libvirt/src/qemu/qemu_process.c

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/*
* qemu_process.c: QEMU process management
*
2016-01-19 19:20:54 +00:00
* Copyright (C) 2006-2016 Red Hat, Inc.
*
* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
* version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License along with this library. If not, see
* <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#if defined(__linux__)
# include <linux/capability.h>
#elif defined(__FreeBSD__)
# include <sys/param.h>
# include <sys/cpuset.h>
#endif
#include <sys/utsname.h>
#if WITH_CAPNG
# include <cap-ng.h>
#endif
#include "qemu_process.h"
#define LIBVIRT_QEMU_PROCESSPRIV_H_ALLOW
#include "qemu_processpriv.h"
#include "qemu_alias.h"
#include "qemu_block.h"
#include "qemu_domain.h"
#include "qemu_domain_address.h"
#include "qemu_namespace.h"
#include "qemu_cgroup.h"
#include "qemu_capabilities.h"
#include "qemu_monitor.h"
#include "qemu_command.h"
#include "qemu_hostdev.h"
#include "qemu_hotplug.h"
#include "qemu_migration.h"
#include "qemu_migration_params.h"
#include "qemu_interface.h"
#include "qemu_security.h"
#include "qemu_extdevice.h"
#include "qemu_firmware.h"
#include "qemu_backup.h"
#include "qemu_dbus.h"
#include "qemu_snapshot.h"
#include "cpu/cpu.h"
#include "cpu/cpu_x86.h"
#include "datatypes.h"
2012-12-12 17:59:27 +00:00
#include "virlog.h"
#include "virerror.h"
2012-12-12 18:06:53 +00:00
#include "viralloc.h"
2012-12-12 17:00:34 +00:00
#include "virhook.h"
#include "virfile.h"
#include "virpidfile.h"
#include "virhostcpu.h"
#include "domain_audit.h"
#include "domain_nwfilter.h"
#include "domain_validate.h"
#include "locking/domain_lock.h"
2012-12-13 18:01:25 +00:00
#include "viruuid.h"
#include "virprocess.h"
#include "virtime.h"
#include "virnetdevtap.h"
#include "virnetdevopenvswitch.h"
#include "virnetdevmidonet.h"
#include "virbitmap.h"
#include "virnuma.h"
#include "virstring.h"
#include "virhostdev.h"
#include "virsecret.h"
#include "configmake.h"
#include "nwfilter_conf.h"
#include "netdev_bandwidth_conf.h"
#include "virresctrl.h"
#include "virvsock.h"
#include "viridentity.h"
#include "virthreadjob.h"
#include "virutil.h"
#include "storage_source.h"
#define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_QEMU
VIR_LOG_INIT("qemu.qemu_process");
/**
* qemuProcessRemoveDomainStatus
*
* remove all state files of a domain from statedir
*/
static void
qemuProcessRemoveDomainStatus(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
g_autofree char *file = NULL;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
file = g_strdup_printf("%s/%s.xml", cfg->stateDir, vm->def->name);
if (unlink(file) < 0 && errno != ENOENT && errno != ENOTDIR)
VIR_WARN("Failed to remove domain XML for %s: %s",
vm->def->name, g_strerror(errno));
if (priv->pidfile &&
unlink(priv->pidfile) < 0 &&
errno != ENOENT)
VIR_WARN("Failed to remove PID file for %s: %s",
vm->def->name, g_strerror(errno));
}
/*
* This is a callback registered with a qemuAgentPtr instance,
* and to be invoked when the agent console hits an end of file
* condition, or error, thus indicating VM shutdown should be
* performed
*/
static void
qemuProcessHandleAgentEOF(qemuAgentPtr agent,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv;
VIR_DEBUG("Received EOF from agent on %p '%s'", vm, vm->def->name);
virObjectLock(vm);
priv = vm->privateData;
if (!priv->agent) {
VIR_DEBUG("Agent freed already");
goto unlock;
}
if (priv->beingDestroyed) {
VIR_DEBUG("Domain is being destroyed, agent EOF is expected");
goto unlock;
}
qemu_agent: fix deadlock in qemuProcessHandleAgentEOF If VM A is shutdown a by qemu agent at appoximately the same time an agent EOF of VM A happened, there's a chance that deadlock may occur: qemuProcessHandleAgentEOF in main thread A) priv->agent = NULL; //A happened before B //deadlock when we get agent lock which's held by worker thread qemuAgentClose(agent); qemuDomainObjExitAgent called by qemuDomainShutdownFlags in worker thread B) hasRefs = virObjectUnref(priv->agent); // priv->agent is NULL, // return false if (hasRefs) virObjectUnlock(priv->agent); //agent lock will not be released here In order to resolve, during EOF close the agent first, then set priv->agent to NULL to fix the deadlock. This essentially reverts commit id '1020a504'. It's also of note that commit id '362d0477' notes a possible/rare deadlock similar to what was seen in the monitor in commit id '25f582e3'. However, it seems interceding changes including commit id 'd960d06f' should remove the deadlock issue. With this change, if EOF is called: Get VM lock Check if !priv->agent || priv->beingDestroyed, then unlock VM Call qemuAgentClose Unlock VM When qemuAgentClose is called Get Agent lock If Agent->fd open, close it Unlock Agent Unref Agent qemuDomainObjEnterAgent Enter with VM lock Get Agent lock Increase Agent refcnt Unlock VM After running agent command, calling qemuDomainObjExitAgent Enter with Agent lock Unref Agent If not last reference, unlock Agent Get VM lock If we were in the middle of an EnterAgent, call Agent command, and ExitAgent sequence and the EOF code is triggered, then the EOF code can get the VM lock, make it's checks against !priv->agent || priv->beingDestroyed, and call qemuAgentClose. The CloseAgent would wait to get agent lock. The other thread then will eventually call ExitAgent, release the Agent lock and unref the Agent. Once ExitAgent releases the Agent lock, AgentClose will get the Agent Agent lock, close the fd, unlock the agent, and unref the agent. The final unref would cause deletion of the agent. Signed-off-by: Wang Yufei <james.wangyufei@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Ren Guannan <renguannan@huawei.com>
2015-09-26 12:18:03 +00:00
qemuAgentClose(agent);
priv->agent = NULL;
priv->agentError = false;
virObjectUnlock(vm);
return;
unlock:
virObjectUnlock(vm);
return;
}
/*
* This is invoked when there is some kind of error
* parsing data to/from the agent. The VM can continue
* to run, but no further agent commands will be
* allowed
*/
static void
qemuProcessHandleAgentError(qemuAgentPtr agent G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv;
VIR_DEBUG("Received error from agent on %p '%s'", vm, vm->def->name);
virObjectLock(vm);
priv = vm->privateData;
priv->agentError = true;
virObjectUnlock(vm);
}
static void qemuProcessHandleAgentDestroy(qemuAgentPtr agent,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
VIR_DEBUG("Received destroy agent=%p vm=%p", agent, vm);
virObjectUnref(vm);
}
static qemuAgentCallbacks agentCallbacks = {
.destroy = qemuProcessHandleAgentDestroy,
.eofNotify = qemuProcessHandleAgentEOF,
.errorNotify = qemuProcessHandleAgentError,
};
int
qemuConnectAgent(virQEMUDriverPtr driver, virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
qemuAgentPtr agent = NULL;
virDomainChrDefPtr config = qemuFindAgentConfig(vm->def);
if (!config)
return 0;
if (priv->agent)
return 0;
if (virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_VSERPORT_CHANGE) &&
config->state != VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_DEVICE_STATE_CONNECTED) {
VIR_DEBUG("Deferring connecting to guest agent");
return 0;
}
if (qemuSecuritySetDaemonSocketLabel(driver->securityManager, vm->def) < 0) {
VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to set security context for agent for %s"),
vm->def->name);
goto cleanup;
}
/* Hold an extra reference because we can't allow 'vm' to be
* deleted while the agent is active */
virObjectRef(vm);
virObjectUnlock(vm);
agent = qemuAgentOpen(vm,
config->source,
virEventThreadGetContext(priv->eventThread),
&agentCallbacks,
virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_VSERPORT_CHANGE));
virObjectLock(vm);
if (agent == NULL)
virObjectUnref(vm);
if (!virDomainObjIsActive(vm)) {
qemuAgentClose(agent);
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
_("guest crashed while connecting to the guest agent"));
return -1;
}
if (qemuSecurityClearSocketLabel(driver->securityManager, vm->def) < 0) {
VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to clear security context for agent for %s"),
vm->def->name);
qemuAgentClose(agent);
goto cleanup;
}
priv->agent = agent;
if (!priv->agent)
VIR_INFO("Failed to connect agent for %s", vm->def->name);
cleanup:
if (!priv->agent) {
VIR_WARN("Cannot connect to QEMU guest agent for %s", vm->def->name);
priv->agentError = true;
virResetLastError();
}
return 0;
}
/*
* This is a callback registered with a qemuMonitorPtr instance,
* and to be invoked when the monitor console hits an end of file
* condition, or error, thus indicating VM shutdown should be
* performed
*/
static void
qemuProcessHandleMonitorEOF(qemuMonitorPtr mon,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv;
struct qemuProcessEvent *processEvent;
virObjectLock(vm);
VIR_DEBUG("Received EOF on %p '%s'", vm, vm->def->name);
priv = vm->privateData;
if (priv->beingDestroyed) {
VIR_DEBUG("Domain is being destroyed, EOF is expected");
goto cleanup;
}
processEvent = g_new0(struct qemuProcessEvent, 1);
processEvent->eventType = QEMU_PROCESS_EVENT_MONITOR_EOF;
processEvent->vm = virObjectRef(vm);
if (virThreadPoolSendJob(driver->workerPool, 0, processEvent) < 0) {
virObjectUnref(vm);
qemuProcessEventFree(processEvent);
goto cleanup;
}
/* We don't want this EOF handler to be called over and over while the
* thread is waiting for a job.
*/
virObjectLock(mon);
qemuMonitorUnregister(mon);
virObjectUnlock(mon);
/* We don't want any cleanup from EOF handler (or any other
* thread) to enter qemu namespace. */
qemuDomainDestroyNamespace(driver, vm);
cleanup:
virObjectUnlock(vm);
}
/*
* This is invoked when there is some kind of error
* parsing data to/from the monitor. The VM can continue
* to run, but no further monitor commands will be
* allowed
*/
static void
qemuProcessHandleMonitorError(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
virObjectEventPtr event = NULL;
VIR_DEBUG("Received error on %p '%s'", vm, vm->def->name);
virObjectLock(vm);
((qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr) vm->privateData)->monError = true;
event = virDomainEventControlErrorNewFromObj(vm);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, event);
virObjectUnlock(vm);
}
/**
* qemuProcessFindDomainDiskByAliasOrQOM:
* @vm: domain object to search for the disk
* @alias: -drive or -device alias of the disk
* @qomid: QOM tree device name
*
* Looks up a disk in the domain definition of @vm which either matches the
* -drive or -device alias used for the backend and frontend respectively or the
* QOM name. If @alias is empty it's treated as NULL as it's a mandatory field
* in some cases.
*
* Returns a disk from @vm or NULL if it could not be found.
*/
virDomainDiskDefPtr
qemuProcessFindDomainDiskByAliasOrQOM(virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *alias,
const char *qomid)
{
size_t i;
if (alias && *alias == '\0')
alias = NULL;
if (alias)
alias = qemuAliasDiskDriveSkipPrefix(alias);
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->ndisks; i++) {
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = vm->def->disks[i];
qemuDomainDiskPrivatePtr diskPriv = QEMU_DOMAIN_DISK_PRIVATE(disk);
if ((disk->info.alias && STREQ_NULLABLE(disk->info.alias, alias)) ||
(diskPriv->qomName && STREQ_NULLABLE(diskPriv->qomName, qomid)))
return disk;
}
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("no disk found with alias '%s' or id '%s'"),
NULLSTR(alias), NULLSTR(qomid));
return NULL;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleReset(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
virObjectEventPtr event;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
int ret = -1;
virObjectLock(vm);
event = virDomainEventRebootNewFromObj(vm);
priv = vm->privateData;
if (priv->agent)
qemuAgentNotifyEvent(priv->agent, QEMU_AGENT_EVENT_RESET);
if (virDomainObjSave(vm, driver->xmlopt, cfg->stateDir) < 0)
VIR_WARN("Failed to save status on vm %s", vm->def->name);
if (vm->def->onReboot == VIR_DOMAIN_LIFECYCLE_ACTION_DESTROY ||
vm->def->onReboot == VIR_DOMAIN_LIFECYCLE_ACTION_PRESERVE) {
if (qemuDomainObjBeginJob(driver, vm, QEMU_JOB_MODIFY) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (!virDomainObjIsActive(vm)) {
VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring RESET event from inactive domain %s",
vm->def->name);
goto endjob;
}
qemuProcessStop(driver, vm, VIR_DOMAIN_SHUTOFF_DESTROYED,
QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE, 0);
virDomainAuditStop(vm, "destroyed");
qemuDomainRemoveInactive(driver, vm);
endjob:
qemuDomainObjEndJob(driver, vm);
}
ret = 0;
cleanup:
virObjectUnlock(vm);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, event);
return ret;
}
/*
* Since we have the '-no-shutdown' flag set, the
* QEMU process will currently have guest OS shutdown
* and the CPUS stopped. To fake the reboot, we thus
* want todo a reset of the virtual hardware, followed
* by restart of the CPUs. This should result in the
* guest OS booting up again
*/
static void
qemuProcessFakeReboot(void *opaque)
{
virDomainObjPtr vm = opaque;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = priv->driver;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
virDomainRunningReason reason = VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING_BOOTED;
int ret = -1, rc;
VIR_DEBUG("vm=%p", vm);
virObjectLock(vm);
if (qemuDomainObjBeginJob(driver, vm, QEMU_JOB_MODIFY) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (!virDomainObjIsActive(vm)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
_("guest unexpectedly quit"));
goto endjob;
}
qemuDomainObjEnterMonitor(driver, vm);
rc = qemuMonitorSystemReset(priv->mon);
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
goto endjob;
if (rc < 0)
goto endjob;
if (virDomainObjGetState(vm, NULL) == VIR_DOMAIN_CRASHED)
reason = VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING_CRASHED;
if (qemuProcessStartCPUs(driver, vm,
reason,
qemu: fix crash when mixing sync and async monitor jobs Currently, we attempt to run sync job and async job at the same time. It means that the monitor commands for two jobs can be run in any order. In the function qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorInternal(): if (priv->job.active == QEMU_JOB_NONE && priv->job.asyncJob) { if (qemuDomainObjBeginNestedJob(driver, obj) < 0) We check whether the caller is an async job by priv->job.active and priv->job.asynJob. But when an async job is running, and a sync job is also running at the time of the check, then priv->job.active is not QEMU_JOB_NONE. So we cannot check whether the caller is an async job in the function qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorInternal(), and must instead put the burden on the caller to tell us when an async command wants to do a nested job. Once the burden is on the caller, then only async monitor enters need to worry about whether the VM is still running; for sync monitor enter, the internal return is always 0, so lots of ignore_value can be dropped. * src/qemu/THREADS.txt: Reflect new rules. * src/qemu/qemu_domain.h (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync): New prototype. * src/qemu/qemu_process.h (qemuProcessStartCPUs) (qemuProcessStopCPUs): Add parameter. * src/qemu/qemu_migration.h (qemuMigrationToFile): Likewise. (qemuMigrationWaitForCompletion): Make static. * src/qemu/qemu_domain.c (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorInternal): Add parameter. (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync): New function. (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitor, qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorWithDriver): Update callers. * src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemuDomainSaveInternal) (qemudDomainCoreDump, doCoreDump, processWatchdogEvent) (qemudDomainSuspend, qemudDomainResume, qemuDomainSaveImageStartVM) (qemuDomainSnapshotCreateActive, qemuDomainRevertToSnapshot): Likewise. * src/qemu/qemu_process.c (qemuProcessStopCPUs) (qemuProcessFakeReboot, qemuProcessRecoverMigration) (qemuProcessRecoverJob, qemuProcessStart): Likewise. * src/qemu/qemu_migration.c (qemuMigrationToFile) (qemuMigrationWaitForCompletion, qemuMigrationUpdateJobStatus) (qemuMigrationJobStart, qemuDomainMigrateGraphicsRelocate) (doNativeMigrate, doTunnelMigrate, qemuMigrationPerformJob) (qemuMigrationPerformPhase, qemuMigrationFinish) (qemuMigrationConfirm): Likewise. * src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c: Drop unneeded ignore_value.
2011-07-28 23:18:24 +00:00
QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE) < 0) {
if (virGetLastErrorCode() == VIR_ERR_OK)
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"%s", _("resume operation failed"));
goto endjob;
}
if (virDomainObjSave(vm, driver->xmlopt, cfg->stateDir) < 0) {
VIR_WARN("Unable to save status on vm %s after state change",
vm->def->name);
}
ret = 0;
endjob:
qemuDomainObjEndJob(driver, vm);
cleanup:
priv->pausedShutdown = false;
if (ret == -1)
ignore_value(qemuProcessKill(vm, VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_KILL_FORCE));
virDomainObjEndAPI(&vm);
}
void
qemuProcessShutdownOrReboot(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
if (priv->fakeReboot) {
g_autofree char *name = g_strdup_printf("reboot-%s", vm->def->name);
virThread th;
qemuDomainSetFakeReboot(driver, vm, false);
virObjectRef(vm);
if (virThreadCreateFull(&th,
false,
qemuProcessFakeReboot,
name,
false,
vm) < 0) {
VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to create reboot thread, killing domain"));
ignore_value(qemuProcessKill(vm, VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_KILL_NOWAIT));
priv->pausedShutdown = false;
virObjectUnref(vm);
}
} else {
ignore_value(qemuProcessKill(vm, VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_KILL_NOWAIT));
}
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleEvent(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *eventName,
long long seconds,
unsigned int micros,
const char *details,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
virObjectEventPtr event = NULL;
VIR_DEBUG("vm=%p", vm);
virObjectLock(vm);
event = virDomainQemuMonitorEventNew(vm->def->id, vm->def->name,
vm->def->uuid, eventName,
seconds, micros, details);
virObjectUnlock(vm);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, event);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleShutdown(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
virTristateBool guest_initiated,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv;
virObjectEventPtr event = NULL;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
int detail = 0;
VIR_DEBUG("vm=%p", vm);
virObjectLock(vm);
priv = vm->privateData;
if (virDomainObjGetState(vm, NULL) == VIR_DOMAIN_SHUTDOWN) {
VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring repeated SHUTDOWN event from domain %s",
vm->def->name);
goto unlock;
} else if (!virDomainObjIsActive(vm)) {
VIR_DEBUG("Ignoring SHUTDOWN event from inactive domain %s",
vm->def->name);
goto unlock;
}
/* In case of fake reboot qemu shutdown state is transient so don't
* change domain state nor send events. */
if (!priv->fakeReboot) {
VIR_DEBUG("Transitioned guest %s to shutdown state",
vm->def->name);
virDomainObjSetState(vm,
VIR_DOMAIN_SHUTDOWN,
VIR_DOMAIN_SHUTDOWN_UNKNOWN);
switch (guest_initiated) {
case VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_YES:
detail = VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SHUTDOWN_GUEST;
break;
case VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_NO:
detail = VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SHUTDOWN_HOST;
break;
case VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_ABSENT:
case VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_LAST:
default:
detail = VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SHUTDOWN_FINISHED;
break;
}
event = virDomainEventLifecycleNewFromObj(vm,
VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SHUTDOWN,
detail);
if (virDomainObjSave(vm, driver->xmlopt, cfg->stateDir) < 0) {
VIR_WARN("Unable to save status on vm %s after state change",
vm->def->name);
}
} else {
priv->pausedShutdown = true;
}
if (priv->agent)
qemuAgentNotifyEvent(priv->agent, QEMU_AGENT_EVENT_SHUTDOWN);
qemuProcessShutdownOrReboot(driver, vm);
unlock:
virObjectUnlock(vm);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, event);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleStop(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
virObjectEventPtr event = NULL;
virDomainPausedReason reason;
virDomainEventSuspendedDetailType detail;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
virObjectLock(vm);
reason = priv->pausedReason;
priv->pausedReason = VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_UNKNOWN;
/* In case of fake reboot qemu paused state is transient so don't
* reveal it in domain state nor sent events */
if (virDomainObjGetState(vm, NULL) == VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING &&
!priv->pausedShutdown) {
if (priv->job.asyncJob == QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_MIGRATION_OUT) {
if (priv->job.current->status == QEMU_DOMAIN_JOB_STATUS_POSTCOPY)
reason = VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_POSTCOPY;
else
reason = VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_MIGRATION;
}
detail = qemuDomainPausedReasonToSuspendedEvent(reason);
VIR_DEBUG("Transitioned guest %s to paused state, "
"reason %s, event detail %d",
vm->def->name, virDomainPausedReasonTypeToString(reason),
detail);
if (priv->job.current)
ignore_value(virTimeMillisNow(&priv->job.current->stopped));
if (priv->signalStop)
virDomainObjBroadcast(vm);
virDomainObjSetState(vm, VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED, reason);
event = virDomainEventLifecycleNewFromObj(vm,
VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SUSPENDED,
detail);
VIR_FREE(priv->lockState);
if (virDomainLockProcessPause(driver->lockManager, vm, &priv->lockState) < 0)
VIR_WARN("Unable to release lease on %s", vm->def->name);
VIR_DEBUG("Preserving lock state '%s'", NULLSTR(priv->lockState));
if (virDomainObjSave(vm, driver->xmlopt, cfg->stateDir) < 0) {
VIR_WARN("Unable to save status on vm %s after state change",
vm->def->name);
}
}
virObjectUnlock(vm);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, event);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleResume(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
virObjectEventPtr event = NULL;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv;
virDomainRunningReason reason = VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING_UNPAUSED;
virDomainEventResumedDetailType eventDetail;
virObjectLock(vm);
priv = vm->privateData;
if (priv->runningReason != VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING_UNKNOWN) {
reason = priv->runningReason;
priv->runningReason = VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING_UNKNOWN;
}
if (virDomainObjGetState(vm, NULL) != VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING) {
eventDetail = qemuDomainRunningReasonToResumeEvent(reason);
VIR_DEBUG("Transitioned guest %s into running state, reason '%s', "
"event detail %d",
vm->def->name, virDomainRunningReasonTypeToString(reason),
eventDetail);
virDomainObjSetState(vm, VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING, reason);
event = virDomainEventLifecycleNewFromObj(vm,
VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_RESUMED,
eventDetail);
if (virDomainObjSave(vm, driver->xmlopt, cfg->stateDir) < 0) {
VIR_WARN("Unable to save status on vm %s after state change",
vm->def->name);
}
}
virObjectUnlock(vm);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, event);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleRTCChange(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
long long offset,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
virObjectEventPtr event = NULL;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
virObjectLock(vm);
if (vm->def->clock.offset == VIR_DOMAIN_CLOCK_OFFSET_VARIABLE) {
/* when a basedate is manually given on the qemu commandline
* rather than simply "-rtc base=utc", the offset sent by qemu
* in this event is *not* the new offset from UTC, but is
* instead the new offset from the *original basedate* +
* uptime. For example, if the original offset was 3600 and
* the guest clock has been advanced by 10 seconds, qemu will
* send "10" in the event - this means that the new offset
* from UTC is 3610, *not* 10. If the guest clock is advanced
* by another 10 seconds, qemu will now send "20" - i.e. each
* event is the sum of the most recent change and all previous
* changes since the domain was started. Fortunately, we have
* saved the initial offset in "adjustment0", so to arrive at
* the proper new "adjustment", we just add the most recent
* offset to adjustment0.
*/
offset += vm->def->clock.data.variable.adjustment0;
vm->def->clock.data.variable.adjustment = offset;
if (virDomainObjSave(vm, driver->xmlopt, cfg->stateDir) < 0)
VIR_WARN("unable to save domain status with RTC change");
}
event = virDomainEventRTCChangeNewFromObj(vm, offset);
virObjectUnlock(vm);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, event);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleWatchdog(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
int action,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
virObjectEventPtr watchdogEvent = NULL;
virObjectEventPtr lifecycleEvent = NULL;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
virObjectLock(vm);
watchdogEvent = virDomainEventWatchdogNewFromObj(vm, action);
if (action == VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_WATCHDOG_PAUSE &&
virDomainObjGetState(vm, NULL) == VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING) {
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
VIR_DEBUG("Transitioned guest %s to paused state due to watchdog", vm->def->name);
virDomainObjSetState(vm, VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED, VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_WATCHDOG);
lifecycleEvent = virDomainEventLifecycleNewFromObj(vm,
VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SUSPENDED,
VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SUSPENDED_WATCHDOG);
VIR_FREE(priv->lockState);
if (virDomainLockProcessPause(driver->lockManager, vm, &priv->lockState) < 0)
VIR_WARN("Unable to release lease on %s", vm->def->name);
VIR_DEBUG("Preserving lock state '%s'", NULLSTR(priv->lockState));
if (virDomainObjSave(vm, driver->xmlopt, cfg->stateDir) < 0) {
VIR_WARN("Unable to save status on vm %s after watchdog event",
vm->def->name);
}
}
if (vm->def->watchdog->action == VIR_DOMAIN_WATCHDOG_ACTION_DUMP) {
struct qemuProcessEvent *processEvent;
processEvent = g_new0(struct qemuProcessEvent, 1);
processEvent->eventType = QEMU_PROCESS_EVENT_WATCHDOG;
processEvent->action = VIR_DOMAIN_WATCHDOG_ACTION_DUMP;
/* Hold an extra reference because we can't allow 'vm' to be
* deleted before handling watchdog event is finished.
*/
processEvent->vm = virObjectRef(vm);
if (virThreadPoolSendJob(driver->workerPool, 0, processEvent) < 0) {
virObjectUnref(vm);
qemuProcessEventFree(processEvent);
}
}
virObjectUnlock(vm);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, watchdogEvent);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, lifecycleEvent);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleIOError(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *diskAlias,
const char *nodename,
int action,
const char *reason,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
virObjectEventPtr ioErrorEvent = NULL;
virObjectEventPtr ioErrorEvent2 = NULL;
virObjectEventPtr lifecycleEvent = NULL;
const char *srcPath;
const char *devAlias;
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
virObjectLock(vm);
if (*diskAlias == '\0')
diskAlias = NULL;
if (diskAlias)
disk = qemuProcessFindDomainDiskByAliasOrQOM(vm, diskAlias, NULL);
else if (nodename)
disk = qemuDomainDiskLookupByNodename(vm->def, NULL, nodename, NULL);
else
disk = NULL;
if (disk) {
srcPath = virDomainDiskGetSource(disk);
devAlias = disk->info.alias;
} else {
srcPath = "";
devAlias = "";
}
ioErrorEvent = virDomainEventIOErrorNewFromObj(vm, srcPath, devAlias, action);
ioErrorEvent2 = virDomainEventIOErrorReasonNewFromObj(vm, srcPath, devAlias, action, reason);
if (action == VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_IO_ERROR_PAUSE &&
virDomainObjGetState(vm, NULL) == VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING) {
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
VIR_DEBUG("Transitioned guest %s to paused state due to IO error", vm->def->name);
if (priv->signalIOError)
virDomainObjBroadcast(vm);
virDomainObjSetState(vm, VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED, VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_IOERROR);
lifecycleEvent = virDomainEventLifecycleNewFromObj(vm,
VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SUSPENDED,
VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SUSPENDED_IOERROR);
VIR_FREE(priv->lockState);
if (virDomainLockProcessPause(driver->lockManager, vm, &priv->lockState) < 0)
VIR_WARN("Unable to release lease on %s", vm->def->name);
VIR_DEBUG("Preserving lock state '%s'", NULLSTR(priv->lockState));
if (virDomainObjSave(vm, driver->xmlopt, cfg->stateDir) < 0)
VIR_WARN("Unable to save status on vm %s after IO error", vm->def->name);
}
virObjectUnlock(vm);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, ioErrorEvent);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, ioErrorEvent2);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, lifecycleEvent);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleBlockJob(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *diskAlias,
int type,
int status,
const char *error,
void *opaque)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv;
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
struct qemuProcessEvent *processEvent = NULL;
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk;
g_autoptr(qemuBlockJobData) job = NULL;
char *data = NULL;
virObjectLock(vm);
blockjob: properly track blockcopy xml changes on disk We were not directly saving the domain XML to file after starting or finishing a blockcopy. Without the startup write, a libvirtd restart in the middle of a copy job would forget that the job was underway. Then at pivot, we were indirectly writing new XML in reaction to events that occur as we stop and restart the guest CPUs. But there was a race: since pivot is an async action, it is possible that libvirtd is restarted before the pivot completes, so if XML changes during the event, that change was not written. The original blockcopy code cleared out the <mirror> element prior to restarting the CPUs, but this is also a race, observed if a user does an async pivot and a dumpxml before the event occurs. Furthermore, this race will interfere with active commit in a future patch, because that code will rely on the <mirror> element at the time of the qemu event to determine whether to inform the user of a normal commit or an active commit. Fix things by saving state any time we modify live XML, while delaying XML disk modifications until after the event completes. We still need a to teach libvirtd restarts to examine all existing <mirror> elements to see if the job completed in the meantime (that is, if libvirtd misses the event, the updated state still needs to be updated in live XML), but that will be a later patch, in part because we also need to to start taking advantage of newer qemu's ability to keep the job around after completion rather than the current usage where the job disappears both on error and on success. * src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemuDomainBlockCopy): Track XML change on disk. (qemuDomainBlockJobImpl, qemuDomainBlockPivot): Move job-end XML rewrites... * src/qemu/qemu_process.c (qemuProcessHandleBlockJob): ...here. Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2014-07-29 20:42:45 +00:00
priv = vm->privateData;
/* with QEMU_CAPS_BLOCKDEV we handle block job events via JOB_STATUS_CHANGE */
if (virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_BLOCKDEV))
goto cleanup;
VIR_DEBUG("Block job for device %s (domain: %p,%s) type %d status %d",
diskAlias, vm, vm->def->name, type, status);
if (!(disk = qemuProcessFindDomainDiskByAliasOrQOM(vm, diskAlias, NULL)))
goto cleanup;
job = qemuBlockJobDiskGetJob(disk);
if (job && job->synchronous) {
/* We have a SYNC API waiting for this event, dispatch it back */
job->newstate = status;
VIR_FREE(job->errmsg);
job->errmsg = g_strdup(error);
virDomainObjBroadcast(vm);
} else {
/* there is no waiting SYNC API, dispatch the update to a thread */
processEvent = g_new0(struct qemuProcessEvent, 1);
processEvent->eventType = QEMU_PROCESS_EVENT_BLOCK_JOB;
data = g_strdup(diskAlias);
processEvent->data = data;
processEvent->vm = virObjectRef(vm);
processEvent->action = type;
processEvent->status = status;
if (virThreadPoolSendJob(driver->workerPool, 0, processEvent) < 0) {
virObjectUnref(vm);
goto cleanup;
}
processEvent = NULL;
}
cleanup:
qemuProcessEventFree(processEvent);
virObjectUnlock(vm);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleJobStatusChange(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *jobname,
int status,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv;
struct qemuProcessEvent *processEvent = NULL;
qemuBlockJobDataPtr job = NULL;
int jobnewstate;
virObjectLock(vm);
priv = vm->privateData;
VIR_DEBUG("job '%s'(domain: %p,%s) state changed to '%s'(%d)",
jobname, vm, vm->def->name,
qemuMonitorJobStatusTypeToString(status), status);
if (!virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_BLOCKDEV)) {
VIR_DEBUG("job '%s' handled by old blockjob handler", jobname);
goto cleanup;
}
if ((jobnewstate = qemuBlockjobConvertMonitorStatus(status)) == QEMU_BLOCKJOB_STATE_LAST)
goto cleanup;
if (!(job = virHashLookup(priv->blockjobs, jobname))) {
VIR_DEBUG("job '%s' not registered", jobname);
goto cleanup;
}
job->newstate = jobnewstate;
if (job->synchronous) {
VIR_DEBUG("job '%s' handled synchronously", jobname);
virDomainObjBroadcast(vm);
} else {
VIR_DEBUG("job '%s' handled by event thread", jobname);
processEvent = g_new0(struct qemuProcessEvent, 1);
processEvent->eventType = QEMU_PROCESS_EVENT_JOB_STATUS_CHANGE;
processEvent->vm = virObjectRef(vm);
processEvent->data = virObjectRef(job);
if (virThreadPoolSendJob(driver->workerPool, 0, processEvent) < 0) {
virObjectUnref(vm);
goto cleanup;
}
processEvent = NULL;
}
cleanup:
qemuProcessEventFree(processEvent);
virObjectUnlock(vm);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleGraphics(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
int phase,
int localFamily,
const char *localNode,
const char *localService,
int remoteFamily,
const char *remoteNode,
const char *remoteService,
const char *authScheme,
const char *x509dname,
const char *saslUsername,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
virObjectEventPtr event;
virDomainEventGraphicsAddressPtr localAddr = NULL;
virDomainEventGraphicsAddressPtr remoteAddr = NULL;
virDomainEventGraphicsSubjectPtr subject = NULL;
size_t i;
localAddr = g_new0(virDomainEventGraphicsAddress, 1);
localAddr->family = localFamily;
localAddr->service = g_strdup(localService);
localAddr->node = g_strdup(localNode);
remoteAddr = g_new0(virDomainEventGraphicsAddress, 1);
remoteAddr->family = remoteFamily;
remoteAddr->service = g_strdup(remoteService);
remoteAddr->node = g_strdup(remoteNode);
subject = g_new0(virDomainEventGraphicsSubject, 1);
if (x509dname) {
if (VIR_REALLOC_N(subject->identities, subject->nidentity+1) < 0)
goto error;
subject->nidentity++;
subject->identities[subject->nidentity - 1].type = g_strdup("x509dname");
subject->identities[subject->nidentity - 1].name = g_strdup(x509dname);
}
if (saslUsername) {
if (VIR_REALLOC_N(subject->identities, subject->nidentity+1) < 0)
goto error;
subject->nidentity++;
subject->identities[subject->nidentity - 1].type = g_strdup("saslUsername");
subject->identities[subject->nidentity - 1].name = g_strdup(saslUsername);
}
virObjectLock(vm);
event = virDomainEventGraphicsNewFromObj(vm, phase, localAddr, remoteAddr, authScheme, subject);
virObjectUnlock(vm);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, event);
return 0;
error:
VIR_FREE(localAddr->service);
VIR_FREE(localAddr->node);
VIR_FREE(localAddr);
VIR_FREE(remoteAddr->service);
VIR_FREE(remoteAddr->node);
VIR_FREE(remoteAddr);
for (i = 0; i < subject->nidentity; i++) {
VIR_FREE(subject->identities[i].type);
VIR_FREE(subject->identities[i].name);
}
VIR_FREE(subject->identities);
VIR_FREE(subject);
return -1;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleTrayChange(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *devAlias,
const char *devid,
int reason,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
virObjectEventPtr event = NULL;
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
virObjectLock(vm);
disk = qemuProcessFindDomainDiskByAliasOrQOM(vm, devAlias, devid);
if (disk) {
event = virDomainEventTrayChangeNewFromObj(vm, disk->info.alias, reason);
/* Update disk tray status */
if (reason == VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_TRAY_CHANGE_OPEN)
disk->tray_status = VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_TRAY_OPEN;
else if (reason == VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_TRAY_CHANGE_CLOSE)
disk->tray_status = VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_TRAY_CLOSED;
if (virDomainObjSave(vm, driver->xmlopt, cfg->stateDir) < 0) {
VIR_WARN("Unable to save status on vm %s after tray moved event",
vm->def->name);
}
virDomainObjBroadcast(vm);
}
virObjectUnlock(vm);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, event);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandlePMWakeup(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
virObjectEventPtr event = NULL;
virObjectEventPtr lifecycleEvent = NULL;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
virObjectLock(vm);
event = virDomainEventPMWakeupNewFromObj(vm);
/* Don't set domain status back to running if it wasn't paused
* from guest side, otherwise it can just cause confusion.
*/
if (virDomainObjGetState(vm, NULL) == VIR_DOMAIN_PMSUSPENDED) {
VIR_DEBUG("Transitioned guest %s from pmsuspended to running "
"state due to QMP wakeup event", vm->def->name);
virDomainObjSetState(vm, VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING,
VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING_WAKEUP);
lifecycleEvent = virDomainEventLifecycleNewFromObj(vm,
VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_STARTED,
VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_STARTED_WAKEUP);
if (virDomainObjSave(vm, driver->xmlopt, cfg->stateDir) < 0) {
VIR_WARN("Unable to save status on vm %s after wakeup event",
vm->def->name);
}
}
virObjectUnlock(vm);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, event);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, lifecycleEvent);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandlePMSuspend(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
virObjectEventPtr event = NULL;
virObjectEventPtr lifecycleEvent = NULL;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
virObjectLock(vm);
event = virDomainEventPMSuspendNewFromObj(vm);
if (virDomainObjGetState(vm, NULL) == VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING) {
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
VIR_DEBUG("Transitioned guest %s to pmsuspended state due to "
"QMP suspend event", vm->def->name);
virDomainObjSetState(vm, VIR_DOMAIN_PMSUSPENDED,
VIR_DOMAIN_PMSUSPENDED_UNKNOWN);
lifecycleEvent =
virDomainEventLifecycleNewFromObj(vm,
VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_PMSUSPENDED,
VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_PMSUSPENDED_MEMORY);
if (virDomainObjSave(vm, driver->xmlopt, cfg->stateDir) < 0) {
VIR_WARN("Unable to save status on vm %s after suspend event",
vm->def->name);
}
if (priv->agent)
qemuAgentNotifyEvent(priv->agent, QEMU_AGENT_EVENT_SUSPEND);
}
virObjectUnlock(vm);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, event);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, lifecycleEvent);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleBalloonChange(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
unsigned long long actual,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
virObjectEventPtr event = NULL;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
virObjectLock(vm);
event = virDomainEventBalloonChangeNewFromObj(vm, actual);
VIR_DEBUG("Updating balloon from %lld to %lld kb",
vm->def->mem.cur_balloon, actual);
vm->def->mem.cur_balloon = actual;
if (virDomainObjSave(vm, driver->xmlopt, cfg->stateDir) < 0)
VIR_WARN("unable to save domain status with balloon change");
virObjectUnlock(vm);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, event);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandlePMSuspendDisk(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
virObjectEventPtr event = NULL;
virObjectEventPtr lifecycleEvent = NULL;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
virObjectLock(vm);
event = virDomainEventPMSuspendDiskNewFromObj(vm);
if (virDomainObjGetState(vm, NULL) == VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING) {
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
VIR_DEBUG("Transitioned guest %s to pmsuspended state due to "
"QMP suspend_disk event", vm->def->name);
virDomainObjSetState(vm, VIR_DOMAIN_PMSUSPENDED,
VIR_DOMAIN_PMSUSPENDED_UNKNOWN);
lifecycleEvent =
virDomainEventLifecycleNewFromObj(vm,
VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_PMSUSPENDED,
VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_PMSUSPENDED_DISK);
if (virDomainObjSave(vm, driver->xmlopt, cfg->stateDir) < 0) {
VIR_WARN("Unable to save status on vm %s after suspend event",
vm->def->name);
}
if (priv->agent)
qemuAgentNotifyEvent(priv->agent, QEMU_AGENT_EVENT_SUSPEND);
}
virObjectUnlock(vm);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, event);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, lifecycleEvent);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleGuestPanic(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
qemuMonitorEventPanicInfoPtr info,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
struct qemuProcessEvent *processEvent;
virObjectLock(vm);
processEvent = g_new0(struct qemuProcessEvent, 1);
processEvent->eventType = QEMU_PROCESS_EVENT_GUESTPANIC;
processEvent->action = vm->def->onCrash;
processEvent->data = info;
/* Hold an extra reference because we can't allow 'vm' to be
* deleted before handling guest panic event is finished.
