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passt/conf.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
/* PASST - Plug A Simple Socket Transport
* for qemu/UNIX domain socket mode
*
* PASTA - Pack A Subtle Tap Abstraction
* for network namespace/tap device mode
*
* conf.c - Configuration settings and option parsing
*
* Copyright (c) 2020-2021 Red Hat GmbH
* Author: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
*/
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <getopt.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/if_ether.h>
#include "util.h"
#include "passt.h"
#include "netlink.h"
#include "udp.h"
#include "tcp.h"
#include "pasta.h"
#include "lineread.h"
#include "isolation.h"
/**
* get_bound_ports() - Get maps of ports with bound sockets
* @c: Execution context
* @ns: If set, set bitmaps for ports to tap/ns -- to init otherwise
* @proto: Protocol number (IPPROTO_TCP or IPPROTO_UDP)
*/
void get_bound_ports(struct ctx *c, int ns, uint8_t proto)
{
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
uint8_t *udp_map, *udp_excl, *tcp_map, *tcp_excl;
if (ns) {
udp_map = c->udp.port_to_tap;
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
udp_excl = c->udp.port_to_init;
tcp_map = c->tcp.port_to_tap;
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
tcp_excl = c->tcp.port_to_init;
} else {
udp_map = c->udp.port_to_init;
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
udp_excl = c->udp.port_to_tap;
tcp_map = c->tcp.port_to_init;
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
tcp_excl = c->tcp.port_to_tap;
}
if (proto == IPPROTO_UDP) {
memset(udp_map, 0, PORT_BITMAP_SIZE);
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
procfs_scan_listen(c, IPPROTO_UDP, V4, ns, udp_map, udp_excl);
procfs_scan_listen(c, IPPROTO_UDP, V6, ns, udp_map, udp_excl);
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
procfs_scan_listen(c, IPPROTO_TCP, V4, ns, udp_map, udp_excl);
procfs_scan_listen(c, IPPROTO_TCP, V6, ns, udp_map, udp_excl);
} else if (proto == IPPROTO_TCP) {
memset(tcp_map, 0, PORT_BITMAP_SIZE);
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
procfs_scan_listen(c, IPPROTO_TCP, V4, ns, tcp_map, tcp_excl);
procfs_scan_listen(c, IPPROTO_TCP, V6, ns, tcp_map, tcp_excl);
}
}
/**
* struct get_bound_ports_ns_arg - Arguments for get_bound_ports_ns()
* @c: Execution context
* @proto: Protocol number (IPPROTO_TCP or IPPROTO_UDP)
*/
struct get_bound_ports_ns_arg {
struct ctx *c;
uint8_t proto;
};
/**
* get_bound_ports_ns() - Get maps of ports in namespace with bound sockets
* @arg: See struct get_bound_ports_ns_arg
*
* Return: 0
*/
static int get_bound_ports_ns(void *arg)
{
struct get_bound_ports_ns_arg *a = (struct get_bound_ports_ns_arg *)arg;
struct ctx *c = a->c;
if (!c->pasta_netns_fd || ns_enter(c))
return 0;
get_bound_ports(c, 1, a->proto);
return 0;
}
/**
* conf_ports() - Parse port configuration options, initialise UDP/TCP sockets
* @c: Execution context
* @optname: Short option name, t, T, u, or U
* @optarg: Option argument (port specification)
* @set: Pointer to @port_fwd_mode to be set (port forwarding mode)
*
* Return: -EINVAL on parsing error, 0 otherwise
*/
static int conf_ports(struct ctx *c, char optname, const char *optarg,
enum port_fwd_mode *set)
{
int start_src, end_src, start_dst, end_dst, exclude_only = 1, i, port;
char addr_buf[sizeof(struct in6_addr)] = { 0 }, *addr = addr_buf;
void (*remap)(in_port_t port, in_port_t delta);
uint8_t exclude[PORT_BITMAP_SIZE] = { 0 };
char buf[BUFSIZ], *sep, *spec, *p;
sa_family_t af = AF_UNSPEC;
uint8_t *map;
if (optname == 't') {
map = c->tcp.port_to_tap;
remap = tcp_remap_to_tap;
} else if (optname == 'T') {
map = c->tcp.port_to_init;
remap = tcp_remap_to_init;
} else if (optname == 'u') {
map = c->udp.port_to_tap;
remap = udp_remap_to_tap;
} else if (optname == 'U') {
map = c->udp.port_to_init;
remap = udp_remap_to_init;
} else { /* For gcc -O3 */
return 0;
}
if (!strcmp(optarg, "none")) {
if (*set)
return -EINVAL;
*set = FWD_NONE;
return 0;
}
if (!strcmp(optarg, "auto")) {
if (*set || c->mode != MODE_PASTA)
return -EINVAL;
*set = FWD_AUTO;
return 0;
}
if (!strcmp(optarg, "all")) {
int i;
if (*set || c->mode != MODE_PASST)
return -EINVAL;
*set = FWD_ALL;
memset(map, 0xff, PORT_EPHEMERAL_MIN / 8);
for (i = 0; i < PORT_EPHEMERAL_MIN; i++) {
if (optname == 't')
tcp_sock_init(c, 0, AF_UNSPEC, NULL, i);
else if (optname == 'u')
udp_sock_init(c, 0, AF_UNSPEC, NULL, i);
}
return 0;
}
if (*set > FWD_SPEC)
return -EINVAL;
*set = FWD_SPEC;
strncpy(buf, optarg, sizeof(buf) - 1);
if ((spec = strchr(buf, '/'))) {
*spec = 0;
spec++;
if (optname != 't' && optname != 'u')
goto bad;
if (inet_pton(AF_INET, buf, addr))
af = AF_INET;
else if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, buf, addr))
af = AF_INET6;
else
goto bad;
} else {
spec = buf;
addr = NULL;
}
if (strspn(spec, "0123456789-,:~") != strlen(spec))
goto bad;
/* Mark all exclusions first, they might be given after base ranges */
p = spec;
start_src = end_src = -1;
do {
while (*p != '~' && start_src == -1) {
exclude_only = 0;
if (!(p = strchr(p, ',')))
break;
p++;
}
if (!p || !*p)
break;
if (*p == '~')
p++;
errno = 0;
port = strtol(p, &sep, 10);
if (sep == p)
break;
if (port < 0 || port > USHRT_MAX || errno)
goto bad;
switch (*sep) {
case '-':
if (start_src == -1) /* ~22-... */
start_src = port;
break;
case ',':
case 0:
if (start_src == -1) /* ~80 */
start_src = end_src = port;
else if (end_src == -1) /* ~22-25 */
end_src = port;
else
goto bad;
if (start_src > end_src) /* ~80-22 */
goto bad;
for (i = start_src; i <= end_src; i++) {
if (bitmap_isset(exclude, i))
goto overlap;
bitmap_set(exclude, i);
}
start_src = end_src = -1;
break;
default:
goto bad;
}
p = sep + 1;
} while (*sep);
if (exclude_only) {
for (i = 0; i < PORT_EPHEMERAL_MIN; i++) {
if (bitmap_isset(exclude, i))
continue;
bitmap_set(map, i);
if (optname == 't')
tcp_sock_init(c, 0, af, addr, i);
else if (optname == 'u')
udp_sock_init(c, 0, af, addr, i);
}
return 0;
}
/* Now process base ranges, skipping exclusions */
start_src = end_src = start_dst = end_dst = -1;
p = spec;
do {
while (*p == '~') {
if (!(p = strchr(p, ',')))
break;
p++;
}
if (!p || !*p)
break;
errno = 0;
port = strtol(p, &sep, 10);
if (sep == p)
break;
if (port < 0 || port > USHRT_MAX || errno)
goto bad;
/* -p 22
* ^ start_src end_src == start_dst == end_dst == -1
*
* -p 22-25
* | ^ end_src
* ` start_src start_dst == end_dst == -1
*
* -p 80:8080
* | ^ start_dst
* ` start_src end_src == end_dst == -1
*
* -p 22-80:8022-8080
* | | | ^ end_dst
* | | ` start_dst
* | ` end_dst
* ` start_src
*/
switch (*sep) {
case '-':
if (start_src == -1) { /* 22-... */
start_src = port;
} else {
if (!end_src) /* 22:8022-8080 */
goto bad;
start_dst = port; /* 22-80:8022-... */
}
break;
case ':':
if (start_src == -1) /* 80:... */
start_src = end_src = port;
else if (end_src == -1) /* 22-80:... */
end_src = port;
else /* 22-80:8022:... */
goto bad;
break;
case ',':
case 0:
if (start_src == -1) /* 80 */
start_src = end_src = port;
else if (end_src == -1) /* 22-25 */
end_src = port;
else if (start_dst == -1) /* 80:8080 */
start_dst = end_dst = port;
else if (end_dst == -1) /* 22-80:8022-8080 */
end_dst = port;
else
goto bad;
if (start_src > end_src) /* 80-22 */
goto bad;
if (start_dst > end_dst) /* 22-80:8080:8022 */
goto bad;
if (end_dst != -1 &&
end_dst - start_dst != end_src - start_src)
goto bad; /* 22-81:8022:8080 */
for (i = start_src; i <= end_src; i++) {
if (bitmap_isset(map, i))
goto overlap;
if (bitmap_isset(exclude, i))
continue;
bitmap_set(map, i);
if (start_dst != -1) {
/* 80:8080 or 22-80:8080:8080 */
remap(i, (in_port_t)(start_dst -
start_src));
}
if (optname == 't')
tcp_sock_init(c, 0, af, addr, i);
else if (optname == 'u')
udp_sock_init(c, 0, af, addr, i);
}
start_src = end_src = start_dst = end_dst = -1;
break;
}
p = sep + 1;
} while (*sep);
return 0;
bad:
err("Invalid port specifier %s", optarg);
return -EINVAL;
overlap:
err("Overlapping port specifier %s", optarg);
return -EINVAL;
}
/**
* get_dns() - Get nameserver addresses from local /etc/resolv.conf
* @c: Execution context
*/
static void get_dns(struct ctx *c)
{
int dns4_set, dns6_set, dnss_set, dns_set, fd;
struct in6_addr *dns6 = &c->ip6.dns[0];
struct fqdn *s = c->dns_search;
uint32_t *dns4 = &c->ip4.dns[0];
struct lineread resolvconf;
int line_len;
char *line, *p, *end;
dns4_set = !c->ifi4 || !!*dns4;
dns6_set = !c->ifi6 || !IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(dns6);
dnss_set = !!*s->n || c->no_dns_search;
dns_set = (dns4_set && dns6_set) || c->no_dns;
if (dns_set && dnss_set)
return;
if ((fd = open("/etc/resolv.conf", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC)) < 0)
goto out;
lineread_init(&resolvconf, fd);
while ((line_len = lineread_get(&resolvconf, &line)) > 0) {
if (!dns_set && strstr(line, "nameserver ") == line) {
p = strrchr(line, ' ');
