Address side effect of accessing a variable via an index: Filters
accessing a variable where an element is accessed that is beyond the
size of the list (for example $TEST[10] and only 2 elements are available)
cannot instantiate that filter. Test for this and report proper error
to user.
This patch adds access to single elements of variables via index. Example:
<rule action='accept' direction='in' priority='500'>
<tcp srcipaddr='$ADDR[1]' srcportstart='$B[2]'/>
</rule>
This patch introduces the capability to use a different iterator per
variable.
The currently supported notation of variables in a filtering rule like
<rule action='accept' direction='out'>
<tcp srcipaddr='$A' srcportstart='$B'/>
</rule>
processes the two lists 'A' and 'B' in parallel. This means that A and B
must have the same number of 'N' elements and that 'N' rules will be
instantiated (assuming all tuples from A and B are unique).
In this patch we now introduce the assignment of variables to different
iterators. Therefore a rule like
<rule action='accept' direction='out'>
<tcp srcipaddr='$A[@1]' srcportstart='$B[@2]'/>
</rule>
will now create every combination of elements in A with elements in B since
A has been assigned to an iterator with Id '1' and B has been assigned to an
iterator with Id '2', thus processing their value independently.
The first rule has an equivalent notation of
<rule action='accept' direction='out'>
<tcp srcipaddr='$A[@0]' srcportstart='$B[@0]'/>
</rule>
In this patch we introduce testing whether the iterator points to a
unique set of entries that have not been seen before at one of the previous
iterations. The point is to eliminate duplicates and with that unnecessary
filtering rules by preventing identical filtering rules from being
instantiated.
Example with two lists:
list1 = [1,2,1]
list2 = [1,3,1]
The 1st iteration would take the 1st items of each list -> 1,1
The 2nd iteration would take the 2nd items of each list -> 2,3
The 3rd iteration would take the 3rd items of each list -> 1,1 but
skip them since this same pair has already been encountered in the 1st
iteration
Implementation-wise this is solved by taking the n-th element of list1 and
comparing it against elements 1..n-1. If no equivalent is found, then there
is no possibility of this being a duplicate. In case an equivalent element
is found at position i, then the n-th element in the 2nd list is compared
against the i-th element in the 2nd list and if that is not the same, then
this is a unique pair, otherwise it is not unique and we may need to do
the same comparison on the 3rd list.
When running virsh migrate with --xml option and actual xml file doesn't
exist, virsh hasn't output any error information, although return value
is 1.
* tools/virsh.c: Raising a appropriate error information when operation fails.
* How to reproduce?
% virsh migrate <domain> --live qemu+ssh://<target host>/system --xml non-existent.xml
% echo $?
* Fixed result:
error: file 'non-existent.xml' doesn't exist
Signed-off-by: Alex Jia <ajia@redhat.com>
When sVirt is integrated with the LXC driver, it will be neccessary
to invoke the security driver APIs using only a virDomainDefPtr
since the lxc_container.c code has no virDomainObjPtr available.
Aside from two functions which want obj->pid, every bit of the
security driver code only touches obj->def. So we don't need to
pass a virDomainObjPtr into the security drivers, a virDomainDefPtr
is sufficient. Two functions also gain a 'pid_t pid' argument.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c, src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c,
src/qemu/qemu_migration.c, src/qemu/qemu_process.c,
src/security/security_apparmor.c,
src/security/security_dac.c,
src/security/security_driver.h,
src/security/security_manager.c,
src/security/security_manager.h,
src/security/security_nop.c,
src/security/security_selinux.c,
src/security/security_stack.c: Change all security APIs to use a
virDomainDefPtr instead of virDomainObjPtr
When disk snapshots were first implemented, libvirt blindly refused
to allow an external snapshot destination that already exists, since
qemu will blindly overwrite the contents of that file during the
snapshot_blkdev monitor command, and we don't like a default of
data loss by default. But VDSM has a scenario where NFS permissions
are intentionally set so that the destination file can only be
created by the management machine, and not the machine where the
guest is running, so that libvirt will necessarily see the destination
file already existing; adding a flag will allow VDSM to force the file
reuse without libvirt complaining of possible data loss.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=767104
* include/libvirt/libvirt.h.in (virDomainSnapshotCreateFlags): Add
VIR_DOMAIN_SNAPSHOT_CREATE_REUSE_EXT.
