When changing to virArch, the virt-aa-helper.c file was not
completely changed. The vahControl struct was left with a
char *arch field, instead of virArch arch field.
Convert the host capabilities and domain config structs to
use the virArch datatype. Update the parsers and all drivers
to take account of datatype change
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Prepare to support different types of hostdevs by refactoring
the current SELinux security driver code
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
When LXC labels USB devices during hotplug, it is running in
host context, so it needs to pass in a vroot path to the
container root.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The virSecurityManager{Set,Restore}AllLabel methods are invoked
at domain startup/shutdown to relabel resources associated with
a domain. This works fine with QEMU, but with LXC they are in
fact both currently no-ops since LXC does not support disks,
hostdevs, or kernel/initrd files. Worse, when LXC gains support
for disks/hostdevs, they will do the wrong thing, since they
run in host context, not container context. Thus this patch
turns then into a formal no-op when used with LXC. The LXC
controller will call out to specific security manager labelling
APIs as required during startup.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The current SELinux policy only works for KVM guests, since
TCG requires the 'execmem' privilege. There is a 'virt_use_execmem'
boolean to turn this on globally, but that is unpleasant for users.
This changes libvirt to automatically use a new 'svirt_tcg_t'
context for TCG based guests. This obsoletes the previous
boolean tunable and makes things 'just work(tm)'
Since we can't assume we run with new enough policy, I also
make us log a warning message (once only) if we find the policy
lacks support. In this case we fallback to the normal label and
expect users to set the boolean tunable
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
When using vnc gaphics over a unix socket, virt-aa-helper needs to provide
access for the qemu domain to access the sockfile.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
When a qemu domain is backed by huge pages, apparmor needs to grant the domain
rw access to files under the hugetlbfs mount point. Add a hook, called in
qemu_process.c, which ends up adding the read-write access through
virt-aa-helper. Qemu will be creating a randomly named file under the
mountpoint and unlinking it as soon as it has mmap()d it, therefore we
cannot predict the full pathname, but for the same reason it is generally
safe to provide access to $path/**.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
The impls of virSecurityManagerGetMountOptions had no way to
return errors, since the code was treating 'NULL' as a success
value. This is somewhat pointless, since the calling code did
not want NULL in the first place and has to translate it into
the empty string "". So change the code so that the impls can
return "" directly, allowing use of NULL for error reporting
once again
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
For S390, the default console target type cannot be of type 'serial'.
It is necessary to at least interpret the 'arch' attribute
value of the os/type element to produce the correct default type.
Therefore we need to extend the signature of defaultConsoleTargetType
to account for architecture. As a consequence all the drivers
supporting this capability function must be updated.
Despite the amount of changed files, the only change in behavior is
that for S390 the default console target type will be 'virtio'.
N.B.: A more future-proof approach could be to to use hypervisor
specific capabilities to determine the best possible console type.
For instance one could add an opaque private data pointer to the
virCaps structure (in case of QEMU to hold capsCache) which could
then be passed to the defaultConsoleTargetType callback to determine
the console target type.
Seems to be however a bit overengineered for the use case...
Signed-off-by: Viktor Mihajlovski <mihajlov@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The libvirt coding standard is to use 'function(...args...)'
instead of 'function (...args...)'. A non-trivial number of
places did not follow this rule and are fixed in this patch.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
When restoring selinux labels after a VM is stopped, any non-standard
path that doesn't have a default selinux label causes the process
to stop and exit early. This isn't really an error condition IMO.
Of course the selinux API could be erroring for some other reason
but hopefully that's rare enough to not need explicit handling.
Common example here is storing disk images in a non-standard location
like under /mnt.
Fixes a build failure on cygwin:
cc1: warnings being treated as errors
security/security_dac.c: In function 'virSecurityDACSetProcessLabel':
security/security_dac.c:862:5: error: format '%u' expects type 'unsigned int', but argument 7 has type 'uid_t' [-Wformat]
security/security_dac.c:862:5: error: format '%u' expects type 'unsigned int', but argument 8 has type 'gid_t' [-Wformat]
* src/security/security_dac.c (virSecurityDACSetProcessLabel)
(virSecurityDACGenLabel): Use proper casts.
We used to walk the backing file chain at least twice per disk,
once to set up cgroup device whitelisting, and once to set up
security labeling. Rather than walk the chain every iteration,
which possibly includes calls to fork() in order to open root-squashed
NFS files, we can exploit the cache of the previous patch.
* src/conf/domain_conf.h (virDomainDiskDefForeachPath): Alter
signature.
* src/conf/domain_conf.c (virDomainDiskDefForeachPath): Require caller
to supply backing chain via disk, if recursion is desired.
* src/security/security_dac.c
(virSecurityDACSetSecurityImageLabel): Adjust caller.
* src/security/security_selinux.c
(virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel): Likewise.
* src/security/virt-aa-helper.c (get_files): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c (qemuSetupDiskCgroup)
(qemuTeardownDiskCgroup): Likewise.
(qemuSetupCgroup): Pre-populate chain.
BZ:https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=851981
When using macvtap, a character device gets first created by
kernel with name /dev/tapN, its selinux context is:
system_u:object_r:device_t:s0
Shortly, when udev gets notification when new file is created
in /dev, it will then jump in and relabel this file back to the
expected default context:
system_u:object_r:tun_tap_device_t:s0
There is a time gap happened.
Sometimes, it will have migration failed, AVC error message:
type=AVC msg=audit(1349858424.233:42507): avc: denied { read write } for
pid=19926 comm="qemu-kvm" path="/dev/tap33" dev=devtmpfs ino=131524
scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0:c598,c908
tcontext=system_u:object_r:device_t:s0 tclass=chr_file
This patch will label the tapfd device before qemu process starts:
system_u:object_r:tun_tap_device_t:MCS(MCS from seclabel->label)
We are currently able to work only with non-translated SELinux
contexts, but we are using functions that work with translated
contexts throughout the code. This patch swaps all SELinux context
translation relative calls with their raw sisters to avoid parsing
problems.
The problems can be experienced with mcstrans for example. The
difference is that if you have translations enabled (yum install
mcstrans; service mcstrans start), fgetfilecon_raw() will get you
something like 'system_u:object_r:virt_image_t:s0', whereas
fgetfilecon() will return 'system_u:object_r:virt_image_t:SystemLow'
that we cannot parse.
I was trying to confirm that the _raw variants were here since the dawn of
time, but the only thing I see now is that it was imported together in
the upstream repo [1] from svn, so before 2008.
Thanks Laurent Bigonville for finding this out.
[1] http://oss.tresys.com/git/selinux.git
All USB device lookup functions emit an error when they cannot find the
requested device. With this patch, their caller can choose if a missing
device is an error or normal condition.
The functions virGetUserID and virGetGroupID are now able to parse
user/group names and IDs in a similar way to coreutils' chown. So, user
and group parsing in security_dac can be simplified.
The DAC driver is missing parsing of group and user names for DAC labels
and currently just parses uid and gid. This patch extends it to support
names, so the following security label definition is now valid:
<seclabel type='static' model='dac' relabel='yes'>
<label>qemu:qemu</label>
<imagelabel>qemu:qemu</imagelabel>
</seclabel>
When it tries to parse an owner or a group, it first tries to resolve it as
a name, if it fails or it's an invalid user/group name then it tries to
parse it as an UID or GID. A leading '+' can also be used for both owner and
group to force it to be parsed as IDs, so the following example is also
valid:
<seclabel type='static' model='dac' relabel='yes'>
<label>+101:+101</label>
<imagelabel>+101:+101</imagelabel>
</seclabel>
This ensures that UID 101 and GUI 101 will be used instead of an user or
group named "101".
This allows the user to control labelling of each character device
separately (the default is to inherit from the VM).
Signed-off-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-howto.html recommends that
the 'If not, see <url>.' phrase be a separate sentence.
* tests/securityselinuxhelper.c: Remove doubled line.
* tests/securityselinuxtest.c: Likewise.
* globally: s/; If/. If/
The DAC security driver silently ignored errors when parsing the DAC
label and used default values instead.
With a domain containing the following label definition:
<seclabel type='static' model='dac' relabel='yes'>
<label>sdfklsdjlfjklsdjkl</label>
</seclabel>
the domain would start normaly but the disk images would be still owned
by root and no error was displayed.
This patch changes the behavior if the parsing of the label fails (note
that a not present label is not a failure and in this case the default
label should be used) the error isn't masked but is raised that causes
the domain start to fail with a descriptive error message:
virsh # start tr
error: Failed to start domain tr
error: internal error invalid argument: failed to parse DAC seclabel
'sdfklsdjlfjklsdjkl' for domain 'tr'
I also changed the error code to "invalid argument" from "internal
error" and tweaked the various error messages to contain correct and
useful information.