if (!p)
continue;
end = strpbrk(line, "%\n");
if (end)
*end = 0;
if (!dns4_set &&
dns4 - &c->ip4.dns[0] < ARRAY_SIZE(c->ip4.dns) - 1 &&
inet_pton(AF_INET, p + 1, dns4)) {
/* We can only access local addresses via the gw redirect */
if (ntohl(*dns4) >> IN_CLASSA_NSHIFT == IN_LOOPBACKNET) {
if (c->no_map_gw) {
*dns4 = 0;
continue;
}
*dns4 = c->ip4.gw;
}
dns4++;
*dns4 = 0;
}
if (!dns6_set &&
dns6 - &c->ip6.dns[0] < ARRAY_SIZE(c->ip6.dns) - 1 &&
inet_pton(AF_INET6, p + 1, dns6)) {
/* We can only access local addresses via the gw redirect */
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(dns6)) {
if (c->no_map_gw) {
memset(dns6, 0, sizeof(*dns6));
continue;
}
memcpy(dns6, &c->ip6.gw, sizeof(*dns6));
}
dns6++;
memset(dns6, 0, sizeof(*dns6));
}
} else if (!dnss_set && strstr(line, "search ") == line &&
s == c->dns_search) {
end = strpbrk(line, "\n");
if (end)
*end = 0;
if (!strtok(line, " \t"))
continue;
while (s - c->dns_search < ARRAY_SIZE(c->dns_search) - 1
&& (p = strtok(NULL, " \t"))) {
strncpy(s->n, p, sizeof(c->dns_search[0]));
s++;
*s->n = 0;
}
}
}
if (line_len < 0)
warn("Error reading /etc/resolv.conf: %s", strerror(errno));
close(fd);
out:
if (!dns_set && dns4 == c->ip4.dns && dns6 == c->ip6.dns)
warn("Couldn't get any nameserver address");
}
More deterministic detection of whether argument is a PID, PATH or NAME pasta takes as its only non-option argument either a PID to attach to the namespaces of, a PATH to a network namespace or a NAME of a network namespace (relative to /run/netns). Currently to determine which it is we try all 3 in that order, and if anything goes wrong we move onto the next. This has the potential to cause very confusing failure modes. e.g. if the argument is intended to be a network namespace name, but a (non-namespace) file of the same name exists in the current directory. Make behaviour more predictable by choosing how to treat the argument based only on the argument's contents, not anything else on the system: - If it's a decimal integer treat it as a PID - Otherwise, if it has no '/' characters, treat it as a netns name (ip-netns doesn't allow '/' in netns names) - Otherwise, treat it as a netns path If you want to open a persistent netns in the current directory, you can use './netns'. This also allows us to split the parsing of the PID|PATH|NAME option from the actual opening of the namespaces. In turn that allows us to put the opening of existing namespaces next to the opening of new namespaces in pasta_start_ns. That makes the logical flow easier to follow and will enable later cleanups. Caveats: - The separation of functions mean we will always generate the basename and dirname for the netns_quit system, even when using PID namespaces. This is pointless, since the netns_quit system doesn't work for non persistent namespaces, but is harmless. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2022-08-26 04:58:37 +00:00
/**
* conf_netns_opt() - Parse --netns option
* @netns: buffer of size PATH_MAX, updated with netns path
* @arg: --netns argument
*
* Return: 0 on success, negative error code otherwise
*/
static int conf_netns_opt(char *netns, const char *arg)
{
int ret;
if (!strchr(arg, '/')) {
/* looks like a netns name */
ret = snprintf(netns, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s", NETNS_RUN_DIR, arg);
} else {
/* otherwise assume it's a netns path */
ret = snprintf(netns, PATH_MAX, "%s", arg);
}
if (ret <= 0 || ret > PATH_MAX) {
err("Network namespace name/path %s too long");
return -E2BIG;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* conf_pasta_ns() - Validate all pasta namespace options
* @netns_only: Don't use userns, may be updated
More deterministic detection of whether argument is a PID, PATH or NAME pasta takes as its only non-option argument either a PID to attach to the namespaces of, a PATH to a network namespace or a NAME of a network namespace (relative to /run/netns). Currently to determine which it is we try all 3 in that order, and if anything goes wrong we move onto the next. This has the potential to cause very confusing failure modes. e.g. if the argument is intended to be a network namespace name, but a (non-namespace) file of the same name exists in the current directory. Make behaviour more predictable by choosing how to treat the argument based only on the argument's contents, not anything else on the system: - If it's a decimal integer treat it as a PID - Otherwise, if it has no '/' characters, treat it as a netns name (ip-netns doesn't allow '/' in netns names) - Otherwise, treat it as a netns path If you want to open a persistent netns in the current directory, you can use './netns'. This also allows us to split the parsing of the PID|PATH|NAME option from the actual opening of the namespaces. In turn that allows us to put the opening of existing namespaces next to the opening of new namespaces in pasta_start_ns. That makes the logical flow easier to follow and will enable later cleanups. Caveats: - The separation of functions mean we will always generate the basename and dirname for the netns_quit system, even when using PID namespaces. This is pointless, since the netns_quit system doesn't work for non persistent namespaces, but is harmless. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2022-08-26 04:58:37 +00:00
* @userns: buffer of size PATH_MAX, initially contains --userns
* argument (may be empty), updated with userns path
* @netns: buffer of size PATH_MAX, initial contains --netns
* argument (may be empty), updated with netns path
* @optind: Index of first non-option argument
* @argc: Number of arguments
* @argv: Command line arguments
More deterministic detection of whether argument is a PID, PATH or NAME pasta takes as its only non-option argument either a PID to attach to the namespaces of, a PATH to a network namespace or a NAME of a network namespace (relative to /run/netns). Currently to determine which it is we try all 3 in that order, and if anything goes wrong we move onto the next. This has the potential to cause very confusing failure modes. e.g. if the argument is intended to be a network namespace name, but a (non-namespace) file of the same name exists in the current directory. Make behaviour more predictable by choosing how to treat the argument based only on the argument's contents, not anything else on the system: - If it's a decimal integer treat it as a PID - Otherwise, if it has no '/' characters, treat it as a netns name (ip-netns doesn't allow '/' in netns names) - Otherwise, treat it as a netns path If you want to open a persistent netns in the current directory, you can use './netns'. This also allows us to split the parsing of the PID|PATH|NAME option from the actual opening of the namespaces. In turn that allows us to put the opening of existing namespaces next to the opening of new namespaces in pasta_start_ns. That makes the logical flow easier to follow and will enable later cleanups. Caveats: - The separation of functions mean we will always generate the basename and dirname for the netns_quit system, even when using PID namespaces. This is pointless, since the netns_quit system doesn't work for non persistent namespaces, but is harmless. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2022-08-26 04:58:37 +00:00
*
* Return: 0 on success, negative error code otherwise
*/
static int conf_pasta_ns(int *netns_only, char *userns, char *netns,
int optind, int argc, char *argv[])
More deterministic detection of whether argument is a PID, PATH or NAME pasta takes as its only non-option argument either a PID to attach to the namespaces of, a PATH to a network namespace or a NAME of a network namespace (relative to /run/netns). Currently to determine which it is we try all 3 in that order, and if anything goes wrong we move onto the next. This has the potential to cause very confusing failure modes. e.g. if the argument is intended to be a network namespace name, but a (non-namespace) file of the same name exists in the current directory. Make behaviour more predictable by choosing how to treat the argument based only on the argument's contents, not anything else on the system: - If it's a decimal integer treat it as a PID - Otherwise, if it has no '/' characters, treat it as a netns name (ip-netns doesn't allow '/' in netns names) - Otherwise, treat it as a netns path If you want to open a persistent netns in the current directory, you can use './netns'. This also allows us to split the parsing of the PID|PATH|NAME option from the actual opening of the namespaces. In turn that allows us to put the opening of existing namespaces next to the opening of new namespaces in pasta_start_ns. That makes the logical flow easier to follow and will enable later cleanups. Caveats: - The separation of functions mean we will always generate the basename and dirname for the netns_quit system, even when using PID namespaces. This is pointless, since the netns_quit system doesn't work for non persistent namespaces, but is harmless. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2022-08-26 04:58:37 +00:00