* src/libvirt.c (virDomainSnapshotCreateXML): Document it. Add
note about partial failure.
* tools/virsh.c (cmdSnapshotCreate, cmdSnapshotCreateAs): Add new
flag.
* tools/virsh.pod (snapshot-create, snapshot-create-as): Document
it.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemuDomainSnapshotDiskPrepare)
(qemuDomainSnapshotCreateXML): Implement the new flag.
We had loads of different styles in describing the @flags parameter
for various APIs, as well as several APIs that didn't list which
enums provided the bit values valid for the flags.
The end result is one of two formats:
@flags: bitwise-OR of vir...Flags
@flags: extra flags; not used yet, so callers should always pass 0
* src/libvirt.c: Use common sentences for flags. Also,
(virDomainGetBlockIoTune): Mention virTypedParameterFlags.
(virConnectOpenAuth): Mention virConnectFlags.
(virDomainMigrate, virDomainMigrate2, virDomainMigrateToURI)
(virDomainMigrateToURI2): Mention virDomainMigrateFlags.
(virDomainMemoryPeek): Mention virDomainMemoryFlags.
(virStoragePoolBuild): Mention virStoragePoolBuildFlags.
(virStoragePoolDelete): Mention virStoragePoolDeleteFlags.
(virStreamNew): Mention virStreamFlags.
(virDomainOpenGraphics): Mention virDomainOpenGraphicsFlags.
This *kind of* addresses:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=772395
(it doesn't eliminate the failure to start, but causes libvirt to give
a better idea about the cause of the failure).
If a guest uses a kvm emulator (e.g. /usr/bin/qemu-kvm) and the guest
is started when kvm isn't available (either because virtualization is
unavailable / has been disabled in the BIOS, or the kvm modules
haven't been loaded for some reason), a semi-cryptic error message is
logged:
libvirtError: internal error Child process (LC_ALL=C
PATH=/sbin:/usr/sbin:/bin:/usr/bin /usr/bin/qemu-kvm -device ? -device
pci-assign,? -device virtio-blk-pci,? -device virtio-net-pci,?) status
unexpected: exit status 1
This patch notices at process start that a guest needs kvm, and checks
for the presence of /dev/kvm (a reasonable indicator that kvm is
available) before trying to execute the qemu binary. If kvm isn't
available, a more useful (too verbose??) error is logged.
It should be a copy-paste error, the result is programming will result in an
infinite loop again due to without iterating 'j' variable.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: fix a typo on qemuDomainSetBlkioParameters.
RHBZ: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=770520
Signed-off-by: Alex Jia <ajia@redhat.com>
I previously mentioned [1] a PolicyKit issue where libvirt would
proceed with authentication even though polkit-auth failed:
testusr xen134:~> virsh list --all
Attempting to obtain authorization for org.libvirt.unix.manage.
polkit-grant-helper: given auth type (8 -> yes) is bogus
Failed to obtain authorization for org.libvirt.unix.manage.
Id Name State
----------------------------------
0 Domain-0 running
- sles11sp1-pv shut off
AFAICT, libvirt attempts to obtain a privilege it already has,
causing polkit-auth to fail with above message. Instead of calling
obtain and then checking auth, IMO the workflow should be for the
server to check auth first, and if that fails ask the client to
obtain it and check again. This workflow also allows for checking
only successful exit of polkit-auth in virConnectAuthGainPolkit().
[1] https://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2011-December/msg00837.html
In the past, generic SCSI commands issued from a guest to a virtio
disk were always passed through to the underlying disk by qemu, and
the kernel would also pass them on.
As a result of CVE-2011-4127 (see:
http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2011/q4/536), qemu now honors its
scsi=on|off device option for virtio-blk-pci (which enables/disables
passthrough of generic SCSI commands), and the kernel will only allow
the commands for physical devices (not for partitions or logical
volumes). The default behavior of qemu is still to allow sending
generic SCSI commands to physical disks that are presented to a guest
as virtio-blk-pci devices, but libvirt prefers to disable those
commands in the standard virtio block devices, enabling it only when
specifically requested (hopefully indicating that the requester
understands what they're asking for). For this purpose, a new libvirt
disk device type (device='lun') has been created.
device='lun' is identical to the default device='disk', except that:
1) It is only allowed if bus='virtio', type='block', and the qemu
version is "new enough" to support it ("new enough" == qemu 0.11 or
better), otherwise the domain will fail to start and a
CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED error will be logged).