*/
processEvent->vm = virObjectRef(vm);
if (virThreadPoolSendJob(driver->workerPool, 0, processEvent) < 0) {
virObjectUnref(vm);
qemuProcessEventFree(processEvent);
}
virObjectUnlock(vm);
return 0;
}
int
qemuProcessHandleDeviceDeleted(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *devAlias,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
struct qemuProcessEvent *processEvent = NULL;
char *data;
virObjectLock(vm);
VIR_DEBUG("Device %s removed from domain %p %s",
devAlias, vm, vm->def->name);
if (qemuDomainSignalDeviceRemoval(vm, devAlias,
QEMU_DOMAIN_UNPLUGGING_DEVICE_STATUS_OK))
goto cleanup;
processEvent = g_new0(struct qemuProcessEvent, 1);
processEvent->eventType = QEMU_PROCESS_EVENT_DEVICE_DELETED;
data = g_strdup(devAlias);
processEvent->data = data;
processEvent->vm = virObjectRef(vm);
if (virThreadPoolSendJob(driver->workerPool, 0, processEvent) < 0) {
virObjectUnref(vm);
goto error;
}
cleanup:
virObjectUnlock(vm);
return 0;
error:
qemuProcessEventFree(processEvent);
goto cleanup;
}
/**
*
* Meaning of fields reported by the event according to the ACPI standard:
* @source:
* 0x00 - 0xff: Notification values, as passed at the request time
* 0x100: Operating System Shutdown Processing
* 0x103: Ejection processing
* 0x200: Insertion processing
* other values are reserved
*
* @status:
* general values
* 0x00: success
* 0x01: non-specific failure
* 0x02: unrecognized notify code
* 0x03 - 0x7f: reserved
* other values are specific to the notification type (see below)
*
* for the 0x100 source the following additional codes are standardized:
* 0x80: OS Shutdown request denied
* 0x81: OS Shutdown in progress
* 0x82: OS Shutdown completed
* 0x83: OS Graceful shutdown not supported
* other higher values are reserved
*
* for the 0x003 (Ejection request) and 0x103 (Ejection processing) source
* the following additional codes are standardized:
* 0x80: Device ejection not supported by OSPM
* 0x81: Device in use by application
* 0x82: Device Busy
* 0x83: Ejection dependency is busy or not supported for ejection by OSPM
* 0x84: Ejection is in progress (pending)
* other higher values are reserved
*
* for the 0x200 source the following additional codes are standardized:
* 0x80: Device insertion in progress (pending)
* 0x81: Device driver load failure
* 0x82: Device insertion not supported by OSPM
* 0x83-0x8F: Reserved
* 0x90-0x9F: Insertion failure - Resources Unavailable as described by the
* following bit encodings:
* Bit [3]: Bus or Segment Numbers
* Bit [2]: Interrupts
* Bit [1]: I/O
* Bit [0]: Memory
* other higher values are reserved
*
* Other fields and semantics are specific to the qemu handling of the event.
* - @alias may be NULL for successful unplug operations
* - @slotType describes the device type a bit more closely, currently the
* only known value is 'DIMM'
* - @slot describes the specific device
*
* Note that qemu does not emit the event for all the documented sources or
* devices.
*/
static int
qemuProcessHandleAcpiOstInfo(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *alias,
const char *slotType,
const char *slot,
unsigned int source,
unsigned int status,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
virObjectEventPtr event = NULL;
virObjectLock(vm);
VIR_DEBUG("ACPI OST info for device %s domain %p %s. "
"slotType='%s' slot='%s' source=%u status=%u",
NULLSTR(alias), vm, vm->def->name, slotType, slot, source, status);
if (!alias)
goto cleanup;
if (STREQ(slotType, "DIMM")) {
if ((source == 0x003 || source == 0x103) &&
(status == 0x01 || (status >= 0x80 && status <= 0x83))) {
qemuDomainSignalDeviceRemoval(vm, alias,
QEMU_DOMAIN_UNPLUGGING_DEVICE_STATUS_GUEST_REJECTED);
event = virDomainEventDeviceRemovalFailedNewFromObj(vm, alias);
}
}
cleanup:
virObjectUnlock(vm);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, event);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleBlockThreshold(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *nodename,
unsigned long long threshold,
unsigned long long excess,
void *opaque)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv;
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
virObjectEventPtr eventSource = NULL;
virObjectEventPtr eventDevice = NULL;
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk;
virStorageSourcePtr src;
const char *path = NULL;
virObjectLock(vm);
priv = vm->privateData;
VIR_DEBUG("BLOCK_WRITE_THRESHOLD event for block node '%s' in domain %p %s:"
"threshold '%llu' exceeded by '%llu'",
nodename, vm, vm->def->name, threshold, excess);
if ((disk = qemuDomainDiskLookupByNodename(vm->def, priv->backup, nodename, &src))) {
if (virStorageSourceIsLocalStorage(src))
path = src->path;
if (src == disk->src) {
g_autofree char *dev = qemuDomainDiskBackingStoreGetName(disk, 0);
eventDevice = virDomainEventBlockThresholdNewFromObj(vm, dev, path,
threshold, excess);
}
if (src->id != 0) {
g_autofree char *dev = qemuDomainDiskBackingStoreGetName(disk, src->id);
eventSource = virDomainEventBlockThresholdNewFromObj(vm, dev, path,
threshold, excess);
}
}
virObjectUnlock(vm);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, eventDevice);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, eventSource);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleNicRxFilterChanged(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *devAlias,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
struct qemuProcessEvent *processEvent = NULL;
char *data;
virObjectLock(vm);
VIR_DEBUG("Device %s RX Filter changed in domain %p %s",
devAlias, vm, vm->def->name);
processEvent = g_new0(struct qemuProcessEvent, 1);
processEvent->eventType = QEMU_PROCESS_EVENT_NIC_RX_FILTER_CHANGED;
data = g_strdup(devAlias);
processEvent->data = data;
processEvent->vm = virObjectRef(vm);
if (virThreadPoolSendJob(driver->workerPool, 0, processEvent) < 0) {
virObjectUnref(vm);
goto error;
}
cleanup:
virObjectUnlock(vm);
return 0;
error:
qemuProcessEventFree(processEvent);
goto cleanup;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleSerialChanged(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *devAlias,
bool connected,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
struct qemuProcessEvent *processEvent = NULL;
char *data;
virObjectLock(vm);
VIR_DEBUG("Serial port %s state changed to '%d' in domain %p %s",
devAlias, connected, vm, vm->def->name);
processEvent = g_new0(struct qemuProcessEvent, 1);
processEvent->eventType = QEMU_PROCESS_EVENT_SERIAL_CHANGED;
data = g_strdup(devAlias);
processEvent->data = data;
processEvent->action = connected;
processEvent->vm = virObjectRef(vm);
if (virThreadPoolSendJob(driver->workerPool, 0, processEvent) < 0) {
virObjectUnref(vm);
goto error;
}
cleanup:
virObjectUnlock(vm);
return 0;
error:
qemuProcessEventFree(processEvent);
goto cleanup;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleSpiceMigrated(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
void *opaque G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv;
qemuDomainJobPrivatePtr jobPriv;
virObjectLock(vm);
VIR_DEBUG("Spice migration completed for domain %p %s",
vm, vm->def->name);
priv = vm->privateData;
jobPriv = priv->job.privateData;
if (priv->job.asyncJob != QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_MIGRATION_OUT) {
VIR_DEBUG("got SPICE_MIGRATE_COMPLETED event without a migration job");
goto cleanup;
}
jobPriv->spiceMigrated = true;
virDomainObjBroadcast(vm);
cleanup:
virObjectUnlock(vm);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleMigrationStatus(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
int status,
qemu: Fix post-copy migration on the source Post-copy migration has been broken on the source since commit v3.8.0-245-g32c29f10db which implemented support for pause-before-switchover QEMU migration capability. Even though the migration itself went well, the source did not really know when it switched to the post-copy mode despite the messages logged by MIGRATION event handler. As a result of this, the events emitted by source libvirtd were not accurate and statistics of the completed migration would cover only the pre-copy part of migration. Moreover, if migration failed during the post-copy phase for some reason, the source libvirtd would just happily resume the domain, which could lead to disk corruption. With the pause-before-switchover capability enabled, the order of events emitted by QEMU changed: pause-before-switchover disabled enabled MIGRATION, postcopy-active STOP STOP MIGRATION, pre-switchover MIGRATION, postcopy-active The STOP even handler checks the migration status (postcopy-active) and sets the domain state accordingly. Which is sufficient when pause-before-switchover is disabled, but once we enable it, the migration status is still active when we get STOP from QEMU. Thus the domain state set in the STOP handler has to be corrected once we are notified that migration changed to postcopy-active. This results in two SUSPENDED events to be emitted by the source libvirtd during post-copy migration. The first one with VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SUSPENDED_MIGRATED detail, while the second one reports the corrected VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SUSPENDED_POSTCOPY detail. This is inevitable because we don't know whether migration will eventually switch to post-copy at the time we emit the first event. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1647365 Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
2018-11-15 10:16:43 +00:00
void *opaque)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv;
qemu: Fix post-copy migration on the source Post-copy migration has been broken on the source since commit v3.8.0-245-g32c29f10db which implemented support for pause-before-switchover QEMU migration capability. Even though the migration itself went well, the source did not really know when it switched to the post-copy mode despite the messages logged by MIGRATION event handler. As a result of this, the events emitted by source libvirtd were not accurate and statistics of the completed migration would cover only the pre-copy part of migration. Moreover, if migration failed during the post-copy phase for some reason, the source libvirtd would just happily resume the domain, which could lead to disk corruption. With the pause-before-switchover capability enabled, the order of events emitted by QEMU changed: pause-before-switchover disabled enabled MIGRATION, postcopy-active STOP STOP MIGRATION, pre-switchover MIGRATION, postcopy-active The STOP even handler checks the migration status (postcopy-active) and sets the domain state accordingly. Which is sufficient when pause-before-switchover is disabled, but once we enable it, the migration status is still active when we get STOP from QEMU. Thus the domain state set in the STOP handler has to be corrected once we are notified that migration changed to postcopy-active. This results in two SUSPENDED events to be emitted by the source libvirtd during post-copy migration. The first one with VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SUSPENDED_MIGRATED detail, while the second one reports the corrected VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SUSPENDED_POSTCOPY detail. This is inevitable because we don't know whether migration will eventually switch to post-copy at the time we emit the first event. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1647365 Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
2018-11-15 10:16:43 +00:00
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
virObjectEventPtr event = NULL;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
qemu: Fix post-copy migration on the source Post-copy migration has been broken on the source since commit v3.8.0-245-g32c29f10db which implemented support for pause-before-switchover QEMU migration capability. Even though the migration itself went well, the source did not really know when it switched to the post-copy mode despite the messages logged by MIGRATION event handler. As a result of this, the events emitted by source libvirtd were not accurate and statistics of the completed migration would cover only the pre-copy part of migration. Moreover, if migration failed during the post-copy phase for some reason, the source libvirtd would just happily resume the domain, which could lead to disk corruption. With the pause-before-switchover capability enabled, the order of events emitted by QEMU changed: pause-before-switchover disabled enabled MIGRATION, postcopy-active STOP STOP MIGRATION, pre-switchover MIGRATION, postcopy-active The STOP even handler checks the migration status (postcopy-active) and sets the domain state accordingly. Which is sufficient when pause-before-switchover is disabled, but once we enable it, the migration status is still active when we get STOP from QEMU. Thus the domain state set in the STOP handler has to be corrected once we are notified that migration changed to postcopy-active. This results in two SUSPENDED events to be emitted by the source libvirtd during post-copy migration. The first one with VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SUSPENDED_MIGRATED detail, while the second one reports the corrected VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SUSPENDED_POSTCOPY detail. This is inevitable because we don't know whether migration will eventually switch to post-copy at the time we emit the first event. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1647365 Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
2018-11-15 10:16:43 +00:00
int reason;
virObjectLock(vm);
VIR_DEBUG("Migration of domain %p %s changed state to %s",
vm, vm->def->name,
qemuMonitorMigrationStatusTypeToString(status));
priv = vm->privateData;
if (priv->job.asyncJob == QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE) {
VIR_DEBUG("got MIGRATION event without a migration job");
goto cleanup;
}
priv->job.current->stats.mig.status = status;
virDomainObjBroadcast(vm);
qemu: Fix post-copy migration on the source Post-copy migration has been broken on the source since commit v3.8.0-245-g32c29f10db which implemented support for pause-before-switchover QEMU migration capability. Even though the migration itself went well, the source did not really know when it switched to the post-copy mode despite the messages logged by MIGRATION event handler. As a result of this, the events emitted by source libvirtd were not accurate and statistics of the completed migration would cover only the pre-copy part of migration. Moreover, if migration failed during the post-copy phase for some reason, the source libvirtd would just happily resume the domain, which could lead to disk corruption. With the pause-before-switchover capability enabled, the order of events emitted by QEMU changed: pause-before-switchover disabled enabled MIGRATION, postcopy-active STOP STOP MIGRATION, pre-switchover MIGRATION, postcopy-active The STOP even handler checks the migration status (postcopy-active) and sets the domain state accordingly. Which is sufficient when pause-before-switchover is disabled, but once we enable it, the migration status is still active when we get STOP from QEMU. Thus the domain state set in the STOP handler has to be corrected once we are notified that migration changed to postcopy-active. This results in two SUSPENDED events to be emitted by the source libvirtd during post-copy migration. The first one with VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SUSPENDED_MIGRATED detail, while the second one reports the corrected VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SUSPENDED_POSTCOPY detail. This is inevitable because we don't know whether migration will eventually switch to post-copy at the time we emit the first event. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1647365 Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
2018-11-15 10:16:43 +00:00
if (status == QEMU_MONITOR_MIGRATION_STATUS_POSTCOPY &&
priv->job.asyncJob == QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_MIGRATION_OUT &&
qemu: Fix post-copy migration on the source Post-copy migration has been broken on the source since commit v3.8.0-245-g32c29f10db which implemented support for pause-before-switchover QEMU migration capability. Even though the migration itself went well, the source did not really know when it switched to the post-copy mode despite the messages logged by MIGRATION event handler. As a result of this, the events emitted by source libvirtd were not accurate and statistics of the completed migration would cover only the pre-copy part of migration. Moreover, if migration failed during the post-copy phase for some reason, the source libvirtd would just happily resume the domain, which could lead to disk corruption. With the pause-before-switchover capability enabled, the order of events emitted by QEMU changed: pause-before-switchover disabled enabled MIGRATION, postcopy-active STOP STOP MIGRATION, pre-switchover MIGRATION, postcopy-active The STOP even handler checks the migration status (postcopy-active) and sets the domain state accordingly. Which is sufficient when pause-before-switchover is disabled, but once we enable it, the migration status is still active when we get STOP from QEMU. Thus the domain state set in the STOP handler has to be corrected once we are notified that migration changed to postcopy-active. This results in two SUSPENDED events to be emitted by the source libvirtd during post-copy migration. The first one with VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SUSPENDED_MIGRATED detail, while the second one reports the corrected VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SUSPENDED_POSTCOPY detail. This is inevitable because we don't know whether migration will eventually switch to post-copy at the time we emit the first event. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1647365 Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
2018-11-15 10:16:43 +00:00
virDomainObjGetState(vm, &reason) == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED &&
reason == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_MIGRATION) {
VIR_DEBUG("Correcting paused state reason for domain %s to %s",
vm->def->name,
virDomainPausedReasonTypeToString(VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_POSTCOPY));
virDomainObjSetState(vm, VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED, VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_POSTCOPY);
event = virDomainEventLifecycleNewFromObj(vm,
VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SUSPENDED,
VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SUSPENDED_POSTCOPY);
if (virDomainObjSave(vm, driver->xmlopt, cfg->stateDir) < 0) {
qemu: Fix post-copy migration on the source Post-copy migration has been broken on the source since commit v3.8.0-245-g32c29f10db which implemented support for pause-before-switchover QEMU migration capability. Even though the migration itself went well, the source did not really know when it switched to the post-copy mode despite the messages logged by MIGRATION event handler. As a result of this, the events emitted by source libvirtd were not accurate and statistics of the completed migration would cover only the pre-copy part of migration. Moreover, if migration failed during the post-copy phase for some reason, the source libvirtd would just happily resume the domain, which could lead to disk corruption. With the pause-before-switchover capability enabled, the order of events emitted by QEMU changed: pause-before-switchover disabled enabled MIGRATION, postcopy-active STOP STOP MIGRATION, pre-switchover MIGRATION, postcopy-active The STOP even handler checks the migration status (postcopy-active) and sets the domain state accordingly. Which is sufficient when pause-before-switchover is disabled, but once we enable it, the migration status is still active when we get STOP from QEMU. Thus the domain state set in the STOP handler has to be corrected once we are notified that migration changed to postcopy-active. This results in two SUSPENDED events to be emitted by the source libvirtd during post-copy migration. The first one with VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SUSPENDED_MIGRATED detail, while the second one reports the corrected VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SUSPENDED_POSTCOPY detail. This is inevitable because we don't know whether migration will eventually switch to post-copy at the time we emit the first event. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1647365 Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
2018-11-15 10:16:43 +00:00
VIR_WARN("Unable to save status on vm %s after state change",
vm->def->name);
}
}
cleanup:
virObjectUnlock(vm);
qemu: Fix post-copy migration on the source Post-copy migration has been broken on the source since commit v3.8.0-245-g32c29f10db which implemented support for pause-before-switchover QEMU migration capability. Even though the migration itself went well, the source did not really know when it switched to the post-copy mode despite the messages logged by MIGRATION event handler. As a result of this, the events emitted by source libvirtd were not accurate and statistics of the completed migration would cover only the pre-copy part of migration. Moreover, if migration failed during the post-copy phase for some reason, the source libvirtd would just happily resume the domain, which could lead to disk corruption. With the pause-before-switchover capability enabled, the order of events emitted by QEMU changed: pause-before-switchover disabled enabled MIGRATION, postcopy-active STOP STOP MIGRATION, pre-switchover MIGRATION, postcopy-active The STOP even handler checks the migration status (postcopy-active) and sets the domain state accordingly. Which is sufficient when pause-before-switchover is disabled, but once we enable it, the migration status is still active when we get STOP from QEMU. Thus the domain state set in the STOP handler has to be corrected once we are notified that migration changed to postcopy-active. This results in two SUSPENDED events to be emitted by the source libvirtd during post-copy migration. The first one with VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SUSPENDED_MIGRATED detail, while the second one reports the corrected VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SUSPENDED_POSTCOPY detail. This is inevitable because we don't know whether migration will eventually switch to post-copy at the time we emit the first event. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1647365 Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
2018-11-15 10:16:43 +00:00
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, event);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleMigrationPass(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
int pass,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv;
virObjectLock(vm);
VIR_DEBUG("Migrating domain %p %s, iteration %d",
vm, vm->def->name, pass);
priv = vm->privateData;
if (priv->job.asyncJob == QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE) {
VIR_DEBUG("got MIGRATION_PASS event without a migration job");
goto cleanup;
}
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState,
virDomainEventMigrationIterationNewFromObj(vm, pass));
cleanup:
virObjectUnlock(vm);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleDumpCompleted(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
int status,
qemuMonitorDumpStatsPtr stats,
const char *error,
void *opaque G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv;
qemuDomainJobPrivatePtr jobPriv;
virObjectLock(vm);
VIR_DEBUG("Dump completed for domain %p %s with stats=%p error='%s'",
vm, vm->def->name, stats, NULLSTR(error));
priv = vm->privateData;
jobPriv = priv->job.privateData;
if (priv->job.asyncJob == QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE) {
VIR_DEBUG("got DUMP_COMPLETED event without a dump_completed job");
goto cleanup;
}
jobPriv->dumpCompleted = true;
priv->job.current->stats.dump = *stats;
priv->job.error = g_strdup(error);
/* Force error if extracting the DUMP_COMPLETED status failed */
if (!error && status < 0) {
priv->job.error = g_strdup(virGetLastErrorMessage());
priv->job.current->stats.dump.status = QEMU_MONITOR_DUMP_STATUS_FAILED;
}
virDomainObjBroadcast(vm);
cleanup:
virResetLastError();
virObjectUnlock(vm);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandlePRManagerStatusChanged(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *prManager,
bool connected,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv;
struct qemuProcessEvent *processEvent = NULL;
const char *managedAlias = qemuDomainGetManagedPRAlias();
int ret = -1;
virObjectLock(vm);
VIR_DEBUG("pr-manager %s status changed for domain %p %s connected=%d",
prManager, vm, vm->def->name, connected);
if (connected) {
/* Connect events are boring. */
ret = 0;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Disconnect events are more interesting. */
if (STRNEQ(prManager, managedAlias)) {
VIR_DEBUG("pr-manager %s not managed, ignoring event",
prManager);
ret = 0;
goto cleanup;
}
priv = vm->privateData;
priv->prDaemonRunning = false;
processEvent = g_new0(struct qemuProcessEvent, 1);
processEvent->eventType = QEMU_PROCESS_EVENT_PR_DISCONNECT;
processEvent->vm = virObjectRef(vm);
if (virThreadPoolSendJob(driver->workerPool, 0, processEvent) < 0) {
qemuProcessEventFree(processEvent);
virObjectUnref(vm);
goto cleanup;
}
ret = 0;
cleanup:
virObjectUnlock(vm);
return ret;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleRdmaGidStatusChanged(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *netdev,
bool gid_status,
unsigned long long subnet_prefix,
unsigned long long interface_id,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
struct qemuProcessEvent *processEvent = NULL;
qemuMonitorRdmaGidStatusPtr info = NULL;
int ret = -1;
virObjectLock(vm);
VIR_DEBUG("netdev=%s,gid_status=%d,subnet_prefix=0x%llx,interface_id=0x%llx",
netdev, gid_status, subnet_prefix, interface_id);
info = g_new0(qemuMonitorRdmaGidStatus, 1);
info->netdev = g_strdup(netdev);
info->gid_status = gid_status;
info->subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
info->interface_id = interface_id;
processEvent = g_new0(struct qemuProcessEvent, 1);
processEvent->eventType = QEMU_PROCESS_EVENT_RDMA_GID_STATUS_CHANGED;
processEvent->vm = virObjectRef(vm);
processEvent->data = g_steal_pointer(&info);
if (virThreadPoolSendJob(driver->workerPool, 0, processEvent) < 0) {
qemuProcessEventFree(processEvent);
virObjectUnref(vm);
goto cleanup;
}
ret = 0;
cleanup:
qemuMonitorEventRdmaGidStatusFree(info);
virObjectUnlock(vm);
return ret;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleGuestCrashloaded(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
struct qemuProcessEvent *processEvent;
virObjectLock(vm);
processEvent = g_new0(struct qemuProcessEvent, 1);
processEvent->eventType = QEMU_PROCESS_EVENT_GUEST_CRASHLOADED;
processEvent->vm = virObjectRef(vm);
if (virThreadPoolSendJob(driver->workerPool, 0, processEvent) < 0) {
virObjectUnref(vm);
qemuProcessEventFree(processEvent);
}
virObjectUnlock(vm);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessHandleMemoryFailure(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
qemuMonitorEventMemoryFailurePtr mfp,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
virObjectEventPtr event = NULL;
virDomainMemoryFailureRecipientType recipient;
virDomainMemoryFailureActionType action;
unsigned int flags = 0;
switch (mfp->recipient) {
case QEMU_MONITOR_MEMORY_FAILURE_RECIPIENT_HYPERVISOR:
recipient = VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_MEMORY_FAILURE_RECIPIENT_HYPERVISOR;
break;
case QEMU_MONITOR_MEMORY_FAILURE_RECIPIENT_GUEST:
recipient = VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_MEMORY_FAILURE_RECIPIENT_GUEST;
break;
case QEMU_MONITOR_MEMORY_FAILURE_RECIPIENT_LAST:
default:
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INVALID_ARG, "%s",
_("requested unknown memory failure recipient"));
return -1;
}
switch (mfp->action) {
case QEMU_MONITOR_MEMORY_FAILURE_ACTION_IGNORE:
action = VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_MEMORY_FAILURE_ACTION_IGNORE;
break;
case QEMU_MONITOR_MEMORY_FAILURE_ACTION_INJECT:
action = VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_MEMORY_FAILURE_ACTION_INJECT;
break;
case QEMU_MONITOR_MEMORY_FAILURE_ACTION_FATAL:
action = VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_MEMORY_FAILURE_ACTION_FATAL;
break;
case QEMU_MONITOR_MEMORY_FAILURE_ACTION_RESET:
action = VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_MEMORY_FAILURE_ACTION_RESET;
break;
case QEMU_MONITOR_MEMORY_FAILURE_ACTION_LAST:
default:
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INVALID_ARG, "%s",
_("requested unknown memory failure action"));
return -1;
}
if (mfp->action_required)
flags |= VIR_DOMAIN_MEMORY_FAILURE_ACTION_REQUIRED;
if (mfp->recursive)
flags |= VIR_DOMAIN_MEMORY_FAILURE_RECURSIVE;
event = virDomainEventMemoryFailureNewFromObj(vm, recipient, action, flags);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, event);
return 0;
}
static qemuMonitorCallbacks monitorCallbacks = {
.eofNotify = qemuProcessHandleMonitorEOF,
.errorNotify = qemuProcessHandleMonitorError,
.domainEvent = qemuProcessHandleEvent,
.domainShutdown = qemuProcessHandleShutdown,
.domainStop = qemuProcessHandleStop,
.domainResume = qemuProcessHandleResume,
.domainReset = qemuProcessHandleReset,
.domainRTCChange = qemuProcessHandleRTCChange,
.domainWatchdog = qemuProcessHandleWatchdog,
.domainIOError = qemuProcessHandleIOError,
.domainGraphics = qemuProcessHandleGraphics,
.domainBlockJob = qemuProcessHandleBlockJob,
.jobStatusChange = qemuProcessHandleJobStatusChange,
.domainTrayChange = qemuProcessHandleTrayChange,
.domainPMWakeup = qemuProcessHandlePMWakeup,
.domainPMSuspend = qemuProcessHandlePMSuspend,
.domainBalloonChange = qemuProcessHandleBalloonChange,
.domainPMSuspendDisk = qemuProcessHandlePMSuspendDisk,
.domainGuestPanic = qemuProcessHandleGuestPanic,
.domainDeviceDeleted = qemuProcessHandleDeviceDeleted,
.domainNicRxFilterChanged = qemuProcessHandleNicRxFilterChanged,
.domainSerialChange = qemuProcessHandleSerialChanged,
.domainSpiceMigrated = qemuProcessHandleSpiceMigrated,
.domainMigrationStatus = qemuProcessHandleMigrationStatus,
.domainMigrationPass = qemuProcessHandleMigrationPass,
.domainAcpiOstInfo = qemuProcessHandleAcpiOstInfo,
.domainBlockThreshold = qemuProcessHandleBlockThreshold,
.domainDumpCompleted = qemuProcessHandleDumpCompleted,
.domainPRManagerStatusChanged = qemuProcessHandlePRManagerStatusChanged,
.domainRdmaGidStatusChanged = qemuProcessHandleRdmaGidStatusChanged,
.domainGuestCrashloaded = qemuProcessHandleGuestCrashloaded,
.domainMemoryFailure = qemuProcessHandleMemoryFailure,
};
static void
qemuProcessMonitorReportLogError(qemuMonitorPtr mon,
const char *msg,
void *opaque);
static void
qemuProcessMonitorLogFree(void *opaque)
{
qemuDomainLogContextPtr logCtxt = opaque;
g_clear_object(&logCtxt);
}
static int
qemuProcessInitMonitor(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
qemuDomainAsyncJob asyncJob)
{
int ret;
if (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
return -1;
ret = qemuMonitorSetCapabilities(QEMU_DOMAIN_PRIVATE(vm)->mon);
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
ret = -1;
return ret;
}
static int
qemuConnectMonitor(virQEMUDriverPtr driver, virDomainObjPtr vm, int asyncJob,
bool retry, qemuDomainLogContextPtr logCtxt)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
qemuMonitorPtr mon = NULL;
unsigned long long timeout = 0;
if (qemuSecuritySetDaemonSocketLabel(driver->securityManager, vm->def) < 0) {
VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to set security context for monitor for %s"),
vm->def->name);
return -1;
}
/* When using hugepages, kernel zeroes them out before
* handing them over to qemu. This can be very time
* consuming. Therefore, add a second to timeout for each
* 1GiB of guest RAM. */
timeout = vm->def->mem.total_memory / (1024 * 1024);
ignore_value(virTimeMillisNow(&priv->monStart));
mon = qemuMonitorOpen(vm,
priv->monConfig,
retry,
timeout,
virEventThreadGetContext(priv->eventThread),
&monitorCallbacks,
driver);
if (mon && logCtxt) {
g_object_ref(logCtxt);
qemuMonitorSetDomainLog(mon,
qemuProcessMonitorReportLogError,
logCtxt,
qemuProcessMonitorLogFree);
}
qemu: Wire up better early error reporting The previous patches added infrastructure to report better errors from monitor in some cases. This patch finalizes this "feature" by enabling this enhanced error reporting on early phases of VM startup. In these phases the possibility of qemu producing a useful error message is really high compared to running it during the whole life cycle. After the start up is complete, the feature is disabled to provide the usual error messages so that users are not confused by possibly irrelevant messages that may be in the domain log. The original motivation to do this enhancement is to capture errors when using VFIO device passthrough, where qemu reports errors after the monitor is initialized and the existing error catching code couldn't catch this producing a unhelpful message: # virsh start test error: Failed to start domain test error: Unable to read from monitor: Connection reset by peer With this change, the message is changed to: # virsh start test error: Failed to start domain test error: internal error: early end of file from monitor: possible problem: qemu-system-x86_64: -device vfio-pci,host=00:1a.0,id=hostdev0,bus=pci.0,addr=0x5: vfio: error, group 8 is not viable, please ensure all devices within the iommu_group are bound to their vfio bus driver. qemu-system-x86_64: -device vfio-pci,host=00:1a.0,id=hostdev0,bus=pci.0,addr=0x5: vfio: failed to get group 8 qemu-system-x86_64: -device vfio-pci,host=00:1a.0,id=hostdev0,bus=pci.0,addr=0x5: Device 'vfio-pci' could not be initialized
2013-09-18 14:23:14 +00:00
priv->monStart = 0;
priv->mon = mon;
if (qemuSecurityClearSocketLabel(driver->securityManager, vm->def) < 0) {
VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to clear security context for monitor for %s"),
vm->def->name);
return -1;
}
if (priv->mon == NULL) {
VIR_INFO("Failed to connect monitor for %s", vm->def->name);
return -1;
}
if (qemuProcessInitMonitor(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
return -1;
if (qemuMigrationCapsCheck(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/**
* qemuProcessReadLog: Read log file of a qemu VM
* @logCtxt: the domain log context
* @msg: pointer to buffer to store the read messages in
* @max: maximum length of the message returned in @msg
*
* Reads log of a qemu VM. Skips messages not produced by qemu or irrelevant
* messages. If @max is not zero, @msg will contain at most @max characters
* from the end of the log and @msg will start after a new line if possible.
*
* Returns 0 on success or -1 on error
*/
static int
qemuProcessReadLog(qemuDomainLogContextPtr logCtxt,
char **msg,
size_t max)
{
char *buf;
ssize_t got;
char *eol;
char *filter_next;
size_t skip;
if ((got = qemuDomainLogContextRead(logCtxt, &buf)) < 0)
return -1;
/* Filter out debug messages from intermediate libvirt process */
filter_next = buf;
while ((eol = strchr(filter_next, '\n'))) {
*eol = '\0';
if (virLogProbablyLogMessage(filter_next) ||
strstr(filter_next, "char device redirected to")) {
skip = (eol + 1) - filter_next;
qemuProcessReadLog: Fix memmove arguments So I can observe this crasher that with freshly started daemon (and virtlogd enabled) I am trying to startup a domain that immediately dies (because it's said to use huge pages but I haven't allocated a single one in the pool). Hardly reproducible with -O0 or under valgrind. But I just got lucky: ==20469== Invalid write of size 8 ==20469== at 0x4C2E99B: memcpy@GLIBC_2.2.5 (in /usr/lib64/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==20469== by 0x217EDD07: qemuProcessReadLog (qemu_process.c:1670) ==20469== by 0x217EDE1D: qemuProcessReportLogError (qemu_process.c:1696) ==20469== by 0x217EE8C1: qemuProcessWaitForMonitor (qemu_process.c:1957) ==20469== by 0x217F6636: qemuProcessLaunch (qemu_process.c:4955) ==20469== by 0x217F71A4: qemuProcessStart (qemu_process.c:5152) ==20469== by 0x21846582: qemuDomainObjStart (qemu_driver.c:7396) ==20469== by 0x218467DE: qemuDomainCreateWithFlags (qemu_driver.c:7450) ==20469== by 0x21846845: qemuDomainCreate (qemu_driver.c:7468) ==20469== by 0x5611CD0: virDomainCreate (libvirt-domain.c:6753) ==20469== by 0x125D9A: remoteDispatchDomainCreate (remote_dispatch.h:3613) ==20469== by 0x125CB7: remoteDispatchDomainCreateHelper (remote_dispatch.h:3589) ==20469== Address 0x27a52ad0 is 0 bytes after a block of size 5,584 alloc'd ==20469== at 0x4C29F80: malloc (in /usr/lib64/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==20469== by 0x9B8D1DB: xdr_string (in /lib64/libc-2.21.so) ==20469== by 0x563B39C: xdr_virLogManagerProtocolNonNullString (log_protocol.c:24) ==20469== by 0x563B6B7: xdr_virLogManagerProtocolDomainReadLogFileRet (log_protocol.c:123) ==20469== by 0x164B34: virNetMessageDecodePayload (virnetmessage.c:407) ==20469== by 0x5682360: virNetClientProgramCall (virnetclientprogram.c:379) ==20469== by 0x563B30E: virLogManagerDomainReadLogFile (log_manager.c:272) ==20469== by 0x217CD613: qemuDomainLogContextRead (qemu_domain.c:2485) ==20469== by 0x217EDC76: qemuProcessReadLog (qemu_process.c:1660) ==20469== by 0x217EDE1D: qemuProcessReportLogError (qemu_process.c:1696) ==20469== by 0x217EE8C1: qemuProcessWaitForMonitor (qemu_process.c:1957) ==20469== by 0x217F6636: qemuProcessLaunch (qemu_process.c:4955) This points to memmove() in qemuProcessReadLog(). Imagine we just read the following string from qemu: "abc\n2016-01-18T09:40:44.022744Z qemu-system-x86_64: Error\n" After the first pass of the while() loop in the qemuProcessReadLog() (in which we have taken the false branch in the if) @buf still points to the beginning of the string, @filter_next points to the beginning of the second line. So we start second iteration because there is yet another newline character at the end. In this iteration @eol points to it actually. Now, the control gets inside true branch of if(). Just to remind you: got = 58 filter_next = buf + 5, eol = buf + 58. Therefore skip = 54 which is correct. The message we want to skip is 54 bytes long. However: memmove(filter_next, eol + 1, (got - skip) +1); which is memmove(filter_next, eol + 1, 5) is obviously wrong as there is only one byte we can access, not 5! Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
2016-01-18 09:50:14 +00:00
memmove(filter_next, eol + 1, buf + got - eol);
got -= skip;
} else {
filter_next = eol + 1;
*eol = '\n';
}
}
filter_next = NULL; /* silence false coverity warning */
if (got > 0 &&
buf[got - 1] == '\n') {
buf[got - 1] = '\0';
got--;
}
if (max > 0 && got > max) {
skip = got - max;
if (buf[skip - 1] != '\n' &&
(eol = strchr(buf + skip, '\n')) &&
!virStringIsEmpty(eol + 1))
skip = eol + 1 - buf;
memmove(buf, buf + skip, got - skip + 1);
got -= skip;
}
buf = g_renew(char, buf, got + 1);
*msg = buf;
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessReportLogError(qemuDomainLogContextPtr logCtxt,
const char *msgprefix)
{
g_autofree char *logmsg = NULL;
/* assume that 1024 chars of qemu log is the right balance */
if (qemuProcessReadLog(logCtxt, &logmsg, 1024) < 0)
return -1;
virResetLastError();
if (virStringIsEmpty(logmsg))
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s", msgprefix);
else
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s: %s", /* _( silence sc_libvirt_unmarked_diagnostics */
msgprefix, logmsg);
return 0;
}
static void
qemuProcessMonitorReportLogError(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
const char *msg,
void *opaque)
{
qemuDomainLogContextPtr logCtxt = opaque;
qemuProcessReportLogError(logCtxt, msg);
}
static int
qemuProcessLookupPTYs(virDomainChrDefPtr *devices,
int count,
GHashTable *info)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
g_autofree char *id = NULL;
virDomainChrDefPtr chr = devices[i];
if (chr->source->type == VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_PTY) {
qemuMonitorChardevInfoPtr entry;
id = g_strdup_printf("char%s", chr->info.alias);
entry = virHashLookup(info, id);
if (!entry || !entry->ptyPath) {
if (chr->source->data.file.path == NULL) {
/* neither the log output nor 'info chardev' had a
* pty path for this chardev, report an error
*/
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("no assigned pty for device %s"), id);
return -1;
} else {
/* 'info chardev' had no pty path for this chardev,
* but the log output had, so we're fine
*/
continue;
}
}
g_free(chr->source->data.file.path);
chr->source->data.file.path = g_strdup(entry->ptyPath);
}
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessFindCharDevicePTYsMonitor(virDomainObjPtr vm,
GHashTable *info)
{
size_t i = 0;
if (qemuProcessLookupPTYs(vm->def->serials, vm->def->nserials, info) < 0)
return -1;
if (qemuProcessLookupPTYs(vm->def->parallels, vm->def->nparallels,
info) < 0)
return -1;
if (qemuProcessLookupPTYs(vm->def->channels, vm->def->nchannels, info) < 0)
return -1;
/* For historical reasons, console[0] can be just an alias
* for serial[0]. That's why we need to update it as well. */
if (vm->def->nconsoles) {
virDomainChrDefPtr chr = vm->def->consoles[0];
if (vm->def->nserials &&
chr->deviceType == VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_DEVICE_TYPE_CONSOLE &&
chr->targetType == VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_CONSOLE_TARGET_TYPE_SERIAL) {
/* yes, the first console is just an alias for serials[0] */
i = 1;
if (virDomainChrSourceDefCopy(chr->source,
((vm->def->serials[0])->source)) < 0)
return -1;
}
}
if (qemuProcessLookupPTYs(vm->def->consoles + i, vm->def->nconsoles - i,
info) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
static void
qemuProcessRefreshChannelVirtioState(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
GHashTable *info,
int booted)
{
size_t i;
int agentReason = VIR_CONNECT_DOMAIN_EVENT_AGENT_LIFECYCLE_REASON_CHANNEL;
qemuMonitorChardevInfoPtr entry;
virObjectEventPtr event = NULL;
g_autofree char *id = NULL;
if (booted)
agentReason = VIR_CONNECT_DOMAIN_EVENT_AGENT_LIFECYCLE_REASON_DOMAIN_STARTED;
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->nchannels; i++) {
virDomainChrDefPtr chr = vm->def->channels[i];
if (chr->targetType == VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_CHANNEL_TARGET_TYPE_VIRTIO) {
VIR_FREE(id);
id = g_strdup_printf("char%s", chr->info.alias);
/* port state not reported */
if (!(entry = virHashLookup(info, id)) ||
!entry->state)
continue;
if (entry->state != VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_DEVICE_STATE_DEFAULT &&
STREQ_NULLABLE(chr->target.name, "org.qemu.guest_agent.0") &&
(event = virDomainEventAgentLifecycleNewFromObj(vm, entry->state,
agentReason)))
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, event);
chr->state = entry->state;
}
}
}
int
qemuRefreshVirtioChannelState(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
qemuDomainAsyncJob asyncJob)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
GHashTable *info = NULL;
int ret = -1;
if (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = qemuMonitorGetChardevInfo(priv->mon, &info);
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
ret = -1;
if (ret < 0)
goto cleanup;
qemuProcessRefreshChannelVirtioState(driver, vm, info, false);
ret = 0;
cleanup:
virHashFree(info);
return ret;
}
static int
qemuProcessRefreshPRManagerState(virDomainObjPtr vm,
GHashTable *info)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
qemuMonitorPRManagerInfoPtr prManagerInfo;
const char *managedAlias = qemuDomainGetManagedPRAlias();
if (!(prManagerInfo = virHashLookup(info, managedAlias))) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_FAILED,
_("missing info on pr-manager %s"),
managedAlias);
return -1;
}
priv->prDaemonRunning = prManagerInfo->connected;
if (!priv->prDaemonRunning &&
qemuProcessStartManagedPRDaemon(vm) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
static int
qemuRefreshPRManagerState(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
GHashTable *info = NULL;
int ret = -1;
if (!virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_PR_MANAGER_HELPER) ||
!qemuDomainDefHasManagedPR(vm))
return 0;
qemuDomainObjEnterMonitor(driver, vm);
ret = qemuMonitorGetPRManagerInfo(priv->mon, &info);
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
ret = -1;
if (ret < 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = qemuProcessRefreshPRManagerState(vm, info);
cleanup:
virHashFree(info);
return ret;
}
static void
qemuRefreshRTC(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
time_t now, then;
struct tm thenbits;
long localOffset;
int rv;
if (vm->def->clock.offset != VIR_DOMAIN_CLOCK_OFFSET_VARIABLE)
return;
memset(&thenbits, 0, sizeof(thenbits));
qemuDomainObjEnterMonitor(driver, vm);
now = time(NULL);
rv = qemuMonitorGetRTCTime(priv->mon, &thenbits);
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
rv = -1;
if (rv < 0)
return;
thenbits.tm_isdst = -1;
if ((then = mktime(&thenbits)) == (time_t)-1) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
_("Unable to convert time"));
return;
}
/* Thing is, @now is in local TZ but @then in UTC. */
if (virTimeLocalOffsetFromUTC(&localOffset) < 0)
return;
vm->def->clock.data.variable.adjustment = then - now + localOffset;
}
int
qemuProcessRefreshBalloonState(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
int asyncJob)
{
unsigned long long balloon;
int rc;
/* if no ballooning is available, the current size equals to the current
* full memory size */
if (!virDomainDefHasMemballoon(vm->def)) {
vm->def->mem.cur_balloon = virDomainDefGetMemoryTotal(vm->def);
return 0;
}
if (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
return -1;
rc = qemuMonitorGetBalloonInfo(qemuDomainGetMonitor(vm), &balloon);
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0 || rc < 0)
return -1;
vm->def->mem.cur_balloon = balloon;
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessWaitForMonitor(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
int asyncJob,
qemuDomainLogContextPtr logCtxt)
{
int ret = -1;
GHashTable *info = NULL;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
bool retry = true;
if (priv->qemuCaps &&
virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_CHARDEV_FD_PASS))
retry = false;
VIR_DEBUG("Connect monitor to vm=%p name='%s' retry=%d",
vm, vm->def->name, retry);
if (qemuConnectMonitor(driver, vm, asyncJob, retry, logCtxt) < 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Try to get the pty path mappings again via the monitor. This is much more
* reliable if it's available.