{
if (*netns_only && *userns) {
err("Both --userns and --netns-only given");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (*netns && optind != argc) {
err("Both --netns and PID or command given");
return -EINVAL;
}
More deterministic detection of whether argument is a PID, PATH or NAME pasta takes as its only non-option argument either a PID to attach to the namespaces of, a PATH to a network namespace or a NAME of a network namespace (relative to /run/netns). Currently to determine which it is we try all 3 in that order, and if anything goes wrong we move onto the next. This has the potential to cause very confusing failure modes. e.g. if the argument is intended to be a network namespace name, but a (non-namespace) file of the same name exists in the current directory. Make behaviour more predictable by choosing how to treat the argument based only on the argument's contents, not anything else on the system: - If it's a decimal integer treat it as a PID - Otherwise, if it has no '/' characters, treat it as a netns name (ip-netns doesn't allow '/' in netns names) - Otherwise, treat it as a netns path If you want to open a persistent netns in the current directory, you can use './netns'. This also allows us to split the parsing of the PID|PATH|NAME option from the actual opening of the namespaces. In turn that allows us to put the opening of existing namespaces next to the opening of new namespaces in pasta_start_ns. That makes the logical flow easier to follow and will enable later cleanups. Caveats: - The separation of functions mean we will always generate the basename and dirname for the netns_quit system, even when using PID namespaces. This is pointless, since the netns_quit system doesn't work for non persistent namespaces, but is harmless. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2022-08-26 04:58:37 +00:00
if (optind + 1 == argc) {
char *endptr;
long pidval;
pidval = strtol(argv[optind], &endptr, 10);
if (!*endptr) {
/* Looks like a pid */
if (pidval < 0 || pidval > INT_MAX) {
err("Invalid PID %s", argv[optind]);
return -EINVAL;
}
snprintf(netns, PATH_MAX, "/proc/%ld/ns/net", pidval);
if (!*userns)
snprintf(userns, PATH_MAX, "/proc/%ld/ns/user",
pidval);
More deterministic detection of whether argument is a PID, PATH or NAME pasta takes as its only non-option argument either a PID to attach to the namespaces of, a PATH to a network namespace or a NAME of a network namespace (relative to /run/netns). Currently to determine which it is we try all 3 in that order, and if anything goes wrong we move onto the next. This has the potential to cause very confusing failure modes. e.g. if the argument is intended to be a network namespace name, but a (non-namespace) file of the same name exists in the current directory. Make behaviour more predictable by choosing how to treat the argument based only on the argument's contents, not anything else on the system: - If it's a decimal integer treat it as a PID - Otherwise, if it has no '/' characters, treat it as a netns name (ip-netns doesn't allow '/' in netns names) - Otherwise, treat it as a netns path If you want to open a persistent netns in the current directory, you can use './netns'. This also allows us to split the parsing of the PID|PATH|NAME option from the actual opening of the namespaces. In turn that allows us to put the opening of existing namespaces next to the opening of new namespaces in pasta_start_ns. That makes the logical flow easier to follow and will enable later cleanups. Caveats: - The separation of functions mean we will always generate the basename and dirname for the netns_quit system, even when using PID namespaces. This is pointless, since the netns_quit system doesn't work for non persistent namespaces, but is harmless. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2022-08-26 04:58:37 +00:00
}
}
More deterministic detection of whether argument is a PID, PATH or NAME pasta takes as its only non-option argument either a PID to attach to the namespaces of, a PATH to a network namespace or a NAME of a network namespace (relative to /run/netns). Currently to determine which it is we try all 3 in that order, and if anything goes wrong we move onto the next. This has the potential to cause very confusing failure modes. e.g. if the argument is intended to be a network namespace name, but a (non-namespace) file of the same name exists in the current directory. Make behaviour more predictable by choosing how to treat the argument based only on the argument's contents, not anything else on the system: - If it's a decimal integer treat it as a PID - Otherwise, if it has no '/' characters, treat it as a netns name (ip-netns doesn't allow '/' in netns names) - Otherwise, treat it as a netns path If you want to open a persistent netns in the current directory, you can use './netns'. This also allows us to split the parsing of the PID|PATH|NAME option from the actual opening of the namespaces. In turn that allows us to put the opening of existing namespaces next to the opening of new namespaces in pasta_start_ns. That makes the logical flow easier to follow and will enable later cleanups. Caveats: - The separation of functions mean we will always generate the basename and dirname for the netns_quit system, even when using PID namespaces. This is pointless, since the netns_quit system doesn't work for non persistent namespaces, but is harmless. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2022-08-26 04:58:37 +00:00
/* Attaching to a netns/PID, with no userns given */
if (*netns && !*userns)
*netns_only = 1;
return 0;
More deterministic detection of whether argument is a PID, PATH or NAME pasta takes as its only non-option argument either a PID to attach to the namespaces of, a PATH to a network namespace or a NAME of a network namespace (relative to /run/netns). Currently to determine which it is we try all 3 in that order, and if anything goes wrong we move onto the next. This has the potential to cause very confusing failure modes. e.g. if the argument is intended to be a network namespace name, but a (non-namespace) file of the same name exists in the current directory. Make behaviour more predictable by choosing how to treat the argument based only on the argument's contents, not anything else on the system: - If it's a decimal integer treat it as a PID - Otherwise, if it has no '/' characters, treat it as a netns name (ip-netns doesn't allow '/' in netns names) - Otherwise, treat it as a netns path If you want to open a persistent netns in the current directory, you can use './netns'. This also allows us to split the parsing of the PID|PATH|NAME option from the actual opening of the namespaces. In turn that allows us to put the opening of existing namespaces next to the opening of new namespaces in pasta_start_ns. That makes the logical flow easier to follow and will enable later cleanups. Caveats: - The separation of functions mean we will always generate the basename and dirname for the netns_quit system, even when using PID namespaces. This is pointless, since the netns_quit system doesn't work for non persistent namespaces, but is harmless. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2022-08-26 04:58:37 +00:00
}
/**
* conf_ip4() - Verify or detect IPv4 support, get relevant addresses
* @ifi: Host interface to attempt (0 to determine one)
* @ip4: IPv4 context (will be written)
* @mac: MAC address to use (written if unset)
*
* Return: Interface index for IPv4, or 0 on failure.
*/
static unsigned int conf_ip4(unsigned int ifi,
struct ip4_ctx *ip4, unsigned char *mac)
{
if (!ifi)
ifi = nl_get_ext_if(AF_INET);
if (!ifi) {
warn("No external routable interface for IPv4");
return 0;
}
if (!ip4->gw)
nl_route(0, ifi, AF_INET, &ip4->gw);
if (!ip4->addr) {
int mask_len = 0;
nl_addr(0, ifi, AF_INET, &ip4->addr, &mask_len, NULL);
ip4->mask = htonl(0xffffffff << (32 - mask_len));
}
if (!ip4->mask) {
if (IN_CLASSA(ntohl(ip4->addr)))
ip4->mask = htonl(IN_CLASSA_NET);
else if (IN_CLASSB(ntohl(ip4->addr)))
ip4->mask = htonl(IN_CLASSB_NET);
else if (IN_CLASSC(ntohl(ip4->addr)))
ip4->mask = htonl(IN_CLASSC_NET);
else
ip4->mask = 0xffffffff;
}
memcpy(&ip4->addr_seen, &ip4->addr, sizeof(ip4->addr_seen));
if (MAC_IS_ZERO(mac))
nl_link(0, ifi, mac, 0, 0);
if (!ip4->gw || !ip4->addr || MAC_IS_ZERO(mac))
return 0;
return ifi;
}
/**
* conf_ip6() - Verify or detect IPv6 support, get relevant addresses
* @ifi: Host interface to attempt (0 to determine one)
* @ip6: IPv6 context (will be written)
* @mac: MAC address to use (written if unset)
*
* Return: Interface index for IPv6, or 0 on failure.
