docs: update deploy/rightforyou

This commit is contained in:
lukas 2021-11-23 13:10:27 +00:00
parent 7df59d1309
commit f2deacbdf9

View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
title: Understand what you are signing up for
description:
published: true
date: 2021-11-23T13:08:16.540Z
date: 2021-11-23T13:10:24.740Z
tags:
editor: markdown
dateCreated: 2021-11-13T11:19:38.215Z
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ dateCreated: 2021-11-13T11:19:38.215Z
> *Phyllome OS has one goal: to let users bring their favorite operating system and to run them well. Eventually, users should be able to reach **the state of virtual enlightenment** (tm), and stop worrying about the fact that their favorite operating system is running inside a virtual machine, just as humans should stop worrying about living in a computer simulation* ([perhaps?](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulation_hypothesis)).
By definition, the host, Phyllome OS, is trying to be as discrete as possible, so that users won't actually have to spend much time to manage it. Users should be able to spend their time using their favorite personal computing environment, rather than messing around with Phyllome OS itself [^1]
By definition, the host, Phyllome OS, is trying to be as discrete as possible, so that users won't actually have to spend much time to manage it. Users should be able to spend their time using their favorite personal computing environment, rather than messing around with Phyllome OS itself.
However, if the host is meant to be a great place for guest operating systems to thrive, it is up to the user to manage the lifecycle of their guest operating system. Phyllome OS provides an optimized virtual machine model tuned to host modern operating systems, but, at the exception of some RPM-based guests operating systems including Phyllome OS itself, does not intent to provide automated ways to deploy guest operating systems (at the moment [Infrastructure as code solutions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infrastructure_as_code) or instance initialization software like [cloud-init](https://github.com/canonical/cloud-init) do not seem generic enough to satisfy every modern desktop-based operating systems' idiosyncrasies).
@ -87,15 +87,15 @@ How to read this table? For instance: *If you care most about virtualization and
This table is not meant to be clear-cut, or definitive.
For example, Phyllome OS is intended to be easy-to-use, but still isn't, and Spectrum, which is based on Chromium OS, might well end up being easier to use. Out of the box, Chrome OS [^2], or even Windows [^3], might be considered more secure than most Linux desktop-oriented distributions [^4], at the price of greatly limiting user freedom and privacy, however. Due to their tight integration, some BSDs distributions might be considered more secure than some Linux distributions. People might find Windows easier to use than, say, Ubuntu. Finally, just as Phyllome OS, Qubes OS is compatible with running Windows-based guest systems. In other words, using virtualization, a user might be able to access more usable operating systems, and in the case of Phyllome OS, one may even host Qubes OS inside Phyllome OS, for instance to test out Qubes OS.
For example, Phyllome OS is intended to be easy-to-use, but still isn't, and Spectrum, which is based on Chromium OS, might well end up being easier to use. Out of the box, Chrome OS [^1], or even Windows [^2], might be considered more secure than most Linux desktop-oriented distributions [^3], at the price of greatly limiting user freedom and privacy, however. Due to their tight integration, some BSDs distributions might be considered more secure than some Linux distributions. People might find Windows easier to use than, say, Ubuntu. Finally, just as Phyllome OS, Qubes OS is compatible with running Windows-based guest systems. In other words, using virtualization, a user might be able to access more usable operating systems, and in the case of Phyllome OS, one may even host Qubes OS inside Phyllome OS, for instance to test out Qubes OS.
Also note that macOS or Windows can also be used to host virtual machines, just as any Linux or BSDs distributions.
[^2]: See for instance the paper [*Security of Google Chromebook* (PDF)](http://dhanus.mit.edu/docs/ChromeOSSecurity.pdf) by Katherine Fang, Deborah Hanus, Yuzhi Zheng.
[^1]: See for instance the paper [*Security of Google Chromebook* (PDF)](http://dhanus.mit.edu/docs/ChromeOSSecurity.pdf) by Katherine Fang, Deborah Hanus, Yuzhi Zheng.
[^3]: A common pain point for Linux security are desktop environments (DE), which have a limited user base scattered across many different DE: there is a lot of complexity due to adding desktop environments atop the Linux kernel and its associated tools. Simple bugs might still lurk in the codebase for a long time. See for instance [*Is the Linux desktop less secure than Windows 10: Or how super mario music can own your system* (PDF)](https://archive.fosdem.org/2017/schedule/event/linux_desktop_versus_windows10/attachments/slides/1730/export/events/attachments/linux_desktop_versus_windows10/slides/1730/fosdem_linux_desktop_security.pdf), by M.Hanno Böck (2017).
[^2]: A common pain point for Linux security are desktop environments (DE), which have a limited user base scattered across many different DE: there is a lot of complexity due to adding desktop environments atop the Linux kernel and its associated tools. Simple bugs might still lurk in the codebase for a long time. See for instance [*Is the Linux desktop less secure than Windows 10: Or how super mario music can own your system* (PDF)](https://archive.fosdem.org/2017/schedule/event/linux_desktop_versus_windows10/attachments/slides/1730/export/events/attachments/linux_desktop_versus_windows10/slides/1730/fosdem_linux_desktop_security.pdf), by M.Hanno Böck (2017).
[^4]: Take for instance the boot process, or before an operating system effectively takes control over the hardware. Major operating systems editors that are working directly with OEM integrators have a distinct advantage over editors that aren't: these major editors have almost unlimited resources, sometimes almost perfect control over hardware, and can therefore tame the underlying hardware, effectively controlling, measuring and attesting the entire boot process. To implement a user-backed root of trust on a particular hardware platform, one would need to take several extra measures, relying on something like [Heads](https://github.com/osresearch/heads) which, among other things, involves physically flashing a more open firmware to a motherboard, a complicated process. Fortunately, some hardware integrators like [Purism](https://puri.sm/) or [System76](https://system76.com/) are backing security measures straight into hardware platforms, while at the same time respecting user freedom.
[^3]: Take for instance the boot process, or before an operating system effectively takes control over the hardware. Major operating systems editors that are working directly with OEM integrators have a distinct advantage over editors that aren't: these major editors have almost unlimited resources, sometimes almost perfect control over hardware, and can therefore tame the underlying hardware, effectively controlling, measuring and attesting the entire boot process. To implement a user-backed root of trust on a particular hardware platform, one would need to take several extra measures, relying on something like [Heads](https://github.com/osresearch/heads) which, among other things, involves physically flashing a more open firmware to a motherboard, a complicated process. Fortunately, some hardware integrators like [Purism](https://puri.sm/) or [System76](https://system76.com/) are backing security measures straight into hardware platforms, while at the same time respecting user freedom.
> **Still undecided?** You can give Phyllome OS a try, as a live system booting off from a USB thumb drive, without impacting the existing operating system on your machine.