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passt/pasta.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/* PASST - Plug A Simple Socket Transport
* for qemu/UNIX domain socket mode
*
* PASTA - Pack A Subtle Tap Abstraction
* for network namespace/tap device mode
*
* pasta.c - pasta (namespace) specific implementations
*
* Copyright (c) 2020-2021 Red Hat GmbH
* Author: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
*
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
* #syscalls:pasta clone waitid exit exit_group rt_sigprocmask
* #syscalls:pasta rt_sigreturn|sigreturn armv6l:sigreturn armv7l:sigreturn
* #syscalls:pasta ppc64:sigreturn s390x:sigreturn
*/
#include <sched.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <libgen.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
Handle userns isolation and dropping root at the same time passt/pasta can interact with user namespaces in a number of ways: 1) With --netns-only we'll remain in our original user namespace 2) With --userns or a PID option to pasta we'll join either the given user namespace or that of the PID 3) When pasta spawns a shell or command we'll start a new user namespace for the command and then join it 4) With passt we'll create a new user namespace when we sandbox() ourself However (3) and (4) turn out to have essentially the same effect. In both cases we create one new user namespace. The spawned command starts there, and passt/pasta itself will live there from sandbox() onwards. Because of this, we can simplify user namespace handling by moving the userns handling earlier, to the same point we drop root in the original namespace. Extend the drop_user() function to isolate_user() which does both. After switching UID and GID in the original userns, isolate_user() will either join or create the userns we require. When we spawn a command with pasta_start_ns()/pasta_setup_ns() we no longer need to create a userns, because we're already made one. sandbox() likewise no longer needs to create (or join) an userns because we're already in the one we need. We no longer need c->pasta_userns_fd, since the fd is only used locally in isolate_user(). Likewise we can replace c->netns_only with a local in conf(), since it's not used outside there. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2022-09-12 12:24:07 +00:00
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/inotify.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/timerfd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
pasta: Don't try to watch namespaces in procfs with inotify, use timer instead We watch network namespace entries to detect when we should quit (unless --no-netns-quit is passed), and these might stored in a tmpfs typically mounted at /run/user/UID or /var/run/user/UID, or found in procfs at /proc/PID/ns/. Currently, we try to use inotify for any possible location of those entries, but inotify, of course, doesn't work on pseudo-filesystems (see inotify(7)). The man page reflects this: the description of --no-netns-quit implies that we won't quit anyway if the namespace is not "bound to the filesystem". Well, we won't quit, but, since commit 9e0dbc894813 ("More deterministic detection of whether argument is a PID, PATH or NAME"), we try. And, indeed, this is harmless, as the caveat from that commit message states. Now, it turns out that Buildah, a tool to create container images, sharing its codebase with Podman, passes a procfs entry to pasta, and expects pasta to exit once the network namespace is not needed anymore, that is, once the original container process, also spawned by Buildah, terminates. Get this to work by using the timer fallback mechanism if the namespace name is passed as a path belonging to a pseudo-filesystem. This is expected to be procfs, but I covered sysfs and devpts pseudo-filesystems as well, because nothing actually prevents creating this kind of directory structure and links there. Note that fstatfs(), according to some versions of man pages, was apparently "deprecated" by the LSB. My reasoning for using it is essentially this: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-man/f54kudgblgk643u32tb6at4cd3kkzha6hslahv24szs4raroaz@ogivjbfdaqtb/t/#u ...that is, there was no such thing as an LSB deprecation, and anyway there's no other way to get the filesystem type. Also note that, while it might sound more obvious to detect the filesystem type using fstatfs() on the file descriptor itself (c->pasta_netns_fd), the reported filesystem type for it is nsfs, no matter what path was given to pasta. If we use the parent directory, we'll typically have either tmpfs or procfs reported. If the target namespace is given as a PID, or as a PID-based procfs entry, we don't risk races if this PID is recycled: our handle on /proc/PID/ns will always refer to the original namespace associated with that PID, and we don't re-open this entry from procfs to check it. There's, however, a remaining race possibility if the parent process is not the one associated to the network namespace we operate on: in that case, the parent might pass a procfs entry associated to a PID that was recycled by the time we parse it. This can't happen if the namespace PID matches the one of the parent, because we detach from the controlling terminal after parsing the namespace reference. To avoid this type of race, if desired, we could add the option for the parent to pass a PID file descriptor, that the parent obtained via pidfd_open(). This is beyond the scope of this change. Update the man page to reflect that, even if the target network namespace is passed as a procfs path or a PID, we'll now quit when the procfs entry is gone. Reported-by: Paul Holzinger <pholzing@redhat.com> Link: https://github.com/containers/podman/pull/21563#issuecomment-1948200214 Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2024-02-17 12:41:39 +00:00
#include <sys/statfs.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <net/ethernet.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
