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The term "access control list" better describes the concept involved. Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
159 lines
6.2 KiB
ReStructuredText
159 lines
6.2 KiB
ReStructuredText
=============================
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QEMU command-line passthrough
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=============================
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.. contents::
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Libvirt aims to provide explicit modelling of virtualization features in
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the domain XML document schema. QEMU has a very broad range of features
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and not all of these can be mapped to elements in the domain XML. Libvirt
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would like to reduce the gap to QEMU, however, with finite resources there
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will always be cases which aren't covered by the domain XML schema.
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XML document additions
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======================
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To deal with the problem, libvirt introduced support for command-line
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passthrough of QEMU arguments. This is achieved by supporting a custom
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XML namespace, under which some QEMU driver specific elements are defined.
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The canonical place to declare the namespace is on the top level ``<domain>``
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element. At the very end of the document, arbitrary command-line arguments
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can now be added, using the namespace prefix ``qemu:``
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::
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<domain type='kvm' xmlns:qemu='http://libvirt.org/schemas/domain/qemu/1.0'>
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<name>QEMUGuest1</name>
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<uuid>c7a5fdbd-edaf-9455-926a-d65c16db1809</uuid>
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...
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<qemu:commandline>
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<qemu:arg value='-newarg'/>
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<qemu:arg value='parameter'/>
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<qemu:env name='ID' value='wibble'/>
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<qemu:env name='BAR'/>
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</qemu:commandline>
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</domain>
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Note that when an argument takes a value eg ``-newarg parameter``, the argument
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and the value must be passed as separate ``<qemu:arg>`` entries.
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Instead of declaring the XML namespace on the top level ``<domain>`` it is also
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possible to declare it at time of use, which is more convenient for humans
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writing the XML documents manually. So the following example is functionally
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identical:
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::
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<domain type='kvm'>
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<name>QEMUGuest1</name>
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<uuid>c7a5fdbd-edaf-9455-926a-d65c16db1809</uuid>
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...
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<commandline xmlns="http://libvirt.org/schemas/domain/qemu/1.0">
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<arg value='-newarg'/>
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<arg value='parameter'/>
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<env name='ID' value='wibble'/>
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<env name='BAR'/>
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</commandline>
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</domain>
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Note that when querying the XML from libvirt, it will have been translated into
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the canonical syntax once more with the namespace on the top level element.
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Security confinement / sandboxing
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=================================
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When libvirt launches a QEMU process it makes use of a number of security
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technologies to confine QEMU and thus protect the host from malicious VM
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breakouts.
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When configuring security protection, however, libvirt generally needs to know
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exactly which host resources the VM is permitted to access. It gets this
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information from the domain XML document. This only works for elements in the
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regular schema, the arguments used with command-line passthrough are completely
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opaque to libvirt.
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As a result, if command-line passthrough is used to expose a file on the host
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to QEMU, the security protections will activate and either kill QEMU or deny it
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access.
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There are two strategies for dealing with this problem, either figure out what
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steps are needed to grant QEMU access to the device, or disable the security
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protections. The former is harder, but more secure, while the latter is simple.
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Granting access per VM
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----------------------
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* SELinux - the file on the host needs an SELinux label that will grant access
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to QEMU's ``svirt_t`` policy.
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- Read-only access - use the ``virt_content_t`` label
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- Shared, write access - use the ``svirt_image_t:s0`` label (ie no Multi-
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Category Security (MCS) value appended)
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- Exclusive, write access - use the ``svirt_image_t:s0:MCS`` label for the VM.
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The MCS is auto-generatd at boot time, so this may require re-configuring
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the VM to have a fixed MCS label
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* Discretionary Access Control (DAC) - the file on the host needs to be
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readable/writable to the ``qemu`` user or ``qemu`` group. This can be done
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by changing the file ownership to ``qemu``, or relaxing the permissions to
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allow world read, or adding file ACLs to allow access to ``qemu``.
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* Namespaces - a private ``mount`` namespace is used for QEMU by default
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which populates a new ``/dev`` with only the device nodes needed by QEMU.
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There is no way to augment the set of device nodes ahead of time.
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* Seccomp - libvirt launches QEMU with its built-in seccomp policy enabled with
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``obsolete=deny``, ``elevateprivileges=deny``, ``spawn=deny`` and
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``resourcecontrol=deny`` settings active. There is no way to change this
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policy on a per VM basis.
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* Cgroups - a custom cgroup is created per VM and this will either use the
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``devices`` controller or an ``BPF`` rule to define an access control list
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for the set of device nodes.
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There is no way to change this policy on a per VM basis.
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Disabling security protection per VM
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------------------------------------
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Some of the security protections can be disabled per-VM:
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* SELinux - in the domain XML the ``<seclabel>`` model can be changed to
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``none`` instead of ``selinux``, which will make the VM run unconfined.
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* DAC - in the domain XML an ``<seclabel>`` element with the ``dac`` model can
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be added, configured with a user / group account of ``root`` to make QEMU run
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with full privileges.
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* Namespaces - there is no way to disable this per VM.
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* Seccomp - there is no way to disable this per VM.
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* Cgroups - there is no way to disable this per VM.
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Disabling security protection host-wide
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---------------------------------------
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As a last resort it is possible to disable security protection host wide which
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will affect all virtual machines. These settings are all made in
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``/etc/libvirt/qemu.conf``
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* SELinux - set ``security_default_confied = 0`` to make QEMU run unconfined by
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default, while still allowing explicit opt-in to SELinux for VMs.
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* DAC - set ``user = root`` and ``group = root`` to make QEMU run as the root
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account.
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* SELinux, DAC - set ``security_driver = []`` to entirely disable both the
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SELinux and DAC security drivers.
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* Namespaces - set ``namespaces = []`` to disable use of the ``mount``
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namespaces, causing QEMU to see the normal fully popualated ``dev``.
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* Seccomp - set ``seccomp_sandbox = 0`` to disable use of the Seccomp sandboxing
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in QEMU.
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* Cgroups - set ``cgroup_device_acl`` to include the desired device node, or
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``cgroup_controllers = [...]`` to exclude the ``devices`` controller.
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