b5fe710 (LWP 30263) 0x000000351fe0b43c in pthread_cond_wait@@GLIBC_2.3.2 () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0
4 Thread 0x7f972abfd710 (LWP 30264) 0x000000351fe0b43c in pthread_cond_wait@@GLIBC_2.3.2 () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0
* 3 Thread 0x7f972a1fc710 (LWP 30265) 0x000000351fe0e034 in __lll_lock_wait () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0
2 Thread 0x7f97297fb710 (LWP 30266) 0x000000351fe0b43c in pthread_cond_wait@@GLIBC_2.3.2 () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0
1 Thread 0x7f9737aac800 (LWP 30260) 0x000000351fe0803d in pthread_join () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0
The reason is that we will try to lock some object in callback function, and we may call event API with locking the same object.
In the function virEventDispatchHandles(), we unlock eventLoop before calling callback function. I think we should
do the same thing in the function virEventCleanupTimeouts() and virEventCleanupHandles().
Signed-off-by: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Not all applications have an existing event loop they need
to integrate with. Forcing them to implement the libvirt
event loop integration APIs is an undue burden. This just
exposes our simple poll() based implementation for apps
to use. So instead of calling
virEventRegister(....callbacks...)
The app would call
virEventRegisterDefaultImpl()
And then have a thread somewhere calling
static bool quit = false;
....
while (!quit)
virEventRunDefaultImpl()
* daemon/libvirtd.c, tools/console.c,
tools/virsh.c: Convert to public event loop APIs
* include/libvirt/libvirt.h.in, src/libvirt_private.syms: Add
virEventRegisterDefaultImpl and virEventRunDefaultImpl
* src/util/event.c: Implement virEventRegisterDefaultImpl
and virEventRunDefaultImpl using poll() event loop
* src/util/event_poll.c: Add full error reporting
* src/util/virterror.c, include/libvirt/virterror.h: Add
VIR_FROM_EVENTS
The event loop implementation is used by more than just the
daemon, so move it into the shared area.
* daemon/event.c, src/util/event_poll.c: Renamed
* daemon/event.h, src/util/event_poll.h: Renamed
* tools/Makefile.am, tools/console.c, tools/virsh.c: Update
to use new virEventPoll APIs
* daemon/mdns.c, daemon/mdns.c, daemon/Makefile.am: Update
to use new virEventPoll APIs
* src/util/logging.c: fix virLogDumpAllFD() to avoid snprintf, simplify
the code and provide more useful signal descriptions. Also remove an
unused variable.
For qemu names the primary vga as "qxl-vga":
1) if vram is specified for 2nd qxl device:
-vga qxl -global qxl-vga.vram_size=$SIZE \
-device qxl,id=video1,vram_size=$SIZE,...
2) if vram is not specified for 2nd qxl device, (use the default
set by global):
-vga qxl -global qxl-vga.vram_size=$SIZE \
-device qxl,id=video1,...
For qemu names all qxl devices as "qxl":
1) if vram is specified for 2nd qxl device:
-vga qxl -global qxl.vram_size=$SIZE \
-device qxl,id=video1,vram_size=$SIZE ...
2) if vram is not specified for 2nd qxl device:
-vga qxl -global qxl-vga.vram_size=$SIZE \
-device qxl,id=video1,...
"-global" is the only way to define vram_size for the primary qxl
device, regardless of how qemu names it, (It's not good a good
way, as original idea of "-global" is to set a global default for
a driver property, but to specify vram for first qxl device, we
have to use it).
For other qxl devices, as they are represented by "-device", could
specify it directly and seperately for each, and it overrides the
default set by "-global" if specified.
v1 - v2:
* modify "virDomainVideoDefaultRAM" so that it returns 16M as the
default vram_size for qxl device.
* vram_size * 1024 (qemu accepts bytes for vram_size).
* apply default vram_size for qxl device for which vram_size is
not specified.
* modify "graphics-spice" tests (more sensiable vram_size)
* Add an argument of virDomainDefPtr type for qemuBuildVideoDevStr,
to use virDomainVideoDefaultRAM in qemuBuildVideoDevStr).
v2 - v3:
* Modify default video memory size for qxl device from 16M to 24M
* Update codes to be consistent with changes on qemu_capabilities.*
virLogEmergencyDumpAll() allows to dump the content of the
debug buffer from within a signal handler. It saves to all
log file or stderr if none is found
* src/util/logging.h src/util/logging.c: add the new API
and cleanup the old virLogDump code
* src/libvirt_private.syms: exports it as a private symbol
Initially only the log actually written out by libvirt were
saved on the memory buffer, this patch forces all informations
including info and debug to be saved in memory too. This is
useful to get full data in case of crash.