2) The option "scsi=on" will be added to the -device arg to allow
SG_IO commands (if device !='lun', "scsi=off" will be added to the
-device arg so that SG_IO commands are specifically forbidden).
Guests which continue to use disk device='disk' (the default) will no
longer be able to use SG_IO commands on the disk; those that have
their disk device changed to device='lun' will still be able to use SG_IO
commands.
*docs/formatdomain.html.in - document the new device attribute value.
*docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng - allow it in the RNG
*tests/* - update the args of several existing tests to add scsi=off, and
add one new test that will test scsi=on.
*src/conf/domain_conf.c - update domain XML parser and formatter
*src/qemu/qemu_(command|driver|hotplug).c - treat
VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_DEVICE_LUN *almost* identically to
VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_DEVICE_DISK, except as indicated above.
Note that no support for this new device value was added to any
hypervisor drivers other than qemu, because it's unclear what it might
mean (if anything) to those drivers.
This patch adds two capabilities flags to deal with various aspects
of supporting SG_IO commands on virtio-blk-pci devices:
QEMU_CAPS_VIRTIO_BLK_SCSI
set if -device virtio-blk-pci accepts the scsi="on|off" option
When present, this is on by default, but can be set to off to disable
SG_IO functions.
QEMU_CAPS_VIRTIO_BLK_SG_IO
set if SG_IO commands are supported in the virtio-blk-pci driver
(present since qemu 0.11 according to a qemu developer, if I
understood correctly)
This fixes https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=638633
Although scripts are not used by interfaces of type other than
"ethernet" in qemu, due to the fact that the parser stores the script
name in a union that is only valid when type is ethernet or bridge,
there is no way for anyone except the parser itself to catch the
problem of specifying an interface script for an inappropriate
interface type (by the time the parsed data gets back to the code that
called the parser, all evidence that a script was specified is
forgotten).
Since the parser itself should be agnostic to which type of interface
allows scripts (an example of why: a script specified for an interface
of type bridge is valid for xen domains, but not for qemu domains),
the solution here is to move the script out of the union(s) in the
DomainNetDef, always populate it when specified (regardless of
interface type), and let the driver decide whether or not it is
appropriate.
Currently the qemu, xen, libxml, and uml drivers recognize the script
parameter and do something with it (the uml driver only to report that
it isn't supported). Those drivers have been updated to log a
CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED error when a script is specified for an interface
type that's inappropriate for that particular hypervisor.
(NB: There was earlier discussion of solving this problem by adding a
VALIDATE flag to all libvirt APIs that accept XML, which would cause
the XML to be validated against the RNG files. One statement during
that discussion was that the RNG shouldn't contain hypervisor-specific
things, though, and a proper solution to this problem would require
that (again, because a script for an interface of type "bridge" is
accepted by xen, but not by qemu).
Commit ae523427 missed one pair of functions that could use
the helper routine.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemuSetSchedulerParametersFlags)
(qemuGetSchedulerParametersFlags): Simplify.
On rawhide, gcc is new enough to output new DWARF information that
pdwtags has not yet learned, but the resulting 'make check' output
was rather confusing:
$ make -C src check
...
GEN virkeepaliveprotocol-structs
die__process_function: DW_TAG_INVALID (0x4109) @ <0x58c> not handled!
WARNING: your pdwtags program is too old
WARNING: skipping the virkeepaliveprotocol-structs test
WARNING: install dwarves-1.3 or newer
...
$ pdwtags --version
v1.9
I've filed the pdwtags deficiency as
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=772358
* src/Makefile.am (PDWTAGS): Don't leave -t file behind on version
mismatch. Soften warning message, since 1.9 is newer than 1.3.
Don't leak stderr from broken version.
Commit db371a2 mistakenly added new functions inside a #ifndef WIN32
guard, even though they are needed on all platforms.
* src/util/command.c (virCommandFDSet): Move outside WIN32
conditional.