* Note that the monitor itself can be on a pty, so we still need to try the
* log output method. */
if (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = qemuMonitorGetChardevInfo(priv->mon, &info);
VIR_DEBUG("qemuMonitorGetChardevInfo returned %i", ret);
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
ret = -1;
if (ret == 0) {
if ((ret = qemuProcessFindCharDevicePTYsMonitor(vm, info)) < 0)
goto cleanup;
qemuProcessRefreshChannelVirtioState(driver, vm, info, true);
}
cleanup:
virHashFree(info);
if (logCtxt && kill(vm->pid, 0) == -1 && errno == ESRCH) {
qemuProcessReportLogError(logCtxt,
_("process exited while connecting to monitor"));
ret = -1;
}
return ret;
}
static int
qemuProcessDetectIOThreadPIDs(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
int asyncJob)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
qemuMonitorIOThreadInfoPtr *iothreads = NULL;
int niothreads = 0;
int ret = -1;
size_t i;
if (!virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_OBJECT_IOTHREAD)) {
ret = 0;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Get the list of IOThreads from qemu */
if (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = qemuMonitorGetIOThreads(priv->mon, &iothreads, &niothreads);
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (ret < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (niothreads != vm->def->niothreadids) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("got wrong number of IOThread pids from QEMU monitor. "
"got %d, wanted %zu"),
niothreads, vm->def->niothreadids);
goto cleanup;
}
/* Nothing to do */
if (niothreads == 0) {
ret = 0;
goto cleanup;
}
for (i = 0; i < niothreads; i++) {
virDomainIOThreadIDDefPtr iothrid;
if (!(iothrid = virDomainIOThreadIDFind(vm->def,
iothreads[i]->iothread_id))) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("iothread %d not found"),
iothreads[i]->iothread_id);
goto cleanup;
}
iothrid->thread_id = iothreads[i]->thread_id;
}
ret = 0;
cleanup:
if (iothreads) {
for (i = 0; i < niothreads; i++)
VIR_FREE(iothreads[i]);
VIR_FREE(iothreads);
}
return ret;
}
static int
qemuProcessGetAllCpuAffinity(virBitmapPtr *cpumapRet)
{
*cpumapRet = NULL;
if (!virHostCPUHasBitmap())
return 0;
if (!(*cpumapRet = virHostCPUGetOnlineBitmap()))
return -1;
return 0;
}
/*
* To be run between fork/exec of QEMU only
*/
#if defined(WITH_SCHED_GETAFFINITY) || defined(WITH_BSD_CPU_AFFINITY)
static int
qemuProcessInitCpuAffinity(virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
qemu: Do not error out when setting affinity failed Consider a host with 8 CPUs. There are the following possible scenarios 1. Bare metal; libvirtd has affinity of 8 CPUs; QEMU should get 8 CPUs 2. Bare metal; libvirtd has affinity of 2 CPUs; QEMU should get 8 CPUs 3. Container has affinity of 8 CPUs; libvirtd has affinity of 8 CPus; QEMU should get 8 CPUs 4. Container has affinity of 8 CPUs; libvirtd has affinity of 2 CPus; QEMU should get 8 CPUs 5. Container has affinity of 4 CPUs; libvirtd has affinity of 4 CPus; QEMU should get 4 CPUs 6. Container has affinity of 4 CPUs; libvirtd has affinity of 2 CPus; QEMU should get 4 CPUs Scenarios 1 & 2 always work unless systemd restricted libvirtd privs. Scenario 3 works because libvirt checks current affinity first and skips the sched_setaffinity call, avoiding the SYS_NICE issue Scenario 4 works only if CAP_SYS_NICE is availalbe Scenarios 5 & 6 works only if CAP_SYS_NICE is present *AND* the cgroups cpuset is not set on the container. If libvirt blindly ignores the sched_setaffinity failure, then scenarios 4, 5 and 6 should all work, but with caveat in case 4 and 6, that QEMU will only get 2 CPUs instead of the possible 8 and 4 respectively. This is still better than failing. Therefore libvirt can blindly ignore the setaffinity failure, but *ONLY* ignore it when there was no affinity specified in the XML config. If user specified affinity explicitly, libvirt must report an error if it can't be honoured. Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1819801 Suggested-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2020-09-04 12:17:30 +00:00
bool settingAll = false;
g_autoptr(virBitmap) cpumapToSet = NULL;
virDomainNumatuneMemMode mem_mode;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
if (!vm->pid) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
_("Cannot setup CPU affinity until process is started"));
return -1;
}
/* Here is the deal, we can't set cpuset.mems before qemu is
* started as it clashes with KVM allocation. Therefore, we
* used to let qemu allocate its memory anywhere as we would
* then move the memory to desired NUMA node via CGroups.
* However, that might not be always possible because qemu
* might lock some parts of its memory (e.g. due to VFIO).
* Even if it possible, memory has to be copied between NUMA
* nodes which is suboptimal.
* Solution is to set affinity that matches the best what we
* would have set in CGroups and then fix it later, once qemu
* is already running. */
if (virDomainNumaGetNodeCount(vm->def->numa) <= 1 &&
virDomainNumatuneGetMode(vm->def->numa, -1, &mem_mode) == 0 &&
mem_mode == VIR_DOMAIN_NUMATUNE_MEM_STRICT) {
virBitmapPtr nodeset = NULL;
if (virDomainNumatuneMaybeGetNodeset(vm->def->numa,
priv->autoNodeset,
&nodeset,
-1) < 0)
return -1;
if (virNumaNodesetToCPUset(nodeset, &cpumapToSet) < 0)
return -1;
} else if (vm->def->cputune.emulatorpin) {
cpumapToSet = virBitmapNewCopy(vm->def->cputune.emulatorpin);
} else {
qemu: Do not error out when setting affinity failed Consider a host with 8 CPUs. There are the following possible scenarios 1. Bare metal; libvirtd has affinity of 8 CPUs; QEMU should get 8 CPUs 2. Bare metal; libvirtd has affinity of 2 CPUs; QEMU should get 8 CPUs 3. Container has affinity of 8 CPUs; libvirtd has affinity of 8 CPus; QEMU should get 8 CPUs 4. Container has affinity of 8 CPUs; libvirtd has affinity of 2 CPus; QEMU should get 8 CPUs 5. Container has affinity of 4 CPUs; libvirtd has affinity of 4 CPus; QEMU should get 4 CPUs 6. Container has affinity of 4 CPUs; libvirtd has affinity of 2 CPus; QEMU should get 4 CPUs Scenarios 1 & 2 always work unless systemd restricted libvirtd privs. Scenario 3 works because libvirt checks current affinity first and skips the sched_setaffinity call, avoiding the SYS_NICE issue Scenario 4 works only if CAP_SYS_NICE is availalbe Scenarios 5 & 6 works only if CAP_SYS_NICE is present *AND* the cgroups cpuset is not set on the container. If libvirt blindly ignores the sched_setaffinity failure, then scenarios 4, 5 and 6 should all work, but with caveat in case 4 and 6, that QEMU will only get 2 CPUs instead of the possible 8 and 4 respectively. This is still better than failing. Therefore libvirt can blindly ignore the setaffinity failure, but *ONLY* ignore it when there was no affinity specified in the XML config. If user specified affinity explicitly, libvirt must report an error if it can't be honoured. Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1819801 Suggested-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2020-09-04 12:17:30 +00:00
settingAll = true;
if (qemuProcessGetAllCpuAffinity(&cpumapToSet) < 0)
return -1;
}
/*
* We only want to error out if we failed to set the affinity to
* user-requested mapping. If we are just trying to reset the affinity
* to all CPUs and this fails it can only be an issue if:
* 1) libvirtd does not have CAP_SYS_NICE
* 2) libvirtd does not run on all CPUs
*
* This scenario can easily occur when libvirtd is run inside a
* container with restrictive permissions and CPU pinning.
*
* See also: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1819801#c2
*/
if (cpumapToSet &&
virProcessSetAffinity(vm->pid, cpumapToSet, settingAll) < 0) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
#else /* !defined(WITH_SCHED_GETAFFINITY) && !defined(WITH_BSD_CPU_AFFINITY) */
static int
qemuProcessInitCpuAffinity(virDomainObjPtr vm G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
return 0;
}
#endif /* !defined(WITH_SCHED_GETAFFINITY) && !defined(WITH_BSD_CPU_AFFINITY) */
/* set link states to down on interfaces at qemu start */
static int
qemuProcessSetLinkStates(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
qemuDomainAsyncJob asyncJob)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
virDomainDefPtr def = vm->def;
size_t i;
int ret = -1;
int rv;
if (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < def->nnets; i++) {
if (def->nets[i]->linkstate == VIR_DOMAIN_NET_INTERFACE_LINK_STATE_DOWN) {
if (!def->nets[i]->info.alias) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
_("missing alias for network device"));
goto cleanup;
}
VIR_DEBUG("Setting link state: %s", def->nets[i]->info.alias);
rv = qemuMonitorSetLink(priv->mon,
def->nets[i]->info.alias,
VIR_DOMAIN_NET_INTERFACE_LINK_STATE_DOWN);
if (rv < 0) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_FAILED,
_("Couldn't set link state on interface: %s"),
def->nets[i]->info.alias);
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
ret = 0;
cleanup:
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
ret = -1;
return ret;
}
/**
* qemuProcessSetupPid:
*
* This function sets resource properties (affinity, cgroups,
* scheduler) for any PID associated with a domain. It should be used
* to set up emulator PIDs as well as vCPU and I/O thread pids to
* ensure they are all handled the same way.
*
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error.
*/
static int
qemuProcessSetupPid(virDomainObjPtr vm,
pid_t pid,
virCgroupThreadName nameval,
int id,
virBitmapPtr cpumask,
unsigned long long period,
long long quota,
virDomainThreadSchedParamPtr sched)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
virDomainNumatuneMemMode mem_mode;
virCgroupPtr cgroup = NULL;
virBitmapPtr use_cpumask = NULL;
virBitmapPtr affinity_cpumask = NULL;
g_autoptr(virBitmap) hostcpumap = NULL;
g_autofree char *mem_mask = NULL;
int ret = -1;
if ((period || quota) &&
!virCgroupHasController(priv->cgroup, VIR_CGROUP_CONTROLLER_CPU)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
_("cgroup cpu is required for scheduler tuning"));
goto cleanup;
}
/* Infer which cpumask shall be used. */
if (cpumask) {
use_cpumask = cpumask;
} else if (vm->def->placement_mode == VIR_DOMAIN_CPU_PLACEMENT_MODE_AUTO) {
use_cpumask = priv->autoCpuset;
} else if (vm->def->cpumask) {
use_cpumask = vm->def->cpumask;
} else {
/* You may think this is redundant, but we can't assume libvirtd
* itself is running on all pCPUs, so we need to explicitly set
* the spawned QEMU instance to all pCPUs if no map is given in
* its config file */
if (qemuProcessGetAllCpuAffinity(&hostcpumap) < 0)
goto cleanup;
affinity_cpumask = hostcpumap;
}
/*
* If CPU cgroup controller is not initialized here, then we need
* neither period nor quota settings. And if CPUSET controller is
* not initialized either, then there's nothing to do anyway.
*/
if (virCgroupHasController(priv->cgroup, VIR_CGROUP_CONTROLLER_CPU) ||
virCgroupHasController(priv->cgroup, VIR_CGROUP_CONTROLLER_CPUSET)) {
if (virDomainNumatuneGetMode(vm->def->numa, -1, &mem_mode) == 0 &&
mem_mode == VIR_DOMAIN_NUMATUNE_MEM_STRICT &&
virDomainNumatuneMaybeFormatNodeset(vm->def->numa,
priv->autoNodeset,
&mem_mask, -1) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (virCgroupNewThread(priv->cgroup, nameval, id, true, &cgroup) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (virCgroupHasController(priv->cgroup, VIR_CGROUP_CONTROLLER_CPUSET)) {
if (use_cpumask &&
qemuSetupCgroupCpusetCpus(cgroup, use_cpumask) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (mem_mask && virCgroupSetCpusetMems(cgroup, mem_mask) < 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if ((period || quota) &&
qemuSetupCgroupVcpuBW(cgroup, period, quota) < 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Move the thread to the sub dir */
if (virCgroupAddThread(cgroup, pid) < 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (!affinity_cpumask)
affinity_cpumask = use_cpumask;
/* Setup legacy affinity.
*
* We only want to error out if we failed to set the affinity to
* user-requested mapping. If we are just trying to reset the affinity
* to all CPUs and this fails it can only be an issue if:
* 1) libvirtd does not have CAP_SYS_NICE
* 2) libvirtd does not run on all CPUs
*
* This scenario can easily occur when libvirtd is run inside a
* container with restrictive permissions and CPU pinning.
*
* See also: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1819801#c2
*/
if (affinity_cpumask &&
virProcessSetAffinity(pid, affinity_cpumask,
affinity_cpumask == hostcpumap) < 0) {
goto cleanup;
qemu: Do not error out when setting affinity failed Consider a host with 8 CPUs. There are the following possible scenarios 1. Bare metal; libvirtd has affinity of 8 CPUs; QEMU should get 8 CPUs 2. Bare metal; libvirtd has affinity of 2 CPUs; QEMU should get 8 CPUs 3. Container has affinity of 8 CPUs; libvirtd has affinity of 8 CPus; QEMU should get 8 CPUs 4. Container has affinity of 8 CPUs; libvirtd has affinity of 2 CPus; QEMU should get 8 CPUs 5. Container has affinity of 4 CPUs; libvirtd has affinity of 4 CPus; QEMU should get 4 CPUs 6. Container has affinity of 4 CPUs; libvirtd has affinity of 2 CPus; QEMU should get 4 CPUs Scenarios 1 & 2 always work unless systemd restricted libvirtd privs. Scenario 3 works because libvirt checks current affinity first and skips the sched_setaffinity call, avoiding the SYS_NICE issue Scenario 4 works only if CAP_SYS_NICE is availalbe Scenarios 5 & 6 works only if CAP_SYS_NICE is present *AND* the cgroups cpuset is not set on the container. If libvirt blindly ignores the sched_setaffinity failure, then scenarios 4, 5 and 6 should all work, but with caveat in case 4 and 6, that QEMU will only get 2 CPUs instead of the possible 8 and 4 respectively. This is still better than failing. Therefore libvirt can blindly ignore the setaffinity failure, but *ONLY* ignore it when there was no affinity specified in the XML config. If user specified affinity explicitly, libvirt must report an error if it can't be honoured. Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1819801 Suggested-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2020-09-04 12:17:30 +00:00
}
/* Set scheduler type and priority, but not for the main thread. */
if (sched &&
nameval != VIR_CGROUP_THREAD_EMULATOR &&
virProcessSetScheduler(pid, sched->policy, sched->priority) < 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = 0;
cleanup:
if (cgroup) {
if (ret < 0)
virCgroupRemove(cgroup);
virCgroupFree(cgroup);
}
return ret;
}
static int
qemuProcessSetupEmulator(virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
return qemuProcessSetupPid(vm, vm->pid, VIR_CGROUP_THREAD_EMULATOR,
0, vm->def->cputune.emulatorpin,
vm->def->cputune.emulator_period,
vm->def->cputune.emulator_quota,
vm->def->cputune.emulatorsched);
}
static int
qemuProcessResctrlCreate(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
size_t i = 0;
g_autoptr(virCaps) caps = NULL;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
if (!vm->def->nresctrls)
return 0;
/* Force capability refresh since resctrl info can change
* XXX: move cache info into virresctrl so caps are not needed */
caps = virQEMUDriverGetCapabilities(driver, true);
if (!caps)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->nresctrls; i++) {
size_t j = 0;
if (virResctrlAllocCreate(caps->host.resctrl,
vm->def->resctrls[i]->alloc,
priv->machineName) < 0)
return -1;
for (j = 0; j < vm->def->resctrls[i]->nmonitors; j++) {
virDomainResctrlMonDefPtr mon = NULL;
mon = vm->def->resctrls[i]->monitors[j];
if (virResctrlMonitorCreate(mon->instance,
priv->machineName) < 0)
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static char *
qemuProcessBuildPRHelperPidfilePath(virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
const char *prdAlias = qemuDomainGetManagedPRAlias();
return virPidFileBuildPath(priv->libDir, prdAlias);
}
void
qemuProcessKillManagedPRDaemon(virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
virErrorPtr orig_err;
g_autofree char *pidfile = NULL;
if (!(pidfile = qemuProcessBuildPRHelperPidfilePath(vm))) {
VIR_WARN("Unable to construct pr-helper pidfile path");
return;
}
virErrorPreserveLast(&orig_err);
if (virPidFileForceCleanupPath(pidfile) < 0) {
VIR_WARN("Unable to kill pr-helper process");
} else {
priv->prDaemonRunning = false;
}
virErrorRestore(&orig_err);
}
static int
qemuProcessStartPRDaemonHook(void *opaque)
{
virDomainObjPtr vm = opaque;
size_t i, nfds = 0;
g_autofree int *fds = NULL;
int ret = -1;
if (qemuDomainNamespaceEnabled(vm, QEMU_DOMAIN_NS_MOUNT)) {
if (virProcessGetNamespaces(vm->pid, &nfds, &fds) < 0)
return ret;
if (nfds > 0 &&
virProcessSetNamespaces(nfds, fds) < 0)
goto cleanup;
}
ret = 0;
cleanup:
for (i = 0; i < nfds; i++)
VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(fds[i]);
return ret;
}
int
qemuProcessStartManagedPRDaemon(virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = priv->driver;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = NULL;
int errfd = -1;
g_autofree char *pidfile = NULL;
g_autofree char *socketPath = NULL;
pid_t cpid = -1;
g_autoptr(virCommand) cmd = NULL;
virTimeBackOffVar timebackoff;
const unsigned long long timeout = 500000; /* ms */
int ret = -1;
cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
if (!virFileIsExecutable(cfg->prHelperName)) {
virReportSystemError(errno, _("'%s' is not a suitable pr helper"),
cfg->prHelperName);
goto cleanup;
}
if (!(pidfile = qemuProcessBuildPRHelperPidfilePath(vm)))
goto cleanup;
if (!(socketPath = qemuDomainGetManagedPRSocketPath(priv)))
goto cleanup;
/* Remove stale socket */
if (unlink(socketPath) < 0 &&
errno != ENOENT) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("Unable to remove stale socket path: %s"),
socketPath);
goto cleanup;
}
if (!(cmd = virCommandNewArgList(cfg->prHelperName,
"-k", socketPath,
NULL)))
goto cleanup;
virCommandDaemonize(cmd);
virCommandSetPidFile(cmd, pidfile);
virCommandSetErrorFD(cmd, &errfd);
/* Place the process into the same namespace and cgroup as
* qemu (so that it shares the same view of the system). */
virCommandSetPreExecHook(cmd, qemuProcessStartPRDaemonHook, vm);
if (virCommandRun(cmd, NULL) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (virPidFileReadPath(pidfile, &cpid) < 0) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("pr helper %s didn't show up"),
cfg->prHelperName);
goto cleanup;
}
if (virTimeBackOffStart(&timebackoff, 1, timeout) < 0)
goto cleanup;
while (virTimeBackOffWait(&timebackoff)) {
char errbuf[1024] = { 0 };
if (virFileExists(socketPath))
break;
if (virProcessKill(cpid, 0) == 0)
continue;
if (saferead(errfd, errbuf, sizeof(errbuf) - 1) < 0) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("pr helper %s died unexpectedly"),
cfg->prHelperName);
} else {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_FAILED,
_("pr helper died and reported: %s"), errbuf);
}
goto cleanup;
}
if (!virFileExists(socketPath)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_TIMEOUT, "%s",
_("pr helper socked did not show up"));
goto cleanup;
}
if (priv->cgroup &&
virCgroupAddMachineProcess(priv->cgroup, cpid) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (qemuSecurityDomainSetPathLabel(driver, vm, socketPath, true) < 0)
goto cleanup;
priv->prDaemonRunning = true;
ret = 0;
cleanup:
if (ret < 0) {
virCommandAbort(cmd);
if (cpid >= 0)
virProcessKillPainfully(cpid, true);
if (pidfile)
unlink(pidfile);
}
VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(errfd);
return ret;
}
static int
qemuProcessInitPasswords(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
int asyncJob)
{
int ret = 0;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->ngraphics; ++i) {
virDomainGraphicsDefPtr graphics = vm->def->graphics[i];
if (graphics->type == VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_VNC) {
ret = qemuDomainChangeGraphicsPasswords(driver, vm,
VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_VNC,
&graphics->data.vnc.auth,
cfg->vncPassword,
asyncJob);
} else if (graphics->type == VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_SPICE) {
ret = qemuDomainChangeGraphicsPasswords(driver, vm,
VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_SPICE,
&graphics->data.spice.auth,
cfg->spicePassword,
asyncJob);
}
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
return ret;
}
static int
qemuProcessPrepareChardevDevice(virDomainDefPtr def G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainChrDefPtr dev,
void *opaque G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
int fd;
if (dev->source->type != VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_FILE)
return 0;
if ((fd = open(dev->source->data.file.path,
O_CREAT | O_APPEND, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR)) < 0) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("Unable to pre-create chardev file '%s'"),
dev->source->data.file.path);
return -1;
}
VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(fd);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessCleanupChardevDevice(virDomainDefPtr def G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainChrDefPtr dev,
void *opaque G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
if (dev->source->type == VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_UNIX &&
dev->source->data.nix.listen &&
dev->source->data.nix.path)
unlink(dev->source->data.nix.path);
return 0;
}
/**
* Loads and update video memory size for video devices according to QEMU
* process as the QEMU will silently update the values that we pass to QEMU
* through command line. We need to load these updated values and store them
* into the status XML.
*
* We will fail if for some reason the values cannot be loaded from QEMU because
* its mandatory to get the correct video memory size to status XML to not break
* migration.
*/
static int
qemuProcessUpdateVideoRamSize(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
int asyncJob)
{
int ret = -1;
ssize_t i;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
virDomainVideoDefPtr video = NULL;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = NULL;
if (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->nvideos; i++) {
video = vm->def->videos[i];
switch (video->type) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_VIDEO_TYPE_VGA:
if (virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_VGA_VGAMEM)) {
if (qemuMonitorUpdateVideoMemorySize(priv->mon, video, "VGA") < 0)
goto error;
}
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_VIDEO_TYPE_QXL:
if (i == 0) {
if (virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_QXL_VGAMEM) &&
qemuMonitorUpdateVideoMemorySize(priv->mon, video,
"qxl-vga") < 0)
goto error;
if (virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_QXL_VRAM64) &&
qemuMonitorUpdateVideoVram64Size(priv->mon, video,
"qxl-vga") < 0)
goto error;
} else {
if (virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_QXL_VGAMEM) &&
qemuMonitorUpdateVideoMemorySize(priv->mon, video,
"qxl") < 0)
goto error;
if (virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_QXL_VRAM64) &&
qemuMonitorUpdateVideoVram64Size(priv->mon, video,
"qxl") < 0)
goto error;
}
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_VIDEO_TYPE_VMVGA:
if (virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_VMWARE_SVGA_VGAMEM)) {
if (qemuMonitorUpdateVideoMemorySize(priv->mon, video,
"vmware-svga") < 0)
goto error;
}
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_VIDEO_TYPE_CIRRUS:
case VIR_DOMAIN_VIDEO_TYPE_XEN:
case VIR_DOMAIN_VIDEO_TYPE_VBOX:
case VIR_DOMAIN_VIDEO_TYPE_LAST:
break;
}
}
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
return -1;
cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
ret = virDomainObjSave(vm, driver->xmlopt, cfg->stateDir);
return ret;
error:
ignore_value(qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm));
return -1;
}
struct qemuProcessHookData {
virDomainObjPtr vm;
virQEMUDriverPtr driver;
virQEMUDriverConfigPtr cfg;
};
static int qemuProcessHook(void *data)
{
struct qemuProcessHookData *h = data;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = h->vm->privateData;
int ret = -1;
int fd;
virBitmapPtr nodeset = NULL;
virDomainNumatuneMemMode mode;
/* This method cannot use any mutexes, which are not
* protected across fork()
*/
qemuSecurityPostFork(h->driver->securityManager);
/* Some later calls want pid present */
h->vm->pid = getpid();
VIR_DEBUG("Obtaining domain lock");
/*
* Since we're going to leak the returned FD to QEMU,
* we need to make sure it gets a sensible label.
* This mildly sucks, because there could be other
* sockets the lock driver opens that we don't want
* labelled. So far we're ok though.
*/
if (qemuSecuritySetSocketLabel(h->driver->securityManager, h->vm->def) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (virDomainLockProcessStart(h->driver->lockManager,
h->cfg->uri,
h->vm,
2012-10-11 16:31:20 +00:00
/* QEMU is always paused initially */
true,
&fd) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (qemuSecurityClearSocketLabel(h->driver->securityManager, h->vm->def) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (qemuDomainUnshareNamespace(h->cfg, h->driver->securityManager, h->vm) < 0)
qemu: Spawn qemu under mount namespace Prime time. When it comes to spawning qemu process and relabelling all the devices it's going to touch, there's inherent race with other applications in the system (e.g. udev). Instead of trying convincing udev to not touch libvirt managed devices, we can create a separate mount namespace for the qemu, and mount our own /dev there. Of course this puts more work onto us as we have to maintain /dev files on each domain start and device hot(un-)plug. On the other hand, this enhances security also. From technical POV, on domain startup process the parent (libvirtd) creates: /var/lib/libvirt/qemu/$domain.dev /var/lib/libvirt/qemu/$domain.devpts The child (which is going to be qemu eventually) calls unshare() to create new mount namespace. From now on anything that child does is invisible to the parent. Child then mounts tmpfs on $domain.dev (so that it still sees original /dev from the host) and creates some devices (as explained in one of the previous patches). The devices have to be created exactly as they are in the host (including perms, seclabels, ACLs, ...). After that it moves $domain.dev mount to /dev. What's the $domain.devpts mount there for then you ask? QEMU can create PTYs for some chardevs. And historically we exposed the host ends in our domain XML allowing users to connect to them. Therefore we must preserve devpts mount to be shared with the host's one. To make this patch as small as possible, creating of devices configured for domain in question is implemented in next patches. Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
2016-11-15 10:30:18 +00:00
goto cleanup;
if (virDomainNumatuneGetMode(h->vm->def->numa, -1, &mode) == 0) {
if (mode == VIR_DOMAIN_NUMATUNE_MEM_STRICT &&
h->cfg->cgroupControllers & (1 << VIR_CGROUP_CONTROLLER_CPUSET) &&
virCgroupControllerAvailable(VIR_CGROUP_CONTROLLER_CPUSET)) {
/* Use virNuma* API iff necessary. Once set and child is exec()-ed,
* there's no way for us to change it. Rely on cgroups (if available
* and enabled in the config) rather than virNuma*. */
VIR_DEBUG("Relying on CGroups for memory binding");
} else {
nodeset = virDomainNumatuneGetNodeset(h->vm->def->numa,
priv->autoNodeset, -1);
if (virNumaSetupMemoryPolicy(mode, nodeset) < 0)
goto cleanup;
}
}
ret = 0;
cleanup:
virObjectUnref(h->cfg);
VIR_DEBUG("Hook complete ret=%d", ret);
return ret;
}
int
qemuProcessPrepareMonitorChr(virDomainChrSourceDefPtr monConfig,
const char *domainDir)
{
monConfig->type = VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_UNIX;
monConfig->data.nix.listen = true;
monConfig->data.nix.path = g_strdup_printf("%s/monitor.sock", domainDir);
return 0;
}
/*
* Precondition: vm must be locked, and a job must be active.
* This method will call {Enter,Exit}Monitor
*/
int
qemuProcessStartCPUs(virQEMUDriverPtr driver, virDomainObjPtr vm,
virDomainRunningReason reason,
qemuDomainAsyncJob asyncJob)
{
int ret = -1;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
/* Bring up netdevs before starting CPUs */
qemu: always call qemuInterfaceStartDevices() when starting CPUs The patch that added qemuInterfaceStartDevices() (upstream commit 82977058f5b1d143a355079900029e9cbfee2fe4) had an extra conditional to prevent calling it if the reason for starting the CPUs was VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING_UNPAUSED or VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING_SAVE_CANCELED. This was put in by the author as the result of a reviewer asking if it was necessary to ifup the interfaces in *all* occasions (because these were the two cases where the CPU would have already been started (and stopped) once, so the interface would already be ifup'ed). It turns out that, as long as there is no corresponding qemuInterfaceStopDevices() to ifdown the interfaces anytime the CPUs are stopped, neglecting to ifup when reason is RUNNING_UNPAUSED or RUNNING_SAVE_CANCELED doesn't cause any problems (because it just happens that the interface will have already been ifup'ed by a prior call when the CPU was previously started for some other reason). However, it also doesn't *help*, and there will soon be a qemuInterfaceStopDevices() function which *will* ifdown these interfaces when the guest CPUs are stopped, and once that is done, the interfaces will be left down in some cases when they should be up (for example, if a domain is paused and then unpaused). So, this patch is removing the condition in favor of always calling qemuInterfaeStartDevices() when the guest CPUs are started. This patch (and the aforementioned patch) resolve: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1081461
2014-12-11 19:49:13 +00:00
if (qemuInterfaceStartDevices(vm->def) < 0)
return -1;
VIR_DEBUG("Using lock state '%s'", NULLSTR(priv->lockState));
if (virDomainLockProcessResume(driver->lockManager, cfg->uri,
vm, priv->lockState) < 0) {
/* Don't free priv->lockState on error, because we need
* to make sure we have state still present if the user
* tries to resume again
*/
return -1;
}
VIR_FREE(priv->lockState);
priv->runningReason = reason;
if (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
goto release;
ret = qemuMonitorStartCPUs(priv->mon);
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
ret = -1;
if (ret < 0)
goto release;
/* The RESUME event handler will change the domain state with the reason
* saved in priv->runningReason and it will also emit corresponding domain
* lifecycle event.
*/
return ret;
release:
priv->runningReason = VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING_UNKNOWN;
if (virDomainLockProcessPause(driver->lockManager, vm, &priv->lockState) < 0)
VIR_WARN("Unable to release lease on %s", vm->def->name);
VIR_DEBUG("Preserving lock state '%s'", NULLSTR(priv->lockState));
return ret;
}
int qemuProcessStopCPUs(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
qemu: fix crash when mixing sync and async monitor jobs Currently, we attempt to run sync job and async job at the same time. It means that the monitor commands for two jobs can be run in any order. In the function qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorInternal(): if (priv->job.active == QEMU_JOB_NONE && priv->job.asyncJob) { if (qemuDomainObjBeginNestedJob(driver, obj) < 0) We check whether the caller is an async job by priv->job.active and priv->job.asynJob. But when an async job is running, and a sync job is also running at the time of the check, then priv->job.active is not QEMU_JOB_NONE. So we cannot check whether the caller is an async job in the function qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorInternal(), and must instead put the burden on the caller to tell us when an async command wants to do a nested job. Once the burden is on the caller, then only async monitor enters need to worry about whether the VM is still running; for sync monitor enter, the internal return is always 0, so lots of ignore_value can be dropped. * src/qemu/THREADS.txt: Reflect new rules. * src/qemu/qemu_domain.h (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync): New prototype. * src/qemu/qemu_process.h (qemuProcessStartCPUs) (qemuProcessStopCPUs): Add parameter. * src/qemu/qemu_migration.h (qemuMigrationToFile): Likewise. (qemuMigrationWaitForCompletion): Make static. * src/qemu/qemu_domain.c (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorInternal): Add parameter. (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync): New function. (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitor, qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorWithDriver): Update callers. * src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemuDomainSaveInternal) (qemudDomainCoreDump, doCoreDump, processWatchdogEvent) (qemudDomainSuspend, qemudDomainResume, qemuDomainSaveImageStartVM) (qemuDomainSnapshotCreateActive, qemuDomainRevertToSnapshot): Likewise. * src/qemu/qemu_process.c (qemuProcessStopCPUs) (qemuProcessFakeReboot, qemuProcessRecoverMigration) (qemuProcessRecoverJob, qemuProcessStart): Likewise. * src/qemu/qemu_migration.c (qemuMigrationToFile) (qemuMigrationWaitForCompletion, qemuMigrationUpdateJobStatus) (qemuMigrationJobStart, qemuDomainMigrateGraphicsRelocate) (doNativeMigrate, doTunnelMigrate, qemuMigrationPerformJob) (qemuMigrationPerformPhase, qemuMigrationFinish) (qemuMigrationConfirm): Likewise. * src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c: Drop unneeded ignore_value.
2011-07-28 23:18:24 +00:00
virDomainPausedReason reason,
qemuDomainAsyncJob asyncJob)
{
int ret = -1;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
VIR_FREE(priv->lockState);
priv->pausedReason = reason;
if (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = qemuMonitorStopCPUs(priv->mon);
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
ret = -1;
if (ret < 0)
goto cleanup;
/* de-activate netdevs after stopping CPUs */
ignore_value(qemuInterfaceStopDevices(vm->def));
if (priv->job.current)
ignore_value(virTimeMillisNow(&priv->job.current->stopped));
/* The STOP event handler will change the domain state with the reason
* saved in priv->pausedReason and it will also emit corresponding domain
* lifecycle event.