If no 'security_driver' config option was set, then the code
just loaded the 'dac' security driver. This is a regression
on previous behaviour, where we would probe for a possible
security driver. ie default to SELinux if available.
This changes things so that it 'security_driver' is not set,
we once again do probing. For simplicity we also always
create the stack driver, even if there is only one driver
active.
The desired semantics are:
- security_driver not set
-> probe for selinux/apparmour/nop
-> auto-add DAC driver
- security_driver set to a string
-> add that one driver
-> auto-add DAC driver
- security_driver set to a list
-> add all drivers in list
-> auto-add DAC driver
It is not allowed, or possible to specify 'dac' in the
security_driver config param, since that is always
enabled.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
This reverts commit 9f9b7b85c9.
The DAC security driver needs special handling and extra parameters and
can't just be added to regular security drivers.
When starting a machine the DAC security driver tries to set the UID and
GID of the newly spawned process. This worked as desired if the desired
label was set. When the label was missing a logical bug in
virSecurityDACGenLabel() caused that uninitialised values were used as
uid and gid for the new process.
With this patch, default values (from qemu driver configuration)
are used if the label is not found.
Currently, if users set 'security_driver="dac"' in qemu.conf libvirtd
fails to initialize as DAC driver is not found because it is missing
in our security drivers array.
The DAC security driver uses the virStrToLong_ui function to
parse the uid/gid out of the seclabel string. This works on
Linux where 'uid_t' is an unsigned int, but on Mingw32 it is
just an 'int'. This causes compiler warnings about signed/
unsigned int pointer mis-match.
To avoid this, use explicit 'unsigned int ouruid' local
vars to pass into virStrToLong_ui, and then simply assign
to the 'uid_t' type after parsing
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Currently the dynamic label generation code will create labels
with a sensitivity of s0, and a category pair in the range
0-1023. This is fine when running a standard MCS policy because
libvirtd will run with a label
system_u:system_r:virtd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
With custom policies though, it is possible for libvirtd to have
a different sensitivity, or category range. For example
system_u:system_r:virtd_t:s2-s3:c512.c1023
In this case we must assign the VM a sensitivity matching the
current lower sensitivity value, and categories in the range
512-1023
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The code to refactor sec label handling accidentally changed the
SELinux driver to use the 'domain_context' when generating the
image label instead of the 'file_context'
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
These changes make the security drivers able to find and handle the
correct security label information when more than one label is
available. They also update the DAC driver to be used as an usual
security driver.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch updates the structures that store information about each
domain and each hypervisor to support multiple security labels and
drivers. It also updates all the remaining code to use the new fields.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This is a fix for the object label generation. It uses a new flag for
virSecuritySELinuxGenNewContext that specifies whether the context is
for an object. If so the context role remains unchanged.
Without this fix it is not possible to start domains with image file or
block device backed storage when selinux is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Viktor Mihajlovski <mihajlov@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The code for picking a MCS label is about to get significantly
more complicated, so it deserves to be in a standlone method,
instead of a switch/case body.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
When generating an SELinux context for a VM from the template
"system_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0", copy the role + user from the
current process instead of the template context. So if the
current process is
unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
then the VM context ends up as
unconfined_u:unconfined_r:svirt_t:s0:c386,c703
instead of
system_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0:c177,c424
Ideally the /etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/virtual_domain_context
file would have just shown the 'svirt_t' type, and not the full
context, but that can't be changed now for compatibility reasons.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The virSecuritySELinuxGenNewContext method was not reporting any
errors, leaving it up to the caller to report a generic error.
In addition it could potentially trigger a strdup(NULL) in an
OOM scenario. Move all error reporting into the
virSecuritySELinuxGenNewContext method where accurate info
can be provided
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
There is currently no way to distinguish the case that a requested
security driver was disabled, from the case where no security driver
was available. Use VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED as the error when an
explicitly requested security driver was disabled
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The security_manager.h header is not self-contained because it
uses the virDomainDefPtr without first including domain_conf.h
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
All callers used the same initialization seed (well, the new
viratomictest forgot to look at getpid()); so we might as well
make this value automatic. And while it may feel like we are
giving up functionality, I documented how to get it back in the
unlikely case that you actually need to debug with a fixed
pseudo-random sequence. I left that crippled by default, so
that a stray environment variable doesn't cause a lack of
randomness to become a security issue.
* src/util/virrandom.c (virRandomInitialize): Rename...
(virRandomOnceInit): ...and make static, with one-shot call.
Document how to do fixed-seed debugging.
* src/util/virrandom.h (virRandomInitialize): Drop prototype.
* src/libvirt_private.syms (virrandom.h): Don't export it.
* src/libvirt.c (virInitialize): Adjust caller.
* src/lxc/lxc_controller.c (main): Likewise.
* src/security/virt-aa-helper.c (main): Likewise.
* src/util/iohelper.c (main): Likewise.
* tests/seclabeltest.c (main): Likewise.
* tests/testutils.c (virtTestMain): Likewise.
* tests/viratomictest.c (mymain): Likewise.
If a domain is explicitly configured with <seclabel type="none"/> we
correctly ensure that no labeling will be done by setting
norelabel=true. However, if no seclabel element is present in domain XML
and hypervisor is configured not to confine domains by default, we only
set type to "none" without turning off relabeling. Thus if such a domain
is being started, security driver wants to relabel resources with
default label, which doesn't make any sense.
Moreover, with SELinux security driver, the generated image label lacks
"s0" sensitivity, which causes setfilecon() fail with EINVAL in
enforcing mode.
This is a follow up patch of commit f9ce7dad6, it modifies all
the files which declare the copyright like "See COPYING.LIB for
the License of this software" to use the detailed/consistent one.
And deserts the outdated comments like:
* libvirt-qemu.h:
* Summary: qemu specific interfaces
* Description: Provides the interfaces of the libvirt library to handle
* qemu specific methods
*
* Copy: Copyright (C) 2010, 2012 Red Hat, Inc.
Uses the more compact style like:
* libvirt-qemu.h: Interfaces specific for QEMU/KVM driver
*
* Copyright (C) 2010, 2012 Red Hat, Inc.
Per the FSF address could be changed from time to time, and GNU
recommends the following now: (http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-howto.html)
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with Foobar. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
This patch removes the explicit FSF address, and uses above instead
(of course, with inserting 'Lesser' before 'General').
Except a bunch of files for security driver, all others are changed
automatically, the copyright for securify files are not complete,
that's why to do it manually:
src/security/security_selinux.h
src/security/security_driver.h
src/security/security_selinux.c
src/security/security_apparmor.h
src/security/security_apparmor.c
src/security/security_driver.c
Instead of using an O(n) efficiency linked list for storing
MCS labels, use a hash table. Instead of having the list
be global, put it in the SELinux driver private data struct
to ensure uniqueness across different instances of the driver.
This also ensures thread safety when multiple hypervisor
drivers are used in the same libvirtd process
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
When adding MCS labels, OOM was not being handled correctly.
In addition when reserving an existing label, no check was
made to see if it was already reserved
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The function names in the SELinux driver all start with
SELinux or 'mcs' as a prefix. Sanitize this so that they
all use 'virSecuritySELinux' as the prefix
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Update the security drivers to use virReportError instead of
the virSecurityReportError custom macro
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Remove a number of pointless checks against PATH_MAX and
add a syntax-check rule to prevent its use in future
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Most versions of libselinux do not contain the function
selinux_lxc_contexts_path() that the security driver
recently started using for LXC. We must add a conditional
check for it in configure and then disable the LXC security
driver for builds where libselinux lacks this function.
* configure.ac: Check for selinux_lxc_contexts_path
* src/security/security_selinux.c: Disable LXC security
if selinux_lxc_contexts_path() is missing
Some security drivers require special options to be passed to
the mount system call. Add a security driver API for handling
this data.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The SELinux policy for LXC uses a different configuration file
than the traditional svirt one. Thus we need to load
/etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/lxc_contexts which contains
something like this:
process = "system_u:system_r:svirt_lxc_net_t:s0"
file = "system_u:object_r:svirt_lxc_file_t:s0"
content = "system_u:object_r:virt_var_lib_t:s0"
cleverly designed to be parsable by virConfPtr
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Currently the SELinux driver stores its state in a set of global
variables. This switches it to use a private data struct instead.
This will enable different instances to have their own data.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The AppArmour driver does not currently have support for LXC
so ensure that when probing, it claims to be disabled
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
To allow the security drivers to apply different configuration
information per hypervisor, pass the virtualization driver name
into the security manager constructor.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The code is splattered with a mix of
sizeof foo
sizeof (foo)
sizeof(foo)
Standardize on sizeof(foo) and add a syntax check rule to
enforce it
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Return statements with parameter enclosed in parentheses were modified
and parentheses were removed. The whole change was scripted, here is how:
List of files was obtained using this command:
git grep -l -e '\<return\s*([^()]*\(([^()]*)[^()]*\)*)\s*;' | \
grep -e '\.[ch]$' -e '\.py$'
Found files were modified with this command:
sed -i -e \
's_^\(.*\<return\)\s*(\(\([^()]*([^()]*)[^()]*\)*\))\s*\(;.*$\)_\1 \2\4_' \
-e 's_^\(.*\<return\)\s*(\([^()]*\))\s*\(;.*$\)_\1 \2\3_'
Then checked for nonsense.