I hit a VERY weird testsuite failure on rawhide, which included
_binary_ output to stderr, followed by a hang waiting for me
to type something! (Here, using ^@ for NUL):
$ ./commandtest
TEST: commandtest
WARNING: gnome-keyring:: couldn't send data: Bad file descriptor
.WARNING: gnome-keyring:: couldn't send data: Bad file descriptor
.WARNING: gnome-keyring:: couldn't send data: Bad file descriptor
WARNING: gnome-keyring:: couldn't send data: Bad file descriptor
.8^@^@^@8^@^@^@^A^@^@^@^Bay^A^@^@^@)PRIVATE-GNOME-KEYRING-PKCS11-PROTOCOL-V-1
I finally traced it to the fact that gnome-keyring, called via
gnutls_global_init which is turn called by virNetTLSInit, opens
an internal fd that it expects to communicate to via a
pthread_atfork handler (never mind that it violates POSIX by
using non-async-signal-safe functions in that handler:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=772320).
Our problem stems from the fact that we pulled the rug out from
under the library's expectations by closing an fd that it had
just opened. While we aren't responsible for fixing the bugs
in that pthread_atfork handler, we can at least avoid the bugs
by not closing the fd in the first place.
* tests/commandtest.c (mymain): Avoid closing fds that were opened
by virInitialize.
Detected by valgrind. Leak introduced in commit 5745dc1.
* src/qemu/qemu_command.c: fix memory leak on failure and successful path.
* How to reproduce?
% valgrind -v --leak-check=full ./qemuargv2xmltest
* Actual result:
==2196== 80 bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 3 of 4
==2196== at 0x4A05FDE: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:236)
==2196== by 0x39CF07F6E1: strdup (in /lib64/libc-2.12.so)
==2196== by 0x419823: qemuParseRBDString (qemu_command.c:1657)
==2196== by 0x4221ED: qemuParseCommandLine (qemu_command.c:5934)
==2196== by 0x422AFB: qemuParseCommandLineString (qemu_command.c:7561)
==2196== by 0x416864: testCompareXMLToArgvHelper (qemuargv2xmltest.c:48)
==2196== by 0x417DB1: virtTestRun (testutils.c:141)
==2196== by 0x415CAF: mymain (qemuargv2xmltest.c:175)
==2196== by 0x4174A7: virtTestMain (testutils.c:696)
==2196== by 0x39CF01ECDC: (below main) (in /lib64/libc-2.12.so)
==2196==
==2196== LEAK SUMMARY:
==2196== definitely lost: 80 bytes in 1 blocks
Signed-off-by: Alex Jia <ajia@redhat.com>
Using automake.git (will become 1.12 someday), I got this error:
configure.ac:90: error: automatic de-ANSI-fication support has been removed
/usr/local/share/aclocal-1.11a/protos.m4:13: AM_C_PROTOTYPES is expanded from...
configure.ac:90: the top level
autom4te: /usr/bin/m4 failed with exit status: 1
In short, pre-C89 compilers are no longer a viable portability
target. Besides, our code base already requires C99, so worrying
about pre-C89 seems pointless.
* configure.ac (AM_C_PROTOTYPES): Drop, since newer automake no
longer provides it.
When setting numa nodeset for a domain which has no nodeset set
before, libvirtd crashes by dereferencing the pointer to the old
nodemask which is null in that case.
Commit baade4d fixed a memory leak on failure, but in the process,
introduced a use-after-free on success, which can be triggered with:
1. set bandwidth with --live
2. query bandwidth
3. set bandwidth with --live
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemuDomainSetInterfaceParameters): Don't
free newBandwidth on success.
Reported by Hu Tao.
Commit b434329 has a logic bug: seclabel overrides don't set
def->type, but the default value is 0 (aka static). Restarting
libvirtd would thus reject the XML for any domain with an
override of <seclabel relabel='no'/> (which happens quite
easily if a disk image lives on NFS), with a message:
2012-01-04 22:29:40.949+0000: 6769: error : virSecurityLabelDefParseXMLHelper:2593 : XML error: security label is missing
Fix the logic to never read from an override's def->type, and
to allow a missing <label> subelement when relabel is no. There's
a lot of stupid double-negatives in the code (!norelabel) because
of the way that we want the zero-initialized defaults to behave.