*/
static unsigned int conf_ip6(unsigned int ifi,
struct ip6_ctx *ip6, unsigned char *mac)
{
int prefix_len = 0;
if (!ifi)
ifi = nl_get_ext_if(AF_INET6);
if (!ifi) {
warn("No external routable interface for IPv6");
return 0;
}
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&ip6->gw))
nl_route(0, ifi, AF_INET6, &ip6->gw);
nl_addr(0, ifi, AF_INET6,
IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&ip6->addr) ? &ip6->addr : NULL,
&prefix_len, &ip6->addr_ll);
memcpy(&ip6->addr_seen, &ip6->addr, sizeof(ip6->addr));
memcpy(&ip6->addr_ll_seen, &ip6->addr_ll, sizeof(ip6->addr_ll));
if (MAC_IS_ZERO(mac))
nl_link(0, ifi, mac, 0, 0);
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&ip6->gw) ||
IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&ip6->addr) ||
IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&ip6->addr_ll) ||
MAC_IS_ZERO(mac))
return 0;
return ifi;
}
/**
* usage() - Print usage and exit
* @name: Executable name
*/
static void usage(const char *name)
{
if (strstr(name, "pasta")) {
info("Usage: %s [OPTION]... [COMMAND] [ARGS]...", name);
info(" %s [OPTION]... PID", name);
info(" %s [OPTION]... --netns [PATH|NAME]", name);
info("");
info("Without PID or --netns, run the given command or a");
info("default shell in a new network and user namespace, and");
info("connect it via pasta.");
} else {
info("Usage: %s [OPTION]...", name);
}
info("");
info( " -d, --debug Be verbose, don't run in background");
info( " --trace Be extra verbose, implies --debug");
info( " -q, --quiet Don't print informational messages");
info( " -f, --foreground Don't run in background");
info( " default: run in background if started from a TTY");
info( " -e, --stderr Log to stderr too");
info( " default: log to system logger only if started from a TTY");
info( " --runas UID|UID:GID Run as given UID, GID, which can be");
info( " numeric, or login and group names");
info( " default: drop to user \"nobody\"");
info( " -h, --help Display this help message and exit");
if (strstr(name, "pasta")) {
info( " -I, --ns-ifname NAME namespace interface name");
info( " default: same interface name as external one");
} else {
info( " -s, --socket PATH UNIX domain socket path");
info( " default: probe free path starting from "
UNIX_SOCK_PATH, 1);
}
info( " -p, --pcap FILE Log tap-facing traffic to pcap file");
info( " -P, --pid FILE Write own PID to the given file");
info( " -m, --mtu MTU Assign MTU via DHCP/NDP");
info( " a zero value disables assignment");
info( " default: 65520: maximum 802.3 MTU minus 802.3 header");
info( " length, rounded to 32 bits (IPv4 words)");
info( " -a, --address ADDR Assign IPv4 or IPv6 address ADDR");
info( " can be specified zero to two times (for IPv4 and IPv6)");
info( " default: use addresses from interface with default route");
info( " -n, --netmask MASK Assign IPv4 MASK, dot-decimal or bits");
info( " default: netmask from matching address on the host");
info( " -M, --mac-addr ADDR Use source MAC address ADDR");
info( " default: MAC address from interface with default route");
info( " -g, --gateway ADDR Pass IPv4 or IPv6 address as gateway");
info( " default: gateway from interface with default route");
info( " -i, --interface NAME Interface for addresses and routes");
info( " default: interface with first default route");
info( " -D, --dns ADDR Use IPv4 or IPv6 address as DNS");
info( " can be specified multiple times");
info( " a single, empty option disables DNS information");
if (strstr(name, "pasta"))
info( " default: don't use any addresses");
else
info( " default: use addresses from /etc/resolv.conf");
info( " -S, --search LIST Space-separated list, search domains");
info( " a single, empty option disables the DNS search list");
if (strstr(name, "pasta"))
info( " default: don't use any search list");
else
info( " default: use search list from /etc/resolv.conf");
if (strstr(name, "pasta"))
info(" --dhcp-dns: \tPass DNS list via DHCP/DHCPv6/NDP");
else
info(" --no-dhcp-dns: No DNS list in DHCP/DHCPv6/NDP");
if (strstr(name, "pasta"))
info(" --dhcp-search: Pass list via DHCP/DHCPv6/NDP");
else
info(" --no-dhcp-search: No list in DHCP/DHCPv6/NDP");
info( " --dns-forward ADDR Forward DNS queries sent to ADDR");
info( " can be specified zero to two times (for IPv4 and IPv6)");
info( " default: don't forward DNS queries");
info( " --no-tcp Disable TCP protocol handler");
info( " --no-udp Disable UDP protocol handler");
info( " --no-icmp Disable ICMP/ICMPv6 protocol handler");
info( " --no-dhcp Disable DHCP server");
info( " --no-ndp Disable NDP responses");
info( " --no-dhcpv6 Disable DHCPv6 server");
info( " --no-ra Disable router advertisements");
info( " --no-map-gw Don't map gateway address to host");
info( " -4, --ipv4-only Enable IPv4 operation only");
info( " -6, --ipv6-only Enable IPv6 operation only");
if (strstr(name, "pasta"))
goto pasta_opts;
info( " -t, --tcp-ports SPEC TCP port forwarding to guest");
info( " can be specified multiple times");
info( " SPEC can be:");
info( " 'none': don't forward any ports");
info( " 'all': forward all unbound, non-ephemeral ports");
info( " a comma-separated list, optionally ranged with '-'");
info( " and optional target ports after ':', with optional");
info( " address specification suffixed by '/'. Ranges can be");
info( " reduced by excluding ports or ranges prefixed by '~'");
info( " Examples:");
info( " -t 22 Forward local port 22 to 22 on guest");
info( " -t 22:23 Forward local port 22 to 23 on guest");
info( " -t 22,25 Forward ports 22, 25 to ports 22, 25");
info( " -t 22-80 Forward ports 22 to 80");
info( " -t 22-80:32-90 Forward ports 22 to 80 to");
info( " corresponding port numbers plus 10");
info( " -t 192.0.2.1/5 Bind port 5 of 192.0.2.1 to guest");
info( " -t 5-25,~10-20 Forward ports 5 to 9, and 21 to 25");
info( " -t ~25 Forward all ports except for 25");
info( " default: none");
info( " -u, --udp-ports SPEC UDP port forwarding to guest");
info( " SPEC is as described for TCP above");
info( " default: none");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
pasta_opts:
info( " -t, --tcp-ports SPEC TCP port forwarding to namespace");
info( " can be specified multiple times");
info( " SPEC can be:");
info( " 'none': don't forward any ports");
info( " 'auto': forward all ports currently bound in namespace");
info( " a comma-separated list, optionally ranged with '-'");
info( " and optional target ports after ':', with optional");
info( " address specification suffixed by '/'. Examples:");
info( " -t 22 Forward local port 22 to port 22 in netns");
info( " -t 22:23 Forward local port 22 to port 23");
info( " -t 22,25 Forward ports 22, 25 to ports 22, 25");
info( " -t 22-80 Forward ports 22 to 80");
info( " -t 22-80:32-90 Forward ports 22 to 80 to");
info( " corresponding port numbers plus 10");
info( " -t 192.0.2.1/5 Bind port 5 of 192.0.2.1 to namespace");
info( " -t 5-25,~10-20 Forward ports 5 to 9, and 21 to 25");
info( " -t ~25 Forward all bound ports except for 25");
info( " default: auto");
info( " IPv6 bound ports are also forwarded for IPv4");
info( " -u, --udp-ports SPEC UDP port forwarding to namespace");
info( " SPEC is as described for TCP above");
info( " default: auto");
info( " IPv6 bound ports are also forwarded for IPv4");
info( " unless specified, with '-t auto', UDP ports with numbers");
info( " corresponding to forwarded TCP port numbers are");
info( " forwarded too");
info( " -T, --tcp-ns SPEC TCP port forwarding to init namespace");
info( " SPEC is as described above");
info( " default: auto");
info( " -U, --udp-ns SPEC UDP port forwarding to init namespace");
info( " SPEC is as described above");
info( " default: auto");
info( " --userns NSPATH Target user namespace to join");
info( " --netns PATH|NAME Target network namespace to join");
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
info( " --netns-only Don't join existing user namespace");
info( " implied if PATH or NAME are given without --userns");
info( " --config-net Configure tap interface in namespace");
info( " --ns-mac-addr ADDR Set MAC address on tap interface");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/**
* conf_print() - Print fundamental configuration parameters
* @c: Execution context
*/
static void conf_print(const struct ctx *c)
{
char buf4[INET_ADDRSTRLEN], ifn[IFNAMSIZ];
int i;
if (c->ifi4)