The whole command looks like this:
git grep -l -e '\<return\s*([^()]*\(([^()]*)[^()]*\)*)\s*;' | \
grep -e '\.[ch]$' -e '\.py$' | xargs sed -i -e \
's_^\(.*\<return\)\s*(\(\([^()]*([^()]*)[^()]*\)*\))\s*\(;.*$\)_\1 \2\4_' \
-e 's_^\(.*\<return\)\s*(\([^()]*\))\s*\(;.*$\)_\1 \2\3_'
No thanks to 64-bit windows, with 64-bit pid_t, we have to avoid
constructs like 'int pid'. Our API in libvirt-qemu cannot be
changed without breaking ABI; but then again, libvirt-qemu can
only be used on systems that support UNIX sockets, which rules
out Windows (even if qemu could be compiled there) - so for all
points on the call chain that interact with this API decision,
we require a different variable name to make it clear that we
audited the use for safety.
Adding a syntax-check rule only solves half the battle; anywhere
that uses printf on a pid_t still needs to be converted, but that
will be a separate patch.
* cfg.mk (sc_correct_id_types): New syntax check.
* src/libvirt-qemu.c (virDomainQemuAttach): Document why we didn't
use pid_t for pid, and validate for overflow.
* include/libvirt/libvirt-qemu.h (virDomainQemuAttach): Tweak name
for syntax check.
* src/vmware/vmware_conf.c (vmwareExtractPid): Likewise.
* src/driver.h (virDrvDomainQemuAttach): Likewise.
* tools/virsh.c (cmdQemuAttach): Likewise.
* src/remote/qemu_protocol.x (qemu_domain_attach_args): Likewise.
* src/qemu_protocol-structs (qemu_domain_attach_args): Likewise.
* src/util/cgroup.c (virCgroupPidCode, virCgroupKillInternal):
Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_command.c(qemuParseProcFileStrings): Likewise.
(qemuParseCommandLinePid): Use pid_t for pid.
* daemon/libvirtd.c (daemonForkIntoBackground): Likewise.
* src/conf/domain_conf.h (_virDomainObj): Likewise.
* src/probes.d (rpc_socket_new): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_command.h (qemuParseCommandLinePid): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemudGetProcessInfo, qemuDomainAttach):
Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c (qemuProcessAttach): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_process.h (qemuProcessAttach): Likewise.
* src/uml/uml_driver.c (umlGetProcessInfo): Likewise.
* src/util/virnetdev.h (virNetDevSetNamespace): Likewise.
* src/util/virnetdev.c (virNetDevSetNamespace): Likewise.
* tests/testutils.c (virtTestCaptureProgramOutput): Likewise.
* src/conf/storage_conf.h (_virStoragePerms): Use mode_t, uid_t,
and gid_t rather than int.
* src/security/security_dac.c (virSecurityDACSetOwnership): Likewise.
* src/conf/storage_conf.c (virStorageDefParsePerms): Avoid
compiler warning.
In case the caller specifies that confined guests are required but the
security driver turns out to be 'none', we should return an error since
this driver clearly cannot meet that requirement. As a result of this
error, libvirtd fails to start when the host admin explicitly sets
confined guests are required but there is no security driver available.
Since security driver 'none' cannot create confined guests, we override
default confined setting so that hypervisor drivers do not thing they
should create confined guests.
This eliminates the warning message reported in:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=624447
It was caused by a failure to open an image file that is not
accessible by root (the uid libvirtd is running as) because it's on a
root-squash NFS share, owned by a different user, with permissions of
660 (or maybe 600).
The solution is to use virFileOpenAs() rather than open(). The
codepath that generates the error is during qemuSetupDiskCGroup(), but
the actual open() is in a lower-level generic function called from
many places (virDomainDiskDefForeachPath), so some other pieces of the
code were touched just to add dummy (or possibly useful) uid and gid
arguments.
Eliminating this warning message has the nice side effect that the
requested operation may even succeed (which in this case isn't
necessary, but shouldn't hurt anything either).
Curently security labels can be of type 'dynamic' or 'static'.
If no security label is given, then 'dynamic' is assumed. The
current code takes advantage of this default, and avoids even
saving <seclabel> elements with type='dynamic' to disk. This
means if you temporarily change security driver, the guests
can all still start.
With the introduction of sVirt to LXC though, there needs to be
a new default of 'none' to allow unconfined LXC containers.
This patch introduces two new security label types
- default: the host configuration decides whether to run the
guest with type 'none' or 'dynamic' at guest start
- none: the guest will run unconfined by security policy
The 'none' label type will obviously be undesirable for some
deployments, so a new qemu.conf option allows a host admin to
mandate confined guests. It is also possible to turn off default
confinement
security_default_confined = 1|0 (default == 1)
security_require_confined = 1|0 (default == 0)
* src/conf/domain_conf.c, src/conf/domain_conf.h: Add new
seclabel types
* src/security/security_manager.c, src/security/security_manager.h:
Set default sec label types
* src/security/security_selinux.c: Handle 'none' seclabel type
* src/qemu/qemu.conf, src/qemu/qemu_conf.c, src/qemu/qemu_conf.h,
src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug: New security config options
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Tell security driver about default
config
The old virRandom() API was not generating good random numbers.
Replace it with a new API virRandomBits which instead of being
told the upper limit, gets told the number of bits of randomness
required.
* src/util/virrandom.c, src/util/virrandom.h: Add virRandomBits,
and move virRandomInitialize
* src/util/util.h, src/util/util.c: Delete virRandom and
virRandomInitialize
* src/libvirt.c, src/security/security_selinux.c,
src/test/test_driver.c, src/util/iohelper.c: Update for
changes from virRandom to virRandomBits
* src/storage/storage_backend_iscsi.c: Remove bogus call
to virRandomInitialize & convert to virRandomBits
When sVirt is integrated with the LXC driver, it will be neccessary
to invoke the security driver APIs using only a virDomainDefPtr
since the lxc_container.c code has no virDomainObjPtr available.
Aside from two functions which want obj->pid, every bit of the
security driver code only touches obj->def. So we don't need to
pass a virDomainObjPtr into the security drivers, a virDomainDefPtr
is sufficient. Two functions also gain a 'pid_t pid' argument.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c, src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c,
src/qemu/qemu_migration.c, src/qemu/qemu_process.c,
src/security/security_apparmor.c,
src/security/security_dac.c,
src/security/security_driver.h,
src/security/security_manager.c,
src/security/security_manager.h,
src/security/security_nop.c,
src/security/security_selinux.c,
src/security/security_stack.c: Change all security APIs to use a
virDomainDefPtr instead of virDomainObjPtr
This wires up the XML changes in the previous patch to let SELinux
labeling honor user overrides, as well as affecting the live XML
configuration in one case where the user didn't specify anything
in the offline XML.
I noticed that the logs contained messages like this:
2011-12-05 23:32:40.382+0000: 26569: warning : SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel:533 : cannot lookup default selinux label for /nfs/libvirt/images/dom.img
for all my domain images living on NFS. But if we would just remember
that on domain creation that we were unable to set a SELinux label (due to
NFSv3 lacking labels, or NFSv4 not being configured to expose attributes),
then we could avoid wasting the time trying to clear the label on
domain shutdown. This in turn is one less point of NFS failure,
especially since there have been documented cases of virDomainDestroy
hanging during an attempted operation on a failed NFS connection.
* src/security/security_selinux.c (SELinuxSetFilecon): Move guts...
(SELinuxSetFileconHelper): ...to new function.
(SELinuxSetFileconOptional): New function.
(SELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel): Honor override label, and remember
if labeling failed.
(SELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabelInt): Skip relabeling based on
override.
Network disks don't have paths to be resolved or files to be checked
for ownership. ee3efc41e6 checked this
for some image label functions, but was partially reverted in a
refactor. This finishes adding the check to each security driver's
set and restore label methods for images.
Signed-off-by: Josh Durgin <josh.durgin@dreamhost.com>
The pathname for the pipe for tunnelled migration is unresolvable. The
libvirt apparmor driver therefore refuses access, causing migration to
fail. If we can't resolve the path, the worst that can happen is that
we should have given permission to the file but didn't. Otherwise
(especially since this is a /proc/$$/fd/N file) the file is already open
and libvirt won't be refused access by apparmor anyway.
Also adjust virt-aa-helper to allow access to the
*.tunnelmigrate.dest.name files.