* src/conf/domain_conf.c (virSecurityLabelDefParseXMLHelper): Use
type field from correct location.
Currently, virCommand implementation uses FD_ macros from
sys/select.h. However, those cannot handle more opened files
than FD_SETSIZE. Therefore switch to generalized implementation
based on array of integers.
xen-unstable c/s 23874:651aed73b39c added another member to
xen_domctl_getdomaininfo struct and bumped domctl version to 8.
Add a corresponding domctl v8 struct in xen hypervisor sub-driver
and detect domctl v8 during initialization.
The console path in xenstore is /local/domain/<id>/console/tty
for PV guests (PV console) and /local/domain/<id>/serial/0/tty
(serial console) for HVM guests. Similar to Xen's in-tree console
client, read the correct path for PV vs HVM.
It is a good practise to set revents to zero before doing any poll().
Moreover, we should check if event we waited for really occurred or
if any of fds we were polling on didn't encountered hangup.
Most severe here is a latent (but currently untriggered) memory leak
if any hypervisor ever adds a string interface property; the
remainder are mainly cosmetic.
* include/libvirt/libvirt.h.in (VIR_DOMAIN_BANDWIDTH_*): Move
macros closer to interface that uses them, and document type.
* src/libvirt.c (virDomainSetInterfaceParameters)
(virDomainGetInterfaceParameters): Formatting tweaks.
* daemon/remote.c (remoteDispatchDomainGetInterfaceParameters):
Avoid memory leak.
* src/libvirt_public.syms (LIBVIRT_0.9.9): Sort lines.
* src/libvirt_private.syms (domain_conf.h): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemuDomainSetInterfaceParameters): Fix
comments, break long lines.
virshReportError() function frees the most recent error reported from
libvirt. Condition that checks if connection to the daemon was broken
during last command was then limited to check for SIGPIPE signal not
taking into account possible errors signalized without SIGPIPE.
This patch moves the check before the error is freed, to take into
account code that does not emit SIGPIPE while failing.
* tools/virsh.c: - move check for broken connection before error print.
Hi,
this is the fifth version of my SRV record for DNSMasq patch rebased
for the current codebase to the bridge driver and libvirt XML file to
include support for the SRV records in the DNS. The syntax is based on
DNSMasq man page and tests for both xml2xml and xml2argv were added as
well. There are some things written a better way in comparison with
version 4, mainly there's no hack in tests/networkxml2argvtest.c and
also the xPath context is changed to use a simpler query using the
virXPathInt() function relative to the current node.
Also, the patch is also fixing the networkxml2argv test to pass both
checks, i.e. both unit tests and also syntax check.
Please review,
Michal
Signed-off-by: Michal Novotny <minovotn@redhat.com>
Leak detected by Coverity, and introduced in commit 93ab585.
Reported by Alex Jia.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemuDomainSetBlkioParameters): Free
devices array on error.
The blocks to extract node information on a per-arch
basis wasn't well balanced leading to a compilation
failure if not on one of the handled arches (PCs and PPCs)
This wires up the XML changes in the previous patch to let SELinux
labeling honor user overrides, as well as affecting the live XML
configuration in one case where the user didn't specify anything
in the offline XML.
I noticed that the logs contained messages like this:
2011-12-05 23:32:40.382+0000: 26569: warning : SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel:533 : cannot lookup default selinux label for /nfs/libvirt/images/dom.img
for all my domain images living on NFS. But if we would just remember
that on domain creation that we were unable to set a SELinux label (due to
NFSv3 lacking labels, or NFSv4 not being configured to expose attributes),
then we could avoid wasting the time trying to clear the label on
domain shutdown. This in turn is one less point of NFS failure,
especially since there have been documented cases of virDomainDestroy
hanging during an attempted operation on a failed NFS connection.
* src/security/security_selinux.c (SELinuxSetFilecon): Move guts...
(SELinuxSetFileconHelper): ...to new function.
(SELinuxSetFileconOptional): New function.
(SELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel): Honor override label, and remember
if labeling failed.
(SELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabelInt): Skip relabeling based on
override.
