If a parent accidentally or due to implementation reasons leaks any
open file, we don't want to have access to them, except for the file
passed via --fd, if any.
This is the case for Podman when Podman's parent leaks files into
Podman: it's not practical for Podman to close unrelated files before
starting pasta, as reported by Paul.
Use close_range(2) to close all open files except for standard streams
and the one from --fd.
Given that parts of conf() depend on other files to be already opened,
such as the epoll file descriptor, we can't easily defer this to a
more convenient point, where --fd was already parsed. Introduce a
minimal, duplicate version of --fd parsing to keep this simple.
As we need to check that the passed --fd option doesn't exceed
INT_MAX, because we'll parse it with strtol() but file descriptor
indices are signed ints (regardless of the arguments close_range()
take), extend the existing check in the actual --fd parsing in conf(),
also rejecting file descriptors numbers that match standard streams,
while at it.
Suggested-by: Paul Holzinger <pholzing@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Paul Holzinger <pholzing@redhat.com>
Now that we have logging functions embedding perror() functionality,
we can make _some_ calls more terse by using them. In many places,
the strerror() calls are still more convenient because, for example,
they are used in flow debugging functions, or because the return code
variable of interest is not 'errno'.
While at it, convert a few error messages from a scant perror style
to proper failure descriptions.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
perror() prints directly to standard error, but in many cases standard
error might be already closed, or we might want to skip logging, based
on configuration. Our logging functions provide all that.
While at it, make errors more descriptive, replacing some of the
existing basic perror-style messages.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
As we are going to introduce the MODE_VU that will act like
the mode MODE_PASST, compare to MODE_PASTA rather than to add
a comparison to MODE_VU when we check for MODE_PASST.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Newer versions of cppcheck (as of 2.12.0, at least) added a warning for
pointers which could be declared to point at const data, but aren't.
Based on that, make many pointers throughout the codebase const.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
When pasta is started from an existing userns and tries to join the
netns from another process it fails to open /proc/$pid/ns/net due the
missing CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability in the --netns-only case.
A simple reproducer for this.
First create a userns:
$ unshare -r
Then create a new netns inside it and try to join that netns with pasta.
$ unshare -n sleep inf &
$ pasta --config-net --netns /proc/$!/ns/net
Signed-off-by: Paul Holzinger <pholzing@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
If pasta spawns a child process while running as UID 0, which is only
allowed from a non-init namespace, we need to keep CAP_SETFCAP before
pasta_start_ns() is called: otherwise, starting from Linux 5.12, we
won't be able to update /proc/self/uid_map with the intended mapping
(from 0 to 0). See user_namespaces(7).
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
In practical terms, passt doesn't benefit from the additional
protection offered by the AGPL over the GPL, because it's not
suitable to be executed over a computer network.
Further, restricting the distribution under the version 3 of the GPL
wouldn't provide any practical advantage either, as long as the passt
codebase is concerned, and might cause unnecessary compatibility
dilemmas.
Change licensing terms to the GNU General Public License Version 2,
or any later version, with written permission from all current and
past contributors, namely: myself, David Gibson, Laine Stump, Andrea
Bolognani, Paul Holzinger, Richard W.M. Jones, Chris Kuhn, Florian
Weimer, Giuseppe Scrivano, Stefan Hajnoczi, and Vasiliy Ulyanov.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Roughly inspired from a patch by Chris Kuhn: fix up includes so that
we can build against musl: glibc is more lenient as headers generally
include a larger amount of other headers.
Compared to the original patch, I only included what was needed
directly in C files, instead of adding blanket includes in local
header files. It's a bit more involved, but more consistent with the
current (not ideal) situation.
Reported-by: Chris Kuhn <kuhnchris+github@kuhnchris.eu>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
This actually leaves us with 0 uses of err(), but someone could want
to use it in the future, so we may as well leave it around.
Signed-off-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
When in passt mode, or pasta mode spawning a command, we create a userns
for ourselves. This is used both to isolate the pasta/passt process itself
and to run the spawned command, if any.
Since eed17a47 "Handle userns isolation and dropping root at the same time"
we've handled both cases the same, configuring the UID and GID mappings in
the new userns to map whichever UID we're running as to root within the
userns.