For more information, see https://launchpad.net/bugs/869553.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Every instance of virCapsPtr must have the defaultConsoleTargetType
field set.
* src/security/virt-aa-helper.c: Add defaultConsoleTargetType to
virCapsPtr
While Xen only has a single paravirt console, UML, and
QEMU both support multiple paravirt consoles. The LXC
driver can also be trivially made to support multiple
consoles. This patch extends the XML to allow multiple
<console> elements in the XML. It also makes the UML
and QEMU drivers support this config.
* src/conf/domain_conf.c, src/conf/domain_conf.h: Allow
multiple <console> devices
* src/lxc/lxc_driver.c, src/xen/xen_driver.c,
src/xenxs/xen_sxpr.c, src/xenxs/xen_xm.c: Update for
internal API changes
* src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/virt-aa-helper.c:
Only label consoles that aren't a copy of the serial device
* src/qemu/qemu_command.c, src/qemu/qemu_driver.c,
src/qemu/qemu_process.c, src/uml/uml_conf.c,
src/uml/uml_driver.c: Support multiple console devices
* tests/qemuxml2xmltest.c, tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c: Extra
tests for multiple virtio consoles. Set QEMU_CAPS_CHARDEV
for all console /channel tests
* tests/qemuxml2argvdata/qemuxml2argv-channel-virtio-auto.args,
tests/qemuxml2argvdata/qemuxml2argv-channel-virtio.args
tests/qemuxml2argvdata/qemuxml2argv-console-virtio.args: Update
for correct chardev syntax
* tests/qemuxml2argvdata/qemuxml2argv-console-virtio-many.args,
tests/qemuxml2argvdata/qemuxml2argv-console-virtio-many.xml: New
test file
This patch fixes the regression with using named pipes for qemu serial
devices noted in:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=740478
The problem was that, while new code in libvirt looks for a single
bidirectional fifo of the name given in the config, then relabels that
and continues without looking for / relabelling the two unidirectional
fifos named ${name}.in and ${name}.out, qemu looks in the opposite
order. So if the user had naively created all three fifos, libvirt
would relabel the bidirectional fifo to allow qemu access, but qemu
would attempt to use the two unidirectional fifos and fail (because it
didn't have proper permissions/rights).
This patch changes the order that libvirt looks for the fifos to match
what qemu does - first it looks for the dual fifos, then it looks for
the single bidirectional fifo. If it finds the dual unidirectional
fifos first, it labels/chowns them and ignores any possible
bidirectional fifo.
(Note commit d37c6a3a (which first appeared in libvirt-0.9.2) added
the code that checked for a bidirectional fifo. Prior to that commit,
bidirectional fifos for serial devices didn't work because libvirt
always required the ${name}.(in|out) fifos to exist, and qemu would
always prefer those.
The AppArmor security driver adds only the path specified in the domain
XML for character devices of type 'pipe'. It should be using <path>.in
and <path>.out. We do this by creating a new vah_add_file_chardev() and
use it for char devices instead of vah_add_file(). Also adjust
valid_path() to accept S_FIFO (since qemu chardevs of type 'pipe' use
fifos). This is https://launchpad.net/bugs/832507
Commit 498d783 cleans up some of virtual file names for parsing strings
in memory. This patch cleans up (hopefuly) the rest forgotten by the
first patch.
This patch also changes all of the previously modified "filenames" to
valid URI's replacing spaces for underscores.
Changes to v1:
- Replace all spaces for underscores, so that the strings form valid
URI's
- Replace spaces in places changed by commit 498d783
While parsing XML strings from memory, the previous convention in
libvirt was to set the virtual file name to "domain.xml" or something
similar. This could potentialy trick the user into looking for a file
named domain.xml on the disk in an attempt to fix the error.
This patch changes these filenames to something that can't be as easily
confused for a valid filename.
Examples of error messages:
---------------------------
Error while loading file from disk:
15:07:59.015: 527: error : catchXMLError:709 : /path/to/domain.xml:1: StartTag: invalid element name
<domain type='kvm'><
--------------------^
Error while parsing definition in memory:
15:08:43.581: 525: error : catchXMLError:709 : (domain definition):2: error parsing attribute name
<name>vm1</name>
--^
The virSecurityManagerSetProcessFDLabel method was introduced
after a mis-understanding from a conversation about SELinux
socket labelling. The virSecurityManagerSetSocketLabel method
should have been used for all such scenarios.
* src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_apparmor.c,
src/security/security_driver.h, src/security/security_manager.c,
src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_selinux.c,
src/security/security_stack.c: Remove SetProcessFDLabel driver
This API labels all sockets created until ClearSocketLabel is called in
a way that a vm can access them (i.e., they are labeled with svirt_t
based label in SELinux).
The APIs are designed to label a socket in a way that the libvirt daemon
itself is able to access it (i.e., in SELinux the label is virtd_t based
as opposed to svirt_* we use for labeling resources that need to be
accessed by a vm). The new name reflects this.
In the Ubuntu development release we recently got a new udev that
moves /var/run to /run, /var/lock to /run/lock and /dev/shm to /run/shm.
This change in udev requires updating the apparmor security driver in
libvirt[1].
Attached is a patch that:
* adjusts src/security/virt-aa-helper.c to allow both
LOCALSTATEDIR/run/libvirt/**/%s.pid and /run/libvirt/**/%s.pid. While
the profile is not as precise, LOCALSTATEDIR/run/ is typically a symlink
to /run/ anyway, so there is no additional access (remember that
apparmor resolves symlinks, which is why this is still required even
if /var/run points to /run).
* adjusts example/apparmor/libvirt-qemu paths for /dev/shm
[1]https://launchpad.net/bugs/810270
--
Jamie Strandboge | http://www.canonical.com
The drivers were accepting domain configs without checking if those
were actually meant for them. For example the LXC driver happily
accepts configs with type QEMU.
Add a check for the expected domain types to the virDomainDefParse*
functions.
When no <seclabel> is present in the XML, the virDomainSeclabelDef
struct is left as all zeros. Unfortunately, this means it gets setup
as type=dynamic, with relabel=no, which is an illegal combination.
Change the 'bool relabel' attribute in virDomainSeclabelDef to
the inverse 'bool norelabel' so that the default initialization
is sensible
* src/conf/domain_conf.c, src/conf/domain_conf.h,
src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_selinux.c:
Replace 'relabel' with 'norelabel'
Add a new attribute to the <seclabel> XML to allow resource
relabelling to be enabled with static label usage.
<seclabel model='selinux' type='static' relabel='yes'>
<label>system_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0:c392,c662</label>
</seclabel>
* docs/schemas/domain.rng: Add relabel attribute
* src/conf/domain_conf.c, src/conf/domain_conf.h: Parse
the 'relabel' attribute
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c: Unconditionally clear out the
'imagelabel' attribute
* src/security/security_apparmor.c: Skip based on 'relabel'
attribute instead of label type
* src/security/security_selinux.c: Skip based on 'relabel'
attribute instead of label type and fill in <imagelabel>
attribute if relabel is enabled.
Normally the dynamic labelling mode will always use a base
label of 'svirt_t' for VMs. Introduce a <baselabel> field
in the <seclabel> XML to allow this base label to be changed
eg
<seclabel type='dynamic' model='selinux'>
<baselabel>system_u:object_r:virt_t:s0</baselabel>
</seclabel>
* docs/schemas/domain.rng: Add <baselabel>
* src/conf/domain_conf.c, src/conf/domain_conf.h: Parsing
of base label
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c: Don't reset 'model' attribute if
a base label is specified
* src/security/security_apparmor.c: Refuse to support base label
* src/security/security_selinux.c: Use 'baselabel' when generating
label, if available
Add a new security driver method for labelling an FD with
the process label, rather than the image label
* src/libvirt_private.syms, src/security/security_apparmor.c,
src/security/security_dac.c, src/security/security_driver.h,
src/security/security_manager.c, src/security/security_manager.h,
src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_stack.c:
Add virSecurityManagerSetProcessFDLabel & impl
The virSecurityManagerSetFDLabel method is used to label
file descriptors associated with disk images. There will
shortly be a need to label other file descriptors in a
different way. So the current name is ambiguous. Rename
the method to virSecurityManagerSetImageFDLabel to clarify
its purpose
* src/libvirt_private.syms,
src/qemu/qemu_migration.c, src/qemu/qemu_process.c,
src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_dac.c,
src/security/security_driver.h, src/security/security_manager.c,
src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_selinux.c,
src/security/security_stack.c: s/FDLabel/ImageFDLabel/
Commit 12317957ec introduced an incompatible
architectural change for the AppArmor security driver. Specifically,
virSecurityManagerSetAllLabel() is now called much later in
src/qemu/qemu_process.c:qemuProcessStart(). Previously, SetAllLabel() was
called immediately after GenLabel() such that after the dynamic label (profile
name) was generated, SetAllLabel() would be called to create and load the
AppArmor profile into the kernel before qemuProcessHook() was executed. With
12317957ec, qemuProcessHook() is now called
before SetAllLabel(), such that aa_change_profile() ends up being called
before the AppArmor profile is loaded into the kernel (via ProcessLabel() in
qemuProcessHook()).
