If any of the devices referenced a USB hub that does not exist,
defining the domain would either fail with:
error: An error occurred, but the cause is unknown
(if only the last hub in the path is missing)
or crash.
Return a proper error instead of crashing.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1367130
More misunderstanding/mistaken assumptions on my part - I had thought
that a pci-expander-bus could be plugged into any legacy PCI slot, and
that pcie-expander-bus could be plugged into any PCIe slot. This isn't
correct - they can both be plugged ontly into their respective root
buses. This patch adds that restriction.
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1358712
libvirt had allowed a dmi-to-pci-bridge to be plugged in anywhere a
normal PCIe endpoint can be connected, but this is wrong - it will
only work if it's plugged into pcie-root (the PCIe root complex) or a
pcie-expander-bus (the qemu device pxb-pcie). This patch adjusts the
connection flags accordingly.
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1363648
The generated command line wouldn't work since QEMU doesn't know what
'cmt' is. The following patch will fix this issue.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1355857
Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
In qemu, enabling this feature boils down to adding the following
onto the command line:
-global driver=cfi.pflash01,property=secure,value=on
However, there are some constraints resulting from the
implementation. For instance, System Management Mode (SMM) is
required to be enabled, the machine type must be q35-2.4 or
later, and the guest should be x86_64. While technically it is
possible to have 32 bit guests with secure boot, some non-trivial
CPU flags tuning is required (for instance lm and nx flags must
be prohibited). Given complexity of our CPU driver, this is not
trivial. Therefore I've chosen to forbid 32 bit guests for now.
If there's ever need, we can refine the check later.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Since its release of 2.4.0 qemu is able to enable System
Management Module in the firmware, or disable it. We should
expose this capability in the XML. Unfortunately, there's no good
way to determine whether the binary we are talking to supports
it. I mean, if qemu's run with real machine type, the smm
attribute can be seen in 'qom-list /machine' output. But it's not
there when qemu's run with -M none. Therefore we're stuck with
version based check.
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
When parsing a command line with USB devices that have
no address specified, QEMU automatically adds a USB hub
if the device would fill up all the available USB ports.
To help most of the users, add one hub if there are more
USB devices than available ports. For wilder configurations,
expect the user to provide us with more hubs and/or controllers.
Resolves a CI test integration failure with a RHEL6/Centos6 environment.
In order to use a LUKS encrypted device, the design decision was to
generate an encrypted secret based on the master key. However, commit
id 'da86c6c' missed checking for that specifically.
When qemuDomainSecretSetup was implemented, a design decision was made
to "fall back" to a plain text secret setup if the specific cipher was
not available (e.g. virCryptoHaveCipher(VIR_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES256CBC))
as well as the QEMU_CAPS_OBJECT_SECRET. For the luks encryption setup
there is no fall back to the plaintext secret, thus if that gets set
up by qemuDomainSecretSetup, then we need to fail.
Also, while the qemuxml2argvtest has set the QEMU_CAPS_OBJECT_SECRET
bit, it didn't take into account the second requirement that the
ability to generate the encrypted secret is possible. So modify the
test to not attempt to run the luks-disk if we know we don't have
the encryption algorithm.
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1301021
Generate the luks command line using the AES secret key to encrypt the
luks secret. A luks secret object will be in addition to a an AES secret.
For hotplug, check if the encinfo exists and if so, add the AES secret
for the passphrase for the secret object used to decrypt the device.
Modify/augment the fakeSecret* in qemuxml2argvtest in order to handle
find a uuid or a volume usage with a specific path prefix in the XML
(corresponds to the already generated XML tests). Add error message
when the 'usageID' is not 'mycluster_myname'. Commit id '1d632c39'
altered the error message generation to rely on the errors from the
secret_driver (or it's faked replacement).
Add the .args output for adding the LUKS disk to the domain
Signed-off-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
We were requiring a USB port path in the schema, but not enforcing it.
Omitting the USB port would lead to libvirt formatting it as (null).
Such domain cannot be started and will disappear after libvirtd restart
(since it cannot parse back the XML).
Only format the port if it has been specified and mark it as optional
in the XML schema.
It's just test, but why leak it?