*/
if (virDomainLockProcessPause(driver->lockManager, vm, &priv->lockState) < 0)
VIR_WARN("Unable to release lease on %s", vm->def->name);
VIR_DEBUG("Preserving lock state '%s'", NULLSTR(priv->lockState));
cleanup:
if (ret < 0)
priv->pausedReason = VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_UNKNOWN;
return ret;
}
static void
qemuProcessNotifyNets(virDomainDefPtr def)
{
size_t i;
g_autoptr(virConnect) conn = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < def->nnets; i++) {
virDomainNetDefPtr net = def->nets[i];
2016-01-19 19:20:54 +00:00
/* keep others from trying to use the macvtap device name, but
* don't return error if this happens, since that causes the
* domain to be unceremoniously killed, which would be *very*
* impolite.
*/
util: assign tap device names using a monotonically increasing integer When creating a standard tap device, if provided with an ifname that contains "%d", rather than taking that literally as the name to use for the new device, the kernel will instead use that string as a template, and search for the lowest number that could be put in place of %d and produce an otherwise unused and unique name for the new device. For example, if there is no tap device name given in the XML, libvirt will always send "vnet%d" as the device name, and the kernel will create new devices named "vnet0", "vnet1", etc. If one of those devices is deleted, creating a "hole" in the name list, the kernel will always attempt to reuse the name in the hole first before using a name with a higher number (i.e. it finds the lowest possible unused number). The problem with this, as described in the previous patch dealing with macvtap device naming, is that it makes "immediate reuse" of a newly freed tap device name *much* more common, and in the aftermath of deleting a tap device, there is some other necessary cleanup of things which are named based on the device name (nwfilter rules, bandwidth rules, OVS switch ports, to name a few) that could end up stomping over the top of the setup of a new device of the same name for a different guest. Since the kernel "create a name based on a template" functionality for tap devices doesn't exist for macvtap, this patch for standard tap devices is a bit different from the previous patch for macvtap - in particular there was no previous "bitmap ID reservation system" or overly-complex retry loop that needed to be removed. We simply find and unused name, and pass that name on to the kernel instead of "vnet%d". This counter is also wrapped when either it gets to INT_MAX or if the full name would overflow IFNAMSIZ-1 characters. In the case of "vnet%d" and a 32 bit int, we would reach INT_MAX first, but possibly someday someone will change the name from vnet to something else. (NB: It is still possible for a user to provide their own parameterized template name (e.g. "mytap%d") in the XML, and libvirt will just pass that through to the kernel as it always has.) Signed-off-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
2020-08-24 01:20:13 +00:00
switch (virDomainNetGetActualType(net)) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_DIRECT:
virNetDevReserveName(net->ifname);
util: assign tap device names using a monotonically increasing integer When creating a standard tap device, if provided with an ifname that contains "%d", rather than taking that literally as the name to use for the new device, the kernel will instead use that string as a template, and search for the lowest number that could be put in place of %d and produce an otherwise unused and unique name for the new device. For example, if there is no tap device name given in the XML, libvirt will always send "vnet%d" as the device name, and the kernel will create new devices named "vnet0", "vnet1", etc. If one of those devices is deleted, creating a "hole" in the name list, the kernel will always attempt to reuse the name in the hole first before using a name with a higher number (i.e. it finds the lowest possible unused number). The problem with this, as described in the previous patch dealing with macvtap device naming, is that it makes "immediate reuse" of a newly freed tap device name *much* more common, and in the aftermath of deleting a tap device, there is some other necessary cleanup of things which are named based on the device name (nwfilter rules, bandwidth rules, OVS switch ports, to name a few) that could end up stomping over the top of the setup of a new device of the same name for a different guest. Since the kernel "create a name based on a template" functionality for tap devices doesn't exist for macvtap, this patch for standard tap devices is a bit different from the previous patch for macvtap - in particular there was no previous "bitmap ID reservation system" or overly-complex retry loop that needed to be removed. We simply find and unused name, and pass that name on to the kernel instead of "vnet%d". This counter is also wrapped when either it gets to INT_MAX or if the full name would overflow IFNAMSIZ-1 characters. In the case of "vnet%d" and a 32 bit int, we would reach INT_MAX first, but possibly someday someone will change the name from vnet to something else. (NB: It is still possible for a user to provide their own parameterized template name (e.g. "mytap%d") in the XML, and libvirt will just pass that through to the kernel as it always has.) Signed-off-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
2020-08-24 01:20:13 +00:00
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_BRIDGE:
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_NETWORK:
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_ETHERNET:
virNetDevReserveName(net->ifname);
util: assign tap device names using a monotonically increasing integer When creating a standard tap device, if provided with an ifname that contains "%d", rather than taking that literally as the name to use for the new device, the kernel will instead use that string as a template, and search for the lowest number that could be put in place of %d and produce an otherwise unused and unique name for the new device. For example, if there is no tap device name given in the XML, libvirt will always send "vnet%d" as the device name, and the kernel will create new devices named "vnet0", "vnet1", etc. If one of those devices is deleted, creating a "hole" in the name list, the kernel will always attempt to reuse the name in the hole first before using a name with a higher number (i.e. it finds the lowest possible unused number). The problem with this, as described in the previous patch dealing with macvtap device naming, is that it makes "immediate reuse" of a newly freed tap device name *much* more common, and in the aftermath of deleting a tap device, there is some other necessary cleanup of things which are named based on the device name (nwfilter rules, bandwidth rules, OVS switch ports, to name a few) that could end up stomping over the top of the setup of a new device of the same name for a different guest. Since the kernel "create a name based on a template" functionality for tap devices doesn't exist for macvtap, this patch for standard tap devices is a bit different from the previous patch for macvtap - in particular there was no previous "bitmap ID reservation system" or overly-complex retry loop that needed to be removed. We simply find and unused name, and pass that name on to the kernel instead of "vnet%d". This counter is also wrapped when either it gets to INT_MAX or if the full name would overflow IFNAMSIZ-1 characters. In the case of "vnet%d" and a 32 bit int, we would reach INT_MAX first, but possibly someday someone will change the name from vnet to something else. (NB: It is still possible for a user to provide their own parameterized template name (e.g. "mytap%d") in the XML, and libvirt will just pass that through to the kernel as it always has.) Signed-off-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
2020-08-24 01:20:13 +00:00
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_USER:
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_VHOSTUSER:
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_SERVER:
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_CLIENT:
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_MCAST:
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_INTERNAL:
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_HOSTDEV:
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_UDP:
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_VDPA:
util: assign tap device names using a monotonically increasing integer When creating a standard tap device, if provided with an ifname that contains "%d", rather than taking that literally as the name to use for the new device, the kernel will instead use that string as a template, and search for the lowest number that could be put in place of %d and produce an otherwise unused and unique name for the new device. For example, if there is no tap device name given in the XML, libvirt will always send "vnet%d" as the device name, and the kernel will create new devices named "vnet0", "vnet1", etc. If one of those devices is deleted, creating a "hole" in the name list, the kernel will always attempt to reuse the name in the hole first before using a name with a higher number (i.e. it finds the lowest possible unused number). The problem with this, as described in the previous patch dealing with macvtap device naming, is that it makes "immediate reuse" of a newly freed tap device name *much* more common, and in the aftermath of deleting a tap device, there is some other necessary cleanup of things which are named based on the device name (nwfilter rules, bandwidth rules, OVS switch ports, to name a few) that could end up stomping over the top of the setup of a new device of the same name for a different guest. Since the kernel "create a name based on a template" functionality for tap devices doesn't exist for macvtap, this patch for standard tap devices is a bit different from the previous patch for macvtap - in particular there was no previous "bitmap ID reservation system" or overly-complex retry loop that needed to be removed. We simply find and unused name, and pass that name on to the kernel instead of "vnet%d". This counter is also wrapped when either it gets to INT_MAX or if the full name would overflow IFNAMSIZ-1 characters. In the case of "vnet%d" and a 32 bit int, we would reach INT_MAX first, but possibly someday someone will change the name from vnet to something else. (NB: It is still possible for a user to provide their own parameterized template name (e.g. "mytap%d") in the XML, and libvirt will just pass that through to the kernel as it always has.) Signed-off-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
2020-08-24 01:20:13 +00:00
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_LAST:
break;
}
2016-01-19 19:20:54 +00:00
if (net->type == VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_NETWORK && !conn)
conn = virGetConnectNetwork();
virDomainNetNotifyActualDevice(conn, def, net);
}
}
/* Attempt to instantiate the filters. Ignore failures because it's
* possible that someone deleted a filter binding and the associated
* filter while the guest was running and we don't want that action
* to cause failure to keep the guest running during the reconnection
* processing. Nor do we necessarily want other failures to do the
* same. We'll just log the error conditions other than of course
* ignoreExists possibility (e.g. the true flag) */
static void
qemuProcessFiltersInstantiate(virDomainDefPtr def)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < def->nnets; i++) {
virDomainNetDefPtr net = def->nets[i];
if ((net->filter) && (net->ifname)) {
if (virDomainConfNWFilterInstantiate(def->name, def->uuid, net,
true) < 0) {
VIR_WARN("filter '%s' instantiation for '%s' failed '%s'",
net->filter, net->ifname, virGetLastErrorMessage());
virResetLastError();
}
}
}
}
static int
qemuProcessUpdateState(virQEMUDriverPtr driver, virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
virDomainState state;
virDomainPausedReason reason;
virDomainState newState = VIR_DOMAIN_NOSTATE;
int oldReason;
int newReason;
bool running;
g_autofree char *msg = NULL;
int ret;
qemuDomainObjEnterMonitor(driver, vm);
ret = qemuMonitorGetStatus(priv->mon, &running, &reason);
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
return -1;
if (ret < 0)
return -1;
state = virDomainObjGetState(vm, &oldReason);
if (running &&
(state == VIR_DOMAIN_SHUTOFF ||
(state == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED &&
oldReason == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_STARTING_UP))) {
newState = VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING;
newReason = VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING_BOOTED;
msg = g_strdup("finished booting");
} else if (state == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED && running) {
newState = VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING;
newReason = VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING_UNPAUSED;
msg = g_strdup("was unpaused");
} else if (state == VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING && !running) {
if (reason == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_SHUTTING_DOWN) {
newState = VIR_DOMAIN_SHUTDOWN;
newReason = VIR_DOMAIN_SHUTDOWN_UNKNOWN;
msg = g_strdup("shutdown");
} else if (reason == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_CRASHED) {
newState = VIR_DOMAIN_CRASHED;
newReason = VIR_DOMAIN_CRASHED_PANICKED;
msg = g_strdup("crashed");
} else {
newState = VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED;
newReason = reason;
msg = g_strdup_printf("was paused (%s)",
virDomainPausedReasonTypeToString(reason));
}
}
if (newState != VIR_DOMAIN_NOSTATE) {
VIR_DEBUG("Domain %s %s while its monitor was disconnected;"
" changing state to %s (%s)",
vm->def->name,
NULLSTR(msg),
virDomainStateTypeToString(newState),
virDomainStateReasonToString(newState, newReason));
virDomainObjSetState(vm, newState, newReason);
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessRecoverMigrationIn(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const qemuDomainJobObj *job,
virDomainState state,
int reason)
{
qemuDomainJobPrivatePtr jobPriv = job->privateData;
bool postcopy = (state == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED &&
reason == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_POSTCOPY_FAILED) ||
(state == VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING &&
reason == VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING_POSTCOPY);
switch ((qemuMigrationJobPhase) job->phase) {
case QEMU_MIGRATION_PHASE_NONE:
case QEMU_MIGRATION_PHASE_PERFORM2:
case QEMU_MIGRATION_PHASE_BEGIN3:
case QEMU_MIGRATION_PHASE_PERFORM3:
case QEMU_MIGRATION_PHASE_PERFORM3_DONE:
case QEMU_MIGRATION_PHASE_CONFIRM3_CANCELLED:
case QEMU_MIGRATION_PHASE_CONFIRM3:
case QEMU_MIGRATION_PHASE_LAST:
/* N/A for incoming migration */
break;
case QEMU_MIGRATION_PHASE_PREPARE:
VIR_DEBUG("Killing unfinished incoming migration for domain %s",
vm->def->name);
return -1;
case QEMU_MIGRATION_PHASE_FINISH2:
/* source domain is already killed so let's just resume the domain
* and hope we are all set */
VIR_DEBUG("Incoming migration finished, resuming domain %s",
vm->def->name);
if (qemuProcessStartCPUs(driver, vm,
VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING_MIGRATED,
QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE) < 0) {
VIR_WARN("Could not resume domain %s", vm->def->name);
}
break;
case QEMU_MIGRATION_PHASE_FINISH3:
/* migration finished, we started resuming the domain but didn't
* confirm success or failure yet; killing it seems safest unless
* we already started guest CPUs or we were in post-copy mode */
if (postcopy) {
qemuMigrationAnyPostcopyFailed(driver, vm);
} else if (state != VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING) {
VIR_DEBUG("Killing migrated domain %s", vm->def->name);
return -1;
}
break;
}
qemuMigrationParamsReset(driver, vm, QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE,
jobPriv->migParams, job->apiFlags);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessRecoverMigrationOut(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const qemuDomainJobObj *job,
virDomainState state,
int reason,
unsigned int *stopFlags)
{
qemuDomainJobPrivatePtr jobPriv = job->privateData;
bool postcopy = state == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED &&
(reason == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_POSTCOPY ||
reason == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_POSTCOPY_FAILED);
bool resume = false;
switch ((qemuMigrationJobPhase) job->phase) {
case QEMU_MIGRATION_PHASE_NONE:
case QEMU_MIGRATION_PHASE_PREPARE:
case QEMU_MIGRATION_PHASE_FINISH2:
case QEMU_MIGRATION_PHASE_FINISH3:
case QEMU_MIGRATION_PHASE_LAST:
/* N/A for outgoing migration */
break;
case QEMU_MIGRATION_PHASE_BEGIN3:
/* nothing happened so far, just forget we were about to migrate the
* domain */
break;
case QEMU_MIGRATION_PHASE_PERFORM2:
case QEMU_MIGRATION_PHASE_PERFORM3:
/* migration is still in progress, let's cancel it and resume the
* domain; however we can only do that before migration enters
* post-copy mode
*/
if (postcopy) {
qemuMigrationAnyPostcopyFailed(driver, vm);
} else {
VIR_DEBUG("Cancelling unfinished migration of domain %s",
vm->def->name);
if (qemuMigrationSrcCancel(driver, vm) < 0) {
VIR_WARN("Could not cancel ongoing migration of domain %s",
vm->def->name);
}
resume = true;
}
break;
case QEMU_MIGRATION_PHASE_PERFORM3_DONE:
/* migration finished but we didn't have a chance to get the result
* of Finish3 step; third party needs to check what to do next; in
* post-copy mode we can use PAUSED_POSTCOPY_FAILED state for this
*/
if (postcopy)
qemuMigrationAnyPostcopyFailed(driver, vm);
break;
case QEMU_MIGRATION_PHASE_CONFIRM3_CANCELLED:
/* Finish3 failed, we need to resume the domain, but once we enter
* post-copy mode there's no way back, so let's just mark the domain
* as broken in that case
*/
if (postcopy) {
qemuMigrationAnyPostcopyFailed(driver, vm);
} else {
VIR_DEBUG("Resuming domain %s after failed migration",
vm->def->name);
resume = true;
}
break;
case QEMU_MIGRATION_PHASE_CONFIRM3:
/* migration completed, we need to kill the domain here */
*stopFlags |= VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_STOP_MIGRATED;
return -1;
}
if (resume) {
/* resume the domain but only if it was paused as a result of
* migration
*/
if (state == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED &&
(reason == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_MIGRATION ||
reason == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_UNKNOWN)) {
if (qemuProcessStartCPUs(driver, vm,
VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING_MIGRATION_CANCELED,
QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE) < 0) {
VIR_WARN("Could not resume domain %s", vm->def->name);
}
}
}
qemuMigrationParamsReset(driver, vm, QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE,
jobPriv->migParams, job->apiFlags);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessRecoverJob(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const qemuDomainJobObj *job,
unsigned int *stopFlags)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
virDomainState state;
int reason;
unsigned long long now;
state = virDomainObjGetState(vm, &reason);
switch (job->asyncJob) {
case QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_MIGRATION_OUT:
if (qemuProcessRecoverMigrationOut(driver, vm, job,
state, reason, stopFlags) < 0)
return -1;
break;
case QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_MIGRATION_IN:
if (qemuProcessRecoverMigrationIn(driver, vm, job,
state, reason) < 0)
return -1;
break;
case QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_SAVE:
case QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_DUMP:
case QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_SNAPSHOT:
qemu: fix crash when mixing sync and async monitor jobs Currently, we attempt to run sync job and async job at the same time. It means that the monitor commands for two jobs can be run in any order. In the function qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorInternal(): if (priv->job.active == QEMU_JOB_NONE && priv->job.asyncJob) { if (qemuDomainObjBeginNestedJob(driver, obj) < 0) We check whether the caller is an async job by priv->job.active and priv->job.asynJob. But when an async job is running, and a sync job is also running at the time of the check, then priv->job.active is not QEMU_JOB_NONE. So we cannot check whether the caller is an async job in the function qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorInternal(), and must instead put the burden on the caller to tell us when an async command wants to do a nested job. Once the burden is on the caller, then only async monitor enters need to worry about whether the VM is still running; for sync monitor enter, the internal return is always 0, so lots of ignore_value can be dropped. * src/qemu/THREADS.txt: Reflect new rules. * src/qemu/qemu_domain.h (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync): New prototype. * src/qemu/qemu_process.h (qemuProcessStartCPUs) (qemuProcessStopCPUs): Add parameter. * src/qemu/qemu_migration.h (qemuMigrationToFile): Likewise. (qemuMigrationWaitForCompletion): Make static. * src/qemu/qemu_domain.c (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorInternal): Add parameter. (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync): New function. (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitor, qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorWithDriver): Update callers. * src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemuDomainSaveInternal) (qemudDomainCoreDump, doCoreDump, processWatchdogEvent) (qemudDomainSuspend, qemudDomainResume, qemuDomainSaveImageStartVM) (qemuDomainSnapshotCreateActive, qemuDomainRevertToSnapshot): Likewise. * src/qemu/qemu_process.c (qemuProcessStopCPUs) (qemuProcessFakeReboot, qemuProcessRecoverMigration) (qemuProcessRecoverJob, qemuProcessStart): Likewise. * src/qemu/qemu_migration.c (qemuMigrationToFile) (qemuMigrationWaitForCompletion, qemuMigrationUpdateJobStatus) (qemuMigrationJobStart, qemuDomainMigrateGraphicsRelocate) (doNativeMigrate, doTunnelMigrate, qemuMigrationPerformJob) (qemuMigrationPerformPhase, qemuMigrationFinish) (qemuMigrationConfirm): Likewise. * src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c: Drop unneeded ignore_value.
2011-07-28 23:18:24 +00:00
qemuDomainObjEnterMonitor(driver, vm);
ignore_value(qemuMonitorMigrateCancel(priv->mon));
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
return -1;
/* resume the domain but only if it was paused as a result of
* running a migration-to-file operation. Although we are
* recovering an async job, this function is run at startup
* and must resume things using sync monitor connections. */
if (state == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED &&
((job->asyncJob == QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_DUMP &&
reason == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_DUMP) ||
(job->asyncJob == QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_SAVE &&
reason == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_SAVE) ||
(job->asyncJob == QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_SNAPSHOT &&
(reason == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_SNAPSHOT ||
reason == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_MIGRATION)) ||
reason == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_UNKNOWN)) {
if (qemuProcessStartCPUs(driver, vm,
VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING_SAVE_CANCELED,
QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE) < 0) {
VIR_WARN("Could not resume domain '%s' after migration to file",
vm->def->name);
}
}
break;
case QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_START:
/* Already handled in VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_STARTING_UP check. */
break;
case QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_BACKUP:
ignore_value(virTimeMillisNow(&now));
/* Restore the config of the async job which is not persisted */
priv->jobs_queued++;
priv->job.asyncJob = QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_BACKUP;
priv->job.asyncOwnerAPI = g_strdup(virThreadJobGet());
priv->job.asyncStarted = now;
qemuDomainObjSetAsyncJobMask(vm, (QEMU_JOB_DEFAULT_MASK |
JOB_MASK(QEMU_JOB_SUSPEND) |
JOB_MASK(QEMU_JOB_MODIFY)));
/* We reset the job parameters for backup so that the job will look
* active. This is possible because we are able to recover the state
* of blockjobs and also the backup job allows all sub-job types */
priv->job.current = g_new0(qemuDomainJobInfo, 1);
priv->job.current->operation = VIR_DOMAIN_JOB_OPERATION_BACKUP;
priv->job.current->statsType = QEMU_DOMAIN_JOB_STATS_TYPE_BACKUP;
priv->job.current->status = QEMU_DOMAIN_JOB_STATUS_ACTIVE;
priv->job.current->started = now;
break;
case QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE:
case QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_LAST:
break;
}
if (!virDomainObjIsActive(vm))
return -1;
/* In case any special handling is added for job type that has been ignored
* before, QEMU_DOMAIN_TRACK_JOBS (from qemu_domain.h) needs to be updated
* for the job to be properly tracked in domain state XML.
*/
switch (job->active) {
case QEMU_JOB_QUERY:
/* harmless */
break;
case QEMU_JOB_DESTROY:
VIR_DEBUG("Domain %s should have already been destroyed",
vm->def->name);
return -1;
case QEMU_JOB_SUSPEND:
/* mostly harmless */
break;
case QEMU_JOB_MODIFY:
/* XXX depending on the command we may be in an inconsistent state and
* we should probably fall back to "monitor error" state and refuse to
*/
break;
case QEMU_JOB_MIGRATION_OP:
case QEMU_JOB_ABORT:
case QEMU_JOB_ASYNC:
case QEMU_JOB_ASYNC_NESTED:
/* async job was already handled above */
case QEMU_JOB_NONE:
case QEMU_JOB_LAST:
break;
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessUpdateDevices(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
virDomainDeviceDef dev;
g_auto(GStrv) old = g_steal_pointer(&priv->qemuDevices);
GStrv tmp;
if (qemuDomainUpdateDeviceList(driver, vm, QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE) < 0)
return -1;
if (!old)
return 0;
for (tmp = old; *tmp; tmp++) {
if (!g_strv_contains((const char **) priv->qemuDevices, *tmp) &&
virDomainDefFindDevice(vm->def, *tmp, &dev, false) == 0 &&
qemuDomainRemoveDevice(driver, vm, &dev))
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuDomainPerfRestart(virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
size_t i;
virDomainDefPtr def = vm->def;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
if (!(priv->perf = virPerfNew()))
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < VIR_PERF_EVENT_LAST; i++) {
if (def->perf.events[i] &&
def->perf.events[i] == VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_YES) {
/* Failure to re-enable the perf event should not be fatal */
if (virPerfEventEnable(priv->perf, i, vm->pid) < 0)
def->perf.events[i] = VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_NO;
}
}
return 0;
}
static void
qemuProcessReconnectCheckMemAliasOrderMismatch(virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
size_t i;
int aliasidx;
virDomainDefPtr def = vm->def;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
if (!virDomainDefHasMemoryHotplug(def) || def->nmems == 0)
return;
for (i = 0; i < def->nmems; i++) {
aliasidx = qemuDomainDeviceAliasIndex(&def->mems[i]->info, "dimm");
if (def->mems[i]->info.addr.dimm.slot != aliasidx) {
priv->memAliasOrderMismatch = true;
break;
}
}
}
static bool
qemuProcessNeedHugepagesPath(virDomainDefPtr def,
virDomainMemoryDefPtr mem)
{
const long system_pagesize = virGetSystemPageSizeKB();
size_t i;
if (def->mem.source == VIR_DOMAIN_MEMORY_SOURCE_FILE)
return true;
for (i = 0; i < def->mem.nhugepages; i++) {
if (def->mem.hugepages[i].size != system_pagesize)
return true;
}
for (i = 0; i < def->nmems; i++) {
if (def->mems[i]->model == VIR_DOMAIN_MEMORY_MODEL_DIMM &&
def->mems[i]->pagesize &&
def->mems[i]->pagesize != system_pagesize)
return true;
}
if (mem &&
mem->model == VIR_DOMAIN_MEMORY_MODEL_DIMM &&
mem->pagesize &&
mem->pagesize != system_pagesize)
return true;
return false;
}
static bool
qemuProcessNeedMemoryBackingPath(virDomainDefPtr def,
virDomainMemoryDefPtr mem)
{
size_t i;
size_t numaNodes;
if (def->mem.source == VIR_DOMAIN_MEMORY_SOURCE_FILE ||
def->mem.access != VIR_DOMAIN_MEMORY_ACCESS_DEFAULT)
return true;
numaNodes = virDomainNumaGetNodeCount(def->numa);
for (i = 0; i < numaNodes; i++) {
if (virDomainNumaGetNodeMemoryAccessMode(def->numa, i)
!= VIR_DOMAIN_MEMORY_ACCESS_DEFAULT)
return true;
}
if (mem &&
mem->model == VIR_DOMAIN_MEMORY_MODEL_DIMM &&
(mem->access != VIR_DOMAIN_MEMORY_ACCESS_DEFAULT ||
(mem->targetNode >= 0 &&
virDomainNumaGetNodeMemoryAccessMode(def->numa, mem->targetNode)
!= VIR_DOMAIN_MEMORY_ACCESS_DEFAULT)))
return true;
return false;
}
static int
qemuProcessBuildDestroyMemoryPathsImpl(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *path,
bool build)
{
if (build) {
if (virFileExists(path))
return 0;
if (g_mkdir_with_parents(path, 0700) < 0) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("Unable to create %s"),
path);
return -1;
}
if (qemuSecurityDomainSetPathLabel(driver, vm, path, true) < 0)
return -1;
} else {
if (virFileDeleteTree(path) < 0)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int
qemuProcessBuildDestroyMemoryPaths(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
virDomainMemoryDefPtr mem,
bool build)
{
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
size_t i;
bool shouldBuildHP = false;
bool shouldBuildMB = false;
if (build) {
shouldBuildHP = qemuProcessNeedHugepagesPath(vm->def, mem);
shouldBuildMB = qemuProcessNeedMemoryBackingPath(vm->def, mem);
}
if (!build || shouldBuildHP) {
for (i = 0; i < cfg->nhugetlbfs; i++) {
g_autofree char *path = NULL;
path = qemuGetDomainHugepagePath(driver, vm->def, &cfg->hugetlbfs[i]);
if (!path)
return -1;
if (qemuProcessBuildDestroyMemoryPathsImpl(driver, vm,
path, build) < 0)
return -1;
}
}
if (!build || shouldBuildMB) {
g_autofree char *path = NULL;
if (qemuGetMemoryBackingDomainPath(driver, vm->def, &path) < 0)
return -1;
if (qemuProcessBuildDestroyMemoryPathsImpl(driver, vm,
path, build) < 0)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int
qemuProcessDestroyMemoryBackingPath(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
virDomainMemoryDefPtr mem)
{
g_autofree char *path = NULL;
if (qemuGetMemoryBackingPath(driver, vm->def, mem->info.alias, &path) < 0)
return -1;
if (unlink(path) < 0 &&
errno != ENOENT) {
virReportSystemError(errno, _("Unable to remove %s"), path);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessVNCAllocatePorts(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainGraphicsDefPtr graphics,
bool allocate)
{
unsigned short port;
if (!allocate) {
if (graphics->data.vnc.autoport)
graphics->data.vnc.port = 5900;
return 0;
}
if (graphics->data.vnc.autoport) {
if (virPortAllocatorAcquire(driver->remotePorts, &port) < 0)
return -1;
graphics->data.vnc.port = port;
}
if (graphics->data.vnc.websocket == -1) {
if (virPortAllocatorAcquire(driver->webSocketPorts, &port) < 0)
return -1;
graphics->data.vnc.websocket = port;
graphics->data.vnc.websocketGenerated = true;
}
return 0;
}
qemu: Create domain master key Add a masterKey and masterKeyLen to _qemuDomainObjPrivate to store a random domain master key and its length in order to support the ability to encrypt/decrypt sensitive data shared between libvirt and qemu. The key will be base64 encoded and written to a file to be used by the command line building code to share with qemu. New API's from this patch: qemuDomainGetMasterKeyFilePath: Return a path to where the key is located qemuDomainWriteMasterKeyFile: (private) Open (create/trunc) the masterKey path and write the masterKey qemuDomainMasterKeyReadFile: Using the master key path, open/read the file, and store the masterKey and masterKeyLen. Expected use only from qemuProcessReconnect qemuDomainGenerateRandomKey: (private) Generate a random key using available algorithms The key is generated either from the gnutls_rnd function if it exists or a less cryptographically strong mechanism using virGenerateRandomBytes qemuDomainMasterKeyRemove: Remove traces of the master key, remove the *KeyFilePath qemuDomainMasterKeyCreate: Generate the domain master key and save the key in the location returned by qemuDomainGetMasterKeyFilePath. This API will first ensure the QEMU_CAPS_OBJECT_SECRET is set in the capabilities. If not, then there's no need to generate the secret or file. The creation of the key will be attempted from qemuProcessPrepareHost once the libDir directory structure exists. The removal of the key will handled from qemuProcessStop just prior to deleting the libDir tree. Since the key will not be written out to the domain object XML file, the qemuProcessReconnect will read the saved file and restore the masterKey and masterKeyLen.
2016-03-29 22:22:46 +00:00
static int
qemuProcessSPICEAllocatePorts(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainGraphicsDefPtr graphics,
bool allocate)
{
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
unsigned short port = 0;
unsigned short tlsPort;
size_t i;
int defaultMode = graphics->data.spice.defaultMode;
bool needTLSPort = false;
bool needPort = false;
if (graphics->data.spice.autoport) {
/* check if tlsPort or port need allocation */
for (i = 0; i < VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_SPICE_CHANNEL_LAST; i++) {
switch (graphics->data.spice.channels[i]) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_SPICE_CHANNEL_MODE_SECURE:
needTLSPort = true;
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_SPICE_CHANNEL_MODE_INSECURE:
needPort = true;
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_SPICE_CHANNEL_MODE_ANY:
/* default mode will be used */
break;
}
}
switch (defaultMode) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_SPICE_CHANNEL_MODE_SECURE:
needTLSPort = true;
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_SPICE_CHANNEL_MODE_INSECURE:
needPort = true;
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_SPICE_CHANNEL_MODE_ANY:
if (cfg->spiceTLS)
needTLSPort = true;
needPort = true;
break;
}
}
if (!allocate) {
if (needPort || graphics->data.spice.port == -1)
graphics->data.spice.port = 5901;
if (needTLSPort || graphics->data.spice.tlsPort == -1)
graphics->data.spice.tlsPort = 5902;
return 0;
}
if (needPort || graphics->data.spice.port == -1) {
if (virPortAllocatorAcquire(driver->remotePorts, &port) < 0)
return -1;
graphics->data.spice.port = port;
if (!graphics->data.spice.autoport)
graphics->data.spice.portReserved = true;
}
if (needTLSPort || graphics->data.spice.tlsPort == -1) {
if (!cfg->spiceTLS) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
_("Auto allocation of spice TLS port requested "
"but spice TLS is disabled in qemu.conf"));
return -1;
}
if (virPortAllocatorAcquire(driver->remotePorts, &tlsPort) < 0)
return -1;
graphics->data.spice.tlsPort = tlsPort;
if (!graphics->data.spice.autoport)
graphics->data.spice.tlsPortReserved = true;
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessVerifyHypervFeatures(virDomainDefPtr def,
virCPUDataPtr cpu)
{
size_t i;
int rc;
for (i = 0; i < VIR_DOMAIN_HYPERV_LAST; i++) {
g_autofree char *cpuFeature = NULL;
/* always supported string property */
if (i == VIR_DOMAIN_HYPERV_VENDOR_ID ||
i == VIR_DOMAIN_HYPERV_SPINLOCKS)
continue;
if (def->hyperv_features[i] != VIR_TRISTATE_SWITCH_ON)
continue;
cpuFeature = g_strdup_printf("hv-%s", virDomainHypervTypeToString(i));
rc = virCPUDataCheckFeature(cpu, cpuFeature);
if (rc < 0) {
return -1;
} else if (rc == 1) {
if (i == VIR_DOMAIN_HYPERV_STIMER) {
if (def->hyperv_stimer_direct != VIR_TRISTATE_SWITCH_ON)
continue;
rc = virCPUDataCheckFeature(cpu, VIR_CPU_x86_HV_STIMER_DIRECT);
if (rc < 0)
return -1;
else if (rc == 1)
continue;
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED,
_("host doesn't support hyperv stimer '%s' feature"),
"direct");
return -1;
}
continue;
}
switch ((virDomainHyperv) i) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_HYPERV_RELAXED:
case VIR_DOMAIN_HYPERV_VAPIC:
VIR_WARN("host doesn't support hyperv '%s' feature",
virDomainHypervTypeToString(i));
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_HYPERV_VPINDEX:
case VIR_DOMAIN_HYPERV_RUNTIME:
case VIR_DOMAIN_HYPERV_SYNIC:
case VIR_DOMAIN_HYPERV_STIMER:
case VIR_DOMAIN_HYPERV_RESET:
case VIR_DOMAIN_HYPERV_FREQUENCIES:
case VIR_DOMAIN_HYPERV_REENLIGHTENMENT:
case VIR_DOMAIN_HYPERV_TLBFLUSH:
case VIR_DOMAIN_HYPERV_IPI:
case VIR_DOMAIN_HYPERV_EVMCS:
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED,
_("host doesn't support hyperv '%s' feature"),
virDomainHypervTypeToString(i));
return -1;
/* coverity[dead_error_begin] */
case VIR_DOMAIN_HYPERV_SPINLOCKS:
case VIR_DOMAIN_HYPERV_VENDOR_ID:
case VIR_DOMAIN_HYPERV_LAST:
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessVerifyKVMFeatures(virDomainDefPtr def,
virCPUDataPtr cpu)
{
int rc = 0;
if (def->features[VIR_DOMAIN_FEATURE_PVSPINLOCK] != VIR_TRISTATE_SWITCH_ON)
return 0;
rc = virCPUDataCheckFeature(cpu, VIR_CPU_x86_KVM_PV_UNHALT);
if (rc <= 0) {
if (rc == 0)
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
_("host doesn't support paravirtual spinlocks"));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessVerifyCPUFeatures(virDomainDefPtr def,
virCPUDataPtr cpu)
{
int rc;
rc = virCPUCheckFeature(def->os.arch, def->cpu, "invtsc");
if (rc < 0) {
return -1;
} else if (rc == 1) {
rc = virCPUDataCheckFeature(cpu, "invtsc");
if (rc <= 0) {
if (rc == 0) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
_("host doesn't support invariant TSC"));
}
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static const char *
qemuProcessTranslateCPUFeatures(const char *name,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps = opaque;
return virQEMUCapsCPUFeatureFromQEMU(qemuCaps, name);
}
static int
qemuProcessFetchGuestCPU(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
qemuDomainAsyncJob asyncJob,
virCPUDataPtr *enabled,
virCPUDataPtr *disabled)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
g_autoptr(virCPUData) dataEnabled = NULL;
g_autoptr(virCPUData) dataDisabled = NULL;
bool generic;
int rc;
*enabled = NULL;
*disabled = NULL;
generic = virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_CPU_UNAVAILABLE_FEATURES);
if (!generic && !ARCH_IS_X86(vm->def->os.arch))
return 0;
if (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
return -1;
if (generic) {
rc = qemuMonitorGetGuestCPU(priv->mon,
vm->def->os.arch,
qemuProcessTranslateCPUFeatures, priv->qemuCaps,
&dataEnabled, &dataDisabled);
} else {
rc = qemuMonitorGetGuestCPUx86(priv->mon, &dataEnabled, &dataDisabled);
}
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
return -1;
if (rc == -1)
return -1;
*enabled = g_steal_pointer(&dataEnabled);
*disabled = g_steal_pointer(&dataDisabled);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessVerifyCPU(virDomainObjPtr vm,
virCPUDataPtr cpu)
{
virDomainDefPtr def = vm->def;
if (!cpu)
return 0;
if (qemuProcessVerifyKVMFeatures(def, cpu) < 0 ||
qemuProcessVerifyHypervFeatures(def, cpu) < 0)
return -1;
if (!def->cpu ||
(def->cpu->mode == VIR_CPU_MODE_CUSTOM &&
!def->cpu->model))
return 0;
if (qemuProcessVerifyCPUFeatures(def, cpu) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessUpdateLiveGuestCPU(virDomainObjPtr vm,
virCPUDataPtr enabled,
virCPUDataPtr disabled)
{
virDomainDefPtr def = vm->def;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
g_autoptr(virCPUDef) orig = NULL;
int rc;
if (!enabled)
return 0;
if (!def->cpu ||
(def->cpu->mode == VIR_CPU_MODE_CUSTOM &&
!def->cpu->model))
return 0;
if (!(orig = virCPUDefCopy(def->cpu)))
return -1;
if ((rc = virCPUUpdateLive(def->os.arch, def->cpu, enabled, disabled)) < 0) {
return -1;
} else if (rc == 0) {
/* Store the original CPU in priv if QEMU changed it and we didn't
* get the original CPU via migration, restore, or snapshot revert.
*/
if (!priv->origCPU && !virCPUDefIsEqual(def->cpu, orig, false))
priv->origCPU = g_steal_pointer(&orig);
def->cpu->check = VIR_CPU_CHECK_FULL;
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessUpdateAndVerifyCPU(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
qemuDomainAsyncJob asyncJob)
{
virCPUDataPtr cpu = NULL;
virCPUDataPtr disabled = NULL;
int ret = -1;
if (qemuProcessFetchGuestCPU(driver, vm, asyncJob, &cpu, &disabled) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (qemuProcessVerifyCPU(vm, cpu) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (qemuProcessUpdateLiveGuestCPU(vm, cpu, disabled) < 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = 0;
cleanup:
virCPUDataFree(cpu);
virCPUDataFree(disabled);
return ret;
}
static int
qemuProcessFetchCPUDefinitions(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
qemuDomainAsyncJob asyncJob,
virDomainCapsCPUModelsPtr *cpuModels)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
g_autoptr(virDomainCapsCPUModels) models = NULL;
int rc;
if (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
return -1;
rc = virQEMUCapsFetchCPUModels(priv->mon, vm->def->os.arch, &models);
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0 || rc < 0)
return -1;
*cpuModels = g_steal_pointer(&models);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessUpdateCPU(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
qemuDomainAsyncJob asyncJob)
{
g_autoptr(virCPUData) cpu = NULL;
g_autoptr(virCPUData) disabled = NULL;
g_autoptr(virDomainCapsCPUModels) models = NULL;
/* The host CPU model comes from host caps rather than QEMU caps so
* fallback must be allowed no matter what the user specified in the XML.