This patch addresses the change by making GenLabel() load the AppArmor
profile into the kernel after the label (profile name) is generated.
SetAllLabel() is then adjusted to only reload_profile() and append stdin_fn to
the profile when it is specified. This also makes the AppArmor driver work
like its SELinux counterpart with regard to SetAllLabel() and stdin_fn.
Bug-Ubuntu: https://launchpad.net/bugs/801569
During a savevm operation, libvirt will now use fd migration if qemu
supports it. When the AppArmor driver is enabled, AppArmorSetFDLabel()
is used but since this function simply returns '0', the dynamic AppArmor
profile is not updated and AppArmor blocks access to the save file. This
patch implements AppArmorSetFDLabel() to get the pathname of the file by
resolving the fd symlink in /proc, and then gives that pathname to
reload_profile(), which fixes 'virsh save' when AppArmor is enabled.
Reference: https://launchpad.net/bugs/795800
This fixes:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=702044https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=709454
Both of these complain of a failure to use an image file that resides
on a read-only NFS volume. The function in the DAC security driver
that chowns image files to the qemu user:group before using them
already has special cases to ignore failure of chown on read-only file
systems, and in a few other cases, but it hadn't been checking for
EINVAL, which is what is returned if the qemu user doesn't even exist
on the NFS server.
Since the explanation of EINVAL in the chown man page almost exactly
matches the log message already present for the case of EOPNOTSUPP,
I've just added EINVAL to that same conditional.
Regression introduced in commit d6623003 (v0.8.8) - using the
wrong sizeof operand meant that security manager private data
was overlaying the allowDiskFormatProbing member of struct
_virSecurityManager. This reopens disk probing, which was
supposed to be prevented by the solution to CVE-2010-2238.
* src/security/security_manager.c
(virSecurityManagerGetPrivateData): Use correct offset.
When setting up a FIFO for QEMU, it allows either a pair
of fifos used unidirectionally, or a single fifo used
bidirectionally. Look for the bidirectional fifo first
when labelling since that is more useful
* src/security/security_dac.c,
src/security/security_selinux.c: Fix fifo handling
We already have virAsprintf, so picking a similar name helps for
seeing a similar purpose. Furthermore, the prefix V before printf
generally implies 'va_list', even though this variant was '...', and
the old name got in the way of adding a new va_list version.
global rename performed with:
$ git grep -l virBufferVSprintf \
| xargs -L1 sed -i 's/virBufferVSprintf/virBufferAsprintf/g'
then revert the changes in ChangeLog-old.
Even with -Wuninitialized (which is part of autobuild.sh
--enable-compile-warnings=error), gcc does NOT catch this
use of an uninitialized variable:
{
if (cond)
goto error;
int a = 1;
error:
printf("%d", a);
}
which prints 0 (supposing the stack started life wiped) if
cond was true. Clang will catch it, but we don't use clang
as often. Using gcc -Wjump-misses-init catches it, but also
gives false positives:
{
if (cond)
goto error;
int a = 1;
return a;
error:
return 0;
}
Here, a was never used in the scope of the error block, so
declaring it after goto is technically fine (and clang agrees).
However, given that our HACKING already documents a preference
to C89 decl-before-statement, the false positive warning is
enough of a prod to comply with HACKING.
[Personally, I'd _really_ rather use C99 decl-after-statement
to minimize scope, but until gcc can efficiently and reliably
catch scoping and uninitialized usage bugs, I'll settle with
the compromise of enforcing a coding standard that happens to
reject false positives if it can also detect real bugs.]
* acinclude.m4 (LIBVIRT_COMPILE_WARNINGS): Add -Wjump-misses-init.
* src/util/util.c (__virExec): Adjust offenders.
* src/conf/domain_conf.c (virDomainTimerDefParseXML): Likewise.
* src/remote/remote_driver.c (doRemoteOpen): Likewise.
* src/phyp/phyp_driver.c (phypGetLparNAME, phypGetLparProfile)
(phypGetVIOSFreeSCSIAdapter, phypVolumeGetKey)
(phypGetStoragePoolDevice)
(phypVolumeGetPhysicalVolumeByStoragePool)
(phypVolumeGetPath): Likewise.
* src/vbox/vbox_tmpl.c (vboxNetworkUndefineDestroy)
(vboxNetworkCreate, vboxNetworkDumpXML)
(vboxNetworkDefineCreateXML): Likewise.
* src/xenapi/xenapi_driver.c (getCapsObject)
(xenapiDomainDumpXML): Likewise.
* src/xenapi/xenapi_utils.c (createVMRecordFromXml): Likewise.
* src/security/security_selinux.c (SELinuxGenNewContext):
Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_command.c (qemuBuildCommandLine): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c (qemuDomainChangeEjectableMedia):
Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c (qemuProcessWaitForMonitor): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_monitor_text.c (qemuMonitorTextGetPtyPaths):
Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemudDomainShutdown)
(qemudDomainBlockStats, qemudDomainMemoryPeek): Likewise.
* src/storage/storage_backend_iscsi.c
(virStorageBackendCreateIfaceIQN): Likewise.
* src/node_device/node_device_udev.c (udevProcessPCI): Likewise.
Child processes don't always reach _exit(); if they die from a
signal, then any messages should still be accurate. Most users
either expect a 0 status (thankfully, if status==0, then
WIFEXITED(status) is true and WEXITSTATUS(status)==0 for all
known platforms) or were filtering on WIFEXITED before printing
a status, but a few were missing this check. Additionally,
nwfilter_ebiptables_driver was making an assumption that works
on Linux (where WEXITSTATUS shifts and WTERMSIG just masks)
but fails on other platforms (where WEXITSTATUS just masks and
WTERMSIG shifts).
* src/util/command.h (virCommandTranslateStatus): New helper.
* src/libvirt_private.syms (command.h): Export it.
* src/util/command.c (virCommandTranslateStatus): New function.
(virCommandWait): Use it to also diagnose status from signals.
* src/security/security_apparmor.c (load_profile): Likewise.
* src/storage/storage_backend.c
(virStorageBackendQEMUImgBackingFormat): Likewise.
* src/util/util.c (virExecDaemonize, virRunWithHook)
(virFileOperation, virDirCreate): Likewise.
* daemon/remote.c (remoteDispatchAuthPolkit): Likewise.
* src/nwfilter/nwfilter_ebiptables_driver.c (ebiptablesExecCLI):
Likewise.
On cygwin:
CC libvirt_driver_security_la-security_dac.lo
security/security_dac.c: In function 'virSecurityDACSetProcessLabel':
security/security_dac.c:618: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 7 has type 'uid_t' [-Wformat]
We've done this before (see src/util/util.c).
* src/security/security_dac.c (virSecurityDACSetProcessLabel): On
cygwin, uid_t is a 32-bit long.
virSecurityDAC{Set,Restore}ChardevCallback expect virSecurityManagerPtr,
but are passed virDomainObjPtr instead. This makes
virSecurityDACSetChardevLabel set a wrong uid/gid on chardevs. This
patch fixes this behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Soren Hansen <soren@linux2go.dk>
Done mechanically with:
$ git grep -l '\bDEBUG0\? *(' | xargs -L1 sed -i 's/\bDEBUG0\? *(/VIR_&/'
followed by manual deletion of qemudDebug in daemon/libvirtd.c, along
with a single 'make syntax-check' fallout in the same file, and the
actual deletion in src/util/logging.h.
* src/util/logging.h (DEBUG, DEBUG0): Delete.
* daemon/libvirtd.h (qemudDebug): Likewise.
* global: Change remaining clients over to VIR_DEBUG counterpart.
A need was found to set the SELinux context label on an open fd (a
pipe, as a matter of fact). This patch adds a function to the security
driver API that will set the label on an open fd to secdef.label. For
all drivers other than the SELinux driver, it's a NOP. For the SElinux
driver, it calls fsetfilecon().
If the return is a failure, it only returns error up to the caller if
1) the desired label is different from the existing label, 2) the
destination fd is of a type that supports setting the selinux context,
and 3) selinux is in enforcing mode. Otherwise it will return
success. This follows the pattern of the existing function
SELinuxSetFilecon().