pasta: Don't try to watch namespaces in procfs with inotify, use timer instead We watch network namespace entries to detect when we should quit (unless --no-netns-quit is passed), and these might stored in a tmpfs typically mounted at /run/user/UID or /var/run/user/UID, or found in procfs at /proc/PID/ns/. Currently, we try to use inotify for any possible location of those entries, but inotify, of course, doesn't work on pseudo-filesystems (see inotify(7)). The man page reflects this: the description of --no-netns-quit implies that we won't quit anyway if the namespace is not "bound to the filesystem". Well, we won't quit, but, since commit 9e0dbc894813 ("More deterministic detection of whether argument is a PID, PATH or NAME"), we try. And, indeed, this is harmless, as the caveat from that commit message states. Now, it turns out that Buildah, a tool to create container images, sharing its codebase with Podman, passes a procfs entry to pasta, and expects pasta to exit once the network namespace is not needed anymore, that is, once the original container process, also spawned by Buildah, terminates. Get this to work by using the timer fallback mechanism if the namespace name is passed as a path belonging to a pseudo-filesystem. This is expected to be procfs, but I covered sysfs and devpts pseudo-filesystems as well, because nothing actually prevents creating this kind of directory structure and links there. Note that fstatfs(), according to some versions of man pages, was apparently "deprecated" by the LSB. My reasoning for using it is essentially this: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-man/f54kudgblgk643u32tb6at4cd3kkzha6hslahv24szs4raroaz@ogivjbfdaqtb/t/#u ...that is, there was no such thing as an LSB deprecation, and anyway there's no other way to get the filesystem type. Also note that, while it might sound more obvious to detect the filesystem type using fstatfs() on the file descriptor itself (c->pasta_netns_fd), the reported filesystem type for it is nsfs, no matter what path was given to pasta. If we use the parent directory, we'll typically have either tmpfs or procfs reported. If the target namespace is given as a PID, or as a PID-based procfs entry, we don't risk races if this PID is recycled: our handle on /proc/PID/ns will always refer to the original namespace associated with that PID, and we don't re-open this entry from procfs to check it. There's, however, a remaining race possibility if the parent process is not the one associated to the network namespace we operate on: in that case, the parent might pass a procfs entry associated to a PID that was recycled by the time we parse it. This can't happen if the namespace PID matches the one of the parent, because we detach from the controlling terminal after parsing the namespace reference. To avoid this type of race, if desired, we could add the option for the parent to pass a PID file descriptor, that the parent obtained via pidfd_open(). This is beyond the scope of this change. Update the man page to reflect that, even if the target network namespace is passed as a procfs path or a PID, we'll now quit when the procfs entry is gone. Reported-by: Paul Holzinger <pholzing@redhat.com> Link: https://github.com/containers/podman/pull/21563#issuecomment-1948200214 Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2024-02-17 12:41:39 +00:00
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include "util.h"
#include "passt.h"
#include "isolation.h"
#include "netlink.h"
#include "log.h"
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
/* PID of child, in case we created a namespace */
int pasta_child_pid;
/**
* pasta_child_handler() - Exit once shell exits (if we started it), reap clones
* @signal: Unused, handler deals with SIGCHLD only
*/
void pasta_child_handler(int signal)
{
siginfo_t infop;
(void)signal;
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
if (signal != SIGCHLD)
return;
if (pasta_child_pid &&
!waitid(P_PID, pasta_child_pid, &infop, WEXITED | WNOHANG)) {
if (infop.si_pid == pasta_child_pid) {
if (infop.si_code == CLD_EXITED)
exit(infop.si_status);
/* If killed by a signal, si_status is the number.
* Follow common shell convention of returning it + 128.
*/
exit(infop.si_status + 128);
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
/* Nothing to do, detached PID namespace going away */
}
}
waitid(P_ALL, 0, NULL, WEXITED | WNOHANG);
waitid(P_ALL, 0, NULL, WEXITED | WNOHANG);
}
/**
* pasta_wait_for_ns() - Busy loop until we can enter the target namespace
* @arg: Execution context
*
* Return: 0
*/
static int pasta_wait_for_ns(void *arg)
{
struct ctx *c = (struct ctx *)arg;
int flags = O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC;
char ns[PATH_MAX];
snprintf(ns, PATH_MAX, "/proc/%i/ns/net", pasta_child_pid);
do {
while ((c->pasta_netns_fd = open(ns, flags)) < 0) {
if (errno != ENOENT)
return 0;
}
} while (setns(c->pasta_netns_fd, CLONE_NEWNET) &&
!close(c->pasta_netns_fd));
return 0;
}
/**
* ns_check() - Check if we can enter configured namespaces
* @arg: Execution context
*
* Return: 0
*/
static int ns_check(void *arg)
{
struct ctx *c = (struct ctx *)arg;
Handle userns isolation and dropping root at the same time passt/pasta can interact with user namespaces in a number of ways: 1) With --netns-only we'll remain in our original user namespace 2) With --userns or a PID option to pasta we'll join either the given user namespace or that of the PID 3) When pasta spawns a shell or command we'll start a new user namespace for the command and then join it 4) With passt we'll create a new user namespace when we sandbox() ourself However (3) and (4) turn out to have essentially the same effect. In both cases we create one new user namespace. The spawned command starts there, and passt/pasta itself will live there from sandbox() onwards. Because of this, we can simplify user namespace handling by moving the userns handling earlier, to the same point we drop root in the original namespace. Extend the drop_user() function to isolate_user() which does both. After switching UID and GID in the original userns, isolate_user() will either join or create the userns we require. When we spawn a command with pasta_start_ns()/pasta_setup_ns() we no longer need to create a userns, because we're already made one. sandbox() likewise no longer needs to create (or join) an userns because we're already in the one we need. We no longer need c->pasta_userns_fd, since the fd is only used locally in isolate_user(). Likewise we can replace c->netns_only with a local in conf(), since it's not used outside there. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2022-09-12 12:24:07 +00:00
if (setns(c->pasta_netns_fd, CLONE_NEWNET))
c->pasta_netns_fd = -1;
return 0;
}
/**