*/
vm->def->cpu->fallback = VIR_CPU_FALLBACK_ALLOW;
if (qemuProcessFetchGuestCPU(driver, vm, asyncJob, &cpu, &disabled) < 0)
return -1;
if (qemuProcessUpdateLiveGuestCPU(vm, cpu, disabled) < 0)
return -1;
if (qemuProcessFetchCPUDefinitions(driver, vm, asyncJob, &models) < 0 ||
virCPUTranslate(vm->def->os.arch, vm->def->cpu, models) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
static int
qemuPrepareNVRAM(virQEMUDriverConfigPtr cfg,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
int ret = -1;
int srcFD = -1;
int dstFD = -1;
virDomainLoaderDefPtr loader = vm->def->os.loader;
bool created = false;
const char *master_nvram_path;
ssize_t r;
if (!loader || !loader->nvram || virFileExists(loader->nvram))
return 0;
master_nvram_path = loader->templt;
if (!loader->templt) {
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < cfg->nfirmwares; i++) {
if (STREQ(cfg->firmwares[i]->name, loader->path)) {
master_nvram_path = cfg->firmwares[i]->nvram;
break;
}
}
}
if (!master_nvram_path) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_FAILED,
_("unable to find any master var store for "
"loader: %s"), loader->path);
goto cleanup;
}
if ((srcFD = virFileOpenAs(master_nvram_path, O_RDONLY,
0, -1, -1, 0)) < 0) {
virReportSystemError(-srcFD,
_("Failed to open file '%s'"),
master_nvram_path);
goto cleanup;
}
if ((dstFD = virFileOpenAs(loader->nvram,
O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL,
S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR,
cfg->user, cfg->group, 0)) < 0) {
virReportSystemError(-dstFD,
_("Failed to create file '%s'"),
loader->nvram);
goto cleanup;
}
created = true;
do {
char buf[1024];
if ((r = saferead(srcFD, buf, sizeof(buf))) < 0) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("Unable to read from file '%s'"),
master_nvram_path);
goto cleanup;
}
if (safewrite(dstFD, buf, r) < 0) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("Unable to write to file '%s'"),
loader->nvram);
goto cleanup;
}
} while (r);
if (VIR_CLOSE(srcFD) < 0) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("Unable to close file '%s'"),
master_nvram_path);
goto cleanup;
}
if (VIR_CLOSE(dstFD) < 0) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("Unable to close file '%s'"),
loader->nvram);
goto cleanup;
}
ret = 0;
cleanup:
/* We successfully generated the nvram path, but failed to
* copy the file content. Roll back. */
if (ret < 0) {
if (created)
unlink(loader->nvram);
}
VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(srcFD);
VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(dstFD);
return ret;
}
static void
qemuLogOperation(virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *msg,
virCommandPtr cmd,
qemuDomainLogContextPtr logCtxt)
{
g_autofree char *timestamp = NULL;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
int qemuVersion = virQEMUCapsGetVersion(priv->qemuCaps);
const char *package = virQEMUCapsGetPackage(priv->qemuCaps);
g_autofree char *hostname = virGetHostname();
struct utsname uts;
uname(&uts);
if ((timestamp = virTimeStringNow()) == NULL)
return;
if (qemuDomainLogContextWrite(logCtxt,
"%s: %s %s, qemu version: %d.%d.%d%s, kernel: %s, hostname: %s\n",
timestamp, msg, VIR_LOG_VERSION_STRING,
(qemuVersion / 1000000) % 1000,
(qemuVersion / 1000) % 1000,
qemuVersion % 1000,
NULLSTR_EMPTY(package),
uts.release,
NULLSTR_EMPTY(hostname)) < 0)
return;
if (cmd) {
g_autofree char *args = virCommandToString(cmd, true);
qemuDomainLogContextWrite(logCtxt, "%s\n", args);
}
}
void
qemuProcessIncomingDefFree(qemuProcessIncomingDefPtr inc)
{
if (!inc)
return;
g_free(inc->address);
g_free(inc->launchURI);
g_free(inc->deferredURI);
g_free(inc);
}
/*
* This function does not copy @path, the caller is responsible for keeping
* the @path pointer valid during the lifetime of the allocated
* qemuProcessIncomingDef structure.
*
* The caller is responsible for closing @fd, calling
* qemuProcessIncomingDefFree will NOT close it.
*/
qemuProcessIncomingDefPtr
qemuProcessIncomingDefNew(virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps,
const char *listenAddress,
const char *migrateFrom,
int fd,
const char *path)
{
qemuProcessIncomingDefPtr inc = NULL;
if (qemuMigrationDstCheckProtocol(qemuCaps, migrateFrom) < 0)
return NULL;
inc = g_new0(qemuProcessIncomingDef, 1);
inc->address = g_strdup(listenAddress);
inc->launchURI = qemuMigrationDstGetURI(migrateFrom, fd);
if (!inc->launchURI)
goto error;
if (virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_INCOMING_DEFER)) {
inc->deferredURI = inc->launchURI;
inc->launchURI = g_strdup("defer");
}
inc->fd = fd;
inc->path = path;
return inc;
error:
qemuProcessIncomingDefFree(inc);
return NULL;
}
/*
* This function starts a new QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_START async job. The user is
* responsible for calling qemuProcessEndJob to stop this job and for passing
* QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_START as @asyncJob argument to any function requiring this
* parameter between qemuProcessBeginJob and qemuProcessEndJob.
*/
int
qemuProcessBeginJob(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
virDomainJobOperation operation,
unsigned long apiFlags)
{
if (qemuDomainObjBeginAsyncJob(driver, vm, QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_START,
operation, apiFlags) < 0)
return -1;
qemuDomainObjSetAsyncJobMask(vm, QEMU_JOB_NONE);
return 0;
}
void
qemuProcessEndJob(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
qemuDomainObjEndAsyncJob(driver, vm);
}
static int
qemuProcessStartHook(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
virHookQemuOpType op,
virHookSubopType subop)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
g_autofree char *xml = NULL;
int ret;
if (!virHookPresent(VIR_HOOK_DRIVER_QEMU))
return 0;
if (!(xml = qemuDomainDefFormatXML(driver, priv->qemuCaps, vm->def, 0)))
return -1;
ret = virHookCall(VIR_HOOK_DRIVER_QEMU, vm->def->name, op, subop,
NULL, xml, NULL);
return ret;
}
static int
qemuProcessGraphicsReservePorts(virDomainGraphicsDefPtr graphics,
bool reconnect)
{
virDomainGraphicsListenDefPtr glisten;
if (graphics->nListens <= 0)
return 0;
glisten = &graphics->listens[0];
if (glisten->type != VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_LISTEN_TYPE_ADDRESS &&
glisten->type != VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_LISTEN_TYPE_NETWORK)
return 0;
switch (graphics->type) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_VNC:
if (!graphics->data.vnc.autoport ||
reconnect) {
if (virPortAllocatorSetUsed(graphics->data.vnc.port) < 0)
return -1;
graphics->data.vnc.portReserved = true;
}
if (graphics->data.vnc.websocket > 0 &&
virPortAllocatorSetUsed(graphics->data.vnc.websocket) < 0)
return -1;
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_SPICE:
if (graphics->data.spice.autoport && !reconnect)
return 0;
if (graphics->data.spice.port > 0) {
if (virPortAllocatorSetUsed(graphics->data.spice.port) < 0)
return -1;
graphics->data.spice.portReserved = true;
}
if (graphics->data.spice.tlsPort > 0) {
if (virPortAllocatorSetUsed(graphics->data.spice.tlsPort) < 0)
return -1;
graphics->data.spice.tlsPortReserved = true;
}
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_SDL:
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_RDP:
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_DESKTOP:
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_EGL_HEADLESS:
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_LAST:
break;
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessGraphicsAllocatePorts(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainGraphicsDefPtr graphics,
bool allocate)
{
virDomainGraphicsListenDefPtr glisten;
if (graphics->nListens <= 0)
return 0;
glisten = &graphics->listens[0];
if (glisten->type != VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_LISTEN_TYPE_ADDRESS &&
glisten->type != VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_LISTEN_TYPE_NETWORK)
return 0;
switch (graphics->type) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_VNC:
if (qemuProcessVNCAllocatePorts(driver, graphics, allocate) < 0)
return -1;
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_SPICE:
if (qemuProcessSPICEAllocatePorts(driver, graphics, allocate) < 0)
return -1;
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_SDL:
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_RDP:
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_DESKTOP:
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_EGL_HEADLESS:
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_LAST:
break;
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessGetNetworkAddress(const char *netname,
char **netaddr)
{
g_autoptr(virConnect) conn = NULL;
int ret = -1;
g_autoptr(virNetwork) net = NULL;
virNetworkDefPtr netdef = NULL;
virNetworkIPDefPtr ipdef;
virSocketAddr addr;
virSocketAddrPtr addrptr = NULL;
char *dev_name = NULL;
g_autofree char *xml = NULL;
*netaddr = NULL;
if (!(conn = virGetConnectNetwork()))
return -1;
net = virNetworkLookupByName(conn, netname);
if (!net)
goto cleanup;
xml = virNetworkGetXMLDesc(net, 0);
if (!xml)
goto cleanup;
netdef = virNetworkDefParseString(xml, NULL);
if (!netdef)
goto cleanup;
switch ((virNetworkForwardType) netdef->forward.type) {
case VIR_NETWORK_FORWARD_NONE:
case VIR_NETWORK_FORWARD_NAT:
case VIR_NETWORK_FORWARD_ROUTE:
case VIR_NETWORK_FORWARD_OPEN:
ipdef = virNetworkDefGetIPByIndex(netdef, AF_UNSPEC, 0);
if (!ipdef) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("network '%s' doesn't have an IP address"),
netdef->name);
goto cleanup;
}
addrptr = &ipdef->address;
break;
case VIR_NETWORK_FORWARD_BRIDGE:
if ((dev_name = netdef->bridge))
break;
/*
* fall through if netdef->bridge wasn't set, since that is
* macvtap bridge mode network.
*/
G_GNUC_FALLTHROUGH;
case VIR_NETWORK_FORWARD_PRIVATE:
case VIR_NETWORK_FORWARD_VEPA:
case VIR_NETWORK_FORWARD_PASSTHROUGH:
if ((netdef->forward.nifs > 0) && netdef->forward.ifs)
dev_name = netdef->forward.ifs[0].device.dev;
if (!dev_name) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("network '%s' has no associated interface or bridge"),
netdef->name);
goto cleanup;
}
break;
case VIR_NETWORK_FORWARD_HOSTDEV:
break;
case VIR_NETWORK_FORWARD_LAST:
default:
virReportEnumRangeError(virNetworkForwardType, netdef->forward.type);
goto cleanup;
}
if (dev_name) {
if (virNetDevIPAddrGet(dev_name, &addr) < 0)
goto cleanup;
addrptr = &addr;
}
if (!(addrptr &&
(*netaddr = virSocketAddrFormat(addrptr)))) {
goto cleanup;
}
ret = 0;
cleanup:
virNetworkDefFree(netdef);
return ret;
}
static int
qemuProcessGraphicsSetupNetworkAddress(virDomainGraphicsListenDefPtr glisten,
const char *listenAddr)
{
int rc;
/* TODO: reject configuration without network specified for network listen */
if (!glisten->network) {
glisten->address = g_strdup(listenAddr);
return 0;
}
rc = qemuProcessGetNetworkAddress(glisten->network, &glisten->address);
if (rc <= -2) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
_("network-based listen isn't possible, "
"network driver isn't present"));
return -1;
}
if (rc < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessGraphicsSetupListen(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainGraphicsDefPtr graphics,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
const char *type = virDomainGraphicsTypeToString(graphics->type);
char *listenAddr = NULL;
bool useSocket = false;
size_t i;
switch (graphics->type) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_VNC:
useSocket = cfg->vncAutoUnixSocket;
listenAddr = cfg->vncListen;
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_SPICE:
useSocket = cfg->spiceAutoUnixSocket;
listenAddr = cfg->spiceListen;
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_SDL:
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_RDP:
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_DESKTOP:
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_EGL_HEADLESS:
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_LAST:
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < graphics->nListens; i++) {
virDomainGraphicsListenDefPtr glisten = &graphics->listens[i];
switch (glisten->type) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_LISTEN_TYPE_ADDRESS:
if (!glisten->address) {
/* If there is no address specified and qemu.conf has
* *_auto_unix_socket set we should use unix socket as
* default instead of tcp listen. */
if (useSocket) {
memset(glisten, 0, sizeof(virDomainGraphicsListenDef));
glisten->socket = g_strdup_printf("%s/%s.sock", priv->libDir,
type);
glisten->fromConfig = true;
glisten->type = VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_LISTEN_TYPE_SOCKET;
} else if (listenAddr) {
glisten->address = g_strdup(listenAddr);
glisten->fromConfig = true;
}
}
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_LISTEN_TYPE_NETWORK:
if (glisten->address || !listenAddr)
continue;
if (qemuProcessGraphicsSetupNetworkAddress(glisten,
listenAddr) < 0)
return -1;
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_LISTEN_TYPE_SOCKET:
if (!glisten->socket) {
glisten->socket = g_strdup_printf("%s/%s.sock", priv->libDir,
type);
glisten->autoGenerated = true;
}
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_LISTEN_TYPE_NONE:
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_LISTEN_TYPE_LAST:
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessGraphicsSetupRenderNode(virDomainGraphicsDefPtr graphics,
virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps)
{
char **rendernode = NULL;
if (!virDomainGraphicsNeedsAutoRenderNode(graphics))
return 0;
/* Don't bother picking a DRM node if QEMU doesn't support it. */
if (graphics->type == VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_SPICE) {
if (!virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_SPICE_RENDERNODE))
return 0;
rendernode = &graphics->data.spice.rendernode;
} else {
if (!virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_EGL_HEADLESS_RENDERNODE))
return 0;
rendernode = &graphics->data.egl_headless.rendernode;
}
if (!(*rendernode = virHostGetDRMRenderNode()))
return -1;
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessSetupGraphics(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps,
unsigned int flags)
{
virDomainGraphicsDefPtr graphics;
bool allocate = !(flags & VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_PRETEND);
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->ngraphics; i++) {
graphics = vm->def->graphics[i];
if (qemuProcessGraphicsSetupRenderNode(graphics, qemuCaps) < 0)
return -1;
if (qemuProcessGraphicsSetupListen(driver, graphics, vm) < 0)
return -1;
}
if (allocate) {
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->ngraphics; i++) {
graphics = vm->def->graphics[i];
if (qemuProcessGraphicsReservePorts(graphics, false) < 0)
return -1;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->ngraphics; ++i) {
graphics = vm->def->graphics[i];
if (qemuProcessGraphicsAllocatePorts(driver, graphics, allocate) < 0)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessSetupRawIO(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
virCommandPtr cmd G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
bool rawio = false;
size_t i;
int ret = -1;
/* in case a certain disk is desirous of CAP_SYS_RAWIO, add this */
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->ndisks; i++) {
virDomainDeviceDef dev;
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = vm->def->disks[i];
if (disk->rawio == VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_YES) {
rawio = true;
#ifndef CAP_SYS_RAWIO
break;
#endif
}
dev.type = VIR_DOMAIN_DEVICE_DISK;
dev.data.disk = disk;
if (qemuAddSharedDevice(driver, &dev, vm->def->name) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (qemuSetUnprivSGIO(&dev) < 0)
goto cleanup;
}
/* If rawio not already set, check hostdevs as well */
if (!rawio) {
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->nhostdevs; i++) {
virDomainHostdevSubsysSCSIPtr scsisrc;
if (!virHostdevIsSCSIDevice(vm->def->hostdevs[i]))
continue;
scsisrc = &vm->def->hostdevs[i]->source.subsys.u.scsi;
if (scsisrc->rawio == VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_YES) {
rawio = true;
break;
}
}
}
ret = 0;
cleanup:
if (rawio) {
#ifdef CAP_SYS_RAWIO
if (ret == 0)
virCommandAllowCap(cmd, CAP_SYS_RAWIO);
#else
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
_("Raw I/O is not supported on this platform"));
ret = -1;
#endif
}
return ret;
}
static int
qemuProcessSetupBalloon(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
qemuDomainAsyncJob asyncJob)
{
unsigned long long balloon = vm->def->mem.cur_balloon;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
int ret = -1;
if (!virDomainDefHasMemballoon(vm->def))
return 0;
if (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
return -1;
if (vm->def->memballoon->period)
qemuMonitorSetMemoryStatsPeriod(priv->mon, vm->def->memballoon,
vm->def->memballoon->period);
if (qemuMonitorSetBalloon(priv->mon, balloon) < 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = 0;
cleanup:
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
ret = -1;
return ret;
}
static int
qemuProcessMakeDir(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *path)
{
if (g_mkdir_with_parents(path, 0750) < 0) {
virReportSystemError(errno, _("Cannot create directory '%s'"), path);
return -1;
}
if (qemuSecurityDomainSetPathLabel(driver, vm, path, true) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
static void
qemuProcessStartWarnShmem(virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
size_t i;
bool check_shmem = false;
bool shmem = vm->def->nshmems;
/*
* For vhost-user to work, the domain has to have some type of
* shared memory configured. We're not the proper ones to judge
* whether shared hugepages or shm are enough and will be in the
* future, so we'll just warn in case neither is configured.
* Moreover failing would give the false illusion that libvirt is
* really checking that everything works before running the domain
* and not only we are unable to do that, but it's also not our
* aim to do so.
*/
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->nnets; i++) {
if (virDomainNetGetActualType(vm->def->nets[i]) ==
VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_VHOSTUSER) {
check_shmem = true;
break;
}
}
if (!check_shmem)
return;
/*
* This check is by no means complete. We merely check
* whether there are *some* hugepages enabled and *some* NUMA
* nodes with shared memory access.
*/
if (!shmem && vm->def->mem.nhugepages) {
for (i = 0; i < virDomainNumaGetNodeCount(vm->def->numa); i++) {
if (virDomainNumaGetNodeMemoryAccessMode(vm->def->numa, i) ==
VIR_DOMAIN_MEMORY_ACCESS_SHARED) {
shmem = true;
break;
}
}
}
if (!shmem) {
VIR_WARN("Detected vhost-user interface without any shared memory, "
"the interface might not be operational");
}
}
static int
qemuProcessStartValidateGraphics(virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->ngraphics; i++) {
virDomainGraphicsDefPtr graphics = vm->def->graphics[i];
switch (graphics->type) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_VNC:
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_SPICE:
if (graphics->nListens > 1) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
_("QEMU does not support multiple listens for "
"one graphics device."));
return -1;
}
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_SDL:
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_RDP:
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_DESKTOP:
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_EGL_HEADLESS:
case VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_LAST:
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessStartValidateIOThreads(virDomainObjPtr vm,
virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps)
{
size_t i;
if (vm->def->niothreadids > 0 &&
!virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_OBJECT_IOTHREAD)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
_("IOThreads not supported for this QEMU"));
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->ncontrollers; i++) {
virDomainControllerDefPtr cont = vm->def->controllers[i];
if (cont->type == VIR_DOMAIN_CONTROLLER_TYPE_SCSI &&
cont->model == VIR_DOMAIN_CONTROLLER_MODEL_SCSI_VIRTIO_SCSI &&
cont->iothread > 0 &&
!virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_VIRTIO_SCSI_IOTHREAD)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
_("IOThreads for virtio-scsi not supported for "
"this QEMU"));
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessStartValidateShmem(virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->nshmems; i++) {
virDomainShmemDefPtr shmem = vm->def->shmems[i];
if (strchr(shmem->name, '/')) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED,
_("shmem name '%s' must not contain '/'"),
shmem->name);
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessStartValidateDisks(virDomainObjPtr vm,
virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->ndisks; i++) {
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = vm->def->disks[i];
virStorageSourcePtr src = disk->src;
/* This is a best effort check as we can only check if the command
* option exists, but we cannot determine whether the running QEMU
* was build with '--enable-vxhs'. */
if (src->type == VIR_STORAGE_TYPE_NETWORK &&
src->protocol == VIR_STORAGE_NET_PROTOCOL_VXHS &&
!virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_VXHS)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
_("VxHS protocol is not supported with this "
"QEMU binary"));
return -1;
}
/* PowerPC pseries based VMs do not support floppy device */
if (disk->device == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_DEVICE_FLOPPY &&
qemuDomainIsPSeries(vm->def)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
_("PowerPC pseries machines do not support floppy device"));
return -1;
}
if (src->type == VIR_STORAGE_TYPE_NVME &&
!virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_DRIVE_NVME)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
_("NVMe disks are not supported with this QEMU binary"));
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/* 250 parts per million (ppm) is a half of NTP threshold */
#define TSC_TOLERANCE 250
static int
qemuProcessStartValidateTSC(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
size_t i;
unsigned long long freq = 0;
unsigned long long tolerance;
unsigned long long minFreq;
unsigned long long maxFreq;
virHostCPUTscInfoPtr tsc;
g_autoptr(virCPUDef) cpu = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->clock.ntimers; i++) {
virDomainTimerDefPtr timer = vm->def->clock.timers[i];
if (timer->name == VIR_DOMAIN_TIMER_NAME_TSC &&
timer->frequency > 0) {
freq = timer->frequency;
break;
}
}
if (freq == 0)
return 0;
VIR_DEBUG("Requested TSC frequency %llu Hz", freq);
cpu = virQEMUDriverGetHostCPU(driver);
if (!cpu || !cpu->tsc) {
VIR_DEBUG("Host TSC frequency could not be probed");
return 0;
}
tsc = cpu->tsc;
tolerance = tsc->frequency * TSC_TOLERANCE / 1000000;
minFreq = tsc->frequency - tolerance;
maxFreq = tsc->frequency + tolerance;
VIR_DEBUG("Host TSC frequency %llu Hz, scaling %s, tolerance +/- %llu Hz",
tsc->frequency, virTristateBoolTypeToString(tsc->scaling),
tolerance);
if (freq >= minFreq && freq <= maxFreq) {
VIR_DEBUG("Requested TSC frequency is within tolerance interval");
return 0;
}
if (tsc->scaling == VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_YES)
return 0;
if (tsc->scaling == VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_ABSENT) {
VIR_DEBUG("Requested TSC frequency falls outside tolerance range and "
"scaling support is unknown, QEMU will try and possibly "
"fail later");
return 0;
}
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED,
_("Requested TSC frequency %llu Hz is outside tolerance "
"range ([%llu, %llu] Hz) around host frequency %llu Hz "
"and TSC scaling is not supported by the host CPU"),
freq, minFreq, maxFreq, tsc->frequency);
return -1;
}
/**
* qemuProcessStartValidate:
* @vm: domain object
* @qemuCaps: emulator capabilities
* @migration: restoration of existing state
*
* This function aggregates checks done prior to start of a VM.
*
* Flag VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_PRETEND tells, that we don't want to actually
* start the domain but create a valid qemu command. If some code shouldn't be
* executed in this case, make sure to check this flag.
*/
static int
qemuProcessStartValidate(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps,
unsigned int flags)
{
if (!(flags & VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_PRETEND)) {
if (vm->def->virtType == VIR_DOMAIN_VIRT_KVM) {
VIR_DEBUG("Checking for KVM availability");
if (!virFileExists("/dev/kvm")) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
_("Domain requires KVM, but it is not available. "
"Check that virtualization is enabled in the "
"host BIOS, and host configuration is setup to "
"load the kvm modules."));
return -1;
}
}
VIR_DEBUG("Checking domain and device security labels");
if (qemuSecurityCheckAllLabel(driver->securityManager, vm->def) < 0)
return -1;
}
/* Checks below should not be executed when starting a qemu process for a
* VM that was running before (migration, snapshots, save). It's more
* important to start such VM than keep the configuration clean */
if ((flags & VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_NEW) &&
virDomainDefValidate(vm->def, 0, driver->xmlopt, qemuCaps) < 0)
return -1;
if (qemuProcessStartValidateGraphics(vm) < 0)
return -1;
if (qemuProcessStartValidateIOThreads(vm, qemuCaps) < 0)
return -1;
if (qemuProcessStartValidateShmem(vm) < 0)
return -1;
if (vm->def->cpu) {
if (virCPUValidateFeatures(vm->def->os.arch, vm->def->cpu) < 0)
return -1;
if (ARCH_IS_X86(vm->def->os.arch) &&
!virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_CPU_UNAVAILABLE_FEATURES)) {
g_auto(GStrv) features = NULL;
int n;
if ((n = virCPUDefCheckFeatures(vm->def->cpu,
virCPUx86FeatureFilterSelectMSR,
NULL,
&features)) < 0)
return -1;
if (n > 0) {
g_autofree char *str = NULL;
str = g_strjoinv(", ", features);
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED,
_("Some features cannot be reliably used "
"with this QEMU: %s"), str);
return -1;
}
}
}
if (qemuProcessStartValidateDisks(vm, qemuCaps) < 0)
return -1;
if (qemuProcessStartValidateTSC(driver, vm) < 0)
return -1;
VIR_DEBUG("Checking for any possible (non-fatal) issues");
qemuProcessStartWarnShmem(vm);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessStartUpdateCustomCaps(virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(priv->driver);
qemuDomainXmlNsDefPtr nsdef = vm->def->namespaceData;
char **next;
int tmp;
size_t i;
if (cfg->capabilityfilters) {
for (next = cfg->capabilityfilters; *next; next++) {
if ((tmp = virQEMUCapsTypeFromString(*next)) < 0) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("invalid capability_filters capability '%s'"),
*next);
return -1;
}
virQEMUCapsClear(priv->qemuCaps, tmp);
}
}
if (nsdef) {
for (i = 0; i < nsdef->ncapsadd; i++) {
if ((tmp = virQEMUCapsTypeFromString(nsdef->capsadd[i])) < 0) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("invalid qemu namespace capability '%s'"),
nsdef->capsadd[i]);
return -1;
}
virQEMUCapsSet(priv->qemuCaps, tmp);
}
for (i = 0; i < nsdef->ncapsdel; i++) {
if ((tmp = virQEMUCapsTypeFromString(nsdef->capsdel[i])) < 0) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("invalid qemu namespace capability '%s'"),
nsdef->capsdel[i]);
return -1;
}
virQEMUCapsClear(priv->qemuCaps, tmp);
}
}
return 0;
}
/**
* qemuProcessPrepareQEMUCaps:
* @vm: domain object
* @qemuCapsCache: cache of QEMU capabilities
* @processStartFlags: flags based on the VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_* enum
*
* Prepare the capabilities of a QEMU process for startup. This includes
* copying the caps to a static cache and potential post-processing depending
* on the configuration of the VM and startup process.
*
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error.
*/
static int
qemuProcessPrepareQEMUCaps(virDomainObjPtr vm,
virFileCachePtr qemuCapsCache,
unsigned int processStartFlags)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
virObjectUnref(priv->qemuCaps);
if (!(priv->qemuCaps = virQEMUCapsCacheLookupCopy(qemuCapsCache,
vm->def->virtType,
vm->def->emulator,
vm->def->os.machine)))
return -1;
if (processStartFlags & VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_STANDALONE)
virQEMUCapsClear(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_CHARDEV_FD_PASS);
/* Update qemu capabilities according to lists passed in via namespace */
if (qemuProcessStartUpdateCustomCaps(vm) < 0)
return -1;
/* re-process capability lockouts since we might have removed capabilities */
virQEMUCapsInitProcessCapsInterlock(priv->qemuCaps);
return 0;
}
/**
* qemuProcessInit:
*
* Prepares the domain up to the point when priv->qemuCaps is initialized. The
* function calls qemuProcessStop when needed.
*
* Flag VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_PRETEND tells, that we don't want to actually
* start the domain but create a valid qemu command. If some code shouldn't be
* executed in this case, make sure to check this flag.
*
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error.
*/
int
qemuProcessInit(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
virCPUDefPtr updatedCPU,
qemuDomainAsyncJob asyncJob,
bool migration,
unsigned int flags)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
int stopFlags;
virCPUDefPtr origCPU = NULL;
int ret = -1;
VIR_DEBUG("vm=%p name=%s id=%d migration=%d",
vm, vm->def->name, vm->def->id, migration);
VIR_DEBUG("Beginning VM startup process");
if (virDomainObjIsActive(vm)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_INVALID, "%s",
_("VM is already active"));
goto cleanup;
}
/* in case when the post parse callback failed we need to re-run it on the
* old config prior we start the VM */
if (vm->def->postParseFailed) {
VIR_DEBUG("re-running the post parse callback");
/* we don't have the private copy of qemuCaps at this point */
if (virDomainDefPostParse(vm->def, 0, driver->xmlopt, NULL) < 0)
goto cleanup;
}
VIR_DEBUG("Determining emulator version");
if (qemuProcessPrepareQEMUCaps(vm, driver->qemuCapsCache, flags) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (qemuDomainUpdateCPU(vm, updatedCPU, &origCPU) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (qemuProcessStartValidate(driver, vm, priv->qemuCaps, flags) < 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Do this upfront, so any part of the startup process can add
* runtime state to vm->def that won't be persisted. This let's us
* report implicit runtime defaults in the XML, like vnc listen/socket
*/
VIR_DEBUG("Setting current domain def as transient");
if (virDomainObjSetDefTransient(driver->xmlopt, vm, priv->qemuCaps) < 0)
goto cleanup;
/* don't clean up files for <transient> disks until we set them up */
priv->inhibitDiskTransientDelete = true;
if (flags & VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_PRETEND) {
if (qemuDomainSetPrivatePaths(driver, vm) < 0) {
virDomainObjRemoveTransientDef(vm);
goto cleanup;
}
} else {
vm->def->id = qemuDriverAllocateID(driver);
qemuDomainSetFakeReboot(driver, vm, false);
virDomainObjSetState(vm, VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED, VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_STARTING_UP);
if (g_atomic_int_add(&driver->nactive, 1) == 0 && driver->inhibitCallback)
driver->inhibitCallback(true, driver->inhibitOpaque);
/* Run an early hook to set-up missing devices */
if (qemuProcessStartHook(driver, vm,
VIR_HOOK_QEMU_OP_PREPARE,
VIR_HOOK_SUBOP_BEGIN) < 0)
goto stop;
if (qemuDomainSetPrivatePaths(driver, vm) < 0)
goto stop;
priv->origCPU = g_steal_pointer(&origCPU);
}
ret = 0;
cleanup:
virCPUDefFree(origCPU);
return ret;
stop:
stopFlags = VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_STOP_NO_RELABEL;
if (migration)
stopFlags |= VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_STOP_MIGRATED;
qemuProcessStop(driver, vm, VIR_DOMAIN_SHUTOFF_FAILED, asyncJob, stopFlags);
goto cleanup;
}
/**
* qemuProcessNetworkPrepareDevices
*/
static int
qemuProcessNetworkPrepareDevices(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
virDomainDefPtr def = vm->def;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
size_t i;
g_autoptr(virConnect) conn = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < def->nnets; i++) {
virDomainNetDefPtr net = def->nets[i];
virDomainNetType actualType;
/* If appropriate, grab a physical device from the configured
* network's pool of devices, or resolve bridge device name
* to the one defined in the network definition.
*/
if (net->type == VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_NETWORK) {
if (!conn && !(conn = virGetConnectNetwork()))
return -1;
if (virDomainNetAllocateActualDevice(conn, def, net) < 0)
return -1;
}
actualType = virDomainNetGetActualType(net);
if (actualType == VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_HOSTDEV &&
net->type == VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_NETWORK) {
/* Each type='hostdev' network device must also have a
* corresponding entry in the hostdevs array. For netdevs
* that are hardcoded as type='hostdev', this is already
* done by the parser, but for those allocated from a
* network / determined at runtime, we need to do it
* separately.
*/
virDomainHostdevDefPtr hostdev = virDomainNetGetActualHostdev(net);
virDomainHostdevSubsysPCIPtr pcisrc = &hostdev->source.subsys.u.pci;
if (virDomainHostdevFind(def, hostdev, NULL) >= 0) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("PCI device %04x:%02x:%02x.%x "
"allocated from network %s is already "
"in use by domain %s"),
pcisrc->addr.domain, pcisrc->addr.bus,
pcisrc->addr.slot, pcisrc->addr.function,
net->data.network.name, def->name);
return -1;
}
if (virDomainHostdevInsert(def, hostdev) < 0)
return -1;
} else if (actualType == VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_USER &&
!priv->disableSlirp &&
virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_DBUS_VMSTATE)) {
qemuSlirpPtr slirp = NULL;
int rv = qemuInterfacePrepareSlirp(driver, net, &slirp);
if (rv == -1)
return -1;
if (rv == 1)
QEMU_DOMAIN_NETWORK_PRIVATE(net)->slirp = slirp;
}
}
return 0;
}
/**
* qemuProcessSetupVcpu:
* @vm: domain object
* @vcpuid: id of VCPU to set defaults
*
* This function sets resource properties (cgroups, affinity, scheduler) for a
* vCPU. This function expects that the vCPU is online and the vCPU pids were
* correctly detected at the point when it's called.
*
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error.
*/
int
qemuProcessSetupVcpu(virDomainObjPtr vm,
unsigned int vcpuid)
{
pid_t vcpupid = qemuDomainGetVcpuPid(vm, vcpuid);
virDomainVcpuDefPtr vcpu = virDomainDefGetVcpu(vm->def, vcpuid);
virDomainResctrlMonDefPtr mon = NULL;
size_t i = 0;
if (qemuProcessSetupPid(vm, vcpupid, VIR_CGROUP_THREAD_VCPU,
vcpuid, vcpu->cpumask,
vm->def->cputune.period,
vm->def->cputune.quota,
&vcpu->sched) < 0)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->nresctrls; i++) {
size_t j = 0;
virDomainResctrlDefPtr ct = vm->def->resctrls[i];
if (virBitmapIsBitSet(ct->vcpus, vcpuid)) {
if (virResctrlAllocAddPID(ct->alloc, vcpupid) < 0)
return -1;
for (j = 0; j < ct->nmonitors; j++) {
mon = ct->monitors[j];
if (virBitmapEqual(ct->vcpus, mon->vcpus) &&
!virResctrlAllocIsEmpty(ct->alloc))
continue;
if (virBitmapIsBitSet(mon->vcpus, vcpuid)) {
if (virResctrlMonitorAddPID(mon->instance, vcpupid) < 0)
return -1;
break;
}
}
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessSetupVcpus(virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
virDomainVcpuDefPtr vcpu;
unsigned int maxvcpus = virDomainDefGetVcpusMax(vm->def);
size_t i;
if ((vm->def->cputune.period || vm->def->cputune.quota) &&
!virCgroupHasController(((qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr) vm->privateData)->cgroup,
VIR_CGROUP_CONTROLLER_CPU)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
_("cgroup cpu is required for scheduler tuning"));
return -1;
}
if (!qemuDomainHasVcpuPids(vm)) {
/* If any CPU has custom affinity that differs from the
* VM default affinity, we must reject it */
for (i = 0; i < maxvcpus; i++) {
vcpu = virDomainDefGetVcpu(vm->def, i);
if (!vcpu->online)
continue;
if (vcpu->cpumask &&
!virBitmapEqual(vm->def->cpumask, vcpu->cpumask)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_INVALID, "%s",
_("cpu affinity is not supported"));
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < maxvcpus; i++) {
vcpu = virDomainDefGetVcpu(vm->def, i);
if (!vcpu->online)
continue;
if (qemuProcessSetupVcpu(vm, i) < 0)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int
qemuProcessSetupIOThread(virDomainObjPtr vm,
virDomainIOThreadIDDefPtr iothread)
{
return qemuProcessSetupPid(vm, iothread->thread_id,
VIR_CGROUP_THREAD_IOTHREAD,
iothread->iothread_id,
iothread->cpumask,
vm->def->cputune.iothread_period,
vm->def->cputune.iothread_quota,
&iothread->sched);
}
static int
qemuProcessSetupIOThreads(virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->niothreadids; i++) {
virDomainIOThreadIDDefPtr info = vm->def->iothreadids[i];
if (qemuProcessSetupIOThread(vm, info) < 0)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessValidateHotpluggableVcpus(virDomainDefPtr def)
{
virDomainVcpuDefPtr vcpu;
virDomainVcpuDefPtr subvcpu;
qemuDomainVcpuPrivatePtr vcpupriv;
unsigned int maxvcpus = virDomainDefGetVcpusMax(def);
size_t i = 0;
size_t j;
virBitmapPtr ordermap = virBitmapNew(maxvcpus + 1);
int ret = -1;
/* validate:
* - all hotpluggable entities to be hotplugged have the correct data
* - vcpus belonging to a hotpluggable entity share configuration
* - order of the hotpluggable entities is unique
*/
for (i = 0; i < maxvcpus; i++) {
vcpu = virDomainDefGetVcpu(def, i);
vcpupriv = QEMU_DOMAIN_VCPU_PRIVATE(vcpu);
/* skip over hotpluggable entities */
if (vcpupriv->vcpus == 0)
continue;
if (vcpu->order != 0) {
if (virBitmapIsBitSet(ordermap, vcpu->order)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED,
_("duplicate vcpu order '%u'"), vcpu->order);
goto cleanup;
}
if (virBitmapSetBit(ordermap, vcpu->order)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED,
_("vcpu order '%u' exceeds vcpu count"),
vcpu->order);
goto cleanup;
}
}
for (j = i + 1; j < (i + vcpupriv->vcpus); j++) {
subvcpu = virDomainDefGetVcpu(def, j);
if (subvcpu->hotpluggable != vcpu->hotpluggable ||
subvcpu->online != vcpu->online ||
subvcpu->order != vcpu->order) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED,
_("vcpus '%zu' and '%zu' are in the same hotplug "
"group but differ in configuration"), i, j);
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (vcpu->online && vcpu->hotpluggable == VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_YES) {
if ((vcpupriv->socket_id == -1 && vcpupriv->core_id == -1 &&
vcpupriv->thread_id == -1 && vcpupriv->node_id == -1) ||
!vcpupriv->type) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED,
_("vcpu '%zu' is missing hotplug data"), i);
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
ret = 0;
cleanup:
virBitmapFree(ordermap);
return ret;
}
static int
qemuDomainHasHotpluggableStartupVcpus(virDomainDefPtr def)
{
size_t maxvcpus = virDomainDefGetVcpusMax(def);
virDomainVcpuDefPtr vcpu;
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < maxvcpus; i++) {
vcpu = virDomainDefGetVcpu(def, i);
if (vcpu->online && vcpu->hotpluggable == VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_YES)
return true;
}
return false;
}
static int
qemuProcessVcpusSortOrder(const void *a,
const void *b)
{
virDomainVcpuDefPtr vcpua = *((virDomainVcpuDefPtr *)a);
virDomainVcpuDefPtr vcpub = *((virDomainVcpuDefPtr *)b);
return vcpua->order - vcpub->order;
}
static int
qemuProcessSetupHotpluggableVcpus(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
qemuDomainAsyncJob asyncJob)
{
unsigned int maxvcpus = virDomainDefGetVcpusMax(vm->def);
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
qemuCgroupEmulatorAllNodesDataPtr emulatorCgroup = NULL;
virDomainVcpuDefPtr vcpu;
qemuDomainVcpuPrivatePtr vcpupriv;
virJSONValuePtr vcpuprops = NULL;
size_t i;
int ret = -1;
int rc;
virDomainVcpuDefPtr *bootHotplug = NULL;
size_t nbootHotplug = 0;
for (i = 0; i < maxvcpus; i++) {
vcpu = virDomainDefGetVcpu(vm->def, i);
vcpupriv = QEMU_DOMAIN_VCPU_PRIVATE(vcpu);
if (vcpu->hotpluggable == VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_YES && vcpu->online &&
vcpupriv->vcpus != 0) {
vcpupriv->alias = g_strdup_printf("vcpu%zu", i);
if (VIR_APPEND_ELEMENT(bootHotplug, nbootHotplug, vcpu) < 0)
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (nbootHotplug == 0) {
ret = 0;
goto cleanup;
}
qsort(bootHotplug, nbootHotplug, sizeof(*bootHotplug),
qemuProcessVcpusSortOrder);
if (qemuCgroupEmulatorAllNodesAllow(priv->cgroup, &emulatorCgroup) < 0)
goto cleanup;
for (i = 0; i < nbootHotplug; i++) {
vcpu = bootHotplug[i];
if (!(vcpuprops = qemuBuildHotpluggableCPUProps(vcpu)))
goto cleanup;
if (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
goto cleanup;
rc = qemuMonitorAddDeviceArgs(qemuDomainGetMonitor(vm), vcpuprops);
vcpuprops = NULL;
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (rc < 0)
goto cleanup;
virJSONValueFree(vcpuprops);
}
ret = 0;
cleanup:
qemuCgroupEmulatorAllNodesRestore(emulatorCgroup);
VIR_FREE(bootHotplug);
virJSONValueFree(vcpuprops);
return ret;
}
static bool
qemuProcessDropUnknownCPUFeatures(const char *name,
virCPUFeaturePolicy policy,
void *opaque)
{
const char **features = opaque;
if (policy != VIR_CPU_FEATURE_DISABLE &&
policy != VIR_CPU_FEATURE_FORBID)
return true;
if (g_strv_contains(features, name))
return true;
/* Features unknown to QEMU are implicitly disabled, we can just drop them
* from the definition. */
return false;
}
static int
qemuProcessUpdateGuestCPU(virDomainDefPtr def,
virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps,
virArch hostarch,
unsigned int flags)
{
if (!def->cpu)
return 0;
/* nothing to do if only topology part of CPU def is used */
if (def->cpu->mode == VIR_CPU_MODE_CUSTOM && !def->cpu->model)
return 0;
/* Old libvirt added host CPU model to host-model CPUs for migrations,
* while new libvirt just turns host-model into custom mode. We need
* to fix the mode to maintain backward compatibility and to avoid
* the CPU model to be replaced in virCPUUpdate.