info("Outbound interface (IPv4): %s", if_indextoname(c->ifi4, ifn));
if (c->ifi6)
info("Outbound interface (IPv6): %s", if_indextoname(c->ifi6, ifn));
if (c->mode == MODE_PASTA)
info("Namespace interface: %s", c->pasta_ifn);
info("MAC:");
info(" host: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x",
c->mac[0], c->mac[1], c->mac[2],
c->mac[3], c->mac[4], c->mac[5]);
if (c->ifi4) {
if (!c->no_dhcp) {
info("DHCP:");
info(" assign: %s",
inet_ntop(AF_INET, &c->ip4.addr, buf4, sizeof(buf4)));
info(" mask: %s",
inet_ntop(AF_INET, &c->ip4.mask, buf4, sizeof(buf4)));
info(" router: %s",
inet_ntop(AF_INET, &c->ip4.gw, buf4, sizeof(buf4)));
}
for (i = 0; c->ip4.dns[i]; i++) {
if (!i)
info("DNS:");
inet_ntop(AF_INET, &c->ip4.dns[i], buf4, sizeof(buf4));
info(" %s", buf4);
}
for (i = 0; *c->dns_search[i].n; i++) {
if (!i)
info("DNS search list:");
info(" %s", c->dns_search[i].n);
}
}
if (c->ifi6) {
char buf6[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
if (!c->no_ndp && !c->no_dhcpv6)
info("NDP/DHCPv6:");
else if (!c->no_ndp)
info("DHCPv6:");
else if (!c->no_dhcpv6)
info("NDP:");
else
goto dns6;
info(" assign: %s",
inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &c->ip6.addr, buf6, sizeof(buf6)));
info(" router: %s",
inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &c->ip6.gw, buf6, sizeof(buf6)));
info(" our link-local: %s",
inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &c->ip6.addr_ll, buf6, sizeof(buf6)));
dns6:
for (i = 0; !IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&c->ip6.dns[i]); i++) {
if (!i)
info("DNS:");
inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &c->ip6.dns[i], buf6, sizeof(buf6));
info(" %s", buf6);
}
for (i = 0; *c->dns_search[i].n; i++) {
if (!i)
info("DNS search list:");
info(" %s", c->dns_search[i].n);
}
}
}
/**
* conf_runas() - Handle --runas: look up desired UID and GID
* @opt: Passed option value
* @uid: User ID, set on return if valid
* @gid: Group ID, set on return if valid
*
* Return: 0 on success, negative error code on failure
*/
static int conf_runas(const char *opt, unsigned int *uid, unsigned int *gid)
{
char ubuf[LOGIN_NAME_MAX], gbuf[LOGIN_NAME_MAX], *endptr;
struct passwd *pw;
struct group *gr;
/* NOLINTNEXTLINE(cert-err34-c): 2 if conversion succeeds */
if (sscanf(opt, "%u:%u", uid, gid) == 2 && *uid && *gid)
return 0;
*uid = strtol(opt, &endptr, 0);
if (!*endptr && (*gid = *uid))
return 0;
#ifdef GLIBC_NO_STATIC_NSS
(void)ubuf;
(void)gbuf;
(void)pw;
(void)gr;
return -EINVAL;
#else
/* NOLINTNEXTLINE(cert-err34-c): 2 if conversion succeeds */
if (sscanf(opt, "%" STR(LOGIN_NAME_MAX) "[^:]:"
"%" STR(LOGIN_NAME_MAX) "s", ubuf, gbuf) == 2) {
if (!(pw = getpwnam(ubuf)) || !(*uid = pw->pw_uid))
return -ENOENT;
if (!(gr = getgrnam(gbuf)) || !(*gid = gr->gr_gid))
return -ENOENT;
return 0;
}
pw = getpwnam(ubuf);
if (!pw || !(*uid = pw->pw_uid) || !(*gid = pw->pw_gid))
return -ENOENT;
return 0;
#endif /* !GLIBC_NO_STATIC_NSS */
}
/**
* conf_ugid() - Determine UID and GID to run as
* @runas: --runas option, may be NULL
* @uid: User ID, set on success
* @gid: Group ID, set on success
*
* Return: 0 on success, negative error code on failure
*/
static int conf_ugid(const char *runas, uid_t *uid, gid_t *gid)
{
const char root_uid_map[] = " 0 0 4294967295";
struct passwd *pw;
char buf[BUFSIZ];
int ret;
int fd;
/* If user has specified --runas, that takes precedence... */
if (runas) {
ret = conf_runas(runas, uid, gid);
if (ret)
err("Invalid --runas option: %s", runas);
return ret;
}
/* ...otherwise default to current user and group... */
*uid = geteuid();
*gid = getegid();
/* ...as long as it's not root... */
if (*uid)
return 0;
/* ...or at least not root in the init namespace... */
if ((fd = open("/proc/self/uid_map", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC)) < 0) {
ret = -errno;
err("Can't determine if we're in init namespace: %s",
strerror(-ret));
return ret;
}
if (read(fd, buf, BUFSIZ) != sizeof(root_uid_map) ||
strncmp(buf, root_uid_map, sizeof(root_uid_map) - 1)) {
close(fd);
return 0;
}
close(fd);
/* ...otherwise use nobody:nobody */
warn("Don't run as root. Changing to nobody...");
#ifndef GLIBC_NO_STATIC_NSS
pw = getpwnam("nobody");
if (!pw) {
perror("getpwnam");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
*uid = pw->pw_uid;
*gid = pw->pw_gid;
#else
(void)pw;
/* Common value for 'nobody', not really specified */
*uid = *gid = 65534;
#endif
return 0;
}
/**
* conf() - Process command-line arguments and set configuration
* @c: Execution context
* @argc: Argument count
* @argv: Options, plus target PID for pasta mode
*/
void conf(struct ctx *c, int argc, char **argv)
{
Handle userns isolation and dropping root at the same time passt/pasta can interact with user namespaces in a number of ways: 1) With --netns-only we'll remain in our original user namespace 2) With --userns or a PID option to pasta we'll join either the given user namespace or that of the PID 3) When pasta spawns a shell or command we'll start a new user namespace for the command and then join it 4) With passt we'll create a new user namespace when we sandbox() ourself However (3) and (4) turn out to have essentially the same effect. In both cases we create one new user namespace. The spawned command starts there, and passt/pasta itself will live there from sandbox() onwards. Because of this, we can simplify user namespace handling by moving the userns handling earlier, to the same point we drop root in the original namespace. Extend the drop_user() function to isolate_user() which does both. After switching UID and GID in the original userns, isolate_user() will either join or create the userns we require. When we spawn a command with pasta_start_ns()/pasta_setup_ns() we no longer need to create a userns, because we're already made one. sandbox() likewise no longer needs to create (or join) an userns because we're already in the one we need. We no longer need c->pasta_userns_fd, since the fd is only used locally in isolate_user(). Likewise we can replace c->netns_only with a local in conf(), since it's not used outside there. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2022-09-12 12:24:07 +00:00
int netns_only = 0;
struct option options[] = {
{"debug", no_argument, NULL, 'd' },
{"quiet", no_argument, NULL, 'q' },
{"foreground", no_argument, NULL, 'f' },
{"stderr", no_argument, NULL, 'e' },
{"help", no_argument, NULL, 'h' },
{"socket", required_argument, NULL, 's' },
{"ns-ifname", required_argument, NULL, 'I' },
{"pcap", required_argument, NULL, 'p' },
{"pid", required_argument, NULL, 'P' },
{"mtu", required_argument, NULL, 'm' },
{"address", required_argument, NULL, 'a' },
{"netmask", required_argument, NULL, 'n' },
{"mac-addr", required_argument, NULL, 'M' },
{"gateway", required_argument, NULL, 'g' },
{"interface", required_argument, NULL, 'i' },
{"dns", required_argument, NULL, 'D' },
{"search", required_argument, NULL, 'S' },
{"no-tcp", no_argument, &c->no_tcp, 1 },
{"no-udp", no_argument, &c->no_udp, 1 },
{"no-icmp", no_argument, &c->no_icmp, 1 },
{"no-dhcp", no_argument, &c->no_dhcp, 1 },
{"no-dhcpv6", no_argument, &c->no_dhcpv6, 1 },
{"no-ndp", no_argument, &c->no_ndp, 1 },
{"no-ra", no_argument, &c->no_ra, 1 },
{"no-map-gw", no_argument, &c->no_map_gw, 1 },
{"ipv4-only", no_argument, NULL, '4' },
{"ipv6-only", no_argument, NULL, '6' },
{"tcp-ports", required_argument, NULL, 't' },
{"udp-ports", required_argument, NULL, 'u' },
{"tcp-ns", required_argument, NULL, 'T' },
{"udp-ns", required_argument, NULL, 'U' },
{"userns", required_argument, NULL, 2 },
{"netns", required_argument, NULL, 3 },