Handle userns isolation and dropping root at the same time passt/pasta can interact with user namespaces in a number of ways: 1) With --netns-only we'll remain in our original user namespace 2) With --userns or a PID option to pasta we'll join either the given user namespace or that of the PID 3) When pasta spawns a shell or command we'll start a new user namespace for the command and then join it 4) With passt we'll create a new user namespace when we sandbox() ourself However (3) and (4) turn out to have essentially the same effect. In both cases we create one new user namespace. The spawned command starts there, and passt/pasta itself will live there from sandbox() onwards. Because of this, we can simplify user namespace handling by moving the userns handling earlier, to the same point we drop root in the original namespace. Extend the drop_user() function to isolate_user() which does both. After switching UID and GID in the original userns, isolate_user() will either join or create the userns we require. When we spawn a command with pasta_start_ns()/pasta_setup_ns() we no longer need to create a userns, because we're already made one. sandbox() likewise no longer needs to create (or join) an userns because we're already in the one we need. We no longer need c->pasta_userns_fd, since the fd is only used locally in isolate_user(). Likewise we can replace c->netns_only with a local in conf(), since it's not used outside there. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2022-09-12 12:24:07 +00:00
* pasta_open_ns() - Open network namespace descriptors
* @c: Execution context
* @netns: network namespace path
*
* Return: 0 on success, negative error code otherwise
*/
Handle userns isolation and dropping root at the same time passt/pasta can interact with user namespaces in a number of ways: 1) With --netns-only we'll remain in our original user namespace 2) With --userns or a PID option to pasta we'll join either the given user namespace or that of the PID 3) When pasta spawns a shell or command we'll start a new user namespace for the command and then join it 4) With passt we'll create a new user namespace when we sandbox() ourself However (3) and (4) turn out to have essentially the same effect. In both cases we create one new user namespace. The spawned command starts there, and passt/pasta itself will live there from sandbox() onwards. Because of this, we can simplify user namespace handling by moving the userns handling earlier, to the same point we drop root in the original namespace. Extend the drop_user() function to isolate_user() which does both. After switching UID and GID in the original userns, isolate_user() will either join or create the userns we require. When we spawn a command with pasta_start_ns()/pasta_setup_ns() we no longer need to create a userns, because we're already made one. sandbox() likewise no longer needs to create (or join) an userns because we're already in the one we need. We no longer need c->pasta_userns_fd, since the fd is only used locally in isolate_user(). Likewise we can replace c->netns_only with a local in conf(), since it's not used outside there. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2022-09-12 12:24:07 +00:00
void pasta_open_ns(struct ctx *c, const char *netns)
{
Handle userns isolation and dropping root at the same time passt/pasta can interact with user namespaces in a number of ways: 1) With --netns-only we'll remain in our original user namespace 2) With --userns or a PID option to pasta we'll join either the given user namespace or that of the PID 3) When pasta spawns a shell or command we'll start a new user namespace for the command and then join it 4) With passt we'll create a new user namespace when we sandbox() ourself However (3) and (4) turn out to have essentially the same effect. In both cases we create one new user namespace. The spawned command starts there, and passt/pasta itself will live there from sandbox() onwards. Because of this, we can simplify user namespace handling by moving the userns handling earlier, to the same point we drop root in the original namespace. Extend the drop_user() function to isolate_user() which does both. After switching UID and GID in the original userns, isolate_user() will either join or create the userns we require. When we spawn a command with pasta_start_ns()/pasta_setup_ns() we no longer need to create a userns, because we're already made one. sandbox() likewise no longer needs to create (or join) an userns because we're already in the one we need. We no longer need c->pasta_userns_fd, since the fd is only used locally in isolate_user(). Likewise we can replace c->netns_only with a local in conf(), since it's not used outside there. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2022-09-12 12:24:07 +00:00
int nfd = -1;
nfd = open(netns, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
if (nfd < 0) {
die("Couldn't open network namespace %s: %s",
netns, strerror(errno));
}
c->pasta_netns_fd = nfd;
NS_CALL(ns_check, c);
if (c->pasta_netns_fd < 0)
die("Couldn't switch to pasta namespaces: %s", strerror(errno));
if (!c->no_netns_quit) {
char buf[PATH_MAX] = { 0 };
strncpy(buf, netns, PATH_MAX - 1);
strncpy(c->netns_base, basename(buf), PATH_MAX - 1);
strncpy(buf, netns, PATH_MAX - 1);
strncpy(c->netns_dir, dirname(buf), PATH_MAX - 1);
}
}
/**
* struct pasta_spawn_cmd_arg - Argument for pasta_spawn_cmd()
* @exe: Executable to run
Handle userns isolation and dropping root at the same time passt/pasta can interact with user namespaces in a number of ways: 1) With --netns-only we'll remain in our original user namespace 2) With --userns or a PID option to pasta we'll join either the given user namespace or that of the PID 3) When pasta spawns a shell or command we'll start a new user namespace for the command and then join it 4) With passt we'll create a new user namespace when we sandbox() ourself However (3) and (4) turn out to have essentially the same effect. In both cases we create one new user namespace. The spawned command starts there, and passt/pasta itself will live there from sandbox() onwards. Because of this, we can simplify user namespace handling by moving the userns handling earlier, to the same point we drop root in the original namespace. Extend the drop_user() function to isolate_user() which does both. After switching UID and GID in the original userns, isolate_user() will either join or create the userns we require. When we spawn a command with pasta_start_ns()/pasta_setup_ns() we no longer need to create a userns, because we're already made one. sandbox() likewise no longer needs to create (or join) an userns because we're already in the one we need. We no longer need c->pasta_userns_fd, since the fd is only used locally in isolate_user(). Likewise we can replace c->netns_only with a local in conf(), since it's not used outside there. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2022-09-12 12:24:07 +00:00