If the XML security model is NULL, it is assumed that the current
model will be used with dynamic labelling. The verify step is
meaningless and potentially crashes if dereferencing NULL
* src/security/security_manager.c: Skip NULL model on verify
The current security driver usage requires horrible code like
if (driver->securityDriver &&
driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel &&
driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver,
vm, hostdev) < 0)
This pair of checks for NULL clutters up the code, making the driver
calls 2 lines longer than they really need to be. The goal of the
patchset is to change the calling convention to simply
if (virSecurityManagerSetHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver,
vm, hostdev) < 0)
The first check for 'driver->securityDriver' being NULL is removed
by introducing a 'no op' security driver that will always be present
if no real driver is enabled. This guarentees driver->securityDriver
!= NULL.
The second check for 'driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel'
being non-NULL is hidden in a new abstraction called virSecurityManager.
This separates the driver callbacks, from main internal API. The addition
of a virSecurityManager object, that is separate from the virSecurityDriver
struct also allows for security drivers to carry state / configuration
information directly. Thus the DAC/Stack drivers from src/qemu which
used to pull config from 'struct qemud_driver' can now be moved into
the 'src/security' directory and store their config directly.
* src/qemu/qemu_conf.h, src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Update to
use new virSecurityManager APIs
* src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.h
src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.h:
Move into src/security directory
* src/security/security_stack.c, src/security/security_stack.h,
src/security/security_dac.c, src/security/security_dac.h: Generic
versions of previous QEMU specific drivers
* src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_apparmor.h,
src/security/security_driver.c, src/security/security_driver.h,
src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_selinux.h:
Update to take virSecurityManagerPtr object as the first param
in all callbacks
* src/security/security_nop.c, src/security/security_nop.h: Stub
implementation of all security driver APIs.
* src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_manager.c:
New internal API for invoking security drivers
* src/libvirt.c: Add missing debug for security APIs
Network disks are accessed by qemu directly, and have no
associated file on the host, so checking for file ownership etc.
is unnecessary.
Signed-off-by: Josh Durgin <joshd@hq.newdream.net>
* configure.ac (with_selinux): Check for <selinux/label.h>.
* src/security/security_selinux.c (getContext): New function.
(SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel): Use it to restore compilation
when using older libselinux.
security_context_t happens to be a typedef for char*, and happens to
begin with a string usable as a raw context string. But in reality,
it is an opaque type that may or may not have additional information
after the first NUL byte, where that additional information can
include pointers that can only be freed via freecon().
Proof is from this valgrind run of daemon/libvirtd:
==6028== 839,169 (40 direct, 839,129 indirect) bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 274 of 274
==6028== at 0x4A0515D: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:195)
==6028== by 0x3022E0D48C: selabel_open (label.c:165)
==6028== by 0x3022E11646: matchpathcon_init_prefix (matchpathcon.c:296)
==6028== by 0x3022E1190D: matchpathcon (matchpathcon.c:317)
==6028== by 0x4F9D842: SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel (security_selinux.c:382)
800k is a lot of memory to be leaking.
* src/storage/storage_backend.c
(virStorageBackendUpdateVolTargetInfoFD): Avoid leak on error.
* src/security/security_selinux.c
(SELinuxReserveSecurityLabel, SELinuxGetSecurityProcessLabel)
(SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel): Use correct function to free
security_context_t.
The code in SELinuxRestoreSecurityChardevLabel() was trying to
use SELinuxSetFilecon directly for devices or file types while
it should really use SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel encapsulating
routine, which avoid various problems like resolving symlinks,
making sure he file exists and work around NFS problems
Include locale.h for setlocale().
Revert the usage string back to it's original form.
Use puts() instead of fputs(), as fputs() expects a FILE*.
Add closing parenthesis to some vah_error() calls.
Use argv[0] instead of an undefined argv0.
These messages are visible to the user, so they should be
consistently translated.
* cfg.mk (msg_gen_function): Add vah_error, vah_warning.
* src/security/virt-aa-helper.c: Translate messages.
(catchXMLError): Fix capitalization.
Per the gettext developer:
http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-gnu-utils/2010-10/msg00019.htmlhttp://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-gnu-utils/2010-10/msg00021.html
gettext() doesn't work correctly on all platforms unless you have
called setlocale(). Furthermore, gnulib's gettext.h has provisions
for setting up a default locale, which is the preferred method for
libraries to use gettext without having to call textdomain() and
override the main program's default domain (virInitialize already
calls bindtextdomain(), but this is insufficient without the
setlocale() added in this patch; and a redundant bindtextdomain()
in this patch doesn't hurt, but serves as a good example for other
packages that need to bind a second translation domain).
This patch is needed to silence a new gnulib 'make syntax-check'
rule in the next patch.
* daemon/libvirtd.c (main): Setup locale and gettext.
* src/lxc/lxc_controller.c (main): Likewise.
* src/security/virt-aa-helper.c (main): Likewise.
* src/storage/parthelper.c (main): Likewise.
* tools/virsh.c (main): Fix exit status.
* src/internal.h (DEFAULT_TEXT_DOMAIN): Define, for gettext.h.
(_): Simplify definition accordingly.
* po/POTFILES.in: Add src/storage/parthelper.c.
When <uuid> is not in the XML, a virUUIDGenerate() ends up being called which
is unnecessary and can lead to crashes if /dev/urandom isn't available
because virRandomInitialize() is not called within virt-aa-helper. This patch
adds verify_xpath_context() and updates caps_mockup() to use it.
Bug-Ubuntu: https://launchpad.net/bugs/672943
If virDomainAttachDevice() was called with an image that was located
on a root-squashed NFS server, and in a directory that was unreadable
by root on the machine running libvirtd, the attach would fail due to
an attempt to change the selinux label of the image with EACCES (which
isn't covered as an ignore case in SELinuxSetFilecon())
NFS doesn't support SELinux labelling anyway, so we mimic the failure
handling of commit 93a18bbafa, which
just ignores the errors if the target is on an NFS filesystem (in
SELinuxSetSecurityAllLabel() only, though.)
This can be seen as a follow-on to commit
347d266c51, which ignores file open
failures of files on NFS that occur directly in
virDomainDiskDefForeachPath() (also necessary), but does not ignore
failures in functions that are called from there (eg
SELinuxSetSecurityFileLabel()).
Using automated replacement with sed and editing I have now replaced all
occurrences of close() with VIR_(FORCE_)CLOSE() except for one, of
course. Some replacements were straight forward, others I needed to pay
attention. I hope I payed attention in all the right places... Please
have a look. This should have at least solved one more double-close
error.
NFS in root squash mode may prevent opening disk images to
determine backing store. Ignore errors in this scenario.
* src/security/security_selinux.c: Ignore open failures on disk
images
NFS does not support file labelling, so ignore this error
for stdin_path when on NFS.
* src/security/security_selinux.c: Ignore failures on labelling
stdin_path on NFS
* src/util/storage_file.c, src/util/storage_file.h: Refine
virStorageFileIsSharedFS() to allow it to check for a
specific FS type.
A more natural auditing point would perhaps be
SELinuxSetSecurityProcessLabel, but this happens in the child after root
permissions are dropped, so the kernel would refuse the audit record.
Description: Implement AppArmorSetSecurityHostdevLabel() and
AppArmorRestoreSecurityHostdevLabel() for hostdev and pcidev attach.
virt-aa-helper also has to be adjusted because *FileIterate() is used for pci
and usb devices and the corresponding XML for hot attached hostdev and pcidev
is not in the XML passed to virt-aa-helper. The new '-F filename' option is
added to append a rule to the profile as opposed to the existing '-f
filename', which rewrites the libvirt-<uuid>.files file anew. This new '-F'
option will append a rule to an existing libvirt-<uuid>.files if it exists,
otherwise it acts the same as '-f'.
load_profile() and reload_profile() have been adjusted to add an 'append'
argument, which when true will use '-F' instead of '-f' when executing
virt-aa-helper.
All existing calls to load_profile() and reload_profile() have been adjusted
to use the old behavior (ie append==false) except AppArmorSetSavedStateLabel()
where it made sense to use the new behavior.
This patch also adds tests for '-F'.
Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libvirt/+bug/640993
Description: Check for VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE in serial ports and add 'rw' for
defined serial ports, parallel ports and channels
Bug-Ubuntu: LP: #578527, LP: #609055
Commit 68719c4bdd added the
p option to control disk format probing, but it wasn't added
to the getopt_long optstring parameter.
Add the p option to the getopt_long optstring parameter.
Commit a885334499 added this
function and wrapped vah_add_file in it. vah_add_file may
return -1, 0, 1. It returns 1 in case the call to valid_path
detects a restricted file. The original code treated a return
value != 0 as error. The refactored code treats a return
value < 0 as error. This triggers segfault in virt-aa-helper
and breaks virt-aa-helper-test for the restricted file tests.
Make sure that add_file_path returns -1 on error.
virt-aa-helper used to ignore errors when opening files.
Commit a885334499 refactored
the related code and changed this behavior. virt-aa-helper
didn't ignore open errors anymore and virt-aa-helper-test
fails.
Make sure that virt-aa-helper ignores open errors again.