*/
if (!(flags & VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_NEW) &&
ARCH_IS_X86(def->os.arch) &&
def->cpu->mode == VIR_CPU_MODE_HOST_MODEL &&
def->cpu->model) {
def->cpu->mode = VIR_CPU_MODE_CUSTOM;
}
if (!virQEMUCapsIsCPUModeSupported(qemuCaps, hostarch, def->virtType,
def->cpu->mode, def->os.machine)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED,
_("CPU mode '%s' for %s %s domain on %s host is not "
"supported by hypervisor"),
virCPUModeTypeToString(def->cpu->mode),
virArchToString(def->os.arch),
virDomainVirtTypeToString(def->virtType),
virArchToString(hostarch));
return -1;
}
if (virCPUConvertLegacy(hostarch, def->cpu) < 0)
return -1;
/* nothing to update for host-passthrough / maximum */
if (def->cpu->mode != VIR_CPU_MODE_HOST_PASSTHROUGH &&
def->cpu->mode != VIR_CPU_MODE_MAXIMUM) {
g_autoptr(virDomainCapsCPUModels) cpuModels = NULL;
if (def->cpu->check == VIR_CPU_CHECK_PARTIAL &&
virCPUCompare(hostarch,
virQEMUCapsGetHostModel(qemuCaps, def->virtType,
VIR_QEMU_CAPS_HOST_CPU_FULL),
def->cpu, true) < 0)
return -1;
if (virCPUUpdate(def->os.arch, def->cpu,
virQEMUCapsGetHostModel(qemuCaps, def->virtType,
VIR_QEMU_CAPS_HOST_CPU_MIGRATABLE)) < 0)
return -1;
cpuModels = virQEMUCapsGetCPUModels(qemuCaps, def->virtType, NULL, NULL);
if (virCPUTranslate(def->os.arch, def->cpu, cpuModels) < 0)
return -1;
def->cpu->fallback = VIR_CPU_FALLBACK_FORBID;
}
if (virCPUDefFilterFeatures(def->cpu, virQEMUCapsCPUFilterFeatures,
&def->os.arch) < 0)
return -1;
if (ARCH_IS_X86(def->os.arch)) {
g_auto(GStrv) features = NULL;
if (virQEMUCapsGetCPUFeatures(qemuCaps, def->virtType, false, &features) < 0)
return -1;
if (features &&
virCPUDefFilterFeatures(def->cpu, qemuProcessDropUnknownCPUFeatures,
features) < 0)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessPrepareDomainNUMAPlacement(virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
g_autofree char *nodeset = NULL;
g_autoptr(virBitmap) numadNodeset = NULL;
g_autoptr(virBitmap) hostMemoryNodeset = NULL;
g_autoptr(virCapsHostNUMA) caps = NULL;
/* Get the advisory nodeset from numad if 'placement' of
* either <vcpu> or <numatune> is 'auto'.
*/
if (!virDomainDefNeedsPlacementAdvice(vm->def))
return 0;
nodeset = virNumaGetAutoPlacementAdvice(virDomainDefGetVcpus(vm->def),
virDomainDefGetMemoryTotal(vm->def));
if (!nodeset)
return -1;
if (!(hostMemoryNodeset = virNumaGetHostMemoryNodeset()))
return -1;
VIR_DEBUG("Nodeset returned from numad: %s", nodeset);
if (virBitmapParse(nodeset, &numadNodeset, VIR_DOMAIN_CPUMASK_LEN) < 0)
return -1;
if (!(caps = virCapabilitiesHostNUMANewHost()))
return -1;
/* numad may return a nodeset that only contains cpus but cgroups don't play
* well with that. Set the autoCpuset from all cpus from that nodeset, but
* assign autoNodeset only with nodes containing memory. */
if (!(priv->autoCpuset = virCapabilitiesHostNUMAGetCpus(caps, numadNodeset)))
return -1;
virBitmapIntersect(numadNodeset, hostMemoryNodeset);
priv->autoNodeset = g_steal_pointer(&numadNodeset);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessPrepareDomainStorage(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv,
virQEMUDriverConfigPtr cfg,
unsigned int flags)
{
size_t i;
bool cold_boot = flags & VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_COLD;
for (i = vm->def->ndisks; i > 0; i--) {
size_t idx = i - 1;
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = vm->def->disks[idx];
if (virDomainDiskTranslateSourcePool(disk) < 0) {
if (qemuDomainCheckDiskStartupPolicy(driver, vm, idx, cold_boot) < 0)
return -1;
/* disk source was dropped */
continue;
}
if (qemuDomainPrepareDiskSource(disk, priv, cfg) < 0)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessPrepareDomainHostdevs(virDomainObjPtr vm,
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->nhostdevs; i++) {
virDomainHostdevDefPtr hostdev = vm->def->hostdevs[i];
if (qemuDomainPrepareHostdev(hostdev, priv) < 0)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int
qemuProcessPrepareHostHostdev(virDomainHostdevDefPtr hostdev)
{
if (virHostdevIsSCSIDevice(hostdev)) {
virDomainHostdevSubsysSCSIPtr scsisrc = &hostdev->source.subsys.u.scsi;
switch ((virDomainHostdevSCSIProtocolType) scsisrc->protocol) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SCSI_PROTOCOL_TYPE_NONE: {
virDomainHostdevSubsysSCSIHostPtr scsihostsrc = &scsisrc->u.host;
virStorageSourcePtr src = scsisrc->u.host.src;
g_autofree char *devstr = NULL;
if (!(devstr = virSCSIDeviceGetSgName(NULL,
scsihostsrc->adapter,
scsihostsrc->bus,
scsihostsrc->target,
scsihostsrc->unit)))
return -1;
src->path = g_strdup_printf("/dev/%s", devstr);
break;
}
case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SCSI_PROTOCOL_TYPE_ISCSI:
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SCSI_PROTOCOL_TYPE_LAST:
default:
virReportEnumRangeError(virDomainHostdevSCSIProtocolType, scsisrc->protocol);
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessPrepareHostHostdevs(virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->nhostdevs; i++) {
virDomainHostdevDefPtr hostdev = vm->def->hostdevs[i];
if (qemuProcessPrepareHostHostdev(hostdev) < 0)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static void
qemuProcessPrepareAllowReboot(virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
virDomainDefPtr def = vm->def;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
if (priv->allowReboot != VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_ABSENT)
return;
if (def->onReboot == VIR_DOMAIN_LIFECYCLE_ACTION_DESTROY &&
def->onPoweroff == VIR_DOMAIN_LIFECYCLE_ACTION_DESTROY &&
(def->onCrash == VIR_DOMAIN_LIFECYCLE_ACTION_DESTROY ||
def->onCrash == VIR_DOMAIN_LIFECYCLE_ACTION_COREDUMP_DESTROY)) {
priv->allowReboot = VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_NO;
} else {
priv->allowReboot = VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_YES;
}
}
static int
qemuProcessUpdateSEVInfo(virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps = priv->qemuCaps;
virDomainSEVDefPtr sev = vm->def->sev;
virSEVCapabilityPtr sevCaps = NULL;
/* if platform specific info like 'cbitpos' and 'reducedPhysBits' have
* not been supplied, we need to autofill them from caps now as both are
* mandatory on QEMU cmdline
*/
sevCaps = virQEMUCapsGetSEVCapabilities(qemuCaps);
if (!sev->haveCbitpos) {
sev->cbitpos = sevCaps->cbitpos;
sev->haveCbitpos = true;
}
if (!sev->haveReducedPhysBits) {
sev->reduced_phys_bits = sevCaps->reduced_phys_bits;
sev->haveReducedPhysBits = true;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* qemuProcessPrepareDomain:
* @driver: qemu driver
* @vm: domain object
* @flags: qemuProcessStartFlags
*
* This function groups all code that modifies only live XML of a domain which
* is about to start and it's the only place to do those modifications.
*
* Flag VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_PRETEND tells, that we don't want to actually
* start the domain but create a valid qemu command. If some code shouldn't be
* executed in this case, make sure to check this flag.
*
* TODO: move all XML modification from qemuBuildCommandLine into this function
*/
int
qemuProcessPrepareDomain(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
unsigned int flags)
{
size_t i;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
priv->machineName = qemuDomainGetMachineName(vm);
if (!priv->machineName)
return -1;
if (!(flags & VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_PRETEND)) {
/* If you are using a SecurityDriver with dynamic labelling,
then generate a security label for isolation */
VIR_DEBUG("Generating domain security label (if required)");
if (qemuSecurityGenLabel(driver->securityManager, vm->def) < 0) {
virDomainAuditSecurityLabel(vm, false);
return -1;
}
virDomainAuditSecurityLabel(vm, true);
if (qemuProcessPrepareDomainNUMAPlacement(vm) < 0)
return -1;
}
/* Whether we should use virtlogd as stdio handler for character
* devices source backend. */
if (cfg->stdioLogD &&
virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_CHARDEV_FILE_APPEND)) {
priv->chardevStdioLogd = true;
}
/* Track if this domain remembers original owner */
priv->rememberOwner = cfg->rememberOwner;
qemuProcessPrepareAllowReboot(vm);
/*
* Normally PCI addresses are assigned in the virDomainCreate
* or virDomainDefine methods. We might still need to assign
* some here to cope with the question of upgrades. Regardless
* we also need to populate the PCI address set cache for later
* use in hotplug
*/
VIR_DEBUG("Assigning domain PCI addresses");
if ((qemuDomainAssignAddresses(vm->def, priv->qemuCaps, driver, vm,
!!(flags & VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_NEW))) < 0) {
return -1;
}
if (qemuAssignDeviceAliases(vm->def, priv->qemuCaps) < 0)
return -1;
VIR_DEBUG("Setting graphics devices");
if (qemuProcessSetupGraphics(driver, vm, priv->qemuCaps, flags) < 0)
return -1;
VIR_DEBUG("Create domain masterKey");
if (qemuDomainMasterKeyCreate(vm) < 0)
return -1;
VIR_DEBUG("Setting up storage");
if (qemuProcessPrepareDomainStorage(driver, vm, priv, cfg, flags) < 0)
return -1;
VIR_DEBUG("Setting up host devices");
if (qemuProcessPrepareDomainHostdevs(vm, priv) < 0)
return -1;
VIR_DEBUG("Prepare chardev source backends for TLS");
qemuDomainPrepareChardevSource(vm->def, cfg);
VIR_DEBUG("Prepare device secrets");
if (qemuDomainSecretPrepare(driver, vm) < 0)
return -1;
VIR_DEBUG("Prepare bios/uefi paths");
if (qemuFirmwareFillDomain(driver, vm->def, flags) < 0)
return -1;
if (qemuDomainInitializePflashStorageSource(vm) < 0)
return -1;
VIR_DEBUG("Preparing external devices");
if (qemuExtDevicesPrepareDomain(driver, vm) < 0)
return -1;
if (flags & VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_NEW) {
VIR_DEBUG("Aligning guest memory");
if (qemuDomainAlignMemorySizes(vm->def) < 0)
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->nchannels; i++) {
if (qemuDomainPrepareChannel(vm->def->channels[i],
priv->channelTargetDir) < 0)
return -1;
}
if (!(priv->monConfig = virDomainChrSourceDefNew(driver->xmlopt)))
return -1;
VIR_DEBUG("Preparing monitor state");
if (qemuProcessPrepareMonitorChr(priv->monConfig, priv->libDir) < 0)
return -1;
priv->monError = false;
priv->monStart = 0;
priv->runningReason = VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING_UNKNOWN;
priv->pausedReason = VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_UNKNOWN;
VIR_DEBUG("Updating guest CPU definition");
if (qemuProcessUpdateGuestCPU(vm->def, priv->qemuCaps, driver->hostarch, flags) < 0)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->nshmems; i++)
qemuDomainPrepareShmemChardev(vm->def->shmems[i]);
if (vm->def->sev) {
VIR_DEBUG("Updating SEV platform info");
if (qemuProcessUpdateSEVInfo(vm) < 0)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessSEVCreateFile(virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *name,
const char *data)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = priv->driver;
g_autofree char *configFile = NULL;
if (!(configFile = virFileBuildPath(priv->libDir, name, ".base64")))
return -1;
if (virFileRewriteStr(configFile, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR, data) < 0) {
virReportSystemError(errno, _("failed to write data to config '%s'"),
configFile);
return -1;
}
if (qemuSecurityDomainSetPathLabel(driver, vm, configFile, true) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessPrepareSEVGuestInput(virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
virDomainSEVDefPtr sev = vm->def->sev;
if (!sev)
return 0;
VIR_DEBUG("Preparing SEV guest");
if (sev->dh_cert) {
if (qemuProcessSEVCreateFile(vm, "dh_cert", sev->dh_cert) < 0)
return -1;
}
if (sev->session) {
if (qemuProcessSEVCreateFile(vm, "session", sev->session) < 0)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessPrepareHostStorage(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
unsigned int flags)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
size_t i;
bool cold_boot = flags & VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_COLD;
bool blockdev = virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_BLOCKDEV);
for (i = vm->def->ndisks; i > 0; i--) {
size_t idx = i - 1;
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = vm->def->disks[idx];
if (virStorageSourceIsEmpty(disk->src))
continue;
/* backing chain needs to be redetected if we aren't using blockdev */
if (!blockdev || qemuDiskBusIsSD(disk->bus))
virStorageSourceBackingStoreClear(disk->src);
/*
* Go to applying startup policy for optional disk with nonexistent
* source file immediately as determining chain will surely fail
* and we don't want noisy error notice in logs for this case.
*/
if (qemuDomainDiskIsMissingLocalOptional(disk) && cold_boot)
VIR_INFO("optional disk '%s' source file is missing, "
"skip checking disk chain", disk->dst);
else if (qemuDomainDetermineDiskChain(driver, vm, disk, NULL, true) >= 0)
continue;
if (qemuDomainCheckDiskStartupPolicy(driver, vm, idx, cold_boot) >= 0)
continue;
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int
qemuProcessOpenVhostVsock(virDomainVsockDefPtr vsock)
{
qemuDomainVsockPrivatePtr priv = (qemuDomainVsockPrivatePtr)vsock->privateData;
const char *vsock_path = "/dev/vhost-vsock";
int fd;
if ((fd = open(vsock_path, O_RDWR)) < 0) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED,
"%s", _("unable to open vhost-vsock device"));
return -1;
}
if (vsock->auto_cid == VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_YES) {
if (virVsockAcquireGuestCid(fd, &vsock->guest_cid) < 0)
goto error;
} else {
if (virVsockSetGuestCid(fd, vsock->guest_cid) < 0)
goto error;
}
priv->vhostfd = fd;
return 0;
error:
VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(fd);
return -1;
}
/**
* qemuProcessPrepareHost:
* @driver: qemu driver
* @vm: domain object
* @flags: qemuProcessStartFlags
*
* This function groups all code that modifies host system (which also may
* update live XML) to prepare environment for a domain which is about to start
* and it's the only place to do those modifications.
*
* TODO: move all host modification from qemuBuildCommandLine into this function
*/
int
qemuProcessPrepareHost(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
unsigned int flags)
{
unsigned int hostdev_flags = 0;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
if (qemuPrepareNVRAM(cfg, vm) < 0)
return -1;
if (vm->def->vsock) {
if (qemuProcessOpenVhostVsock(vm->def->vsock) < 0)
return -1;
}
qemu: allocate network connections sooner during domain startup VFIO device assignment requires a cgroup ACL to be setup for access to the /dev/vfio/nn "group" device for any devices that will be assigned to a guest. In the case of a host device that is allocated from a pool, it was being allocated during qemuBuildCommandLine(), which is called by qemuProcessStart() *after* the all-encompassing qemuSetupCgroup() was called, meaning that the standard Cgroup ACL setup wasn't creating ACLs for these devices allocated from pools. One possible solution was to manually add a single ACL down inside qemuBuildCommandLine() when networkAllocateActualDevice() is called, but that has two problems: 1) the function that adds the cgroup ACL requires a virDomainObjPtr, which isn't available in qemuBuildCommandLine(), and 2) we really shouldn't be doing network device setup inside qemuBuildCommandLine() anyway. Instead, I've created a new function called qemuNetworkPrepareDevices() which is called just before qemuPrepareHostDevices() during qemuProcessStart() (explanation of ordering in the comments), i.e. well before the call to qemuSetupCgroup(). To minimize code churn in a patch that will be backported to 1.0.5-maint, qemuNetworkPrepareDevices only does networkAllocateActualDevice() and the bare amount of setup required for type='hostdev network devices, but it eventually should do *all* device setup for guest network devices. Note that some of the code that was previously needed in qemuBuildCommandLine() is no longer required when networkAllocateActualDevice() is called earlier: * qemuAssignDeviceHostdevAlias() is already done further down in qemuProcessStart(). * qemuPrepareHostdevPCIDevices() is called by qemuPrepareHostDevices() which is called after qemuNetworkPrepareDevices() in qemuProcessStart(). As hinted above, this new function should be moved into a separate qemu_network.c (or similarly named) file along with qemuPhysIfaceConnect(), qemuNetworkIfaceConnect(), and qemuOpenVhostNet(), and expanded to call those functions as well, then the nnets loop in qemuBuildCommandLine() should be reduced to only build the commandline string (which itself can be in a separate qemuInterfaceBuilldCommandLine() function as suggested by Michal). However, this will require storing away an array of tapfd and vhostfd that are needed for the commandline, so I would rather do that in a separate patch and leave this patch at the minimum to fix the bug.
2013-05-06 19:43:56 +00:00
/* network devices must be "prepared" before hostdevs, because
* setting up a network device might create a new hostdev that
* will need to be setup.
*/
VIR_DEBUG("Preparing network devices");
if (qemuProcessNetworkPrepareDevices(driver, vm) < 0)
return -1;
qemu: allocate network connections sooner during domain startup VFIO device assignment requires a cgroup ACL to be setup for access to the /dev/vfio/nn "group" device for any devices that will be assigned to a guest. In the case of a host device that is allocated from a pool, it was being allocated during qemuBuildCommandLine(), which is called by qemuProcessStart() *after* the all-encompassing qemuSetupCgroup() was called, meaning that the standard Cgroup ACL setup wasn't creating ACLs for these devices allocated from pools. One possible solution was to manually add a single ACL down inside qemuBuildCommandLine() when networkAllocateActualDevice() is called, but that has two problems: 1) the function that adds the cgroup ACL requires a virDomainObjPtr, which isn't available in qemuBuildCommandLine(), and 2) we really shouldn't be doing network device setup inside qemuBuildCommandLine() anyway. Instead, I've created a new function called qemuNetworkPrepareDevices() which is called just before qemuPrepareHostDevices() during qemuProcessStart() (explanation of ordering in the comments), i.e. well before the call to qemuSetupCgroup(). To minimize code churn in a patch that will be backported to 1.0.5-maint, qemuNetworkPrepareDevices only does networkAllocateActualDevice() and the bare amount of setup required for type='hostdev network devices, but it eventually should do *all* device setup for guest network devices. Note that some of the code that was previously needed in qemuBuildCommandLine() is no longer required when networkAllocateActualDevice() is called earlier: * qemuAssignDeviceHostdevAlias() is already done further down in qemuProcessStart(). * qemuPrepareHostdevPCIDevices() is called by qemuPrepareHostDevices() which is called after qemuNetworkPrepareDevices() in qemuProcessStart(). As hinted above, this new function should be moved into a separate qemu_network.c (or similarly named) file along with qemuPhysIfaceConnect(), qemuNetworkIfaceConnect(), and qemuOpenVhostNet(), and expanded to call those functions as well, then the nnets loop in qemuBuildCommandLine() should be reduced to only build the commandline string (which itself can be in a separate qemuInterfaceBuilldCommandLine() function as suggested by Michal). However, this will require storing away an array of tapfd and vhostfd that are needed for the commandline, so I would rather do that in a separate patch and leave this patch at the minimum to fix the bug.
2013-05-06 19:43:56 +00:00
/* Must be run before security labelling */
VIR_DEBUG("Preparing host devices");
if (!cfg->relaxedACS)
hostdev_flags |= VIR_HOSTDEV_STRICT_ACS_CHECK;
if (flags & VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_NEW)
hostdev_flags |= VIR_HOSTDEV_COLD_BOOT;
if (qemuHostdevPrepareDomainDevices(driver, vm->def, priv->qemuCaps,
hostdev_flags) < 0)
return -1;
VIR_DEBUG("Preparing chr devices");
if (virDomainChrDefForeach(vm->def,
true,
qemuProcessPrepareChardevDevice,
NULL) < 0)
return -1;
if (qemuProcessBuildDestroyMemoryPaths(driver, vm, NULL, true) < 0)
return -1;
/* Ensure no historical cgroup for this VM is lying around bogus
* settings */
VIR_DEBUG("Ensuring no historical cgroup is lying around");
systemd: Modernize machine naming So, systemd-machined has this philosophy that machine names are like hostnames and hence should follow the same rules. But we always allowed international characters in domain names. Thus we need to modify the machine name we are passing to systemd. In order to change some machine names that we will be passing to systemd, we also need to call TerminateMachine at the end of a lifetime of a domain. Even for domains that were started with older libvirt. That can be achieved thanks to virSystemdGetMachineNameByPID(). And because we can change machine names, we can get rid of the inconsistent and pointless escaping of domain names when creating machine names. So this patch modifies the naming in the following way. It creates the name as <drivername>-<id>-<name> where invalid hostname characters are stripped out of the name and if the resulting name is longer, it truncates it to 64 characters. That way we can start domains we couldn't start before. Well, at least on systemd. To make it work all together, the machineName (which is needed only with systemd) is saved in domain's private data. That way the generation is moved to the driver and we don't need to pass various unnecessary arguments to cgroup functions. The only thing this complicates a bit is the scope generation when validating a cgroup where we must check both old and new naming, so a slight modification was needed there. Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1282846 Signed-off-by: Martin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>
2016-02-01 15:50:54 +00:00
qemuRemoveCgroup(vm);
if (g_mkdir_with_parents(cfg->logDir, 0777) < 0) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("cannot create log directory %s"),
cfg->logDir);
return -1;
}
VIR_FREE(priv->pidfile);
if (!(priv->pidfile = virPidFileBuildPath(cfg->stateDir, vm->def->name))) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
"%s", _("Failed to build pidfile path."));
return -1;
}
if (unlink(priv->pidfile) < 0 &&
errno != ENOENT) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("Cannot remove stale PID file %s"),
priv->pidfile);
return -1;
}
/*
* Create all per-domain directories in order to make sure domain
* with any possible seclabels can access it.
*/
if (qemuProcessMakeDir(driver, vm, priv->libDir) < 0 ||
qemuProcessMakeDir(driver, vm, priv->channelTargetDir) < 0)
return -1;
VIR_DEBUG("Write domain masterKey");
if (qemuDomainWriteMasterKeyFile(driver, vm) < 0)
return -1;
qemu: Create domain master key Add a masterKey and masterKeyLen to _qemuDomainObjPrivate to store a random domain master key and its length in order to support the ability to encrypt/decrypt sensitive data shared between libvirt and qemu. The key will be base64 encoded and written to a file to be used by the command line building code to share with qemu. New API's from this patch: qemuDomainGetMasterKeyFilePath: Return a path to where the key is located qemuDomainWriteMasterKeyFile: (private) Open (create/trunc) the masterKey path and write the masterKey qemuDomainMasterKeyReadFile: Using the master key path, open/read the file, and store the masterKey and masterKeyLen. Expected use only from qemuProcessReconnect qemuDomainGenerateRandomKey: (private) Generate a random key using available algorithms The key is generated either from the gnutls_rnd function if it exists or a less cryptographically strong mechanism using virGenerateRandomBytes qemuDomainMasterKeyRemove: Remove traces of the master key, remove the *KeyFilePath qemuDomainMasterKeyCreate: Generate the domain master key and save the key in the location returned by qemuDomainGetMasterKeyFilePath. This API will first ensure the QEMU_CAPS_OBJECT_SECRET is set in the capabilities. If not, then there's no need to generate the secret or file. The creation of the key will be attempted from qemuProcessPrepareHost once the libDir directory structure exists. The removal of the key will handled from qemuProcessStop just prior to deleting the libDir tree. Since the key will not be written out to the domain object XML file, the qemuProcessReconnect will read the saved file and restore the masterKey and masterKeyLen.
2016-03-29 22:22:46 +00:00
VIR_DEBUG("Preparing disks (host)");
if (qemuProcessPrepareHostStorage(driver, vm, flags) < 0)
return -1;
VIR_DEBUG("Preparing hostdevs (host-side)");
if (qemuProcessPrepareHostHostdevs(vm) < 0)
return -1;
VIR_DEBUG("Preparing external devices");
if (qemuExtDevicesPrepareHost(driver, vm) < 0)
return -1;
if (qemuProcessPrepareSEVGuestInput(vm) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/**
* qemuProcessGenID:
* @vm: Pointer to domain object
* @flags: qemuProcessStartFlags
*
* If this domain is requesting to use genid, then update the GUID
* value if the VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_GEN_VMID flag is set. This
* flag is set on specific paths during domain start processing when
* there is the possibility that the VM is potentially re-executing
* something that has already been executed before.
*/
static int
qemuProcessGenID(virDomainObjPtr vm,
unsigned int flags)
{
if (!vm->def->genidRequested)
return 0;
/* If we are coming from a path where we must provide a new gen id
* value regardless of whether it was previously generated or provided,
* then generate a new GUID value before we build the command line. */
if (flags & VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_GEN_VMID) {
if (virUUIDGenerate(vm->def->genid) < 0) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
_("failed to regenerate genid"));
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/**
* qemuProcessSetupDiskThrottlingBlockdev:
*
* Sets up disk trottling for -blockdev via block_set_io_throttle monitor
* command. This hack should be replaced by proper use of the 'throttle'
* blockdev driver in qemu once it will support changing of the throttle group.
* Same hack is done in qemuDomainAttachDiskGeneric.
*/
static int
qemuProcessSetupDiskThrottlingBlockdev(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
qemuDomainAsyncJob asyncJob)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
size_t i;
int ret = -1;
if (!virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_BLOCKDEV))
return 0;
VIR_DEBUG("Setting up disk throttling for -blockdev via block_set_io_throttle");
if (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->ndisks; i++) {
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = vm->def->disks[i];
qemuDomainDiskPrivatePtr diskPriv = QEMU_DOMAIN_DISK_PRIVATE(disk);
/* sd-cards are instantiated via -drive */
if (qemuDiskBusIsSD(disk->bus))
continue;
/* Setting throttling for empty drives fails */
if (virStorageSourceIsEmpty(disk->src))
continue;
if (!qemuDiskConfigBlkdeviotuneEnabled(disk))
continue;
if (qemuMonitorSetBlockIoThrottle(qemuDomainGetMonitor(vm), NULL,
diskPriv->qomName, &disk->blkdeviotune,
true, true, true) < 0)
goto cleanup;
}
ret = 0;
cleanup:
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
ret = -1;
return ret;
}
static int
qemuProcessEnableDomainNamespaces(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
if (virBitmapIsBitSet(cfg->namespaces, QEMU_DOMAIN_NS_MOUNT) &&
qemuDomainEnableNamespace(vm, QEMU_DOMAIN_NS_MOUNT) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessEnablePerf(virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
size_t i;
if (!(priv->perf = virPerfNew()))
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < VIR_PERF_EVENT_LAST; i++) {
if (vm->def->perf.events[i] == VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_YES &&
virPerfEventEnable(priv->perf, i, vm->pid) < 0)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* qemuProcessLaunch:
*
* Launch a new QEMU process with stopped virtual CPUs.
*
* The caller is supposed to call qemuProcessStop with appropriate
* flags in case of failure.
*
* Returns 0 on success,
* -1 on error which happened before devices were labeled and thus
* there is no need to restore them,
* -2 on error requesting security labels to be restored.
*/
int
qemuProcessLaunch(virConnectPtr conn,
virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
qemuDomainAsyncJob asyncJob,
qemuProcessIncomingDefPtr incoming,
virDomainMomentObjPtr snapshot,
virNetDevVPortProfileOp vmop,
unsigned int flags)
{
int ret = -1;
int rv;
int logfile = -1;
g_autoptr(qemuDomainLogContext) logCtxt = NULL;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
g_autoptr(virCommand) cmd = NULL;
struct qemuProcessHookData hookData;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = NULL;
size_t nnicindexes = 0;
g_autofree int *nicindexes = NULL;
VIR_DEBUG("conn=%p driver=%p vm=%p name=%s if=%d asyncJob=%d "
"incoming.launchURI=%s incoming.deferredURI=%s "
"incoming.fd=%d incoming.path=%s "
"snapshot=%p vmop=%d flags=0x%x",
conn, driver, vm, vm->def->name, vm->def->id, asyncJob,
NULLSTR(incoming ? incoming->launchURI : NULL),
NULLSTR(incoming ? incoming->deferredURI : NULL),
incoming ? incoming->fd : -1,
NULLSTR(incoming ? incoming->path : NULL),
snapshot, vmop, flags);
/* Okay, these are just internal flags,
* but doesn't hurt to check */
virCheckFlags(VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_COLD |
VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_PAUSED |
VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_AUTODESTROY |
VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_NEW |
VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_GEN_VMID, -1);
cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
qemu: add support for running QEMU driver in embedded mode This enables support for running QEMU embedded to the calling application process using a URI: qemu:///embed?root=/some/path Note that it is important to keep the path reasonably short to avoid risk of hitting the limit on UNIX socket path names which is 108 characters. When using the embedded mode with a root=/var/tmp/embed, the driver will use the following paths: logDir: /var/tmp/embed/log/qemu swtpmLogDir: /var/tmp/embed/log/swtpm configBaseDir: /var/tmp/embed/etc/qemu stateDir: /var/tmp/embed/run/qemu swtpmStateDir: /var/tmp/embed/run/swtpm cacheDir: /var/tmp/embed/cache/qemu libDir: /var/tmp/embed/lib/qemu swtpmStorageDir: /var/tmp/embed/lib/swtpm defaultTLSx509certdir: /var/tmp/embed/etc/pki/qemu These are identical whether the embedded driver is privileged or unprivileged. This compares with the system instance which uses logDir: /var/log/libvirt/qemu swtpmLogDir: /var/log/swtpm/libvirt/qemu configBaseDir: /etc/libvirt/qemu stateDir: /run/libvirt/qemu swtpmStateDir: /run/libvirt/qemu/swtpm cacheDir: /var/cache/libvirt/qemu libDir: /var/lib/libvirt/qemu swtpmStorageDir: /var/lib/libvirt/swtpm defaultTLSx509certdir: /etc/pki/qemu At this time all features present in the QEMU driver are available when running in embedded mode, availability matching whether the embedded driver is privileged or unprivileged. Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2019-05-17 11:35:57 +00:00
if (flags & VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_AUTODESTROY) {
if (!conn) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
_("Domain autodestroy requires a connection handle"));
return -1;
}
if (driver->embeddedRoot) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
_("Domain autodestroy not supported for embedded drivers yet"));
return -1;
}
}
hookData.vm = vm;
hookData.driver = driver;
/* We don't increase cfg's reference counter here. */
hookData.cfg = cfg;
VIR_DEBUG("Creating domain log file");
if (!(logCtxt = qemuDomainLogContextNew(driver, vm,
QEMU_DOMAIN_LOG_CONTEXT_MODE_START))) {
virLastErrorPrefixMessage("%s", _("can't connect to virtlogd"));
goto cleanup;
}
logfile = qemuDomainLogContextGetWriteFD(logCtxt);
if (qemuProcessGenID(vm, flags) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (qemuExtDevicesStart(driver, vm,
qemuDomainLogContextGetManager(logCtxt),
incoming != NULL) < 0)
goto cleanup;
VIR_DEBUG("Building emulator command line");
if (!(cmd = qemuBuildCommandLine(driver,
qemuDomainLogContextGetManager(logCtxt),
driver->securityManager,
vm,
incoming ? incoming->launchURI : NULL,
snapshot, vmop,
false,
qemuCheckFips(vm),
&nnicindexes, &nicindexes, 0)))
goto cleanup;
if (incoming && incoming->fd != -1)
virCommandPassFD(cmd, incoming->fd, 0);
/* now that we know it is about to start call the hook if present */
if (qemuProcessStartHook(driver, vm,
VIR_HOOK_QEMU_OP_START,
VIR_HOOK_SUBOP_BEGIN) < 0)
goto cleanup;
qemuLogOperation(vm, "starting up", cmd, logCtxt);
qemuDomainObjCheckTaint(driver, vm, logCtxt, incoming != NULL);
qemuDomainLogContextMarkPosition(logCtxt);
qemu: Spawn qemu under mount namespace Prime time. When it comes to spawning qemu process and relabelling all the devices it's going to touch, there's inherent race with other applications in the system (e.g. udev). Instead of trying convincing udev to not touch libvirt managed devices, we can create a separate mount namespace for the qemu, and mount our own /dev there. Of course this puts more work onto us as we have to maintain /dev files on each domain start and device hot(un-)plug. On the other hand, this enhances security also. From technical POV, on domain startup process the parent (libvirtd) creates: /var/lib/libvirt/qemu/$domain.dev /var/lib/libvirt/qemu/$domain.devpts The child (which is going to be qemu eventually) calls unshare() to create new mount namespace. From now on anything that child does is invisible to the parent. Child then mounts tmpfs on $domain.dev (so that it still sees original /dev from the host) and creates some devices (as explained in one of the previous patches). The devices have to be created exactly as they are in the host (including perms, seclabels, ACLs, ...). After that it moves $domain.dev mount to /dev. What's the $domain.devpts mount there for then you ask? QEMU can create PTYs for some chardevs. And historically we exposed the host ends in our domain XML allowing users to connect to them. Therefore we must preserve devpts mount to be shared with the host's one. To make this patch as small as possible, creating of devices configured for domain in question is implemented in next patches. Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
2016-11-15 10:30:18 +00:00
VIR_DEBUG("Building mount namespace");
if (qemuProcessEnableDomainNamespaces(driver, vm) < 0)
qemu: Spawn qemu under mount namespace Prime time. When it comes to spawning qemu process and relabelling all the devices it's going to touch, there's inherent race with other applications in the system (e.g. udev). Instead of trying convincing udev to not touch libvirt managed devices, we can create a separate mount namespace for the qemu, and mount our own /dev there. Of course this puts more work onto us as we have to maintain /dev files on each domain start and device hot(un-)plug. On the other hand, this enhances security also. From technical POV, on domain startup process the parent (libvirtd) creates: /var/lib/libvirt/qemu/$domain.dev /var/lib/libvirt/qemu/$domain.devpts The child (which is going to be qemu eventually) calls unshare() to create new mount namespace. From now on anything that child does is invisible to the parent. Child then mounts tmpfs on $domain.dev (so that it still sees original /dev from the host) and creates some devices (as explained in one of the previous patches). The devices have to be created exactly as they are in the host (including perms, seclabels, ACLs, ...). After that it moves $domain.dev mount to /dev. What's the $domain.devpts mount there for then you ask? QEMU can create PTYs for some chardevs. And historically we exposed the host ends in our domain XML allowing users to connect to them. Therefore we must preserve devpts mount to be shared with the host's one. To make this patch as small as possible, creating of devices configured for domain in question is implemented in next patches. Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
2016-11-15 10:30:18 +00:00
goto cleanup;
VIR_DEBUG("Setting up raw IO");
if (qemuProcessSetupRawIO(driver, vm, cmd) < 0)
goto cleanup;
virCommandSetPreExecHook(cmd, qemuProcessHook, &hookData);
virCommandSetMaxProcesses(cmd, cfg->maxProcesses);
virCommandSetMaxFiles(cmd, cfg->maxFiles);
virCommandSetMaxCoreSize(cmd, cfg->maxCore);
virCommandSetUmask(cmd, 0x002);
VIR_DEBUG("Setting up security labelling");
if (qemuSecuritySetChildProcessLabel(driver->securityManager,
vm->def, cmd) < 0)
goto cleanup;
virCommandSetOutputFD(cmd, &logfile);
virCommandSetErrorFD(cmd, &logfile);
virCommandNonblockingFDs(cmd);
virCommandSetPidFile(cmd, priv->pidfile);
virCommandDaemonize(cmd);
virCommandRequireHandshake(cmd);
if (qemuSecurityPreFork(driver->securityManager) < 0)
goto cleanup;
rv = virCommandRun(cmd, NULL);
qemuSecurityPostFork(driver->securityManager);
/* wait for qemu process to show up */
if (rv == 0) {
if ((rv = virPidFileReadPath(priv->pidfile, &vm->pid)) < 0) {
virReportSystemError(-rv,
_("Domain %s didn't show up"),
vm->def->name);
goto cleanup;
}
VIR_DEBUG("QEMU vm=%p name=%s running with pid=%lld",
vm, vm->def->name, (long long)vm->pid);
} else {
VIR_DEBUG("QEMU vm=%p name=%s failed to spawn",
vm, vm->def->name);
goto cleanup;
}
VIR_DEBUG("Writing early domain status to disk");
if (virDomainObjSave(vm, driver->xmlopt, cfg->stateDir) < 0)
goto cleanup;
VIR_DEBUG("Waiting for handshake from child");
if (virCommandHandshakeWait(cmd) < 0) {
/* Read errors from child that occurred between fork and exec. */
qemuProcessReportLogError(logCtxt,
_("Process exited prior to exec"));
goto cleanup;
}
VIR_DEBUG("Building domain mount namespace (if required)");
if (qemuDomainBuildNamespace(cfg, vm) < 0)
goto cleanup;
VIR_DEBUG("Setting up domain cgroup (if required)");
if (qemuSetupCgroup(vm, nnicindexes, nicindexes) < 0)
goto cleanup;
VIR_DEBUG("Setting up domain perf (if required)");
if (qemuProcessEnablePerf(vm) < 0)
goto cleanup;
/* This must be done after cgroup placement to avoid resetting CPU
* affinity */
if (qemuProcessInitCpuAffinity(vm) < 0)
goto cleanup;
VIR_DEBUG("Setting emulator tuning/settings");
if (qemuProcessSetupEmulator(vm) < 0)
goto cleanup;
VIR_DEBUG("Setting cgroup for external devices (if required)");
if (qemuSetupCgroupForExtDevices(vm, driver) < 0)
goto cleanup;
VIR_DEBUG("Setting up resctrl");
if (qemuProcessResctrlCreate(driver, vm) < 0)
goto cleanup;
VIR_DEBUG("Setting up managed PR daemon");
if (virDomainDefHasManagedPR(vm->def) &&
qemuProcessStartManagedPRDaemon(vm) < 0)
goto cleanup;
VIR_DEBUG("Setting domain security labels");
if (qemuSecuritySetAllLabel(driver,
vm,
incoming ? incoming->path : NULL,
incoming != NULL) < 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Security manager labeled all devices, therefore
* if any operation from now on fails, we need to ask the caller to
* restore labels.