==26971== 20 bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 623 of 704
==26971== at 0x4C29F80: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:296)
==26971== by 0xE560447: vasprintf (vasprintf.c:76)
==26971== by 0xAE0DEE2: virVasprintfInternal (virstring.c:480)
==26971== by 0xAE0DFF7: virAsprintfInternal (virstring.c:501)
==26971== by 0x4751F3: qemuProcessPrepareMonitorChr (qemu_process.c:2651)
==26971== by 0x4334B1: testCompareXMLToArgvFiles (qemuxml2argvtest.c:297)
==26971== by 0x4339AC: testCompareXMLToArgvHelper (qemuxml2argvtest.c:413)
==26971== by 0x446E7A: virTestRun (testutils.c:179)
==26971== by 0x445D33: mymain (qemuxml2argvtest.c:2029)
==26971== by 0x44886F: virTestMain (testutils.c:969)
==26971== by 0x445D9B: main (qemuxml2argvtest.c:2036)
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
This is preferrable to -nographic which (in addition to disabling
graphics output) redirects the serial port to stdio and on OpenBIOS
enables the firmware's serial console.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For type='ethernet' interfaces only.
(This patch had been pushed earlier in
commit 0b4645a7e0, but was reverted in
commit 84d47a3cce because it had been
accidentally pushed during the freeze for release 2.0.0)
In order to use more common code and set up for a future type, modify the
encryption secret to allow the "usage" attribute or the "uuid" attribute
to define the secret. The "usage" in the case of a volume secret would be
the path to the volume as dictated by the backwards compatibility brought
on by virStorageGenerateQcowEncryption where it set up the usage field as
the vol->target.path and didn't allow someone to provide it. This carries
into virSecretObjListFindByUsageLocked which takes the secret usage attribute
value from from the domain disk definition and compares it against the
usage type from the secret definition. Since none of the code dealing
with qcow/qcow2 encryption secrets uses usage for lookup, it's a mostly
cosmetic change. The real usage comes in a future path where the encryption
is expanded to be a luks volume and the secret will allow definition of
the usage field.
This code will make use of the virSecretLookup{Parse|Format}Secret common code.
Signed-off-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
I'm not sure why our code claimed "-boot menu=on" cannot be used in
combination with per-device bootindex, but it was proved wrong about
four years ago by commit 8c952908. Let's always use bootindex when QEMU
supports it.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1323085
Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
Make them work again... The xml2xml had been working, but the xml2argv
were not working. Making the xml2argv work required a few adjustments to
the xml to update to more recent times.
Signed-off-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
VNC graphics already supports sockets but only via 'socket' attribute.
This patch coverts that attribute into listen type 'socket'.
For backward compatibility we need to handle listen type 'socket' and 'socket'
attribute properly to support old XMLs and new XMLs. If both are provided they
have to match, if only one of them is provided we need to be able to parse that
configuration too.
To not break migration back to old libvirt if the socket is provided by user we
need to generate migratable XML without the listen element and use only 'socket'
attribute.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
Since it will not be called from outside of conf we can unexport it too
if we move it to the appropriate place.
Test suite change is necessary since the error will be reported sooner
now.
Historically, we added heads=1 to videos, but for example for qxl, we
did not reflect that on the command line.
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1283207
Signed-off-by: Martin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>
Hand-entering indexes for 20 PCI controllers is not as tedious as
manually determining and entering their PCI addresses, but it's still
annoying, and the algorithm for determining the proper index is
incredibly simple (in all cases except one) - just pick the lowest
unused index.
The one exception is USB2 controllers because multiple controllers in
the same group have the same index. For these we look to see if 1) the
most recently added USB controller is also a USB2 controller, and 2)
the group *that* controller belongs to doesn't yet have a controller
of the exact model we're just now adding - if both are true, the new
controller gets the same index, but in all other cases we just assign
the lowest unused index.
With this patch in place and combined with the automatic PCI address
assignment, we can define a PCIe switch with several ports like this:
<controller type='pci' model='pcie-root-port'/>
<controller type='pci' model='pcie-switch-upstream-port'/>
<controller type='pci' model='pcie-switch-downstream-port'/>
<controller type='pci' model='pcie-switch-downstream-port'/>
<controller type='pci' model='pcie-switch-downstream-port'/>
<controller type='pci' model='pcie-switch-downstream-port'/>
<controller type='pci' model='pcie-switch-downstream-port'/>
...