* @argv: Command and arguments to run
*/
struct pasta_spawn_cmd_arg {
const char *exe;
char *const *argv;
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
};
/**
* pasta_spawn_cmd() - Prepare new netns, start command or shell
* @arg: See @pasta_spawn_cmd_arg
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
*
* Return: this function never returns
*/
static int pasta_spawn_cmd(void *arg)
{
const struct pasta_spawn_cmd_arg *a;
sigset_t set;
/* We run in a detached PID and mount namespace: mount /proc over */
if (mount("", "/proc", "proc", 0, NULL))
warn("Couldn't mount /proc: %s", strerror(errno));
if (write_file("/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range", "0 0"))
warn("Cannot set ping_group_range, ICMP requests might fail");
/* Wait for the parent to be ready: see main() */
sigemptyset(&set);
sigaddset(&set, SIGUSR1);
sigwaitinfo(&set, NULL);
a = (const struct pasta_spawn_cmd_arg *)arg;
execvp(a->exe, a->argv);
perror("execvp");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
/**
* pasta_start_ns() - Fork command in new namespace if target ns is not given
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
* @c: Execution context
isolation: Only configure UID/GID mappings in userns when spawning shell When in passt mode, or pasta mode spawning a command, we create a userns for ourselves. This is used both to isolate the pasta/passt process itself and to run the spawned command, if any. Since eed17a47 "Handle userns isolation and dropping root at the same time" we've handled both cases the same, configuring the UID and GID mappings in the new userns to map whichever UID we're running as to root within the userns. This mapping is desirable when spawning a shell or other command, so that the user gets a root shell with reasonably clear abilities within the userns and netns. It's not necessarily essential, though. When not spawning a shell, it doesn't really have any purpose: passt itself doesn't need to be root and can operate fine with an unmapped user (using some of the capabilities we get when entering the userns instead). Configuring the uid_map can cause problems if passt is running with any capabilities in the initial namespace, such as CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE to allow it to forward low ports. In this case the kernel makes files in /proc/pid owned by root rather than the starting user to prevent the user from interfering with the operation of the capability-enhanced process. This includes uid_map meaning we are not able to write to it. Whether this behaviour is correct in the kernel is debatable, but in any case we might as well avoid problems by only initializing the user mappings when we really want them. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-10-14 04:25:36 +00:00
* @uid: UID we're running as in the init namespace
* @gid: GID we're running as in the init namespace
* @argc: Number of arguments for spawned command
* @argv: Command to spawn and arguments
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
*/
isolation: Only configure UID/GID mappings in userns when spawning shell When in passt mode, or pasta mode spawning a command, we create a userns for ourselves. This is used both to isolate the pasta/passt process itself and to run the spawned command, if any. Since eed17a47 "Handle userns isolation and dropping root at the same time" we've handled both cases the same, configuring the UID and GID mappings in the new userns to map whichever UID we're running as to root within the userns. This mapping is desirable when spawning a shell or other command, so that the user gets a root shell with reasonably clear abilities within the userns and netns. It's not necessarily essential, though. When not spawning a shell, it doesn't really have any purpose: passt itself doesn't need to be root and can operate fine with an unmapped user (using some of the capabilities we get when entering the userns instead). Configuring the uid_map can cause problems if passt is running with any capabilities in the initial namespace, such as CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE to allow it to forward low ports. In this case the kernel makes files in /proc/pid owned by root rather than the starting user to prevent the user from interfering with the operation of the capability-enhanced process. This includes uid_map meaning we are not able to write to it. Whether this behaviour is correct in the kernel is debatable, but in any case we might as well avoid problems by only initializing the user mappings when we really want them. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-10-14 04:25:36 +00:00
void pasta_start_ns(struct ctx *c, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
int argc, char *argv[])
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
{
struct pasta_spawn_cmd_arg arg = {
.exe = argv[0],
.argv = argv,
};
isolation: Only configure UID/GID mappings in userns when spawning shell When in passt mode, or pasta mode spawning a command, we create a userns for ourselves. This is used both to isolate the pasta/passt process itself and to run the spawned command, if any. Since eed17a47 "Handle userns isolation and dropping root at the same time" we've handled both cases the same, configuring the UID and GID mappings in the new userns to map whichever UID we're running as to root within the userns. This mapping is desirable when spawning a shell or other command, so that the user gets a root shell with reasonably clear abilities within the userns and netns. It's not necessarily essential, though. When not spawning a shell, it doesn't really have any purpose: passt itself doesn't need to be root and can operate fine with an unmapped user (using some of the capabilities we get when entering the userns instead). Configuring the uid_map can cause problems if passt is running with any capabilities in the initial namespace, such as CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE to allow it to forward low ports. In this case the kernel makes files in /proc/pid owned by root rather than the starting user to prevent the user from interfering with the operation of the capability-enhanced process. This includes uid_map meaning we are not able to write to it. Whether this behaviour is correct in the kernel is debatable, but in any case we might as well avoid problems by only initializing the user mappings when we really want them. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-10-14 04:25:36 +00:00