*/
ret = -2;
if (incoming && incoming->fd != -1) {
/* if there's an fd to migrate from, and it's a pipe, put the
* proper security label on it
*/
struct stat stdin_sb;
VIR_DEBUG("setting security label on pipe used for migration");
if (fstat(incoming->fd, &stdin_sb) < 0) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("cannot stat fd %d"), incoming->fd);
goto cleanup;
}
if (S_ISFIFO(stdin_sb.st_mode) &&
qemuSecuritySetImageFDLabel(driver->securityManager,
vm->def, incoming->fd) < 0)
goto cleanup;
}
VIR_DEBUG("Labelling done, completing handshake to child");
if (virCommandHandshakeNotify(cmd) < 0)
goto cleanup;
VIR_DEBUG("Handshake complete, child running");
if (qemuDomainObjStartWorker(vm) < 0)
goto cleanup;
VIR_DEBUG("Waiting for monitor to show up");
if (qemuProcessWaitForMonitor(driver, vm, asyncJob, logCtxt) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (qemuConnectAgent(driver, vm) < 0)
goto cleanup;
VIR_DEBUG("Verifying and updating provided guest CPU");
if (qemuProcessUpdateAndVerifyCPU(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
goto cleanup;
VIR_DEBUG("setting up hotpluggable cpus");
if (qemuDomainHasHotpluggableStartupVcpus(vm->def)) {
if (qemuDomainRefreshVcpuInfo(driver, vm, asyncJob, false) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (qemuProcessValidateHotpluggableVcpus(vm->def) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (qemuProcessSetupHotpluggableVcpus(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
goto cleanup;
}
VIR_DEBUG("Refreshing VCPU info");
if (qemuDomainRefreshVcpuInfo(driver, vm, asyncJob, false) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (qemuDomainValidateVcpuInfo(vm) < 0)
goto cleanup;
qemuDomainVcpuPersistOrder(vm->def);
VIR_DEBUG("Detecting IOThread PIDs");
if (qemuProcessDetectIOThreadPIDs(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
goto cleanup;
VIR_DEBUG("Setting global CPU cgroup (if required)");
if (qemuSetupGlobalCpuCgroup(vm) < 0)
goto cleanup;
VIR_DEBUG("Setting vCPU tuning/settings");
if (qemuProcessSetupVcpus(vm) < 0)
goto cleanup;
VIR_DEBUG("Setting IOThread tuning/settings");
if (qemuProcessSetupIOThreads(vm) < 0)
goto cleanup;
VIR_DEBUG("Setting emulator scheduler");
if (vm->def->cputune.emulatorsched &&
virProcessSetScheduler(vm->pid,
vm->def->cputune.emulatorsched->policy,
vm->def->cputune.emulatorsched->priority) < 0)
goto cleanup;
VIR_DEBUG("Setting any required VM passwords");
if (qemuProcessInitPasswords(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
goto cleanup;
/* set default link states */
/* qemu doesn't support setting this on the command line, so
* enter the monitor */
VIR_DEBUG("Setting network link states");
if (qemuProcessSetLinkStates(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
goto cleanup;
VIR_DEBUG("Setting initial memory amount");
if (qemuProcessSetupBalloon(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (qemuProcessSetupDiskThrottlingBlockdev(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Since CPUs were not started yet, the balloon could not return the memory
* to the host and thus cur_balloon needs to be updated so that GetXMLdesc
* and friends return the correct size in case they can't grab the job */
if (!incoming && !snapshot &&
qemuProcessRefreshBalloonState(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (flags & VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_AUTODESTROY &&
qemuProcessAutoDestroyAdd(driver, vm, conn) < 0)
goto cleanup;
VIR_DEBUG("Setting up transient disk");
if (qemuSnapshotCreateDisksTransient(vm, asyncJob) < 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = 0;
cleanup:
qemuDomainSecretDestroy(vm);
return ret;
}
/**
* qemuProcessRefreshState:
* @driver: qemu driver data
* @vm: domain to refresh
* @asyncJob: async job type
*
* This function gathers calls to refresh qemu state after startup. This
* function is called after a deferred migration finishes so that we can update
* state influenced by the migration stream.
*/
int
qemuProcessRefreshState(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
qemuDomainAsyncJob asyncJob)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
VIR_DEBUG("Fetching list of active devices");
if (qemuDomainUpdateDeviceList(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
return -1;
VIR_DEBUG("Updating info of memory devices");
if (qemuDomainUpdateMemoryDeviceInfo(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
return -1;
VIR_DEBUG("Detecting actual memory size for video device");
if (qemuProcessUpdateVideoRamSize(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
return -1;
VIR_DEBUG("Updating disk data");
if (qemuProcessRefreshDisks(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
return -1;
if (!virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_BLOCKDEV) &&
qemuBlockNodeNamesDetect(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/**
* qemuProcessFinishStartup:
*
* Finish starting a new domain.
*/
int
qemuProcessFinishStartup(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
qemuDomainAsyncJob asyncJob,
bool startCPUs,
virDomainPausedReason pausedReason)
{
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
if (startCPUs) {
VIR_DEBUG("Starting domain CPUs");
if (qemuProcessStartCPUs(driver, vm,
VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING_BOOTED,
asyncJob) < 0) {
if (virGetLastErrorCode() == VIR_ERR_OK)
virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_FAILED, "%s",
_("resume operation failed"));
return -1;
}
} else {
virDomainObjSetState(vm, VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED, pausedReason);
}
VIR_DEBUG("Writing domain status to disk");
if (virDomainObjSave(vm, driver->xmlopt, cfg->stateDir) < 0)
return -1;
if (qemuProcessStartHook(driver, vm,
VIR_HOOK_QEMU_OP_STARTED,
VIR_HOOK_SUBOP_BEGIN) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
int
qemuProcessStart(virConnectPtr conn,
virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
virCPUDefPtr updatedCPU,
qemuDomainAsyncJob asyncJob,
const char *migrateFrom,
int migrateFd,
const char *migratePath,
virDomainMomentObjPtr snapshot,
virNetDevVPortProfileOp vmop,
unsigned int flags)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
qemuProcessIncomingDefPtr incoming = NULL;
unsigned int stopFlags;
bool relabel = false;
qemu: Use qemuSecuritySetSavedStateLabel() to label restore path Currently, when restoring from a domain the path that the domain restores from is labelled under qemuSecuritySetAllLabel() (and after v6.3.0-rc1~108 even outside transactions). While this grants QEMU the access, it has a flaw, because once the domain is restored, up and running then qemuSecurityDomainRestorePathLabel() is called, which is not real counterpart. In case of DAC driver the SetAllLabel() does nothing with the restore path but RestorePathLabel() does - it chown()-s the file back and since there is no original label remembered, the file is chown()-ed to root:root. While the apparent solution is to have DAC driver set the label (and thus remember the original one) in SetAllLabel(), we can do better. Turns out, we are opening the file ourselves (because it may live on a root squashed NFS) and then are just passing the FD to QEMU. But this means, that we don't have to chown() the file at all, we need to set SELinux labels and/or add the path to AppArmor profile. And since we want to restore labels right after QEMU is done loading the migration stream (we don't want to wait until qemuSecurityRestoreAllLabel()), the best way to approach this is to have separate APIs for labelling and restoring label on the restore file. I will investigate whether AppArmor can use the SavedStateLabel() API instead of passing the restore path to SetAllLabel(). Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1851016 Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>
2020-06-27 04:28:17 +00:00
bool relabelSavedState = false;
int ret = -1;
int rv;
VIR_DEBUG("conn=%p driver=%p vm=%p name=%s id=%d asyncJob=%s "
"migrateFrom=%s migrateFd=%d migratePath=%s "
"snapshot=%p vmop=%d flags=0x%x",
conn, driver, vm, vm->def->name, vm->def->id,
qemuDomainAsyncJobTypeToString(asyncJob),
NULLSTR(migrateFrom), migrateFd, NULLSTR(migratePath),
snapshot, vmop, flags);
virCheckFlagsGoto(VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_COLD |
VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_PAUSED |
VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_AUTODESTROY |
VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_GEN_VMID, cleanup);
if (!migrateFrom && !snapshot)
flags |= VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_NEW;
if (qemuProcessInit(driver, vm, updatedCPU,
asyncJob, !!migrateFrom, flags) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (migrateFrom) {
incoming = qemuProcessIncomingDefNew(priv->qemuCaps, NULL, migrateFrom,
migrateFd, migratePath);
if (!incoming)
goto stop;
}
if (qemuProcessPrepareDomain(driver, vm, flags) < 0)
goto stop;
if (qemuProcessPrepareHost(driver, vm, flags) < 0)
goto stop;
qemu: Use qemuSecuritySetSavedStateLabel() to label restore path Currently, when restoring from a domain the path that the domain restores from is labelled under qemuSecuritySetAllLabel() (and after v6.3.0-rc1~108 even outside transactions). While this grants QEMU the access, it has a flaw, because once the domain is restored, up and running then qemuSecurityDomainRestorePathLabel() is called, which is not real counterpart. In case of DAC driver the SetAllLabel() does nothing with the restore path but RestorePathLabel() does - it chown()-s the file back and since there is no original label remembered, the file is chown()-ed to root:root. While the apparent solution is to have DAC driver set the label (and thus remember the original one) in SetAllLabel(), we can do better. Turns out, we are opening the file ourselves (because it may live on a root squashed NFS) and then are just passing the FD to QEMU. But this means, that we don't have to chown() the file at all, we need to set SELinux labels and/or add the path to AppArmor profile. And since we want to restore labels right after QEMU is done loading the migration stream (we don't want to wait until qemuSecurityRestoreAllLabel()), the best way to approach this is to have separate APIs for labelling and restoring label on the restore file. I will investigate whether AppArmor can use the SavedStateLabel() API instead of passing the restore path to SetAllLabel(). Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1851016 Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>
2020-06-27 04:28:17 +00:00
if (migratePath) {
if (qemuSecuritySetSavedStateLabel(driver->securityManager,
vm->def, migratePath) < 0)
goto cleanup;
relabelSavedState = true;
}
if ((rv = qemuProcessLaunch(conn, driver, vm, asyncJob, incoming,
snapshot, vmop, flags)) < 0) {
if (rv == -2)
relabel = true;
goto stop;
}
relabel = true;
if (incoming) {
if (incoming->deferredURI &&
qemuMigrationDstRun(driver, vm, incoming->deferredURI, asyncJob) < 0)
goto stop;
} else {
/* Refresh state of devices from QEMU. During migration this happens
* in qemuMigrationDstFinish to ensure that state information is fully
* transferred. */
if (qemuProcessRefreshState(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
goto stop;
}
if (qemuProcessFinishStartup(driver, vm, asyncJob,
!(flags & VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_PAUSED),
incoming ?
VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_MIGRATION :
VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_USER) < 0)
goto stop;
if (!incoming) {
/* Keep watching qemu log for errors during incoming migration, otherwise
* unset reporting errors from qemu log. */
qemuMonitorSetDomainLog(priv->mon, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
ret = 0;
cleanup:
qemu: Use qemuSecuritySetSavedStateLabel() to label restore path Currently, when restoring from a domain the path that the domain restores from is labelled under qemuSecuritySetAllLabel() (and after v6.3.0-rc1~108 even outside transactions). While this grants QEMU the access, it has a flaw, because once the domain is restored, up and running then qemuSecurityDomainRestorePathLabel() is called, which is not real counterpart. In case of DAC driver the SetAllLabel() does nothing with the restore path but RestorePathLabel() does - it chown()-s the file back and since there is no original label remembered, the file is chown()-ed to root:root. While the apparent solution is to have DAC driver set the label (and thus remember the original one) in SetAllLabel(), we can do better. Turns out, we are opening the file ourselves (because it may live on a root squashed NFS) and then are just passing the FD to QEMU. But this means, that we don't have to chown() the file at all, we need to set SELinux labels and/or add the path to AppArmor profile. And since we want to restore labels right after QEMU is done loading the migration stream (we don't want to wait until qemuSecurityRestoreAllLabel()), the best way to approach this is to have separate APIs for labelling and restoring label on the restore file. I will investigate whether AppArmor can use the SavedStateLabel() API instead of passing the restore path to SetAllLabel(). Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1851016 Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>
2020-06-27 04:28:17 +00:00
if (relabelSavedState &&
qemuSecurityRestoreSavedStateLabel(driver->securityManager,
vm->def, migratePath) < 0)
VIR_WARN("failed to restore save state label on %s", migratePath);
qemuProcessIncomingDefFree(incoming);
return ret;
stop:
stopFlags = 0;
if (!relabel)
stopFlags |= VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_STOP_NO_RELABEL;
if (migrateFrom)
stopFlags |= VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_STOP_MIGRATED;
if (priv->mon)
qemuMonitorSetDomainLog(priv->mon, NULL, NULL, NULL);
qemuProcessStop(driver, vm, VIR_DOMAIN_SHUTOFF_FAILED, asyncJob, stopFlags);
goto cleanup;
}
int
qemuProcessCreatePretendCmdPrepare(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *migrateURI,
bool standalone,
unsigned int flags)
{
virCheckFlags(VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_COLD |
VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_PAUSED |
VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_AUTODESTROY, -1);
flags |= VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_PRETEND;
if (!migrateURI)
flags |= VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_NEW;
if (standalone)
flags |= VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_START_STANDALONE;
if (qemuProcessInit(driver, vm, NULL, QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE,
!!migrateURI, flags) < 0)
return -1;
if (qemuProcessPrepareDomain(driver, vm, flags) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
virCommandPtr
qemuProcessCreatePretendCmdBuild(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *migrateURI,
bool enableFips,
bool standalone,
bool jsonPropsValidation)
{
unsigned int buildflags = 0;
if (jsonPropsValidation)
buildflags = QEMU_BUILD_COMMANDLINE_VALIDATE_KEEP_JSON;
VIR_DEBUG("Building emulator command line");
return qemuBuildCommandLine(driver,
NULL,
driver->securityManager,
vm,
migrateURI,
NULL,
VIR_NETDEV_VPORT_PROFILE_OP_NO_OP,
standalone,
enableFips,
NULL,
NULL,
buildflags);
}
qemu: drop driver lock while trying to terminate qemu process This patch is based on an earlier patch by Eric Blake which was never committed: https://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2011-November/msg00243.html Aside from rebasing, this patch only drops the driver lock once (prior to the first time the function sleeps), then leaves it dropped until it returns (Eric's patch would drop and re-acquire the lock around each call to sleep). At the time Eric sent his patch, the response (from Dan Berrange) was that, while it wasn't a good thing to be holding the driver lock while sleeping, we really need to rethink locking wrt the driver object, switching to a finer-grained approach that locks individual items within the driver object separately to allow for greater concurrency. This is a good plan, and at the time it made sense to not apply the patch because there was no known bug related to the driver lock being held in this function. However, we now know that the length of the wait in qemuProcessKill is sometimes too short to allow the qemu process to fully flush its disk cache before SIGKILL is sent, so we need to lengthen the timeout (in order to improve the situation with management applications until they can be updated to use the new VIR_DOMAIN_DESTROY_GRACEFUL flag added in commit 72f8a7f19753506ed957b78ad800c0f3892c9304). But, if we lengthen the timeout, we also lengthen the amount of time that all other threads in libvirtd are essentially blocked from doing anything (since just about everything needs to acquire the driver lock, if only for long enough to get a pointer to a domain). The solution is to modify qemuProcessKill to drop the driver lock while sleeping, as proposed in Eric's patch. Then we can increase the timeout with a clear conscience, and thus at least lower the chances that someone running with existing management software will suffer the consequence's of qemu's disk cache not being flushed. In the meantime, we still should work on Dan's proposal to make locking within the driver object more fine grained. (NB: although I couldn't find any instance where qemuProcessKill() was called with no jobs active for the domain (or some other guarantee that the current thread had at least one refcount on the domain object), this patch still follows Eric's method of temporarily adding a ref prior to unlocking the domain object, because I couldn't convince myself 100% that this was the case.)
2012-02-07 16:13:57 +00:00
int
qemuProcessKill(virDomainObjPtr vm, unsigned int flags)
{
VIR_DEBUG("vm=%p name=%s pid=%lld flags=0x%x",
vm, vm->def->name,
(long long)vm->pid, flags);
if (!(flags & VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_KILL_NOCHECK)) {
if (!virDomainObjIsActive(vm)) {
VIR_DEBUG("VM '%s' not active", vm->def->name);
return 0;
}
}
if (flags & VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_KILL_NOWAIT) {
virProcessKill(vm->pid,
(flags & VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_KILL_FORCE) ?
SIGKILL : SIGTERM);
return 0;
}
/* Request an extra delay of two seconds per current nhostdevs
* to be safe against stalls by the kernel freeing up the resources */
return virProcessKillPainfullyDelay(vm->pid,
!!(flags & VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_KILL_FORCE),
vm->def->nhostdevs * 2);
}
/**
* qemuProcessBeginStopJob:
*
* Stop all current jobs by killing the domain and start a new one for
* qemuProcessStop.
*/
int
qemuProcessBeginStopJob(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
qemuDomainJob job,
bool forceKill)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
unsigned int killFlags = forceKill ? VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_KILL_FORCE : 0;
int ret = -1;
/* We need to prevent monitor EOF callback from doing our work (and
* sending misleading events) while the vm is unlocked inside
* BeginJob/ProcessKill API
*/
priv->beingDestroyed = true;
if (qemuProcessKill(vm, killFlags) < 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Wake up anything waiting on domain condition */
virDomainObjBroadcast(vm);
if (qemuDomainObjBeginJob(driver, vm, job) < 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = 0;
cleanup:
priv->beingDestroyed = false;
return ret;
}
void qemuProcessStop(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
virDomainShutoffReason reason,
qemuDomainAsyncJob asyncJob,
unsigned int flags)
{
int ret;
int retries = 0;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
virErrorPtr orig_err;
virDomainDefPtr def = vm->def;
const virNetDevVPortProfile *vport = NULL;
size_t i;
g_autofree char *timestamp = NULL;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
g_autoptr(virConnect) conn = NULL;
VIR_DEBUG("Shutting down vm=%p name=%s id=%d pid=%lld, "
"reason=%s, asyncJob=%s, flags=0x%x",
vm, vm->def->name, vm->def->id,
(long long)vm->pid,
virDomainShutoffReasonTypeToString(reason),
qemuDomainAsyncJobTypeToString(asyncJob),
flags);
/* This method is routinely used in clean up paths. Disable error
* reporting so we don't squash a legit error. */
virErrorPreserveLast(&orig_err);
if (asyncJob != QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE) {
if (qemuDomainObjBeginNestedJob(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
goto cleanup;
} else if (priv->job.asyncJob != QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE &&
priv->job.asyncOwner == virThreadSelfID() &&
priv->job.active != QEMU_JOB_ASYNC_NESTED) {
VIR_WARN("qemuProcessStop called without a nested job (async=%s)",
qemuDomainAsyncJobTypeToString(asyncJob));
}
if (!virDomainObjIsActive(vm)) {
VIR_DEBUG("VM '%s' not active", vm->def->name);
goto endjob;
}
qemuProcessBuildDestroyMemoryPaths(driver, vm, NULL, false);
if (!!g_atomic_int_dec_and_test(&driver->nactive) && driver->inhibitCallback)
driver->inhibitCallback(false, driver->inhibitOpaque);
/* Wake up anything waiting on domain condition */
virDomainObjBroadcast(vm);
if ((timestamp = virTimeStringNow()) != NULL) {
qemuDomainLogAppendMessage(driver, vm, "%s: shutting down, reason=%s\n",
timestamp,
virDomainShutoffReasonTypeToString(reason));
}
/* Clear network bandwidth */
virDomainClearNetBandwidth(vm->def);
virDomainConfVMNWFilterTeardown(vm);
if (cfg->macFilter) {
for (i = 0; i < def->nnets; i++) {
virDomainNetDefPtr net = def->nets[i];
if (net->ifname == NULL)
continue;
ignore_value(ebtablesRemoveForwardAllowIn(driver->ebtables,
net->ifname,
&net->mac));
}
}
virPortAllocatorRelease(priv->nbdPort);
priv->nbdPort = 0;
if (priv->agent) {
qemuAgentClose(priv->agent);
priv->agent = NULL;
}
priv->agentError = false;
Fix (rare) deadlock in QEMU monitor callbacks Some users report (very rarely) seeing a deadlock in the QEMU monitor callbacks Thread 10 (Thread 0x7fcd11e20700 (LWP 26753)): #0 0x00000030d0e0de4d in __lll_lock_wait () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0 #1 0x00000030d0e09ca6 in _L_lock_840 () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0 #2 0x00000030d0e09ba8 in pthread_mutex_lock () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0 #3 0x00007fcd162f416d in virMutexLock (m=<optimized out>) at util/threads-pthread.c:85 #4 0x00007fcd1632c651 in virDomainObjLock (obj=<optimized out>) at conf/domain_conf.c:14256 #5 0x00007fcd0daf05cc in qemuProcessHandleMonitorDestroy (mon=0x7fcccc0029e0, vm=0x7fcccc00a850) at qemu/qemu_process.c:1026 #6 0x00007fcd0db01710 in qemuMonitorDispose (obj=0x7fcccc0029e0) at qemu/qemu_monitor.c:249 #7 0x00007fcd162fd4e3 in virObjectUnref (anyobj=<optimized out>) at util/virobject.c:139 #8 0x00007fcd0db027a9 in qemuMonitorClose (mon=<optimized out>) at qemu/qemu_monitor.c:860 #9 0x00007fcd0daf61ad in qemuProcessStop (driver=driver@entry=0x7fcd04079d50, vm=vm@entry=0x7fcccc00a850, reason=reason@entry=VIR_DOMAIN_SHUTOFF_DESTROYED, flags=flags@entry=0) at qemu/qemu_process.c:4057 #10 0x00007fcd0db323cf in qemuDomainDestroyFlags (dom=<optimized out>, flags=<optimized out>) at qemu/qemu_driver.c:1977 #11 0x00007fcd1637ff51 in virDomainDestroyFlags ( domain=domain@entry=0x7fccf00c1830, flags=1) at libvirt.c:2256 At frame #10 we are holding the domain lock, we call into qemuProcessStop() to cleanup QEMU, which triggers the monitor to close, which invokes qemuProcessHandleMonitorDestroy() which tries to obtain the domain lock again. This is a non-recursive lock, hence hang. Since qemuMonitorPtr is a virObject, the unref call in qemuProcessHandleMonitorDestroy no longer needs mutex protection. The assignment of priv->mon = NULL, can be instead done by the caller of qemuMonitorClose(), thus removing all need for locking. Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2012-09-26 14:54:58 +00:00
if (priv->mon) {
qemuMonitorClose(priv->mon);
Fix (rare) deadlock in QEMU monitor callbacks Some users report (very rarely) seeing a deadlock in the QEMU monitor callbacks Thread 10 (Thread 0x7fcd11e20700 (LWP 26753)): #0 0x00000030d0e0de4d in __lll_lock_wait () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0 #1 0x00000030d0e09ca6 in _L_lock_840 () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0 #2 0x00000030d0e09ba8 in pthread_mutex_lock () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0 #3 0x00007fcd162f416d in virMutexLock (m=<optimized out>) at util/threads-pthread.c:85 #4 0x00007fcd1632c651 in virDomainObjLock (obj=<optimized out>) at conf/domain_conf.c:14256 #5 0x00007fcd0daf05cc in qemuProcessHandleMonitorDestroy (mon=0x7fcccc0029e0, vm=0x7fcccc00a850) at qemu/qemu_process.c:1026 #6 0x00007fcd0db01710 in qemuMonitorDispose (obj=0x7fcccc0029e0) at qemu/qemu_monitor.c:249 #7 0x00007fcd162fd4e3 in virObjectUnref (anyobj=<optimized out>) at util/virobject.c:139 #8 0x00007fcd0db027a9 in qemuMonitorClose (mon=<optimized out>) at qemu/qemu_monitor.c:860 #9 0x00007fcd0daf61ad in qemuProcessStop (driver=driver@entry=0x7fcd04079d50, vm=vm@entry=0x7fcccc00a850, reason=reason@entry=VIR_DOMAIN_SHUTOFF_DESTROYED, flags=flags@entry=0) at qemu/qemu_process.c:4057 #10 0x00007fcd0db323cf in qemuDomainDestroyFlags (dom=<optimized out>, flags=<optimized out>) at qemu/qemu_driver.c:1977 #11 0x00007fcd1637ff51 in virDomainDestroyFlags ( domain=domain@entry=0x7fccf00c1830, flags=1) at libvirt.c:2256 At frame #10 we are holding the domain lock, we call into qemuProcessStop() to cleanup QEMU, which triggers the monitor to close, which invokes qemuProcessHandleMonitorDestroy() which tries to obtain the domain lock again. This is a non-recursive lock, hence hang. Since qemuMonitorPtr is a virObject, the unref call in qemuProcessHandleMonitorDestroy no longer needs mutex protection. The assignment of priv->mon = NULL, can be instead done by the caller of qemuMonitorClose(), thus removing all need for locking. Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2012-09-26 14:54:58 +00:00
priv->mon = NULL;
}
if (priv->monConfig) {
if (priv->monConfig->type == VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_UNIX)
unlink(priv->monConfig->data.nix.path);
virObjectUnref(priv->monConfig);
priv->monConfig = NULL;
}
qemuDomainObjStopWorker(vm);
qemu: Create domain master key Add a masterKey and masterKeyLen to _qemuDomainObjPrivate to store a random domain master key and its length in order to support the ability to encrypt/decrypt sensitive data shared between libvirt and qemu. The key will be base64 encoded and written to a file to be used by the command line building code to share with qemu. New API's from this patch: qemuDomainGetMasterKeyFilePath: Return a path to where the key is located qemuDomainWriteMasterKeyFile: (private) Open (create/trunc) the masterKey path and write the masterKey qemuDomainMasterKeyReadFile: Using the master key path, open/read the file, and store the masterKey and masterKeyLen. Expected use only from qemuProcessReconnect qemuDomainGenerateRandomKey: (private) Generate a random key using available algorithms The key is generated either from the gnutls_rnd function if it exists or a less cryptographically strong mechanism using virGenerateRandomBytes qemuDomainMasterKeyRemove: Remove traces of the master key, remove the *KeyFilePath qemuDomainMasterKeyCreate: Generate the domain master key and save the key in the location returned by qemuDomainGetMasterKeyFilePath. This API will first ensure the QEMU_CAPS_OBJECT_SECRET is set in the capabilities. If not, then there's no need to generate the secret or file. The creation of the key will be attempted from qemuProcessPrepareHost once the libDir directory structure exists. The removal of the key will handled from qemuProcessStop just prior to deleting the libDir tree. Since the key will not be written out to the domain object XML file, the qemuProcessReconnect will read the saved file and restore the masterKey and masterKeyLen.