This was also found while investigating
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=670848
An EOF on a domain's monitor socket results in an event being queued
to handle the EOF. The handler calls qemuProcessHandleMonitorEOF. If
it is a transient domain, this leads to a call to
virDomainRemoveInactive, which removes the domain from the driver's
hashtable and unref's it. Nowhere in this code is the qemu driver lock
acquired.
However, all modifications to the driver's domain hashtable *must* be
done while holding the driver lock, otherwise the hashtable can become
corrupt, and (even more likely) another thread could call a different
hashtable function and acquire a pointer to the domain that is in the
process of being destroyed.
To prevent such a disaster, qemuProcessHandleMonitorEOF must get the
qemu driver lock *before* it gets the DomainObj's lock, and hold it
until it is finished with the DomainObj. This guarantees that nobody
else modifies the hashtable at the same time, and that anyone who had
already gotten the DomainObj from the hashtable prior to this call has
finished with it before we remove/destroy it.
This was found while researching the root cause of:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=670848
virDomainUnref should only be called with the lock held for the
virDomainObj in question. However, when a transient qemu domain gets
EOF on its monitor socket, it queues an event which frees the monitor,
which unref's the virDomainObj without first locking it. If another
thread has already locked the virDomainObj, the modification of the
refcount could potentially be corrupted. In an extreme case, it could
also be potentially unlocked by virDomainObjFree, thus left open to
modification by anyone else who would have otherwise waited for the
lock (not to mention the fact that they would be accessing freed
data!).
The solution is to have qemuMonitorFree lock the domain object right
before unrefing it. Since the caller to qemuMonitorFree doesn't expect
this lock to be held, if the refcount doesn't go all the way to 0,
qemuMonitorFree must unlock it after the unref.
In virFileOperation, the parent does a fallback to a non-fork
attempt if it detects that the child returned EACCES. However,
the child was calling _exit(-EACCES), which does _not_ appear
as EACCES in the parent.
* src/util/util.c (virFileOperation): Correctly pass EACCES from
child to parent.
virSecurityDAC{Set,Restore}ChardevCallback expect virSecurityManagerPtr,
but are passed virDomainObjPtr instead. This makes
virSecurityDACSetChardevLabel set a wrong uid/gid on chardevs. This
patch fixes this behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Soren Hansen <soren@linux2go.dk>
This fixes a possible crash of libvirtd during its startup. When qemu
driver reconnects to running domains, it iterates over all domain
objects in a hash. When reconnecting to an associated qemu monitor
fails and the domain is transient, it's immediately removed from the
hash. Despite the fact that it's explicitly forbidden to do so. If
libvirtd is lucky enough, virHashForEach will access random memory when
the callback finishes and the deamon will crash.
Since it's trivial to fix virHashForEach to allow removal of hash
entries while iterating through them, I went this way instead of fixing
qemuReconnectDomain callback (and possibly others) to avoid deleting the
entries.
qemudDomainSaveImageStartVM was evil - it closed the incoming fd
argument on some, but not all, code paths, without informing the
caller about that action. No wonder that this resulted in
double-closes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=672725
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemudDomainSaveImageStartVM): Alter
signature, to avoid double-close.
(qemudDomainRestore, qemudDomainObjRestore): Update callers.
When a SPICE or VNC graphics controller is present, and sound is
piggybacked over a channel to the graphics device rather than
directly accessing host hardware, then there is no need to grant
host hardware access to that qemu process.
* src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c (qemuSetupCgroup): Prevent sound with
spice, and with vnc when vnc_allow_host_audio is 0.
Reported by Daniel Berrange.
The kill() function doesn't exist on Win32, so it needs to be
checked for at build time & code disabled in cgroups
* configure.ac: Check for kill()
* src/util/cgroup.c: Stub out virCGroupKill* functions
when kill() isn't available
this is the patch to add support for multiple serial ports to the
libvirt Xen driver. It support both old style (serial = "pty") and
new style (serial = [ "/dev/ttyS0", "/dev/ttyS1" ]) definition and
tests for xml2sexpr, sexpr2xml and xmconfig have been added as well.
Written and tested on RHEL-5 Xen dom0 and working as designed but
the Xen version have to have patch for RHBZ #614004 but this patch
is for upstream version of libvirt.
Also, this patch is addressing issue described in RHBZ #670789.
Signed-off-by: Michal Novotny <minovotn@redhat.com>
this is the patch to fix the virDomainChrDefParseTargetXML() functionality
to parse the target port from XML if available. This is necessary for
multiple serial port support which is the second part of this patch.
Signed-off-by: Michal Novotny <minovotn@redhat.com>
The virCgroupKill method kills all PIDs found in a cgroup
The virCgroupKillRecursively method does this recursively
for child cgroups.
The virCgroupKillPainfully method does a recursive kill
several times in a row until everything has really died