Handle userns isolation and dropping root at the same time passt/pasta can interact with user namespaces in a number of ways: 1) With --netns-only we'll remain in our original user namespace 2) With --userns or a PID option to pasta we'll join either the given user namespace or that of the PID 3) When pasta spawns a shell or command we'll start a new user namespace for the command and then join it 4) With passt we'll create a new user namespace when we sandbox() ourself However (3) and (4) turn out to have essentially the same effect. In both cases we create one new user namespace. The spawned command starts there, and passt/pasta itself will live there from sandbox() onwards. Because of this, we can simplify user namespace handling by moving the userns handling earlier, to the same point we drop root in the original namespace. Extend the drop_user() function to isolate_user() which does both. After switching UID and GID in the original userns, isolate_user() will either join or create the userns we require. When we spawn a command with pasta_start_ns()/pasta_setup_ns() we no longer need to create a userns, because we're already made one. sandbox() likewise no longer needs to create (or join) an userns because we're already in the one we need. We no longer need c->pasta_userns_fd, since the fd is only used locally in isolate_user(). Likewise we can replace c->netns_only with a local in conf(), since it's not used outside there. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2022-09-12 12:24:07 +00:00
{"netns-only", no_argument, &netns_only, 1 },
{"config-net", no_argument, &c->pasta_conf_ns, 1 },
{"ns-mac-addr", required_argument, NULL, 4 },
{"dhcp-dns", no_argument, NULL, 5 },
{"no-dhcp-dns", no_argument, NULL, 6 },
{"dhcp-search", no_argument, NULL, 7 },
{"no-dhcp-search", no_argument, NULL, 8 },
{"dns-forward", required_argument, NULL, 9 },
{"no-netns-quit", no_argument, NULL, 10 },
{"trace", no_argument, NULL, 11 },
{"runas", required_argument, NULL, 12 },
{ 0 },
};
struct get_bound_ports_ns_arg ns_ports_arg = { .c = c };
More deterministic detection of whether argument is a PID, PATH or NAME pasta takes as its only non-option argument either a PID to attach to the namespaces of, a PATH to a network namespace or a NAME of a network namespace (relative to /run/netns). Currently to determine which it is we try all 3 in that order, and if anything goes wrong we move onto the next. This has the potential to cause very confusing failure modes. e.g. if the argument is intended to be a network namespace name, but a (non-namespace) file of the same name exists in the current directory. Make behaviour more predictable by choosing how to treat the argument based only on the argument's contents, not anything else on the system: - If it's a decimal integer treat it as a PID - Otherwise, if it has no '/' characters, treat it as a netns name (ip-netns doesn't allow '/' in netns names) - Otherwise, treat it as a netns path If you want to open a persistent netns in the current directory, you can use './netns'. This also allows us to split the parsing of the PID|PATH|NAME option from the actual opening of the namespaces. In turn that allows us to put the opening of existing namespaces next to the opening of new namespaces in pasta_start_ns. That makes the logical flow easier to follow and will enable later cleanups. Caveats: - The separation of functions mean we will always generate the basename and dirname for the netns_quit system, even when using PID namespaces. This is pointless, since the netns_quit system doesn't work for non persistent namespaces, but is harmless. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2022-08-26 04:58:37 +00:00
char userns[PATH_MAX] = { 0 }, netns[PATH_MAX] = { 0 };
bool v4_only = false, v6_only = false;
struct in6_addr *dns6 = c->ip6.dns;
struct fqdn *dnss = c->dns_search;
uint32_t *dns4 = c->ip4.dns;
int name, ret, mask, b, i;
const char *runas = NULL;
unsigned int ifi = 0;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
if (c->mode == MODE_PASTA)
c->no_dhcp_dns = c->no_dhcp_dns_search = 1;
c->tcp.fwd_mode_in = c->tcp.fwd_mode_out = 0;
c->udp.fwd_mode_in = c->udp.fwd_mode_out = 0;
do {
const char *optstring;
if (c->mode == MODE_PASST)
optstring = "dqfehs:p:P:m:a:n:M:g:i:D:S:46t:u:";
else
optstring = "dqfehI:p:P:m:a:n:M:g:i:D:S:46t:u:T:U:";
name = getopt_long(argc, argv, optstring, options, NULL);
switch (name) {
case -1:
case 0:
break;
case 2:
if (c->mode != MODE_PASTA) {
err("--userns is for pasta mode only");
usage(argv[0]);
}
ret = snprintf(userns, sizeof(userns), "%s", optarg);
if (ret <= 0 || ret >= (int)sizeof(userns)) {
err("Invalid userns: %s", optarg);
usage(argv[0]);
}
break;
case 3:
if (c->mode != MODE_PASTA) {
err("--netns is for pasta mode only");
usage(argv[0]);
}
ret = conf_netns_opt(netns, optarg);
if (ret < 0)
usage(argv[0]);
break;
case 4:
if (c->mode != MODE_PASTA) {
err("--ns-mac-addr is for pasta mode only");
usage(argv[0]);
}
for (i = 0; i < ETH_ALEN; i++) {
errno = 0;
b = strtol(optarg + (intptr_t)i * 3, NULL, 16);
if (b < 0 || b > UCHAR_MAX || errno) {
err("Invalid MAC address: %s", optarg);
usage(argv[0]);
}
c->mac_guest[i] = b;
}
break;
case 5:
if (c->mode != MODE_PASTA) {
err("--dhcp-dns is for pasta mode only");
usage(argv[0]);
}
c->no_dhcp_dns = 0;
break;
case 6:
if (c->mode != MODE_PASST) {
err("--no-dhcp-dns is for passt mode only");
usage(argv[0]);
}
c->no_dhcp_dns = 1;
break;
case 7:
if (c->mode != MODE_PASTA) {
err("--dhcp-search is for pasta mode only");
usage(argv[0]);
}
c->no_dhcp_dns_search = 0;
break;
case 8:
if (c->mode != MODE_PASST) {
err("--no-dhcp-search is for passt mode only");
usage(argv[0]);
}
c->no_dhcp_dns_search = 1;
break;
case 9:
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&c->ip6.dns_fwd) &&
inet_pton(AF_INET6, optarg, &c->ip6.dns_fwd) &&
!IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&c->ip6.dns_fwd) &&
!IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(&c->ip6.dns_fwd))
break;
if (c->ip4.dns_fwd == INADDR_ANY &&
inet_pton(AF_INET, optarg, &c->ip4.dns_fwd) &&
c->ip4.dns_fwd != INADDR_ANY &&
c->ip4.dns_fwd != INADDR_BROADCAST &&
c->ip4.dns_fwd != INADDR_LOOPBACK)
break;
err("Invalid DNS forwarding address: %s", optarg);
usage(argv[0]);
break;
case 10:
if (c->mode != MODE_PASTA) {
err("--no-netns-quit is for pasta mode only");
usage(argv[0]);
}
c->no_netns_quit = 1;
break;
case 11:
if (c->trace) {
err("Multiple --trace options given");
usage(argv[0]);
}
if (c->quiet) {
err("Either --trace or --quiet");
usage(argv[0]);
}
c->trace = c->debug = c->foreground = 1;
break;
case 12:
if (runas) {
err("Multiple --runas options given");
usage(argv[0]);
}
runas = optarg;
break;
case 'd':
if (c->debug) {
err("Multiple --debug options given");
usage(argv[0]);
}
if (c->quiet) {
err("Either --debug or --quiet");
usage(argv[0]);
}
c->debug = 1;
c->foreground = 1;
break;
case 'e':
if (c->stderr) {
err("Multiple --stderr options given");
usage(argv[0]);
}
c->stderr = 1;
break;
case 'q':
if (c->quiet) {
err("Multiple --quiet options given");
usage(argv[0]);
}
if (c->debug) {
err("Either --debug or --quiet");
usage(argv[0]);
}
c->quiet = 1;
break;
case 'f':
if (c->foreground && !c->debug) {
err("Multiple --foreground options given");
usage(argv[0]);
}
c->foreground = 1;
break;
case 's':
if (*c->sock_path) {
err("Multiple --socket options given");
usage(argv[0]);
}
ret = snprintf(c->sock_path, UNIX_SOCK_MAX - 1, "%s",
optarg);
if (ret <= 0 || ret >= (int)sizeof(c->sock_path)) {
err("Invalid socket path: %s", optarg);
usage(argv[0]);
}
break;
case 'I':
if (*c->pasta_ifn) {
err("Multiple --ns-ifname options given");
usage(argv[0]);
}
ret = snprintf(c->pasta_ifn, IFNAMSIZ - 1, "%s",
optarg);
if (ret <= 0 || ret >= IFNAMSIZ - 1) {
err("Invalid interface name: %s", optarg);
usage(argv[0]);
}
break;
case 'p':
if (*c->pcap) {
err("Multiple --pcap options given");
usage(argv[0]);
}
ret = snprintf(c->pcap, sizeof(c->pcap), "%s", optarg);
if (ret <= 0 || ret >= (int)sizeof(c->pcap)) {
err("Invalid pcap path: %s", optarg);
usage(argv[0]);
}
break;
case 'P':
if (*c->pid_file) {
err("Multiple --pid options given");
usage(argv[0]);
}
ret = snprintf(c->pid_file, sizeof(c->pid_file), "%s",
optarg);
if (ret <= 0 || ret >= (int)sizeof(c->pid_file)) {
err("Invalid PID file: %s", optarg);
usage(argv[0]);
}
break;
case 'm':
if (c->mtu) {
err("Multiple --mtu options given");
usage(argv[0]);
}
errno = 0;
c->mtu = strtol(optarg, NULL, 0);
if (!c->mtu) {
c->mtu = -1;
break;
}
if (c->mtu < ETH_MIN_MTU || c->mtu > (int)ETH_MAX_MTU ||
errno) {
err("Invalid MTU: %s", optarg);
usage(argv[0]);
}
break;
case 'a':
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&c->ip6.addr) &&
inet_pton(AF_INET6, optarg, &c->ip6.addr) &&
!IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&c->ip6.addr) &&
!IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(&c->ip6.addr) &&
!IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&c->ip6.addr) &&
!IN6_IS_ADDR_V4COMPAT(&c->ip6.addr) &&
!IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST(&c->ip6.addr))