2016-03-29 22:22:46 +00:00
/* Remove the master key */
qemuDomainMasterKeyRemove(priv);
/* Do this before we delete the tree and remove pidfile. */
qemuProcessKillManagedPRDaemon(vm);
ignore_value(virDomainChrDefForeach(vm->def,
false,
qemuProcessCleanupChardevDevice,
NULL));
/* shut it off for sure */
ignore_value(qemuProcessKill(vm,
VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_KILL_FORCE|
VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_KILL_NOCHECK));
qemuDomainCleanupRun(driver, vm);
qemuExtDevicesStop(driver, vm);
qemuDBusStop(driver, vm);
vm->def->id = -1;
virFileDeleteTree(priv->libDir);
virFileDeleteTree(priv->channelTargetDir);
/* Stop autodestroy in case guest is restarted */
qemuProcessAutoDestroyRemove(driver, vm);
/* now that we know it's stopped call the hook if present */
if (virHookPresent(VIR_HOOK_DRIVER_QEMU)) {
g_autofree char *xml = qemuDomainDefFormatXML(driver, NULL, vm->def, 0);
/* we can't stop the operation even if the script raised an error */
ignore_value(virHookCall(VIR_HOOK_DRIVER_QEMU, vm->def->name,
VIR_HOOK_QEMU_OP_STOPPED, VIR_HOOK_SUBOP_END,
NULL, xml, NULL));
}
/* Reset Security Labels unless caller don't want us to */
if (!(flags & VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_STOP_NO_RELABEL))
qemuSecurityRestoreAllLabel(driver, vm,
!!(flags & VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_STOP_MIGRATED));
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->ndisks; i++) {
virDomainDeviceDef dev;
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = vm->def->disks[i];
dev.type = VIR_DOMAIN_DEVICE_DISK;
dev.data.disk = disk;
ignore_value(qemuRemoveSharedDevice(driver, &dev, vm->def->name));
}
/* Clear out dynamically assigned labels */
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->nseclabels; i++) {
if (vm->def->seclabels[i]->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC)
VIR_FREE(vm->def->seclabels[i]->label);
VIR_FREE(vm->def->seclabels[i]->imagelabel);
}
qemuHostdevReAttachDomainDevices(driver, vm->def);
for (i = 0; i < def->nnets; i++) {
virDomainNetDefPtr net = def->nets[i];
vport = virDomainNetGetActualVirtPortProfile(net);
switch (virDomainNetGetActualType(net)) {
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_DIRECT:
ignore_value(virNetDevMacVLanDeleteWithVPortProfile(
net->ifname, &net->mac,
virDomainNetGetActualDirectDev(net),
virDomainNetGetActualDirectMode(net),
virDomainNetGetActualVirtPortProfile(net),
cfg->stateDir));
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_ETHERNET:
qemu: support unmanaged target tap dev for <interface type='ethernet'> If managed='no', then the tap device must already exist, and setting of MAC address and online status (IFF_UP) is skipped. NB: we still set IFF_VNET_HDR and IFF_MULTI_QUEUE as appropriate, because those bits must be properly set in the TUNSETIFF we use to set the tap device name of the handle we've opened - if IFF_VNET_HDR has not been set and we set it the request will be honored even when running libvirtd unprivileged; if IFF_MULTI_QUEUE is requested to be different than how it was created, that will result in an error from the kernel. This means that you don't need to pay attention to IFF_VNET_HDR when creating the tap devices, but you *do* need to set IFF_MULTI_QUEUE if you're going to use multiple queues for your tap device. NB2: /dev/vhost-net normally has permissions 600, so it can't be opened by an unprivileged process. This would normally cause a warning message when using a virtio net device from an unprivileged libvirtd. I've found that setting the permissions for /dev/vhost-net permits unprivileged libvirtd to use vhost-net for virtio devices, but have no idea what sort of security implications that has. I haven't changed libvrit's code to avoid *attempting* to open /dev/vhost-net - if you are concerned about the security of opening up permissions of /dev/vhost-net (probably a good idea at least until we ask someone who knows about the code) then add <driver name='qemu'/> to the interface definition and you'll avoid the warning message. Note that virNetDevTapCreate() is the correct function to call in the case of an existing device, because the same ioctl() that creates a new tap device will also open an existing tap device. Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1723367 (partially) Signed-off-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2019-08-26 04:24:34 +00:00
if (net->managed_tap != VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_NO && net->ifname) {
ignore_value(virNetDevTapDelete(net->ifname, net->backend.tap));
VIR_FREE(net->ifname);
}
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_BRIDGE:
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_NETWORK:
#ifdef VIR_NETDEV_TAP_REQUIRE_MANUAL_CLEANUP
if (!(vport && vport->virtPortType == VIR_NETDEV_VPORT_PROFILE_OPENVSWITCH))
ignore_value(virNetDevTapDelete(net->ifname, net->backend.tap));
#endif
break;
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_USER:
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_VHOSTUSER:
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_SERVER:
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_CLIENT:
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_MCAST:
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_INTERNAL:
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_HOSTDEV:
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_UDP:
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_VDPA:
case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_LAST:
/* No special cleanup procedure for these types. */
break;
}
/* release the physical device (or any other resources used by
* this interface in the network driver
*/
if (vport) {
if (vport->virtPortType == VIR_NETDEV_VPORT_PROFILE_MIDONET) {
ignore_value(virNetDevMidonetUnbindPort(vport));
} else if (vport->virtPortType == VIR_NETDEV_VPORT_PROFILE_OPENVSWITCH) {
ignore_value(virNetDevOpenvswitchRemovePort(
virDomainNetGetActualBridgeName(net),
net->ifname));
}
}
/* kick the device out of the hostdev list too */
virDomainNetRemoveHostdev(def, net);
if (net->type == VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_NETWORK) {
if (conn || (conn = virGetConnectNetwork()))
virDomainNetReleaseActualDevice(conn, vm->def, net);
else
VIR_WARN("Unable to release network device '%s'", NULLSTR(net->ifname));
}
}
retry:
systemd: Modernize machine naming So, systemd-machined has this philosophy that machine names are like hostnames and hence should follow the same rules. But we always allowed international characters in domain names. Thus we need to modify the machine name we are passing to systemd. In order to change some machine names that we will be passing to systemd, we also need to call TerminateMachine at the end of a lifetime of a domain. Even for domains that were started with older libvirt. That can be achieved thanks to virSystemdGetMachineNameByPID(). And because we can change machine names, we can get rid of the inconsistent and pointless escaping of domain names when creating machine names. So this patch modifies the naming in the following way. It creates the name as <drivername>-<id>-<name> where invalid hostname characters are stripped out of the name and if the resulting name is longer, it truncates it to 64 characters. That way we can start domains we couldn't start before. Well, at least on systemd. To make it work all together, the machineName (which is needed only with systemd) is saved in domain's private data. That way the generation is moved to the driver and we don't need to pass various unnecessary arguments to cgroup functions. The only thing this complicates a bit is the scope generation when validating a cgroup where we must check both old and new naming, so a slight modification was needed there. Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1282846 Signed-off-by: Martin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>
2016-02-01 15:50:54 +00:00
if ((ret = qemuRemoveCgroup(vm)) < 0) {
if (ret == -EBUSY && (retries++ < 5)) {
g_usleep(200*1000);
goto retry;
}
VIR_WARN("Failed to remove cgroup for %s",
vm->def->name);
}
/* Remove resctrl allocation after cgroups are cleaned up which makes it
* kind of safer (although removing the allocation should work even with
* pids in tasks file */
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->nresctrls; i++) {
size_t j = 0;
for (j = 0; j < vm->def->resctrls[i]->nmonitors; j++) {
virDomainResctrlMonDefPtr mon = NULL;
mon = vm->def->resctrls[i]->monitors[j];
virResctrlMonitorRemove(mon->instance);
}
virResctrlAllocRemove(vm->def->resctrls[i]->alloc);
}
/* clean up a possible backup job */
if (priv->backup)
qemuBackupJobTerminate(vm, QEMU_DOMAIN_JOB_STATUS_CANCELED);
qemuProcessRemoveDomainStatus(driver, vm);
/* Remove VNC and Spice ports from port reservation bitmap, but only if
they were reserved by the driver (autoport=yes)
*/
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->ngraphics; ++i) {
virDomainGraphicsDefPtr graphics = vm->def->graphics[i];
if (graphics->type == VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_VNC) {
if (graphics->data.vnc.autoport) {
virPortAllocatorRelease(graphics->data.vnc.port);
} else if (graphics->data.vnc.portReserved) {
virPortAllocatorRelease(graphics->data.vnc.port);
graphics->data.vnc.portReserved = false;
}
if (graphics->data.vnc.websocketGenerated) {
virPortAllocatorRelease(graphics->data.vnc.websocket);
graphics->data.vnc.websocketGenerated = false;
graphics->data.vnc.websocket = -1;
} else if (graphics->data.vnc.websocket) {
virPortAllocatorRelease(graphics->data.vnc.websocket);
}
}
if (graphics->type == VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_SPICE) {
if (graphics->data.spice.autoport) {
virPortAllocatorRelease(graphics->data.spice.port);
virPortAllocatorRelease(graphics->data.spice.tlsPort);
} else {
if (graphics->data.spice.portReserved) {
virPortAllocatorRelease(graphics->data.spice.port);
graphics->data.spice.portReserved = false;
}
if (graphics->data.spice.tlsPortReserved) {
virPortAllocatorRelease(graphics->data.spice.tlsPort);
graphics->data.spice.tlsPortReserved = false;
}
}
}
}
for (i = 0; i < vm->ndeprecations; i++)
g_free(vm->deprecations[i]);
g_free(vm->deprecations);
vm->ndeprecations = 0;
vm->deprecations = NULL;
vm->taint = 0;
vm->pid = -1;
virDomainObjSetState(vm, VIR_DOMAIN_SHUTOFF, reason);
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->niothreadids; i++)
vm->def->iothreadids[i]->thread_id = 0;
qemuProcessStop: Remove image metadata for running mirror jobs If user starts a blockcommit or a blockcopy then we modify access for qemu on both images and leave it like that until the job terminates. So far so good. Problem is, if user instead of terminating the job (where we would modify the access again so that the state before the job is restored) calls destroy on the domain or if qemu dies whilst executing the block job. In this case we don't ever clear the access we granted at the beginning. To fix this, maybe a bit harsh approach is used, but it works: after all labels were restored (that is after qemuSecurityRestoreAllLabel() was called), we iterate over each disk in the domain and remove XATTRs from the whole backing chain and also from any file the disk is being mirrored to. This would have been done at the time of pivot, but it isn't because user decided to kill the domain instead. If we don't do this and leave some XATTRs behind the domain might be unable to start. Also, secdriver can't do this because it doesn't know if there is any job running. It's outside of its scope - the hypervisor driver is responsible for calling secdriver's APIs. Moreover, this is safe to call because we don't remember labels for any member of a backing chain except of the top layer. But that one was restored in qemuSecurityRestoreAllLabel() call done earlier. Therefore, not only we don't remember labels (and thus this is basically a NOP for other images in the backing chain) it is also safe to call this when no blockjob was started in the first place, or if some parts of the backing chain are shared with some other domains - this is NOP, unless a block job is active at the time of domain destroy. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1741456#c19 Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
2019-11-18 16:40:01 +00:00
/* Do this explicitly after vm->pid is reset so that security drivers don't
* try to enter the domain's namespace which is non-existent by now as qemu
* is no longer running. */
if (!(flags & VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_STOP_NO_RELABEL)) {
for (i = 0; i < def->ndisks; i++) {
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = def->disks[i];
qemuProcessStop: Remove image metadata for running mirror jobs If user starts a blockcommit or a blockcopy then we modify access for qemu on both images and leave it like that until the job terminates. So far so good. Problem is, if user instead of terminating the job (where we would modify the access again so that the state before the job is restored) calls destroy on the domain or if qemu dies whilst executing the block job. In this case we don't ever clear the access we granted at the beginning. To fix this, maybe a bit harsh approach is used, but it works: after all labels were restored (that is after qemuSecurityRestoreAllLabel() was called), we iterate over each disk in the domain and remove XATTRs from the whole backing chain and also from any file the disk is being mirrored to. This would have been done at the time of pivot, but it isn't because user decided to kill the domain instead. If we don't do this and leave some XATTRs behind the domain might be unable to start. Also, secdriver can't do this because it doesn't know if there is any job running. It's outside of its scope - the hypervisor driver is responsible for calling secdriver's APIs. Moreover, this is safe to call because we don't remember labels for any member of a backing chain except of the top layer. But that one was restored in qemuSecurityRestoreAllLabel() call done earlier. Therefore, not only we don't remember labels (and thus this is basically a NOP for other images in the backing chain) it is also safe to call this when no blockjob was started in the first place, or if some parts of the backing chain are shared with some other domains - this is NOP, unless a block job is active at the time of domain destroy. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1741456#c19 Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
2019-11-18 16:40:01 +00:00
if (disk->mirror) {
if (qemuSecurityRestoreImageLabel(driver, vm, disk->mirror, false) < 0)
VIR_WARN("Unable to restore security label on %s", disk->dst);
if (virStorageSourceChainHasNVMe(disk->mirror))
qemuHostdevReAttachOneNVMeDisk(driver, vm->def->name, disk->mirror);
}
qemuProcessStop: Remove image metadata for running mirror jobs If user starts a blockcommit or a blockcopy then we modify access for qemu on both images and leave it like that until the job terminates. So far so good. Problem is, if user instead of terminating the job (where we would modify the access again so that the state before the job is restored) calls destroy on the domain or if qemu dies whilst executing the block job. In this case we don't ever clear the access we granted at the beginning. To fix this, maybe a bit harsh approach is used, but it works: after all labels were restored (that is after qemuSecurityRestoreAllLabel() was called), we iterate over each disk in the domain and remove XATTRs from the whole backing chain and also from any file the disk is being mirrored to. This would have been done at the time of pivot, but it isn't because user decided to kill the domain instead. If we don't do this and leave some XATTRs behind the domain might be unable to start. Also, secdriver can't do this because it doesn't know if there is any job running. It's outside of its scope - the hypervisor driver is responsible for calling secdriver's APIs. Moreover, this is safe to call because we don't remember labels for any member of a backing chain except of the top layer. But that one was restored in qemuSecurityRestoreAllLabel() call done earlier. Therefore, not only we don't remember labels (and thus this is basically a NOP for other images in the backing chain) it is also safe to call this when no blockjob was started in the first place, or if some parts of the backing chain are shared with some other domains - this is NOP, unless a block job is active at the time of domain destroy. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1741456#c19 Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
2019-11-18 16:40:01 +00:00
qemuBlockRemoveImageMetadata(driver, vm, disk->dst, disk->src);
/* for now transient disks are forbidden with migration so they
* can be handled here */
if (disk->transient &&
!priv->inhibitDiskTransientDelete) {
VIR_DEBUG("Removing transient overlay '%s' of disk '%s'",
disk->src->path, disk->dst);
if (qemuDomainStorageFileInit(driver, vm, disk->src, NULL) >= 0) {
virStorageSourceUnlink(disk->src);
virStorageSourceDeinit(disk->src);
}
}
}
qemuProcessStop: Remove image metadata for running mirror jobs If user starts a blockcommit or a blockcopy then we modify access for qemu on both images and leave it like that until the job terminates. So far so good. Problem is, if user instead of terminating the job (where we would modify the access again so that the state before the job is restored) calls destroy on the domain or if qemu dies whilst executing the block job. In this case we don't ever clear the access we granted at the beginning. To fix this, maybe a bit harsh approach is used, but it works: after all labels were restored (that is after qemuSecurityRestoreAllLabel() was called), we iterate over each disk in the domain and remove XATTRs from the whole backing chain and also from any file the disk is being mirrored to. This would have been done at the time of pivot, but it isn't because user decided to kill the domain instead. If we don't do this and leave some XATTRs behind the domain might be unable to start. Also, secdriver can't do this because it doesn't know if there is any job running. It's outside of its scope - the hypervisor driver is responsible for calling secdriver's APIs. Moreover, this is safe to call because we don't remember labels for any member of a backing chain except of the top layer. But that one was restored in qemuSecurityRestoreAllLabel() call done earlier. Therefore, not only we don't remember labels (and thus this is basically a NOP for other images in the backing chain) it is also safe to call this when no blockjob was started in the first place, or if some parts of the backing chain are shared with some other domains - this is NOP, unless a block job is active at the time of domain destroy. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1741456#c19 Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
2019-11-18 16:40:01 +00:00
}
qemuSecurityReleaseLabel(driver->securityManager, vm->def);
/* clear all private data entries which are no longer needed */
qemuDomainObjPrivateDataClear(priv);
/* The "release" hook cleans up additional resources */
if (virHookPresent(VIR_HOOK_DRIVER_QEMU)) {
g_autofree char *xml = qemuDomainDefFormatXML(driver, NULL, vm->def, 0);
/* we can't stop the operation even if the script raised an error */
virHookCall(VIR_HOOK_DRIVER_QEMU, vm->def->name,
VIR_HOOK_QEMU_OP_RELEASE, VIR_HOOK_SUBOP_END,
NULL, xml, NULL);
}
virDomainObjRemoveTransientDef(vm);
endjob:
if (asyncJob != QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE)
qemuDomainObjEndJob(driver, vm);
cleanup:
virErrorRestore(&orig_err);
}
static void
qemuProcessAutoDestroy(virDomainObjPtr dom,
virConnectPtr conn,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = dom->privateData;
virObjectEventPtr event = NULL;
unsigned int stopFlags = 0;
VIR_DEBUG("vm=%s, conn=%p", dom->def->name, conn);
if (priv->job.asyncJob == QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_MIGRATION_IN)
stopFlags |= VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_STOP_MIGRATED;
if (priv->job.asyncJob) {
VIR_DEBUG("vm=%s has long-term job active, cancelling",
dom->def->name);
qemuDomainObjDiscardAsyncJob(driver, dom);
}
VIR_DEBUG("Killing domain");
if (qemuProcessBeginStopJob(driver, dom, QEMU_JOB_DESTROY, true) < 0)
return;
qemuProcessStop(driver, dom, VIR_DOMAIN_SHUTOFF_DESTROYED,
QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE, stopFlags);
virDomainAuditStop(dom, "destroyed");
event = virDomainEventLifecycleNewFromObj(dom,
VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_STOPPED,
VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_STOPPED_DESTROYED);
qemuDomainRemoveInactive(driver, dom);
qemuDomainObjEndJob(driver, dom);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, event);
}
int qemuProcessAutoDestroyAdd(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
virConnectPtr conn)
{
VIR_DEBUG("vm=%s, conn=%p", vm->def->name, conn);
return virCloseCallbacksSet(driver->closeCallbacks, vm, conn,
qemuProcessAutoDestroy);
}
int qemuProcessAutoDestroyRemove(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
VIR_DEBUG("vm=%s", vm->def->name);
return virCloseCallbacksUnset(driver->closeCallbacks, vm,
qemuProcessAutoDestroy);
}
bool qemuProcessAutoDestroyActive(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
virCloseCallback cb;
VIR_DEBUG("vm=%s", vm->def->name);
cb = virCloseCallbacksGet(driver->closeCallbacks, vm, NULL);
return cb == qemuProcessAutoDestroy;
}
int
qemuProcessRefreshDisks(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
qemuDomainAsyncJob asyncJob)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
bool blockdev = virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_BLOCKDEV);
GHashTable *table = NULL;
int ret = -1;
size_t i;
if (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync(driver, vm, asyncJob) == 0) {
table = qemuMonitorGetBlockInfo(priv->mon);
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (!table)
goto cleanup;
for (i = 0; i < vm->def->ndisks; i++) {
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = vm->def->disks[i];
qemuDomainDiskPrivatePtr diskpriv = QEMU_DOMAIN_DISK_PRIVATE(disk);
struct qemuDomainDiskInfo *info;
const char *entryname = disk->info.alias;
if (blockdev && diskpriv->qomName)
entryname = diskpriv->qomName;
if (!(info = virHashLookup(table, entryname)))
continue;
if (info->removable) {
if (info->empty)
virDomainDiskEmptySource(disk);
if (info->tray) {
if (info->tray_open)
disk->tray_status = VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_TRAY_OPEN;
else
disk->tray_status = VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_TRAY_CLOSED;
}
}
/* fill in additional data */
diskpriv->removable = info->removable;
diskpriv->tray = info->tray;
}
ret = 0;
cleanup:
virHashFree(table);
return ret;
}
static int
qemuProcessRefreshCPUMigratability(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
qemuDomainAsyncJob asyncJob)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
virDomainDefPtr def = vm->def;
bool migratable;
int rc;
if (def->cpu->mode != VIR_CPU_MODE_HOST_PASSTHROUGH &&
def->cpu->mode != VIR_CPU_MODE_MAXIMUM)
return 0;
/* If the cpu.migratable capability is present, the migratable attribute
* is set correctly. */
if (virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_CPU_MIGRATABLE))
return 0;
if (!ARCH_IS_X86(def->os.arch))
return 0;
if (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync(driver, vm, asyncJob) < 0)
return -1;
rc = qemuMonitorGetCPUMigratable(priv->mon, &migratable);
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0 || rc < 0)
return -1;
if (rc == 1)
migratable = false;
/* Libvirt 6.5.0 would set migratable='off' for running domains even though
* the actual default used by QEMU was 'on'. */
if (def->cpu->migratable == VIR_TRISTATE_SWITCH_OFF && migratable) {
VIR_DEBUG("Fixing CPU migratable attribute");
def->cpu->migratable = VIR_TRISTATE_SWITCH_ON;
}
if (def->cpu->migratable == VIR_TRISTATE_SWITCH_ABSENT)
def->cpu->migratable = virTristateSwitchFromBool(migratable);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessRefreshCPU(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
g_autoptr(virCPUDef) host = NULL;
g_autoptr(virCPUDef) hostmig = NULL;
g_autoptr(virCPUDef) cpu = NULL;
if (!virQEMUCapsGuestIsNative(driver->hostarch, vm->def->os.arch))
return 0;
if (!vm->def->cpu)
return 0;
if (qemuProcessRefreshCPUMigratability(driver, vm, QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE) < 0)
return -1;
if (!(host = virQEMUDriverGetHostCPU(driver))) {
virResetLastError();
return 0;
}
/* If the domain with a host-model CPU was started by an old libvirt
* (< 2.3) which didn't replace the CPU with a custom one, let's do it now
* since the rest of our code does not really expect a host-model CPU in a
* running domain.
*/
if (vm->def->cpu->mode == VIR_CPU_MODE_HOST_MODEL) {
qemuProcessRefreshCPU: skip 'host-model' logic for pSeries guests Commit v3.10.0-182-g237f045d9a ("qemu: Ignore fallback CPU attribute on reconnect") forced CPU 'fallback' to ALLOW, regardless of user choice. This fixed a situation in which guests created with older Libvirt versions, which used CPU mode 'host-model' in runtime, would fail to launch in a newer Libvirt if the fallback was set to FORBID. This would lead to a scenario where the CPU was translated to 'host-model' to 'custom', but then the FORBID setting would make the translation process fail. PSeries can operate with 'host-model' in runtime due to specific PPC64 mechanics regarding compatibility mode. The update() implementation of the cpuDriverPPC64 driver is a NO-OP if CPU mode is 'host-model', and the driver does not implement translate(). The commit mentioned above is causing PSeries guests to get their 'fallback' setting to ALLOW, overwriting user choice, exposing a design problem in qemuProcessRefreshCPU() - for PSeries guests, handling 'host-model' as it is being done does not apply. All other cpuArchDrivers implements update() and changes guest mode to VIR_CPU_MODE_CUSTOM, meaning that PSeries is currently the only exception to this logic. Let's make it official. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1660711 Suggested-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <danielhb413@gmail.com> Message-Id: <20200525123945.4049591-2-danielhb413@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
2020-05-25 12:39:45 +00:00
/*
* PSeries domains are able to run with host-model CPU by design,
* even on Libvirt newer than 2.3, never replacing host-model with
* custom in the virCPUUpdate() call. It is not needed to call
* virCPUUpdate() and qemuProcessUpdateCPU() in this case.
*/
if (qemuDomainIsPSeries(vm->def))
return 0;
if (!(hostmig = virCPUCopyMigratable(host->arch, host)))
return -1;
if (!(cpu = virCPUDefCopyWithoutModel(hostmig)) ||
virCPUDefCopyModelFilter(cpu, hostmig, false,
virQEMUCapsCPUFilterFeatures,
&host->arch) < 0)
return -1;
if (virCPUUpdate(vm->def->os.arch, vm->def->cpu, cpu) < 0)
return -1;
if (qemuProcessUpdateCPU(driver, vm, QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE) < 0)
return -1;
} else if (!virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_QUERY_CPU_MODEL_EXPANSION)) {
/* We only try to fix CPUs when the libvirt/QEMU combo used to start
* the domain did not know about query-cpu-model-expansion in which
* case the host-model is known to not contain features which QEMU
* doesn't know about.
*/
if (qemuDomainFixupCPUs(vm, &priv->origCPU) < 0)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessRefreshLegacyBlockjob(void *payload,
const char *name,
void *opaque)
{
const char *jobname = name;
virDomainObjPtr vm = opaque;
qemuMonitorBlockJobInfoPtr info = payload;
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk;
qemuBlockJobDataPtr job;
qemuBlockJobType jobtype = info->type;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
if (!(disk = qemuProcessFindDomainDiskByAliasOrQOM(vm, jobname, jobname))) {
VIR_DEBUG("could not find disk for block job '%s'", jobname);
return 0;
}
if (jobtype == QEMU_BLOCKJOB_TYPE_COMMIT &&
disk->mirrorJob == VIR_DOMAIN_BLOCK_JOB_TYPE_ACTIVE_COMMIT)
jobtype = disk->mirrorJob;
if (!(job = qemuBlockJobDiskNew(vm, disk, jobtype, jobname)))
return -1;
if (disk->mirror) {
if ((!info->ready_present && info->end == info->cur) ||
info->ready) {
disk->mirrorState = VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_MIRROR_STATE_READY;
job->state = VIR_DOMAIN_BLOCK_JOB_READY;
}
/* Pre-blockdev block copy labelled the chain of the mirrored device
* just before pivoting. At that point it was no longer known whether
* it's even necessary (e.g. disk is being reused). This code fixes
* the labelling in case the job was started in a libvirt version
* which did not label the chain when the block copy is being started.
* Note that we can't do much on failure. */
if (disk->mirrorJob == VIR_DOMAIN_BLOCK_JOB_TYPE_COPY) {
if (qemuDomainDetermineDiskChain(priv->driver, vm, disk,
disk->mirror, true) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (disk->mirror->format &&
disk->mirror->format != VIR_STORAGE_FILE_RAW &&
(qemuDomainNamespaceSetupDisk(vm, disk->mirror) < 0 ||
qemuSetupImageChainCgroup(vm, disk->mirror) < 0 ||
qemuSecuritySetImageLabel(priv->driver, vm, disk->mirror,
true, true) < 0))
goto cleanup;
}
}
qemuBlockJobStarted(job, vm);
cleanup:
qemuBlockJobStartupFinalize(vm, job);
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessRefreshLegacyBlockjobs(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
GHashTable *blockJobs = NULL;
int ret = -1;
qemuDomainObjEnterMonitor(driver, vm);
blockJobs = qemuMonitorGetAllBlockJobInfo(qemuDomainGetMonitor(vm), true);
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0 || !blockJobs)
goto cleanup;
if (virHashForEach(blockJobs, qemuProcessRefreshLegacyBlockjob, vm) < 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = 0;
cleanup:
virHashFree(blockJobs);
return ret;
}
static int
qemuProcessRefreshBlockjobs(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
virDomainObjPtr vm)
{
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
if (virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_BLOCKDEV))
return qemuBlockJobRefreshJobs(driver, vm);
else
return qemuProcessRefreshLegacyBlockjobs(driver, vm);
}
struct qemuProcessReconnectData {
virQEMUDriverPtr driver;
virDomainObjPtr obj;
virIdentityPtr identity;
};
/*
* Open an existing VM's monitor, re-detect VCPU threads
* and re-reserve the security labels in use
*
* This function also inherits a locked and ref'd domain object.
*
* This function needs to:
* 1. Enter job
* 1. just before monitor reconnect do lightweight MonitorEnter
* (increase VM refcount and unlock VM)
* 2. reconnect to monitor
* 3. do lightweight MonitorExit (lock VM)
* 4. continue reconnect process
* 5. EndJob
*
* We can't do normal MonitorEnter & MonitorExit because these two lock the
* monitor lock, which does not exists in this early phase.
*/
static void
qemuProcessReconnect(void *opaque)
{
struct qemuProcessReconnectData *data = opaque;
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = data->driver;
virDomainObjPtr obj = data->obj;
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv;
g_auto(qemuDomainJobObj) oldjob = {
.cb = NULL,
};
int state;
int reason;
g_autoptr(virQEMUDriverConfig) cfg = NULL;
size_t i;
unsigned int stopFlags = 0;
bool jobStarted = false;
bool retry = true;
bool tryMonReconn = false;
virIdentitySetCurrent(data->identity);
g_clear_object(&data->identity);
VIR_FREE(data);
qemuDomainObjRestoreJob(obj, &oldjob);
if (oldjob.asyncJob == QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_MIGRATION_IN)
stopFlags |= VIR_QEMU_PROCESS_STOP_MIGRATED;
cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
priv = obj->privateData;
/* expect that libvirt might have crashed during VM start, so prevent
* cleanup of transient disks */
priv->inhibitDiskTransientDelete = true;
if (qemuDomainObjBeginJob(driver, obj, QEMU_JOB_MODIFY) < 0)
goto error;
jobStarted = true;
/* XXX If we ever gonna change pid file pattern, come up with
* some intelligence here to deal with old paths. */
if (!(priv->pidfile = virPidFileBuildPath(cfg->stateDir, obj->def->name)))
goto error;
/* Restore the masterKey */
if (qemuDomainMasterKeyReadFile(priv) < 0)
goto error;
/* If we are connecting to a guest started by old libvirt there is no
* allowReboot in status XML and we need to initialize it. */
qemuProcessPrepareAllowReboot(obj);
if (qemuHostdevUpdateActiveDomainDevices(driver, obj->def) < 0)
goto error;
if (priv->qemuCaps &&
virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_CHARDEV_FD_PASS))
retry = false;
if (qemuDomainObjStartWorker(obj) < 0)
goto error;
VIR_DEBUG("Reconnect monitor to def=%p name='%s' retry=%d",
obj, obj->def->name, retry);
tryMonReconn = true;
/* XXX check PID liveliness & EXE path */
if (qemuConnectMonitor(driver, obj, QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE, retry, NULL) < 0)
goto error;
priv->machineName = qemuDomainGetMachineName(obj);
if (!priv->machineName)
goto error;
if (qemuConnectCgroup(obj) < 0)
goto error;
if (qemuDomainPerfRestart(obj) < 0)
goto error;
/* recreate the pflash storage sources */
if (qemuDomainInitializePflashStorageSource(obj) < 0)
goto error;
/* XXX: Need to change as long as lock is introduced for
* qemu_driver->sharedDevices.
*/
for (i = 0; i < obj->def->ndisks; i++) {
virDomainDiskDefPtr disk = obj->def->disks[i];
virDomainDeviceDef dev;
if (virDomainDiskTranslateSourcePool(disk) < 0)
goto error;
/* backing chains need to be refreshed only if they could change */
if (priv->reconnectBlockjobs != VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_NO &&
!virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_BLOCKDEV)) {
/* This should be the only place that calls
* qemuDomainDetermineDiskChain with @report_broken == false
* to guarantee best-effort domain reconnect */
virStorageSourceBackingStoreClear(disk->src);
if (qemuDomainDetermineDiskChain(driver, obj, disk, NULL, false) < 0)
goto error;
} else {
VIR_DEBUG("skipping backing chain detection for '%s'", disk->dst);
}
dev.type = VIR_DOMAIN_DEVICE_DISK;
dev.data.disk = disk;
if (qemuAddSharedDevice(driver, &dev, obj->def->name) < 0)
goto error;
}
for (i = 0; i < obj->def->ngraphics; i++) {
if (qemuProcessGraphicsReservePorts(obj->def->graphics[i], true) < 0)
goto error;
}
if (qemuProcessUpdateState(driver, obj) < 0)
goto error;
state = virDomainObjGetState(obj, &reason);
if (state == VIR_DOMAIN_SHUTOFF ||
(state == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED &&
reason == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_STARTING_UP)) {
VIR_DEBUG("Domain '%s' wasn't fully started yet, killing it",
obj->def->name);
goto error;
}
if (!priv->qemuCaps) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("domain '%s' has no capabilities recorded"),
obj->def->name);
goto error;
}
/* vm startup complete, we can remove transient disks if required */
priv->inhibitDiskTransientDelete = false;
/* In case the domain shutdown while we were not running,
* we need to finish the shutdown process. And we need to do it after
* we have virQEMUCaps filled in.
*/
if (state == VIR_DOMAIN_SHUTDOWN ||
(state == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED &&
reason == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED_SHUTTING_DOWN)) {
VIR_DEBUG("Finishing shutdown sequence for domain %s",
obj->def->name);
qemuProcessShutdownOrReboot(driver, obj);
goto cleanup;
}
if (qemuProcessBuildDestroyMemoryPaths(driver, obj, NULL, true) < 0)
goto error;
if ((qemuDomainAssignAddresses(obj->def, priv->qemuCaps,
driver, obj, false)) < 0) {
goto error;
}
/* if domain requests security driver we haven't loaded, report error, but
* do not kill the domain
*/
ignore_value(qemuSecurityCheckAllLabel(driver->securityManager,
obj->def));
if (qemuProcessRefreshCPU(driver, obj) < 0)
goto error;
if (qemuDomainRefreshVcpuInfo(driver, obj, QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE, true) < 0)
goto error;
qemuDomainVcpuPersistOrder(obj->def);
if (qemuProcessDetectIOThreadPIDs(driver, obj, QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE) < 0)
goto error;
if (qemuSecurityReserveLabel(driver->securityManager, obj->def, obj->pid) < 0)
goto error;
qemuProcessNotifyNets(obj->def);
qemuProcessFiltersInstantiate(obj->def);
if (qemuProcessRefreshDisks(driver, obj, QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE) < 0)
goto error;
if (!virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_BLOCKDEV) &&
qemuBlockNodeNamesDetect(driver, obj, QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE) < 0)
goto error;
if (qemuRefreshVirtioChannelState(driver, obj, QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE) < 0)
goto error;
/* If querying of guest's RTC failed, report error, but do not kill the domain. */
qemuRefreshRTC(driver, obj);
if (qemuProcessRefreshBalloonState(driver, obj, QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE) < 0)
goto error;
if (qemuProcessRecoverJob(driver, obj, &oldjob, &stopFlags) < 0)
goto error;
if (qemuProcessRefreshBlockjobs(driver, obj) < 0)
goto error;
if (qemuProcessUpdateDevices(driver, obj) < 0)
goto error;
if (qemuRefreshPRManagerState(driver, obj) < 0)
goto error;
qemuProcessReconnectCheckMemAliasOrderMismatch(obj);
if (qemuConnectAgent(driver, obj) < 0)
goto error;
for (i = 0; i < obj->def->nresctrls; i++) {
size_t j = 0;
if (virResctrlAllocDeterminePath(obj->def->resctrls[i]->alloc,
priv->machineName) < 0)
goto error;
for (j = 0; j < obj->def->resctrls[i]->nmonitors; j++) {
virDomainResctrlMonDefPtr mon = NULL;
mon = obj->def->resctrls[i]->monitors[j];
if (virResctrlMonitorDeterminePath(mon->instance,
priv->machineName) < 0)
goto error;
}
}
/* update domain state XML with possibly updated state in virDomainObj */
if (virDomainObjSave(obj, driver->xmlopt, cfg->stateDir) < 0)
goto error;
/* Run an hook to allow admins to do some magic */
if (virHookPresent(VIR_HOOK_DRIVER_QEMU)) {
g_autofree char *xml = qemuDomainDefFormatXML(driver,
priv->qemuCaps,
obj->def, 0);
int hookret;
hookret = virHookCall(VIR_HOOK_DRIVER_QEMU, obj->def->name,
VIR_HOOK_QEMU_OP_RECONNECT, VIR_HOOK_SUBOP_BEGIN,
NULL, xml, NULL);
/*
* If the script raised an error abort the launch
*/
if (hookret < 0)
goto error;
}
if (g_atomic_int_add(&driver->nactive, 1) == 0 && driver->inhibitCallback)
driver->inhibitCallback(true, driver->inhibitOpaque);
cleanup:
if (jobStarted) {
if (!virDomainObjIsActive(obj))
qemuDomainRemoveInactive(driver, obj);
qemuDomainObjEndJob(driver, obj);
} else {
if (!virDomainObjIsActive(obj))
qemuDomainRemoveInactiveJob(driver, obj);
}
virDomainObjEndAPI(&obj);
virNWFilterUnlockFilterUpdates();
virIdentitySetCurrent(NULL);
return;
error:
if (virDomainObjIsActive(obj)) {
/* We can't get the monitor back, so must kill the VM
* to remove danger of it ending up running twice if
* user tries to start it again later.
*
* If we cannot get to the monitor when the QEMU command
* line used -no-shutdown, then we can safely say that the
* domain crashed; otherwise, if the monitor was started,
* then we can blame ourselves, else we failed before the
* monitor started so we don't really know. */
if (!priv->mon && tryMonReconn &&
qemuDomainIsUsingNoShutdown(priv))
state = VIR_DOMAIN_SHUTOFF_CRASHED;
else if (priv->mon)
state = VIR_DOMAIN_SHUTOFF_DAEMON;
else
state = VIR_DOMAIN_SHUTOFF_UNKNOWN;
/* If BeginJob failed, we jumped here without a job, let's hope another
* thread didn't have a chance to start playing with the domain yet
* (it's all we can do anyway).
*/
qemuProcessStop(driver, obj, state, QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE, stopFlags);
}
goto cleanup;
}
static int
qemuProcessReconnectHelper(virDomainObjPtr obj,
void *opaque)
{
virThread thread;
struct qemuProcessReconnectData *src = opaque;
struct qemuProcessReconnectData *data;
g_autofree char *name = NULL;
/* If the VM was inactive, we don't need to reconnect */
if (!obj->pid)
return 0;
data = g_new0(struct qemuProcessReconnectData, 1);
memcpy(data, src, sizeof(*data));
data->obj = obj;
data->identity = virIdentityGetCurrent();
virNWFilterReadLockFilterUpdates();
/* this lock and reference will be eventually transferred to the thread
* that handles the reconnect */
virObjectLock(obj);
virObjectRef(obj);
name = g_strdup_printf("init-%s", obj->def->name);
if (virThreadCreateFull(&thread, false, qemuProcessReconnect,
name, false, data) < 0) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
_("Could not create thread. QEMU initialization "
"might be incomplete"));
/* We can't spawn a thread and thus connect to monitor. Kill qemu.
* It's safe to call qemuProcessStop without a job here since there
* is no thread that could be doing anything else with the same domain
* object.
*/
qemuProcessStop(src->driver, obj, VIR_DOMAIN_SHUTOFF_FAILED,
QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE, 0);
qemuDomainRemoveInactiveJobLocked(src->driver, obj);
virDomainObjEndAPI(&obj);
virNWFilterUnlockFilterUpdates();
g_clear_object(&data->identity);
VIR_FREE(data);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* qemuProcessReconnectAll
*
* Try to re-open the resources for live VMs that we care
* about.
*/
void
qemuProcessReconnectAll(virQEMUDriverPtr driver)
{
struct qemuProcessReconnectData data = {.driver = driver};
virDomainObjListForEach(driver->domains, true,
qemuProcessReconnectHelper, &data);
}
static void virQEMUCapsMonitorNotify(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm G_GNUC_UNUSED,
void *opaque G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
}
static qemuMonitorCallbacks callbacks = {
.eofNotify = virQEMUCapsMonitorNotify,
.errorNotify = virQEMUCapsMonitorNotify,
};
static void
qemuProcessQMPStop(qemuProcessQMPPtr proc)
{
if (proc->mon) {
virObjectUnlock(proc->mon);
qemuMonitorClose(proc->mon);
proc->mon = NULL;
}
if (proc->cmd) {
virCommandAbort(proc->cmd);
virCommandFree(proc->cmd);
proc->cmd = NULL;
}
if (proc->monpath)
unlink(proc->monpath);
virDomainObjEndAPI(&proc->vm);
if (proc->pid != 0) {
VIR_DEBUG("Killing QMP caps process %lld", (long long)proc->pid);
if (virProcessKill(proc->pid, SIGKILL) < 0 && errno != ESRCH)
VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to kill process %lld: %s"),
(long long)proc->pid,
g_strerror(errno));
proc->pid = 0;
}
if (proc->pidfile)
unlink(proc->pidfile);
if (proc->uniqDir)
rmdir(proc->uniqDir);
}
/**
* qemuProcessQMPFree:
* @proc: Stores process and connection state
*
* Kill QEMU process and free process data structure.
*/
void
qemuProcessQMPFree(qemuProcessQMPPtr proc)
{
if (!proc)
return;
qemuProcessQMPStop(proc);
g_object_unref(proc->eventThread);
g_free(proc->binary);
g_free(proc->libDir);
g_free(proc->uniqDir);
g_free(proc->monpath);
g_free(proc->monarg);
g_free(proc->pidfile);
g_free(proc->stdErr);
g_free(proc);
}
/**
* qemuProcessQMPNew:
* @binary: QEMU binary
* @libDir: Directory for process and connection artifacts
* @runUid: UserId for QEMU process
* @runGid: GroupId for QEMU process
* @forceTCG: Force TCG mode if true
*
* Allocate and initialize domain structure encapsulating QEMU process state
* and monitor connection for completing QMP queries.
*/
qemuProcessQMPPtr
qemuProcessQMPNew(const char *binary,
const char *libDir,
uid_t runUid,
gid_t runGid,
bool forceTCG)
{
g_autoptr(qemuProcessQMP) proc = NULL;
const char *threadSuffix;
g_autofree char *threadName = NULL;
VIR_DEBUG("exec=%s, libDir=%s, runUid=%u, runGid=%u, forceTCG=%d",
binary, libDir, runUid, runGid, forceTCG);
proc = g_new0(qemuProcessQMP, 1);
proc->binary = g_strdup(binary);
proc->libDir = g_strdup(libDir);
proc->runUid = runUid;
proc->runGid = runGid;
proc->forceTCG = forceTCG;
threadSuffix = strrchr(binary, '-');
if (threadSuffix)
threadSuffix++;
else
threadSuffix = binary;
threadName = g_strdup_printf("qmp-%s", threadSuffix);
if (!(proc->eventThread = virEventThreadNew(threadName)))
return NULL;
return g_steal_pointer(&proc);
}
static int
qemuProcessQEMULabelUniqPath(qemuProcessQMPPtr proc)
{
/* We cannot use the security driver here, but we should not need to. */
if (chown(proc->uniqDir, proc->runUid, -1) < 0) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("Cannot chown uniq path: %s"),
proc->uniqDir);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessQMPInit(qemuProcessQMPPtr proc)
{
g_autofree char *template = NULL;
VIR_DEBUG("proc=%p, emulator=%s", proc, proc->binary);
template = g_strdup_printf("%s/qmp-XXXXXX", proc->libDir);
if (!(proc->uniqDir = g_mkdtemp(template))) {
virReportSystemError(errno,
_("Failed to create unique directory with "
"template '%s' for probing QEMU"),
template);
return -1;
}
/* if g_mkdtemp succeeds, proc->uniqDir is now the owner of
* the string. Set template to NULL to avoid freeing
* the memory in this case */
template = NULL;
if (qemuProcessQEMULabelUniqPath(proc) < 0)
return -1;
proc->monpath = g_strdup_printf("%s/%s", proc->uniqDir, "qmp.monitor");
proc->monarg = g_strdup_printf("unix:%s,server,nowait", proc->monpath);
/*
* Normally we'd use runDir for pid files, but because we're using
* -daemonize we need QEMU to be allowed to create them, rather
* than libvirtd. So we're using libDir which QEMU can write to
*/
proc->pidfile = g_strdup_printf("%s/%s", proc->uniqDir, "qmp.pid");
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessQMPLaunch(qemuProcessQMPPtr proc)
{
const char *machine;
int status = 0;
int rc;
if (proc->forceTCG)
machine = "none,accel=tcg";
else
machine = "none,accel=kvm:tcg";
VIR_DEBUG("Try to probe capabilities of '%s' via QMP, machine %s",
proc->binary, machine);
/*
* We explicitly need to use -daemonize here, rather than
* virCommandDaemonize, because we need to synchronize
* with QEMU creating its monitor socket API. Using
* daemonize guarantees control won't return to libvirt
* until the socket is present.
*/
proc->cmd = virCommandNewArgList(proc->binary,
"-S",
"-no-user-config",
"-nodefaults",
"-nographic",
"-machine", machine,
"-qmp", proc->monarg,
"-pidfile", proc->pidfile,
"-daemonize",
NULL);
virCommandAddEnvPassCommon(proc->cmd);
virCommandClearCaps(proc->cmd);
#if WITH_CAPNG
/* QEMU might run into permission issues, e.g. /dev/sev (0600), override
* them just for the purpose of probing */
if (geteuid() == 0)
virCommandAllowCap(proc->cmd, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE);
#endif
virCommandSetGID(proc->cmd, proc->runGid);
virCommandSetUID(proc->cmd, proc->runUid);
virCommandSetErrorBuffer(proc->cmd, &(proc->stdErr));
if (virCommandRun(proc->cmd, &status) < 0)
return -1;
if (status != 0) {
VIR_DEBUG("QEMU %s exited with status %d", proc->binary, status);
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("Failed to start QEMU binary %s for probing: %s"),
proc->binary,
proc->stdErr ? proc->stdErr : _("unknown error"));
return -1;
}
if ((rc = virPidFileReadPath(proc->pidfile, &proc->pid)) < 0) {
virReportSystemError(-rc, _("Failed to read pidfile %s"), proc->pidfile);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int
qemuProcessQMPInitMonitor(qemuMonitorPtr mon)
{
if (qemuMonitorSetCapabilities(mon) < 0) {
VIR_DEBUG("Failed to set monitor capabilities %s",
virGetLastErrorMessage());
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
qemuProcessQMPConnectMonitor(qemuProcessQMPPtr proc)
{
virDomainXMLOptionPtr xmlopt = NULL;
virDomainChrSourceDef monConfig;
int ret = -1;
VIR_DEBUG("proc=%p, emulator=%s, proc->pid=%lld",
proc, proc->binary, (long long)proc->pid);
monConfig.type = VIR_DOMAIN_CHR_TYPE_UNIX;
monConfig.data.nix.path = proc->monpath;
monConfig.data.nix.listen = false;
if (!(xmlopt = virDomainXMLOptionNew(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) ||
!(proc->vm = virDomainObjNew(xmlopt)) ||
!(proc->vm->def = virDomainDefNew()))
goto cleanup;
proc->vm->pid = proc->pid;
if (!(proc->mon = qemuMonitorOpen(proc->vm, &monConfig, true, 0,
virEventThreadGetContext(proc->eventThread),
&callbacks, NULL)))
goto cleanup;
virObjectLock(proc->mon);
if (qemuProcessQMPInitMonitor(proc->mon) < 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = 0;
cleanup:
virObjectUnref(xmlopt);
return ret;
}
/**
* qemuProcessQMPStart:
* @proc: QEMU process and connection state created by qemuProcessQMPNew()
*
* Start and connect to QEMU binary so QMP queries can be made.
*
* Usage:
* proc = qemuProcessQMPNew(binary, libDir, runUid, runGid, forceTCG);
* qemuProcessQMPStart(proc);
* ** Send QMP Queries to QEMU using monitor (proc->mon) **
* qemuProcessQMPFree(proc);
*
* Process error output (proc->stdErr) remains available in qemuProcessQMP
* struct until qemuProcessQMPFree is called.
*/
int
qemuProcessQMPStart(qemuProcessQMPPtr proc)
{
VIR_DEBUG("proc=%p, emulator=%s", proc, proc->binary);
if (qemuProcessQMPInit(proc) < 0)
return -1;
if (qemuProcessQMPLaunch(proc) < 0)
return -1;
if (qemuProcessQMPConnectMonitor(proc) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}