Disk format probing is now disabled by default. A new config
option in /etc/qemu/qemu.conf will re-enable it for existing
deployments where this causes trouble
The implementation of security driver callbacks often needs
to access the security driver object. Currently only a handful
of callbacks include the driver object as a parameter. Later
patches require this is many more places.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Pass in the security driver object
to all callbacks
* src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c,
src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_driver.h,
src/security/security_selinux.c: Add a virSecurityDriverPtr
param to all security callbacks
Update the QEMU cgroups code, QEMU DAC security driver, SELinux
and AppArmour security drivers over to use the shared helper API
virDomainDiskDefForeachPath().
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c,
src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/virt-aa-helper.c:
Convert over to use virDomainDiskDefForeachPath()
Require the disk image to be passed into virStorageFileGetMetadata.
If this is set to VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO, then the format will be
resolved using probing. This makes it easier to control when
probing will be used
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c,
src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/virt-aa-helper.c:
Set VIR_STORAGE_FILE_AUTO when calling virStorageFileGetMetadata.
* src/storage/storage_backend_fs.c: Probe for disk format before
calling virStorageFileGetMetadata.
* src/util/storage_file.h, src/util/storage_file.c: Remove format
from virStorageFileMeta struct & require it to be passed into
method.
Also restore the label to its original value after qemu is finished
with the file.
Prior to this patch, qemu domain restore did not function properly if
selinux was set to enforce.
When configuring serial, parallel, console or channel devices
with a file, dev or pipe backend type, it is necessary to label
the file path in the security drivers. For char devices of type
file, it is neccessary to pre-create (touch) the file if it does
not already exist since QEMU won't be allowed todo so itself.
dev/pipe configs already require the admin to pre-create before
starting the guest.
* src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c: set file ownership for character
devices
* src/security/security_selinux.c: Set file labeling for character
devices
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Add character devices to cgroup ACL
The restore code is done in places where errors cannot be
raised, since they will overwrite over pre-existing errors.
* src/security/security_selinux.c: Only warn about failures
in label restore, don't report errors
When SELinux is running in MLS mode, libvirtd will have a
different security level to the VMs. For libvirtd to be
able to connect to the monitor console, the client end of
the UNIX domain socket needs a different label. This adds
infrastructure to set the socket label via the security
driver framework
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Call out to socket label APIs in
security driver
* src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c: Wire up socket label
drivers
* src/security/security_driver.h: Define security driver
entry points for socket labelling
* src/security/security_selinux.c: Set socket label based on
VM label
Adjust args to qemudStartVMDaemon() to also specify path to stdin_fd,
so this can be passed to the AppArmor driver via SetSecurityAllLabel().
This updates all calls to qemudStartVMDaemon() as well as setting up
the non-AppArmor security driver *SetSecurityAllLabel() declarations
for the above. This is required for the following
"apparmor-fix-save-restore" patch since AppArmor resolves the passed
file descriptor to the pathname given to open().
Do not require each caller of virStorageFileGetMetadata and
virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD to first clear the storage of the
"meta" buffer. Instead, initialize that storage in
virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD.
* src/util/storage_file.c (virStorageFileGetMetadataFromFD): Clear
"meta" here, not before each of the following callers.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemuSetupDiskCgroup): Don't clear "meta" here.
(qemuTeardownDiskCgroup): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c (qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityImageLabel):
Likewise.
* src/security/security_selinux.c (SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel):
Likewise.
* src/security/virt-aa-helper.c (get_files): Likewise.
virFileResolveLink was returning a positive value on error,
thus confusing callers that assumed failure was < 0. The
confusion is further evidenced by callers that would have
ended up calling virReportSystemError with a negative value
instead of a valid errno.
Fixes Red Hat BZ #591363.
* src/util/util.c (virFileResolveLink): Live up to documentation.
* src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
(qemuSecurityDACRestoreSecurityFileLabel): Adjust callers.
* src/security/security_selinux.c
(SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel): Likewise.
* src/storage/storage_backend_disk.c
(virStorageBackendDiskDeleteVol): Likewise.
When QEMU runs with its disk on NFS, and as a non-root user, the
disk is chownd to that non-root user. When migration completes
the last step is shutting down the QEMU on the source host. THis
normally resets user/group/security label. This is bad when the
VM was just migrated because the file is still in use on the dest
host. It is thus neccessary to skip the reset step for any files
found to be on a shared filesystem
* src/libvirt_private.syms: Export virStorageFileIsSharedFS
* src/util/storage_file.c, src/util/storage_file.h: Add a new
method virStorageFileIsSharedFS() to determine if a file is
on a shared filesystem (NFS, GFS, OCFS2, etc)
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Tell security driver not to reset
disk labels on migration completion
* src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c,
src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_driver.h,
src/security/security_apparmor.c: Add ability to skip disk
restore step for files on shared filesystems.
* src/security/virt-aa-helper.c: adjust virt-aa-helper to handle pci
devices. Update valid_path() to have an override array to check against,
and add "/sys/devices/pci" to it. Then rename file_iterate_cb() to
file_iterate_hostdev_cb() and create file_iterate_pci_cb() based on it
To avoid an error when hitting the <seclabel...> definition
* src/security/virt-aa-helper.c: add VIR_DOMAIN_XML_INACTIVE flag
to virDomainDefParseString
Don't exit with error if the user unloaded the profile outside of
libvirt
* src/security/virt-aa-helper.c: check the exit error from apparmor_parser
before exiting with a failure
The calls to virExec() in security_apparmor.c when
invoking virt-aa-helper use VIR_EXEC_CLEAR_CAPS. When compiled without
libcap-ng, this is not a problem (it's effectively a no-op) but with
libcap-ng this causes MAC_ADMIN to be cleared. MAC_ADMIN is needed by
virt-aa-helper to manipulate apparmor profiles and without it VMs will
not start[1]. This patch calls virExec with the default VIR_EXEC_NONE
instead.
* src/security/security_apparmor.c: fallback to VIR_EXEC_NONE flags for
virExec of virt_aa_helper
(suggested by Daniel Berrange, tested by Dan Kenigsberg)
virStorageFileGetMetadata will fail for disk images that are stored on
a root-squash NFS share that isn't world-readable.
SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel is called during the startup of every
domain (as long as security_driver != "none"), and it will propogate
the error from virStorageFileGetMetadata, causing the domain startup
to fail. This is, however, a common scenario when qemu is run as a
non-root user and the disk image is stored on NFS.
Ignoring this failure (which doesn't matter in this case, since the
next thing done by SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel - setting the file
context - will also fail (and that function already ignores failures
due to root-squash NFS) will allow us to continue bringing up the
domain. The result is that we don't need to disable the entire
security driver just because a domain's disk image is stored on
root-squashed NFS.
Changeset
commit 5073aa994a
Author: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
Date: Mon Jan 11 11:40:46 2010 -0500
Added support for product/vendor based passthrough, but it only
worked at the security driver layer. The main guest XML config
was not updated with the resolved bus/device ID. When the QEMU
argv refactoring removed use of product/vendor, this then broke
launching guests.
THe solution is to move the product/vendor resolution up a layer
into the QEMU driver. So the first thing QEMU does is resolve
the product/vendor to a bus/device and updates the XML config
with this info. The rest of the code, including security drivers
and QEMU argv generated can now rely on bus/device always being
set.
* src/util/hostusb.c, src/util/hostusb.h: Split vendor/product
resolution code out of usbGetDevice and into usbFindDevice.
Add accessors for bus/device ID
* src/security/virt-aa-helper.c, src/security/security_selinux.c,
src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c: Remove vendor/product from the
usbGetDevice() calls
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Use usbFindDevice to resolve vendor/product
into a bus/device ID
The virRaiseError macro inside of virSecurityReportError expands to
virRaiseErrorFull and includes the __FILE__, __FUNCTION__ and __LINE__
information. But this three values are always the same for every call
to virSecurityReportError and do not reflect the actual error context.
Converting virSecurityReportError into a macro results in getting the
correct __FILE__, __FUNCTION__ and __LINE__ information.
All callers now pass a NULL virConnectPtr into the USB/PCi device
iterator functions. Therefore the virConnectPtr arg can now be
removed from these functions
* src/util/hostusb.h, src/util/hostusb.c: Remove virConnectPtr
from usbDeviceFileIterate
* src/util/pci.c, src/util/pci.h: Remove virConnectPtr arg from
pciDeviceFileIterate
* src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c, src/security/security_selinux.c: Update
to drop redundant virConnectPtr arg
The virConnectPtr is no longer required for error reporting since
that is recorded in a thread local. Remove use of virConnectPtr
from all APIs in security_driver.{h,c} and update all callers to
match
The current security driver architecture has the following
split of logic
* domainGenSecurityLabel
Allocate the unique label for the domain about to be started
* domainGetSecurityLabel
Retrieve the current live security label for a process
* domainSetSecurityLabel
Apply the previously allocated label to the current process
Setup all disk image / device labelling
* domainRestoreSecurityLabel
Restore the original disk image / device labelling.