break;
if (c->ip4.addr == INADDR_ANY &&
inet_pton(AF_INET, optarg, &c->ip4.addr) &&
c->ip4.addr != INADDR_ANY &&
c->ip4.addr != INADDR_BROADCAST &&
c->ip4.addr != INADDR_LOOPBACK &&
!IN_MULTICAST(c->ip4.addr))
break;
err("Invalid address: %s", optarg);
usage(argv[0]);
break;
case 'n':
if (inet_pton(AF_INET, optarg, &c->ip4.mask))
break;
errno = 0;
mask = strtol(optarg, NULL, 0);
if (mask > 0 && mask <= 32 && !errno) {
c->ip4.mask = htonl(0xffffffff << (32 - mask));
break;
}
err("Invalid netmask: %s", optarg);
usage(argv[0]);
break;
case 'M':
for (i = 0; i < ETH_ALEN; i++) {
errno = 0;
b = strtol(optarg + (intptr_t)i * 3, NULL, 16);
if (b < 0 || b > UCHAR_MAX || errno) {
err("Invalid MAC address: %s", optarg);
usage(argv[0]);
}
c->mac[i] = b;
}
break;
case 'g':
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&c->ip6.gw) &&
inet_pton(AF_INET6, optarg, &c->ip6.gw) &&
!IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&c->ip6.gw) &&
!IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(&c->ip6.gw))
break;
if (c->ip4.gw == INADDR_ANY &&
inet_pton(AF_INET, optarg, &c->ip4.gw) &&
c->ip4.gw != INADDR_ANY &&
c->ip4.gw != INADDR_BROADCAST &&
c->ip4.gw != INADDR_LOOPBACK)
break;
err("Invalid gateway address: %s", optarg);
usage(argv[0]);
break;
case 'i':
if (ifi) {
err("Redundant interface: %s", optarg);
usage(argv[0]);
}
if (!(ifi = if_nametoindex(optarg))) {
err("Invalid interface name %s: %s", optarg,
strerror(errno));
usage(argv[0]);
}
break;
case 'D':
if (!strcmp(optarg, "none")) {
if (c->no_dns) {
err("Redundant DNS options");
usage(argv[0]);
}
if (dns4 - c->ip4.dns || dns6 - c->ip6.dns) {
err("Conflicting DNS options");
usage(argv[0]);
}
c->no_dns = 1;
break;
}
if (c->no_dns) {
err("Conflicting DNS options");
usage(argv[0]);
}
if (dns4 - &c->ip4.dns[0] < ARRAY_SIZE(c->ip4.dns) &&
inet_pton(AF_INET, optarg, dns4)) {
dns4++;
break;
}
if (dns6 - &c->ip6.dns[0] < ARRAY_SIZE(c->ip6.dns) &&
inet_pton(AF_INET6, optarg, dns6)) {
dns6++;
break;
}
err("Cannot use DNS address %s", optarg);
usage(argv[0]);
break;
case 'S':
if (!strcmp(optarg, "none")) {
if (c->no_dns_search) {
err("Redundant DNS search options");
usage(argv[0]);
}
if (dnss != c->dns_search) {
err("Conflicting DNS search options");
usage(argv[0]);
}
c->no_dns_search = 1;
break;
}
if (c->no_dns_search) {
err("Conflicting DNS search options");
usage(argv[0]);
}
if (dnss - c->dns_search < ARRAY_SIZE(c->dns_search)) {
ret = snprintf(dnss->n, sizeof(*c->dns_search),
"%s", optarg);
dnss++;
if (ret > 0 &&
ret < (int)sizeof(*c->dns_search))
break;
}
err("Cannot use DNS search domain %s", optarg);
usage(argv[0]);
break;
case '4':
v4_only = true;
break;
case '6':
v6_only = true;
break;
case 't':
case 'u':
case 'T':
case 'U':
/* Handle these later, once addresses are configured */
break;
case '?':
case 'h':
default:
usage(argv[0]);
break;
}
} while (name != -1);
ret = conf_ugid(runas, &uid, &gid);
if (ret)
usage(argv[0]);
if (c->mode == MODE_PASTA) {
Handle userns isolation and dropping root at the same time passt/pasta can interact with user namespaces in a number of ways: 1) With --netns-only we'll remain in our original user namespace 2) With --userns or a PID option to pasta we'll join either the given user namespace or that of the PID 3) When pasta spawns a shell or command we'll start a new user namespace for the command and then join it 4) With passt we'll create a new user namespace when we sandbox() ourself However (3) and (4) turn out to have essentially the same effect. In both cases we create one new user namespace. The spawned command starts there, and passt/pasta itself will live there from sandbox() onwards. Because of this, we can simplify user namespace handling by moving the userns handling earlier, to the same point we drop root in the original namespace. Extend the drop_user() function to isolate_user() which does both. After switching UID and GID in the original userns, isolate_user() will either join or create the userns we require. When we spawn a command with pasta_start_ns()/pasta_setup_ns() we no longer need to create a userns, because we're already made one. sandbox() likewise no longer needs to create (or join) an userns because we're already in the one we need. We no longer need c->pasta_userns_fd, since the fd is only used locally in isolate_user(). Likewise we can replace c->netns_only with a local in conf(), since it's not used outside there. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2022-09-12 12:24:07 +00:00
if (conf_pasta_ns(&netns_only, userns, netns,
optind, argc, argv) < 0)
usage(argv[0]);
} else if (optind != argc) {
usage(argv[0]);
}
Handle userns isolation and dropping root at the same time passt/pasta can interact with user namespaces in a number of ways: 1) With --netns-only we'll remain in our original user namespace 2) With --userns or a PID option to pasta we'll join either the given user namespace or that of the PID 3) When pasta spawns a shell or command we'll start a new user namespace for the command and then join it 4) With passt we'll create a new user namespace when we sandbox() ourself However (3) and (4) turn out to have essentially the same effect. In both cases we create one new user namespace. The spawned command starts there, and passt/pasta itself will live there from sandbox() onwards. Because of this, we can simplify user namespace handling by moving the userns handling earlier, to the same point we drop root in the original namespace. Extend the drop_user() function to isolate_user() which does both. After switching UID and GID in the original userns, isolate_user() will either join or create the userns we require. When we spawn a command with pasta_start_ns()/pasta_setup_ns() we no longer need to create a userns, because we're already made one. sandbox() likewise no longer needs to create (or join) an userns because we're already in the one we need. We no longer need c->pasta_userns_fd, since the fd is only used locally in isolate_user(). Likewise we can replace c->netns_only with a local in conf(), since it's not used outside there. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2022-09-12 12:24:07 +00:00
isolate_user(uid, gid, !netns_only, userns);
if (c->pasta_conf_ns)
c->no_ra = 1;
More deterministic detection of whether argument is a PID, PATH or NAME pasta takes as its only non-option argument either a PID to attach to the namespaces of, a PATH to a network namespace or a NAME of a network namespace (relative to /run/netns). Currently to determine which it is we try all 3 in that order, and if anything goes wrong we move onto the next. This has the potential to cause very confusing failure modes. e.g. if the argument is intended to be a network namespace name, but a (non-namespace) file of the same name exists in the current directory. Make behaviour more predictable by choosing how to treat the argument based only on the argument's contents, not anything else on the system: - If it's a decimal integer treat it as a PID - Otherwise, if it has no '/' characters, treat it as a netns name (ip-netns doesn't allow '/' in netns names) - Otherwise, treat it as a netns path If you want to open a persistent netns in the current directory, you can use './netns'. This also allows us to split the parsing of the PID|PATH|NAME option from the actual opening of the namespaces. In turn that allows us to put the opening of existing namespaces next to the opening of new namespaces in pasta_start_ns. That makes the logical flow easier to follow and will enable later cleanups. Caveats: - The separation of functions mean we will always generate the basename and dirname for the netns_quit system, even when using PID namespaces. This is pointless, since the netns_quit system doesn't work for non persistent namespaces, but is harmless. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2022-08-26 04:58:37 +00:00
if (c->mode == MODE_PASTA) {
if (*netns) {