These will each get a unique index, and PCI addresses that connect
them together appropriately with no pesky numbers required.
<os>
<acpi>
<table type="slic">/path/to/acpi/table/file</table>
</acpi>
</os>
will result in:
-acpitable sig=SLIC,file=/path/to/acpi/table/file
This option was introduced by QEMU commit 8a92ea2 in 2009.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1327537
Test disk-drive-network-rbd-auth-AES depends on existence of
gnutls_cipher_encrypt() function which was introduced in gnutls 2.10.0.
On systems without this function we should skip this test.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
This test requests a read-only virtual FAT drive on the IDE bus.
Read-only IDE drives are unsupported, but libvirt only displays
the error if it has the QEMU_CAPS_DRIVE_READONLY capability.
Read-write FAT drives are also unsupported.
Rather than only assigning a PCI address when no address is given at
all, also do it when the config says that the address type is 'pci',
but it gives no address (virDeviceInfoPCIAddressWanted()).
There are also several places after parsing but prior to address
assignment where code previously expected that any info with address
type='pci' would have a *valid* PCI address, which isn't always the
case - now we check not only for type='pci', but also for a valid
address (virDeviceInfoPCIAddressPresent()).
The test case added in this patch was directly copied from Cole's patch titled:
qemu: Wire up address type=pci auto_allocate
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1182074
If they're available and we need to pass secrets to qemu, then use the
qemu domain secret object in order to pass the secrets for RBD volumes
instead of passing the base64 encoded secret on the command line.
The goal is to make AES secrets the default and have no user interaction
required in order to allow using the AES mechanism. If the mechanism
is not available, then fall back to the current plain mechanism using
a base64 encoded secret.
New APIs:
qemu_domain.c:
qemuDomainGetSecretAESAlias:
Generate/return the secret object alias for an AES Secret Info type.
This will be called from qemuDomainSecretAESSetup.
qemuDomainSecretAESSetup: (private)
This API handles the details of the generation of the AES secret
and saves the pieces that need to be passed to qemu in order for
the secret to be decrypted. The encrypted secret based upon the
domain master key, an initialization vector (16 byte random value),
and the stored secret. Finally, the requirement from qemu is the IV
and encrypted secret are to be base64 encoded.
qemu_command.c:
qemuBuildSecretInfoProps: (private)
Generate/return a JSON properties object for the AES secret to
be used by both the command building and eventually the hotplug
code in order to add the secret object. Code was designed so that
in the future perhaps hotplug could use it if it made sense.
qemuBuildObjectSecretCommandLine (private)
Generate and add to the command line the -object secret for the
secret. This will be required for the subsequent RBD reference
to the object.
qemuBuildDiskSecinfoCommandLine (private)
Handle adding the AES secret object.
Adjustments:
qemu_domain.c:
The qemuDomainSecretSetup was altered to call either the AES or Plain
Setup functions based upon whether AES secrets are possible (we have
the encryption API) or not, we have secrets, and of course if the
protocol source is RBD.
qemu_command.c:
Adjust the qemuBuildRBDSecinfoURI API's in order to generate the
specific command options for an AES secret, such as:
-object secret,id=$alias,keyid=$masterKey,data=$base64encodedencrypted,
format=base64
-drive file=rbd:pool/image:id=myname:auth_supported=cephx\;none:\
mon_host=mon1.example.org\:6321,password-secret=$alias,...
where the 'id=' value is the secret object alias generated by
concatenating the disk alias and "-aesKey0". The 'keyid= $masterKey'
is the master key shared with qemu, and the -drive syntax will
reference that alias as the 'password-secret'. For the -drive
syntax, the 'id=myname' is kept to define the username, while the
'key=$base64 encoded secret' is removed.
While according to the syntax described for qemu commit '60390a21'
or as seen in the email archive:
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-01/msg04083.html
it is possible to pass a plaintext password via a file, the qemu
commit 'ac1d8878' describes the more feature rich 'keyid=' option
based upon the shared masterKey.
Add tests for checking/comparing output.
NB: For hotplug, since the hotplug code doesn't add command line
arguments, passing the encoded secret directly to the monitor
will suffice.