This mapping is desirable when spawning a shell or other command, so that
the user gets a root shell with reasonably clear abilities within the
userns and netns. It's not necessarily essential, though. When not
spawning a shell, it doesn't really have any purpose: passt itself doesn't
need to be root and can operate fine with an unmapped user (using some of
the capabilities we get when entering the userns instead).
Configuring the uid_map can cause problems if passt is running with any
capabilities in the initial namespace, such as CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE to
allow it to forward low ports. In this case the kernel makes files in
/proc/pid owned by root rather than the starting user to prevent the user
from interfering with the operation of the capability-enhanced process.
This includes uid_map meaning we are not able to write to it.
Whether this behaviour is correct in the kernel is debatable, but in any
case we might as well avoid problems by only initializing the user mappings
when we really want them.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
We drop our own capabilities, but it's possible that processes we exec()
could gain extra privilege via file capabilities. It shouldn't be possible
for us to exec() anyway due to seccomp() and our filesystem isolation. But
just in case, zero the bounding and inheritable capability sets to prevent
any such child from gainin privilege.
Note that we do this *after* spawning the pasta shell/command (if any),
because we do want the user to be able to give that privilege if they want.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
The current implementation of drop_caps() doesn't really work because it
attempts to drop capabilities from the bounding set. That's not the set
that really matters, it's about limiting the abilities of things we might
later exec() rather than our own capabilities. It also requires
CAP_SETPCAP which we won't usually have.
Replace it with a new version which uses setcap(2) to drop capabilities
from the effective and permitted sets. For now we leave the inheritable
set as is, since we don't want to preclude the user from passing
inheritable capabilities to the command spawed by pasta.
Correctly dropping caps reveals that we were relying on some capabilities
we'd supposedly dropped. Re-divide the dropping of capabilities between
isolate_initial(), isolate_user() and isolate_prefork() to make this work.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Currently, isolate_user() exits early if the --netns-only option is given.
That works for now, but shortly we're going to want to add some logic to
go at the end of isolate_user() that needs to run in all cases: joining a
given userns, creating a new userns, or staying in our original userns
(--netns-only).
To avoid muddying those changes, here we reorganize isolate_user() to have
a common exit path for all cases.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
In a few places we use the FWRITE() macro to open a file, replace it's
contents with a given string and close it again. There's no real
reason this needs to be a macro rather than just a function though.
Turn it into a function 'write_file()' and make some ancillary
cleanups while we're there:
- Add a return code so the caller can handle giving a useful error message
- Handle the case of short write()s (unlikely, but possible)
- Add O_TRUNC, to make sure we replace the existing contents entirely
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
We have a number of steps of self-isolation scattered across our code.
Improve function names and add comments to make it clearer what the self
isolation model is, what the steps do, and why they happen at the points
they happen.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Logging to file is going to add some further complexity that we don't
want to squeeze into util.c.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
passt/pasta can interact with user namespaces in a number of ways:
1) With --netns-only we'll remain in our original user namespace
2) With --userns or a PID option to pasta we'll join either the given
user namespace or that of the PID
3) When pasta spawns a shell or command we'll start a new user namespace
for the command and then join it
4) With passt we'll create a new user namespace when we sandbox()
ourself
However (3) and (4) turn out to have essentially the same effect. In both
cases we create one new user namespace. The spawned command starts there,
and passt/pasta itself will live there from sandbox() onwards.
Because of this, we can simplify user namespace handling by moving the
userns handling earlier, to the same point we drop root in the original
namespace. Extend the drop_user() function to isolate_user() which does
both.
After switching UID and GID in the original userns, isolate_user() will
either join or create the userns we require. When we spawn a command with
pasta_start_ns()/pasta_setup_ns() we no longer need to create a userns,
because we're already made one. sandbox() likewise no longer needs to
create (or join) an userns because we're already in the one we need.
We no longer need c->pasta_userns_fd, since the fd is only used locally
in isolate_user(). Likewise we can replace c->netns_only with a local
in conf(), since it's not used outside there.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
passt/pasta contains a number of routines designed to isolate passt from
the rest of the system for security. These are spread through util.c and
passt.c. Move them together into a new isolation.c file.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