Handle userns isolation and dropping root at the same time passt/pasta can interact with user namespaces in a number of ways: 1) With --netns-only we'll remain in our original user namespace 2) With --userns or a PID option to pasta we'll join either the given user namespace or that of the PID 3) When pasta spawns a shell or command we'll start a new user namespace for the command and then join it 4) With passt we'll create a new user namespace when we sandbox() ourself However (3) and (4) turn out to have essentially the same effect. In both cases we create one new user namespace. The spawned command starts there, and passt/pasta itself will live there from sandbox() onwards. Because of this, we can simplify user namespace handling by moving the userns handling earlier, to the same point we drop root in the original namespace. Extend the drop_user() function to isolate_user() which does both. After switching UID and GID in the original userns, isolate_user() will either join or create the userns we require. When we spawn a command with pasta_start_ns()/pasta_setup_ns() we no longer need to create a userns, because we're already made one. sandbox() likewise no longer needs to create (or join) an userns because we're already in the one we need. We no longer need c->pasta_userns_fd, since the fd is only used locally in isolate_user(). Likewise we can replace c->netns_only with a local in conf(), since it's not used outside there. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2022-09-12 12:24:07 +00:00
pasta_open_ns(c, netns);
More deterministic detection of whether argument is a PID, PATH or NAME pasta takes as its only non-option argument either a PID to attach to the namespaces of, a PATH to a network namespace or a NAME of a network namespace (relative to /run/netns). Currently to determine which it is we try all 3 in that order, and if anything goes wrong we move onto the next. This has the potential to cause very confusing failure modes. e.g. if the argument is intended to be a network namespace name, but a (non-namespace) file of the same name exists in the current directory. Make behaviour more predictable by choosing how to treat the argument based only on the argument's contents, not anything else on the system: - If it's a decimal integer treat it as a PID - Otherwise, if it has no '/' characters, treat it as a netns name (ip-netns doesn't allow '/' in netns names) - Otherwise, treat it as a netns path If you want to open a persistent netns in the current directory, you can use './netns'. This also allows us to split the parsing of the PID|PATH|NAME option from the actual opening of the namespaces. In turn that allows us to put the opening of existing namespaces next to the opening of new namespaces in pasta_start_ns. That makes the logical flow easier to follow and will enable later cleanups. Caveats: - The separation of functions mean we will always generate the basename and dirname for the netns_quit system, even when using PID namespaces. This is pointless, since the netns_quit system doesn't work for non persistent namespaces, but is harmless. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2022-08-26 04:58:37 +00:00
} else {
pasta_start_ns(c, argc - optind, argv + optind);
More deterministic detection of whether argument is a PID, PATH or NAME pasta takes as its only non-option argument either a PID to attach to the namespaces of, a PATH to a network namespace or a NAME of a network namespace (relative to /run/netns). Currently to determine which it is we try all 3 in that order, and if anything goes wrong we move onto the next. This has the potential to cause very confusing failure modes. e.g. if the argument is intended to be a network namespace name, but a (non-namespace) file of the same name exists in the current directory. Make behaviour more predictable by choosing how to treat the argument based only on the argument's contents, not anything else on the system: - If it's a decimal integer treat it as a PID - Otherwise, if it has no '/' characters, treat it as a netns name (ip-netns doesn't allow '/' in netns names) - Otherwise, treat it as a netns path If you want to open a persistent netns in the current directory, you can use './netns'. This also allows us to split the parsing of the PID|PATH|NAME option from the actual opening of the namespaces. In turn that allows us to put the opening of existing namespaces next to the opening of new namespaces in pasta_start_ns. That makes the logical flow easier to follow and will enable later cleanups. Caveats: - The separation of functions mean we will always generate the basename and dirname for the netns_quit system, even when using PID namespaces. This is pointless, since the netns_quit system doesn't work for non persistent namespaces, but is harmless. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2022-08-26 04:58:37 +00:00
}
}
if (nl_sock_init(c)) {
err("Failed to get netlink socket");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (v4_only && v6_only) {
err("Options ipv4-only and ipv6-only are mutually exclusive");
usage(argv[0]);
}
if (!v6_only)
c->ifi4 = conf_ip4(ifi, &c->ip4, c->mac);
if (!v4_only)
c->ifi6 = conf_ip6(ifi, &c->ip6, c->mac);
if (!c->ifi4 && !c->ifi6) {
err("External interface not usable");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/* Now we can process port configuration options */
optind = 1;
do {
enum port_fwd_mode *fwd = NULL;
const char *optstring;
if (c->mode == MODE_PASST)
optstring = "dqfehs:p::P:m:a:n:M:g:i:D::S::46t:u:";
else
optstring = "dqfehI:p::P:m:a:n:M:g:i:D::S::46t:u:T:U:";
name = getopt_long(argc, argv, optstring, options, NULL);
switch (name) {
case 't':
case 'u':
case 'T':
case 'U':
if (name == 't')
fwd = &c->tcp.fwd_mode_in;
else if (name == 'T')
fwd = &c->tcp.fwd_mode_out;
else if (name == 'u')
fwd = &c->udp.fwd_mode_in;
else if (name == 'U')
fwd = &c->udp.fwd_mode_out;
if (!optarg || conf_ports(c, name, optarg, fwd))
usage(argv[0]);
break;
default:
break;
}
} while (name != -1);
if (!c->ifi4)
c->no_dhcp = 1;
if (!c->ifi6) {
c->no_ndp = 1;
c->no_dhcpv6 = 1;
}
if (!c->mtu)
c->mtu = ROUND_DOWN(ETH_MAX_MTU - ETH_HLEN, sizeof(uint32_t));
get_dns(c);
if (!*c->pasta_ifn) {
if (c->ifi4)
if_indextoname(c->ifi4, c->pasta_ifn);
else
if_indextoname(c->ifi6, c->pasta_ifn);
}
if (c->mode == MODE_PASTA) {
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after initialisation. While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS namespaces. With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64. While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it conceptually makes sense. We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before sandboxing: - the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead - /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context - the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately discard new connection if we already have a valid one Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page. To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon() implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its own PID): mention that in the man page. For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits. We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation, that took care of terminating all processes running in the same namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate once the init process exits. Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt demo and test setup scripts to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 20:11:37 +00:00
c->proc_net_tcp[V4][0] = c->proc_net_tcp[V4][1] = -1;
c->proc_net_tcp[V6][0] = c->proc_net_tcp[V6][1] = -1;
c->proc_net_udp[V4][0] = c->proc_net_udp[V4][1] = -1;
c->proc_net_udp[V6][0] = c->proc_net_udp[V6][1] = -1;
if (!c->tcp.fwd_mode_in || c->tcp.fwd_mode_in == FWD_AUTO) {
c->tcp.fwd_mode_in = FWD_AUTO;
ns_ports_arg.proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
NS_CALL(get_bound_ports_ns, &ns_ports_arg);
}
if (!c->udp.fwd_mode_in || c->udp.fwd_mode_in == FWD_AUTO) {
c->udp.fwd_mode_in = FWD_AUTO;
ns_ports_arg.proto = IPPROTO_UDP;
NS_CALL(get_bound_ports_ns, &ns_ports_arg);
}
if (!c->tcp.fwd_mode_out || c->tcp.fwd_mode_out == FWD_AUTO) {
c->tcp.fwd_mode_out = FWD_AUTO;
get_bound_ports(c, 0, IPPROTO_TCP);
}
if (!c->udp.fwd_mode_out || c->udp.fwd_mode_out == FWD_AUTO) {
c->udp.fwd_mode_out = FWD_AUTO;
get_bound_ports(c, 0, IPPROTO_UDP);
}
} else {
if (!c->tcp.fwd_mode_in)
c->tcp.fwd_mode_in = FWD_NONE;
if (!c->tcp.fwd_mode_out)
c->tcp.fwd_mode_out= FWD_NONE;
if (!c->udp.fwd_mode_in)
c->udp.fwd_mode_in = FWD_NONE;
if (!c->udp.fwd_mode_out)
c->udp.fwd_mode_out = FWD_NONE;
}
if (!c->quiet)
conf_print(c);
}