char uidmap[BUFSIZ], gidmap[BUFSIZ];
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
char ns_fn_stack[NS_FN_STACK_SIZE];
char *sh_argv[] = { NULL, NULL };
char sh_arg0[PATH_MAX + 1];
sigset_t set;
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
c->foreground = 1;
if (!c->debug)
c->quiet = 1;
isolation: Only configure UID/GID mappings in userns when spawning shell When in passt mode, or pasta mode spawning a command, we create a userns for ourselves. This is used both to isolate the pasta/passt process itself and to run the spawned command, if any. Since eed17a47 "Handle userns isolation and dropping root at the same time" we've handled both cases the same, configuring the UID and GID mappings in the new userns to map whichever UID we're running as to root within the userns. This mapping is desirable when spawning a shell or other command, so that the user gets a root shell with reasonably clear abilities within the userns and netns. It's not necessarily essential, though. When not spawning a shell, it doesn't really have any purpose: passt itself doesn't need to be root and can operate fine with an unmapped user (using some of the capabilities we get when entering the userns instead). Configuring the uid_map can cause problems if passt is running with any capabilities in the initial namespace, such as CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE to allow it to forward low ports. In this case the kernel makes files in /proc/pid owned by root rather than the starting user to prevent the user from interfering with the operation of the capability-enhanced process. This includes uid_map meaning we are not able to write to it. Whether this behaviour is correct in the kernel is debatable, but in any case we might as well avoid problems by only initializing the user mappings when we really want them. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-10-14 04:25:36 +00:00
/* Configure user and group mappings */
snprintf(uidmap, BUFSIZ, "0 %u 1", uid);
snprintf(gidmap, BUFSIZ, "0 %u 1", gid);
if (write_file("/proc/self/uid_map", uidmap) ||
write_file("/proc/self/setgroups", "deny") ||
write_file("/proc/self/gid_map", gidmap)) {
warn("Couldn't configure user mappings");
}
if (argc == 0) {
arg.exe = getenv("SHELL");
if (!arg.exe)
arg.exe = "/bin/sh";
if ((size_t)snprintf(sh_arg0, sizeof(sh_arg0),
"-%s", arg.exe) >= sizeof(sh_arg0))
die("$SHELL is too long (%zu bytes)", strlen(arg.exe));
sh_argv[0] = sh_arg0;
arg.argv = sh_argv;
}
/* Block SIGUSR1 in child, we queue it in main() when we're ready */
sigemptyset(&set);
sigaddset(&set, SIGUSR1);
sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &set, NULL);
pasta_child_pid = do_clone(pasta_spawn_cmd, ns_fn_stack,
sizeof(ns_fn_stack),
CLONE_NEWIPC | CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET |
CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWNS | SIGCHLD,
(void *)&arg);
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
if (pasta_child_pid == -1) {
perror("clone");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
NS_CALL(pasta_wait_for_ns, c);
if (c->pasta_netns_fd < 0)
die("Failed to join network namespace: %s", strerror(errno));
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
}
/**
* pasta_ns_conf() - Set up loopback and tap interfaces in namespace as needed
* @c: Execution context
*/
void pasta_ns_conf(struct ctx *c)
{
int rc = 0;
rc = nl_link_up(nl_sock_ns, 1 /* lo */, 0);
if (rc < 0)
die("Couldn't bring up loopback interface in namespace: %s",
strerror(-rc));
/* Get or set MAC in target namespace */
if (MAC_IS_ZERO(c->mac_guest))
nl_link_get_mac(nl_sock_ns, c->pasta_ifi, c->mac_guest);
else
rc = nl_link_set_mac(nl_sock_ns, c->pasta_ifi, c->mac_guest);
if (rc < 0)
die("Couldn't set MAC address in namespace: %s",
strerror(-rc));
if (c->pasta_conf_ns) {
nl_link_up(nl_sock_ns, c->pasta_ifi, c->mtu);
if (c->ifi4) {
if (c->no_copy_addrs) {
rc = nl_addr_set(nl_sock_ns, c->pasta_ifi,
AF_INET,
&c->ip4.addr,
c->ip4.prefix_len);
} else {
rc = nl_addr_dup(nl_sock, c->ifi4,
nl_sock_ns, c->pasta_ifi,
AF_INET);
}
if (rc < 0) {
die("Couldn't set IPv4 address(es) in namespace: %s",
strerror(-rc));
}
if (c->no_copy_routes) {
rc = nl_route_set_def(nl_sock_ns, c->pasta_ifi,
AF_INET, &c->ip4.gw);
} else {
rc = nl_route_dup(nl_sock, c->ifi4, nl_sock_ns,
c->pasta_ifi, AF_INET);
}
if (rc < 0) {
die("Couldn't set IPv4 route(s) in guest: %s",
strerror(-rc));
}
}
if (c->ifi6) {
if (c->no_copy_addrs) {
rc = nl_addr_set(nl_sock_ns, c->pasta_ifi,
AF_INET6, &c->ip6.addr, 64);
} else {
rc = nl_addr_dup(nl_sock, c->ifi6,
nl_sock_ns, c->pasta_ifi,
AF_INET6);
}
if (rc < 0) {
die("Couldn't set IPv6 address(es) in namespace: %s",
strerror(-rc));
}
if (c->no_copy_routes) {
rc = nl_route_set_def(nl_sock_ns, c->pasta_ifi,
AF_INET6, &c->ip6.gw);
} else {
rc = nl_route_dup(nl_sock, c->ifi6,
nl_sock_ns, c->pasta_ifi,
AF_INET6);
}
if (rc < 0) {
die("Couldn't set IPv6 route(s) in guest: %s",
strerror(-rc));
}
}
}
proto_update_l2_buf(c->mac_guest, NULL);
}
/**
* pasta_netns_quit_timer() - Set up fallback timer to monitor namespace
*
* Return: timerfd file descriptor, negative error code on failure
*/
static int pasta_netns_quit_timer(void)
{
int fd = timerfd_create(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, TFD_CLOEXEC);
struct itimerspec it = { { 1, 0 }, { 1, 0 } }; /* one-second interval */
if (fd == -1) {
err("timerfd_create(): %s", strerror(errno));
return -errno;
}
if (timerfd_settime(fd, 0, &it, NULL) < 0) {
err("timerfd_settime(): %s", strerror(errno));
close(fd);
return -errno;
}
return fd;
}
/**
* pasta_netns_quit_init() - Watch network namespace to quit once it's gone
* @c: Execution context
*/
void pasta_netns_quit_init(const struct ctx *c)
{
union epoll_ref ref = { .type = EPOLL_TYPE_NSQUIT_INOTIFY };
struct epoll_event ev = { .events = EPOLLIN };
int flags = O_NONBLOCK | O_CLOEXEC;