Implement the parsing and formatting of the XML addition of
the previous commit. The new XML doesn't affect qemu command
line, so we can now test round-trip XML->memory->XML handling.
I chose to reuse the existing structure, even though per-device
override doesn't use all of those fields, rather than create a
new structure, in order to reuse more code.
* src/conf/domain_conf.h (_virDomainDiskDef): Add seclabel member.
* src/conf/domain_conf.c (virDomainDiskDefFree): Free it.
(virSecurityLabelDefFree): New function.
(virDomainDiskDefFormat): Print it.
(virSecurityLabelDefFormat): Reduce output if model not present.
(virDomainDiskDefParseXML): Alter signature, and parse seclabel.
(virSecurityLabelDefParseXML): Split...
(virSecurityLabelDefParseXMLHelper): ...into new helper.
(virDomainDeviceDefParse, virDomainDefParseXML): Update callers.
* tests/qemuxml2argvdata/qemuxml2argv-seclabel-dynamic-override.args:
New file.
* tests/qemuxml2xmltest.c (mymain): Enhance test.
* tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c (mymain): Likewise.
When doing security relabeling, there are cases where a per-file
override might be appropriate. For example, with a static label
and relabeling, it might be appropriate to skip relabeling on a
particular disk, where the backing file lives on NFS that lacks
the ability to track labeling. Or with dynamic labeling, it might
be appropriate to use a custom (non-dynamic) label for a disk
specifically intended to be shared across domains.
The new XML resembles the top-level <seclabel>, but with fewer
options (basically relabel='no', or <label>text</label>):
<domain ...>
...
<devices>
<disk type='file' device='disk'>
<source file='/path/to/image1'>
<seclabel relabel='no'/> <!-- override for just this disk -->
</source>
...
</disk>
<disk type='file' device='disk'>
<source file='/path/to/image1'>
<seclabel relabel='yes'> <!-- override for just this disk -->
<label>system_u:object_r:shared_content_t:s0</label>
</seclabel>
</source>
...
</disk>
...
</devices>
<seclabel type='dynamic' model='selinux'>
<baselabel>text</baselabel> <!-- used for all devices without override -->
</seclabel>
</domain>
This patch only introduces the XML and documentation; future patches
will actually parse and make use of it. The intent is that we can
further extend things as needed, adding a per-device <seclabel> in
more places (such as the source of a console device), and possibly
allowing a <baselabel> instead of <label> for labeling where we want
to reuse the cNNN,cNNN pair of a dynamically labeled domain but a
different base label.
First suggested by Daniel P. Berrange here:
https://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2011-December/msg00258.html
* docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng (devSeclabel): New define.
(disk): Use it.
* docs/formatdomain.html.in (elementsDisks, seclabel): Document
the new XML.
* tests/qemuxml2argvdata/qemuxml2argv-seclabel-dynamic-override.xml:
New test, to validate RNG.
A future patch will parse and output <seclabel> in more than one
location in a <domain> xml; make it easier to reuse code.
* src/conf/domain_conf.c (virSecurityLabelDefFree): Rename...
(virSecurityLabelDefClear): ...and make static.
(virSecurityLabelDefParseXML): Alter signature.
(virDomainDefParseXML, virDomainDefFree): Adjust callers.
(virDomainDefFormatInternal): Split output...
(virSecurityLabelDefFormat): ...into new helper.
The RNG for <seclabel> was too strict - if it was present, then it
had to have sub-elements, even if those didn't make sense for the
given attributes. Also, we didn't have any tests of <seclabel>
parsing or XML output.
In this patch, I added more parsing tests than output tests (since
the output populates and/or reorders fields not present in certain
inputs). Making the RNG reliable is a precursor to using <seclabel>
variants in more places in the XML in later patches.
See also:
http://berrange.com/posts/2011/09/29/two-small-improvements-to-svirt-guest-configuration-flexibility-with-kvmlibvirt/
* docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng (seclabel): Tighten rules.
* tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c (mymain): New tests.
* tests/qemuxml2xmltest.c (mymain): Likewise.
* tests/qemuxml2argvdata/qemuxml2argv-seclabel-*.*: New files.
Add a new command domiftune to get/set interface parameters.
* tools/virsh.c: implement the new command
* tools/virsh.pod: documentation of the new command