Release the unique label for the domain
The 'domainSetSecurityLabel' method is special because it runs
in the context of the child process between the fork + exec.
This is require in order to set the process label. It is not
required in order to label disks/devices though. Having the
disk labelling code run in the child process limits what it
can do.
In particularly libvirtd would like to remember the current
disk image label, and only change shared image labels for the
first VM to start. This requires use & update of global state
in the libvirtd daemon, and thus cannot run in the child
process context.
The solution is to split domainSetSecurityLabel into two parts,
one applies process label, and the other handles disk image
labelling. At the same time domainRestoreSecurityLabel is
similarly split, just so that it matches the style. Thus the
previous 4 methods are replaced by the following 6 new methods
* domainGenSecurityLabel
Allocate the unique label for the domain about to be started
No actual change here.
* domainReleaseSecurityLabel
Release the unique label for the domain
* domainGetSecurityProcessLabel
Retrieve the current live security label for a process
Merely renamed for clarity.
* domainSetSecurityProcessLabel
Apply the previously allocated label to the current process
* domainRestoreSecurityAllLabel
Restore the original disk image / device labelling.
* domainSetSecurityAllLabel
Setup all disk image / device labelling
The SELinux and AppArmour drivers are then updated to comply with
this new spec. Notice that the AppArmour driver was actually a
little different. It was creating its profile for the disk image
and device labels in the 'domainGenSecurityLabel' method, where as
the SELinux driver did it in 'domainSetSecurityLabel'. With the
new method split, we can have consistency, with both drivers doing
that in the domainSetSecurityAllLabel method.
NB, the AppArmour changes here haven't been compiled so may not
build.
The QEMU driver is doing 90% of the calls to check for static vs
dynamic labelling. Except it is forgetting todo so in many places,
in particular hotplug is mistakenly assigning disk labels. Move
all this logic into the security drivers themselves, so the HV
drivers don't have to think about it.
* src/security/security_driver.h: Add virDomainObjPtr parameter
to virSecurityDomainRestoreHostdevLabel and to
virSecurityDomainRestoreSavedStateLabel
* src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_apparmor.c:
Add explicit checks for VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC and skip all
chcon() code in those cases
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Remove all checks for VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC
or VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC. Add missing checks for possibly NULL
driver entry points.
Based off how QEMU does it, look through /sys/bus/usb/devices/* for
matching vendor:product info, and if found, use info from the surrounding
files to build the device's /dev/bus/usb path.
This fixes USB device assignment by vendor:product when running qemu
as non-root (well, it should, but for some reason I couldn't reproduce
the failure people are seeing in [1], but it appears to work properly)
[1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=542450
Replace free(virBufferContentAndReset()) with virBufferFreeAndReset().
Update documentation and replace all remaining calls to free() with
calls to VIR_FREE(). Also add missing calls to virBufferFreeAndReset()
and virReportOOMError() in OOM error cases.
Introduce a new type="dir" mode for <disks> that allows use of
QEMU's virtual FAT block device driver. eg
<disk type='dir' device='floppy'>
<source dir='/tmp/test'/>
<target dev='fda' bus='fdc'/>
<readonly/>
</disk>
gets turned into
-drive file=fat:floppy:/tmp/test,if=floppy,index=0
Only read-only disks are supported with virtual FAT mode
* src/conf/domain_conf.c, src/conf/domain_conf.h: Add type="dir"
* docs/schemas/domain.rng: Document new disk type
* src/xen/xend_internal.c, src/xen/xm_internal.c: Raise error for
unsupported disk types
* tests/qemuxml2argvdata/qemuxml2argv-disk-cdrom-empty.args: Fix
empty disk file handling
* tests/qemuxml2argvdata/qemuxml2argv-disk-drive-fat.args,
tests/qemuxml2argvdata/qemuxml2argv-disk-drive-fat.xml,
tests/qemuxml2argvdata/qemuxml2argv-floppy-drive-fat.args,
tests/qemuxml2argvdata/qemuxml2argv-floppy-drive-fat.xml
tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c: Test QEMU vitual FAT driver
* src/qemu/qemu_conf.c: Support generating fat:/some/dir type
disk args
* src/security/security_selinux.c: Temporarily skip labelling
of directory based disks
Fixes https://launchpad.net/bugs/453335
* src/security/virt-aa-helper.c: suppress confusing and misleading
apparmor denied message when kvm/qemu tries to open a libvirt specified
readonly file (such as a cdrom) with write permissions. libvirt uses
the readonly attribute for the security driver only, and has no way
of telling kvm/qemu that the device should be opened readonly
Fixes https://launchpad.net/bugs/460271
* src/security/virt-aa-helper.c: require absolute path for dynamic added
files. This is required by AppArmor and conveniently prevents adding
tcp consoles to the profile
* src/security/virt-aa-helper.c: get_definition() now calls the new
caps_mockup() function which will parse the XML for os.type,
os.type.arch and then sets the wordsize. These attributes are needed
only to get a valid virCapsPtr for virDomainDefParseString(). The -H
and -b options are now removed from virt-aa-helper (they weren't used
yet anyway).
* tests/virt-aa-helper-test: extend and fixes tests, chmod'ed 755
When running qemu:///system instance, libvirtd runs as root,
but QEMU may optionally be configured to run non-root. When
then saving a guest to a state file, the file is initially
created as root, and thus QEMU cannot write to it. It is also
missing labelling required to allow access via SELinux.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Set ownership on save image before
running migrate command in virDomainSave impl. Call out to
security driver to set save image labelling
* src/security/security_driver.h: Add driver APIs for setting
and restoring saved state file labelling
* src/security/security_selinux.c: Implement saved state file
labelling for SELinux
- Don't duplicate SystemError
- Use proper error code in domain_conf
- Fix a broken error call in qemu_conf
- Don't use VIR_ERR_ERROR in security driver (isn't a valid code in this case)
Nearly all of the methods in src/util/util.h have error codes that
must be checked by the caller to correct detect & report failure.
Add ATTRIBUTE_RETURN_CHECK to ensure compile time validation of
this
* daemon/libvirtd.c: Add explicit check on return value of virAsprintf
* src/conf/domain_conf.c: Add missing check on virParseMacAddr return
value status & report error
* src/network/bridge_driver.c: Add missing OOM check on virAsprintf
and report error
* src/qemu/qemu_conf.c: Add missing check on virParseMacAddr return
value status & report error
* src/security/security_selinux.c: Remove call to virRandomInitialize
that's done in libvirt.c already
* src/storage/storage_backend_logical.c: Add check & log on virRun
return status
* src/util/util.c: Add missing checks on virAsprintf/Run status
* src/util/util.h: Annotate all methods with ATTRIBUTE_RETURN_CHECK
if they return an error status code
* src/vbox/vbox_tmpl.c: Add missing check on virParseMacAddr
* src/xen/xm_internal.c: Add missing checks on virAsprintf
* tests/qemuargv2xmltest.c: Remove bogus call to virRandomInitialize()
* configure.in: look for AppArmor and devel
* src/security/security_apparmor.[ch] src/security/security_driver.c
src/Makefile.am: add and plug the new driver
* src/security/virt-aa-helper.c: new binary which is used exclusively by
the AppArmor security driver to manipulate AppArmor.
* po/POTFILES.in: registers the new files
* tests/Makefile.am tests/secaatest.c tests/virt-aa-helper-test:
tests for virt-aa-helper and the security driver, secaatest.c is
identical to seclabeltest.c except it initializes the 'apparmor'
driver instead of 'selinux'
When James Morris originally submitted his sVirt patches (as seen in
libvirt 0.6.1), he did not require on disk labelling for
virSecurityDomainRestoreImageLabel. A later commit[2] changed this
behavior to assume on disk labelling, which halts implementations for
path-based MAC systems such as AppArmor and TOMOYO where
vm->def->seclabel is required to obtain the label.
* src/security/security_driver.h src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
src/security/security_selinux.c: adds the 'virDomainObjPtr vm'
argument back to *RestoreImageLabel
A simple misplaced break out of a switch results in:
libvir: error : Failed to open file '/sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:54c./vendor': No such file or directory
libvir: error : Failed to open file '/sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:54c./device': No such file or directory
libvir: error : this function is not supported by the hypervisor: Failed to read product/vendor ID for 0000:00:54c.
when trying to passthrough a USB host device to qemu.
* src/security_selinux.c: fix a switch/break thinko
Use virStorageFileGetMetadata() to find any backing stores for images
and re-label them
Without this, qemu cannot access qcow2 backing files, see:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/497131
* src/security/security_selinux.c: re-label backing store files in
SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel()