pasta: Don't try to watch namespaces in procfs with inotify, use timer instead We watch network namespace entries to detect when we should quit (unless --no-netns-quit is passed), and these might stored in a tmpfs typically mounted at /run/user/UID or /var/run/user/UID, or found in procfs at /proc/PID/ns/. Currently, we try to use inotify for any possible location of those entries, but inotify, of course, doesn't work on pseudo-filesystems (see inotify(7)). The man page reflects this: the description of --no-netns-quit implies that we won't quit anyway if the namespace is not "bound to the filesystem". Well, we won't quit, but, since commit 9e0dbc894813 ("More deterministic detection of whether argument is a PID, PATH or NAME"), we try. And, indeed, this is harmless, as the caveat from that commit message states. Now, it turns out that Buildah, a tool to create container images, sharing its codebase with Podman, passes a procfs entry to pasta, and expects pasta to exit once the network namespace is not needed anymore, that is, once the original container process, also spawned by Buildah, terminates. Get this to work by using the timer fallback mechanism if the namespace name is passed as a path belonging to a pseudo-filesystem. This is expected to be procfs, but I covered sysfs and devpts pseudo-filesystems as well, because nothing actually prevents creating this kind of directory structure and links there. Note that fstatfs(), according to some versions of man pages, was apparently "deprecated" by the LSB. My reasoning for using it is essentially this: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-man/f54kudgblgk643u32tb6at4cd3kkzha6hslahv24szs4raroaz@ogivjbfdaqtb/t/#u ...that is, there was no such thing as an LSB deprecation, and anyway there's no other way to get the filesystem type. Also note that, while it might sound more obvious to detect the filesystem type using fstatfs() on the file descriptor itself (c->pasta_netns_fd), the reported filesystem type for it is nsfs, no matter what path was given to pasta. If we use the parent directory, we'll typically have either tmpfs or procfs reported. If the target namespace is given as a PID, or as a PID-based procfs entry, we don't risk races if this PID is recycled: our handle on /proc/PID/ns will always refer to the original namespace associated with that PID, and we don't re-open this entry from procfs to check it. There's, however, a remaining race possibility if the parent process is not the one associated to the network namespace we operate on: in that case, the parent might pass a procfs entry associated to a PID that was recycled by the time we parse it. This can't happen if the namespace PID matches the one of the parent, because we detach from the controlling terminal after parsing the namespace reference. To avoid this type of race, if desired, we could add the option for the parent to pass a PID file descriptor, that the parent obtained via pidfd_open(). This is beyond the scope of this change. Update the man page to reflect that, even if the target network namespace is passed as a procfs path or a PID, we'll now quit when the procfs entry is gone. Reported-by: Paul Holzinger <pholzing@redhat.com> Link: https://github.com/containers/podman/pull/21563#issuecomment-1948200214 Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2024-02-17 12:41:39 +00:00
struct statfs s = { 0 };
bool try_inotify = true;
int fd = -1, dir_fd;
if (c->mode != MODE_PASTA || c->no_netns_quit || !*c->netns_base)
return;
pasta: Don't try to watch namespaces in procfs with inotify, use timer instead We watch network namespace entries to detect when we should quit (unless --no-netns-quit is passed), and these might stored in a tmpfs typically mounted at /run/user/UID or /var/run/user/UID, or found in procfs at /proc/PID/ns/. Currently, we try to use inotify for any possible location of those entries, but inotify, of course, doesn't work on pseudo-filesystems (see inotify(7)). The man page reflects this: the description of --no-netns-quit implies that we won't quit anyway if the namespace is not "bound to the filesystem". Well, we won't quit, but, since commit 9e0dbc894813 ("More deterministic detection of whether argument is a PID, PATH or NAME"), we try. And, indeed, this is harmless, as the caveat from that commit message states. Now, it turns out that Buildah, a tool to create container images, sharing its codebase with Podman, passes a procfs entry to pasta, and expects pasta to exit once the network namespace is not needed anymore, that is, once the original container process, also spawned by Buildah, terminates. Get this to work by using the timer fallback mechanism if the namespace name is passed as a path belonging to a pseudo-filesystem. This is expected to be procfs, but I covered sysfs and devpts pseudo-filesystems as well, because nothing actually prevents creating this kind of directory structure and links there. Note that fstatfs(), according to some versions of man pages, was apparently "deprecated" by the LSB. My reasoning for using it is essentially this: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-man/f54kudgblgk643u32tb6at4cd3kkzha6hslahv24szs4raroaz@ogivjbfdaqtb/t/#u ...that is, there was no such thing as an LSB deprecation, and anyway there's no other way to get the filesystem type. Also note that, while it might sound more obvious to detect the filesystem type using fstatfs() on the file descriptor itself (c->pasta_netns_fd), the reported filesystem type for it is nsfs, no matter what path was given to pasta. If we use the parent directory, we'll typically have either tmpfs or procfs reported. If the target namespace is given as a PID, or as a PID-based procfs entry, we don't risk races if this PID is recycled: our handle on /proc/PID/ns will always refer to the original namespace associated with that PID, and we don't re-open this entry from procfs to check it. There's, however, a remaining race possibility if the parent process is not the one associated to the network namespace we operate on: in that case, the parent might pass a procfs entry associated to a PID that was recycled by the time we parse it. This can't happen if the namespace PID matches the one of the parent, because we detach from the controlling terminal after parsing the namespace reference. To avoid this type of race, if desired, we could add the option for the parent to pass a PID file descriptor, that the parent obtained via pidfd_open(). This is beyond the scope of this change. Update the man page to reflect that, even if the target network namespace is passed as a procfs path or a PID, we'll now quit when the procfs entry is gone. Reported-by: Paul Holzinger <pholzing@redhat.com> Link: https://github.com/containers/podman/pull/21563#issuecomment-1948200214 Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2024-02-17 12:41:39 +00:00
if ((dir_fd = open(c->netns_dir, O_CLOEXEC | O_RDONLY)) < 0)
die("netns dir open: %s, exiting", strerror(errno));
if (fstatfs(dir_fd, &s) || s.f_type == DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC ||
s.f_type == PROC_SUPER_MAGIC || s.f_type == SYSFS_MAGIC)
try_inotify = false;
if (try_inotify && (fd = inotify_init1(flags)) < 0)
warn("inotify_init1(): %s, use a timer", strerror(errno));
if (fd >= 0 && inotify_add_watch(fd, c->netns_dir, IN_DELETE) < 0) {
warn("inotify_add_watch(): %s, use a timer",
strerror(errno));
close(fd);
fd = -1;
}
if (fd < 0) {
if ((fd = pasta_netns_quit_timer()) < 0)
die("Failed to set up fallback netns timer, exiting");
pasta: Don't try to watch namespaces in procfs with inotify, use timer instead We watch network namespace entries to detect when we should quit (unless --no-netns-quit is passed), and these might stored in a tmpfs typically mounted at /run/user/UID or /var/run/user/UID, or found in procfs at /proc/PID/ns/. Currently, we try to use inotify for any possible location of those entries, but inotify, of course, doesn't work on pseudo-filesystems (see inotify(7)). The man page reflects this: the description of --no-netns-quit implies that we won't quit anyway if the namespace is not "bound to the filesystem". Well, we won't quit, but, since commit 9e0dbc894813 ("More deterministic detection of whether argument is a PID, PATH or NAME"), we try. And, indeed, this is harmless, as the caveat from that commit message states. Now, it turns out that Buildah, a tool to create container images, sharing its codebase with Podman, passes a procfs entry to pasta, and expects pasta to exit once the network namespace is not needed anymore, that is, once the original container process, also spawned by Buildah, terminates. Get this to work by using the timer fallback mechanism if the namespace name is passed as a path belonging to a pseudo-filesystem. This is expected to be procfs, but I covered sysfs and devpts pseudo-filesystems as well, because nothing actually prevents creating this kind of directory structure and links there. Note that fstatfs(), according to some versions of man pages, was apparently "deprecated" by the LSB. My reasoning for using it is essentially this: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-man/f54kudgblgk643u32tb6at4cd3kkzha6hslahv24szs4raroaz@ogivjbfdaqtb/t/#u ...that is, there was no such thing as an LSB deprecation, and anyway there's no other way to get the filesystem type. Also note that, while it might sound more obvious to detect the filesystem type using fstatfs() on the file descriptor itself (c->pasta_netns_fd), the reported filesystem type for it is nsfs, no matter what path was given to pasta. If we use the parent directory, we'll typically have either tmpfs or procfs reported. If the target namespace is given as a PID, or as a PID-based procfs entry, we don't risk races if this PID is recycled: our handle on /proc/PID/ns will always refer to the original namespace associated with that PID, and we don't re-open this entry from procfs to check it. There's, however, a remaining race possibility if the parent process is not the one associated to the network namespace we operate on: in that case, the parent might pass a procfs entry associated to a PID that was recycled by the time we parse it. This can't happen if the namespace PID matches the one of the parent, because we detach from the controlling terminal after parsing the namespace reference. To avoid this type of race, if desired, we could add the option for the parent to pass a PID file descriptor, that the parent obtained via pidfd_open(). This is beyond the scope of this change. Update the man page to reflect that, even if the target network namespace is passed as a procfs path or a PID, we'll now quit when the procfs entry is gone. Reported-by: Paul Holzinger <pholzing@redhat.com> Link: https://github.com/containers/podman/pull/21563#issuecomment-1948200214 Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2024-02-17 12:41:39 +00:00
ref.nsdir_fd = dir_fd;
ref.type = EPOLL_TYPE_NSQUIT_TIMER;
pasta: Don't try to watch namespaces in procfs with inotify, use timer instead We watch network namespace entries to detect when we should quit (unless --no-netns-quit is passed), and these might stored in a tmpfs typically mounted at /run/user/UID or /var/run/user/UID, or found in procfs at /proc/PID/ns/. Currently, we try to use inotify for any possible location of those entries, but inotify, of course, doesn't work on pseudo-filesystems (see inotify(7)). The man page reflects this: the description of --no-netns-quit implies that we won't quit anyway if the namespace is not "bound to the filesystem". Well, we won't quit, but, since commit 9e0dbc894813 ("More deterministic detection of whether argument is a PID, PATH or NAME"), we try. And, indeed, this is harmless, as the caveat from that commit message states. Now, it turns out that Buildah, a tool to create container images, sharing its codebase with Podman, passes a procfs entry to pasta, and expects pasta to exit once the network namespace is not needed anymore, that is, once the original container process, also spawned by Buildah, terminates. Get this to work by using the timer fallback mechanism if the namespace name is passed as a path belonging to a pseudo-filesystem. This is expected to be procfs, but I covered sysfs and devpts pseudo-filesystems as well, because nothing actually prevents creating this kind of directory structure and links there. Note that fstatfs(), according to some versions of man pages, was apparently "deprecated" by the LSB. My reasoning for using it is essentially this: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-man/f54kudgblgk643u32tb6at4cd3kkzha6hslahv24szs4raroaz@ogivjbfdaqtb/t/#u ...that is, there was no such thing as an LSB deprecation, and anyway there's no other way to get the filesystem type. Also note that, while it might sound more obvious to detect the filesystem type using fstatfs() on the file descriptor itself (c->pasta_netns_fd), the reported filesystem type for it is nsfs, no matter what path was given to pasta. If we use the parent directory, we'll typically have either tmpfs or procfs reported. If the target namespace is given as a PID, or as a PID-based procfs entry, we don't risk races if this PID is recycled: our handle on /proc/PID/ns will always refer to the original namespace associated with that PID, and we don't re-open this entry from procfs to check it. There's, however, a remaining race possibility if the parent process is not the one associated to the network namespace we operate on: in that case, the parent might pass a procfs entry associated to a PID that was recycled by the time we parse it. This can't happen if the namespace PID matches the one of the parent, because we detach from the controlling terminal after parsing the namespace reference. To avoid this type of race, if desired, we could add the option for the parent to pass a PID file descriptor, that the parent obtained via pidfd_open(). This is beyond the scope of this change. Update the man page to reflect that, even if the target network namespace is passed as a procfs path or a PID, we'll now quit when the procfs entry is gone. Reported-by: Paul Holzinger <pholzing@redhat.com> Link: https://github.com/containers/podman/pull/21563#issuecomment-1948200214 Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2024-02-17 12:41:39 +00:00
} else {
close(dir_fd);
}
if (fd > FD_REF_MAX)
die("netns monitor file number %i too big, exiting", fd);
ref.fd = fd;
ev.data.u64 = ref.u64;
epoll_ctl(c->epollfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, fd, &ev);
}
/**
* pasta_netns_quit_inotify_handler() - Handle inotify watch, exit if ns is gone
* @c: Execution context
* @inotify_fd: inotify file descriptor with watch on namespace directory
*/
void pasta_netns_quit_inotify_handler(struct ctx *c, int inotify_fd)
{
char buf[sizeof(struct inotify_event) + NAME_MAX + 1];
const struct inotify_event *in_ev = (struct inotify_event *)buf;
if (read(inotify_fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(*in_ev))
return;
if (strncmp(in_ev->name, c->netns_base, sizeof(c->netns_base)))
return;
info("Namespace %s is gone, exiting", c->netns_base);
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
/**
* pasta_netns_quit_timer_handler() - Handle timer, exit if ns is gone
* @c: Execution context
* @ref: epoll reference for timer descriptor
*/
void pasta_netns_quit_timer_handler(struct ctx *c, union epoll_ref ref)
{
uint64_t expirations;
ssize_t n;
int fd;
n = read(ref.fd, &expirations, sizeof(expirations));
if (n < 0)
die("Namespace watch timer read() error: %s", strerror(errno));
if ((size_t)n < sizeof(expirations))
warn("Namespace watch timer: short read(): %zi", n);
fd = openat(ref.nsdir_fd, c->netns_base, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd < 0) {
pasta: Don't try to watch namespaces in procfs with inotify, use timer instead We watch network namespace entries to detect when we should quit (unless --no-netns-quit is passed), and these might stored in a tmpfs typically mounted at /run/user/UID or /var/run/user/UID, or found in procfs at /proc/PID/ns/. Currently, we try to use inotify for any possible location of those entries, but inotify, of course, doesn't work on pseudo-filesystems (see inotify(7)). The man page reflects this: the description of --no-netns-quit implies that we won't quit anyway if the namespace is not "bound to the filesystem". Well, we won't quit, but, since commit 9e0dbc894813 ("More deterministic detection of whether argument is a PID, PATH or NAME"), we try. And, indeed, this is harmless, as the caveat from that commit message states. Now, it turns out that Buildah, a tool to create container images, sharing its codebase with Podman, passes a procfs entry to pasta, and expects pasta to exit once the network namespace is not needed anymore, that is, once the original container process, also spawned by Buildah, terminates. Get this to work by using the timer fallback mechanism if the namespace name is passed as a path belonging to a pseudo-filesystem. This is expected to be procfs, but I covered sysfs and devpts pseudo-filesystems as well, because nothing actually prevents creating this kind of directory structure and links there. Note that fstatfs(), according to some versions of man pages, was apparently "deprecated" by the LSB. My reasoning for using it is essentially this: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-man/f54kudgblgk643u32tb6at4cd3kkzha6hslahv24szs4raroaz@ogivjbfdaqtb/t/#u ...that is, there was no such thing as an LSB deprecation, and anyway there's no other way to get the filesystem type. Also note that, while it might sound more obvious to detect the filesystem type using fstatfs() on the file descriptor itself (c->pasta_netns_fd), the reported filesystem type for it is nsfs, no matter what path was given to pasta. If we use the parent directory, we'll typically have either tmpfs or procfs reported. If the target namespace is given as a PID, or as a PID-based procfs entry, we don't risk races if this PID is recycled: our handle on /proc/PID/ns will always refer to the original namespace associated with that PID, and we don't re-open this entry from procfs to check it. There's, however, a remaining race possibility if the parent process is not the one associated to the network namespace we operate on: in that case, the parent might pass a procfs entry associated to a PID that was recycled by the time we parse it. This can't happen if the namespace PID matches the one of the parent, because we detach from the controlling terminal after parsing the namespace reference. To avoid this type of race, if desired, we could add the option for the parent to pass a PID file descriptor, that the parent obtained via pidfd_open(). This is beyond the scope of this change. Update the man page to reflect that, even if the target network namespace is passed as a procfs path or a PID, we'll now quit when the procfs entry is gone. Reported-by: Paul Holzinger <pholzing@redhat.com> Link: https://github.com/containers/podman/pull/21563#issuecomment-1948200214 Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2024-02-17 12:41:39 +00:00
if (errno == EACCES) /* Expected for existing procfs entry */
return;
info("Namespace %s is gone, exiting", c->netns_base);
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
close(fd);
}