Resolves:https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=923053
When cdrom is block type, the virsh change-media failed to insert
source info because virsh uses "<source block='/dev/sdb'/>" while
the correct name of the attribute for block disks is "dev".
(cherry picked from commit 7729a16814d5bf3aebd248c9af00296ae2773818)
libvirt lxc will fail to start when selinux is disabled.
error: Failed to start domain noroot
error: internal error guest failed to start: PATH=/bin:/sbin TERM=linux container=lxc-libvirt container_uuid=b9873916-3516-c199-8112-1592ff694a9e LIBVIRT_LXC_UUID=b9873916-3516-c199-8112-1592ff694a9e LIBVIRT_LXC_NAME=noroot /bin/sh
2013-01-09 11:04:05.384+0000: 1: info : libvirt version: 1.0.1
2013-01-09 11:04:05.384+0000: 1: error : lxcContainerMountBasicFS:546 : Failed to mkdir /sys/fs/selinux: No such file or directory
2013-01-09 11:04:05.384+0000: 7536: info : libvirt version: 1.0.1
2013-01-09 11:04:05.384+0000: 7536: error : virLXCControllerRun:1466 : error receiving signal from container: Input/output error
2013-01-09 11:04:05.404+0000: 7536: error : virCommandWait:2287 : internal error Child process (ip link del veth1) unexpected exit status 1: Cannot find device "veth1"
fix this problem by checking if selinuxfs is mounted
in host before we try to create dir /sys/fs/selinux.
Signed-off-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8d63af22de880d34aa94bcaa7ed95a8eac856ac6)
The 'stats' variable was not initialized to NULL, so if some
early validation of the RPC call fails, it is possible to jump
to the 'cleanup' label and VIR_FREE an uninitialized pointer.
This is a security flaw, since the API can be called from a
readonly connection which can trigger the validation checks.
This was introduced in release v0.9.1 onwards by
commit 158ba8730e44b7dd07a21ab90499996c5dec080a
Author: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Wed Apr 13 16:21:35 2011 +0100
Merge all returns paths from dispatcher into single path
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit e7f400a110e2e3673b96518170bfea0855dd82c0)
Conflicts:
daemon/remote.c - context
With the existing pkcheck (pid, start time) tuple for identifying
the process, there is a race condition, where a process can make
a libvirt RPC call and in another thread exec a setuid application,
causing it to change to effective UID 0. This in turn causes polkit
to do its permission check based on the wrong UID.
To address this, libvirt must get the UID the caller had at time
of connect() (from SO_PEERCRED) and pass a (pid, start time, uid)
triple to the pkcheck program.
This fix requires that libvirt is re-built against a version of
polkit that has the fix for its CVE-2013-4288, so that libvirt
can see 'pkg-config --variable pkcheck_supports_uid polkit-gobject-1'
Signed-off-by: Colin Walters <walters@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 922b7fda77b094dbf022d625238262ea05335666)
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Conflicts:
configure.ac - context
libvirt.spec.in - context of indentation
src/access/viraccessdriverpolkit.c - not present on this branch
Since PIDs can be reused, polkit prefers to be given
a (PID,start time) pair. If given a PID on its own,
it will attempt to lookup the start time in /proc/pid/stat,
though this is subject to races.
It is safer if the client app resolves the PID start
time itself, because as long as the app has the client
socket open, the client PID won't be reused.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 979e9c56a7aadf2dcfbddd1abfbad594b78b4468)
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Conflicts:
src/libvirt_private.syms - not backported
src/locking/lock_daemon.c - not backported
src/rpc/virnetserverclient.c
src/rpc/virnetsocket.c
src/rpc/virnetsocket.h
src/util/viridentity.h - not backported
src/util/virprocess.c
src/util/virprocess.h
src/util/virstring.c
src/util/virstring.h
Most conflicts were contextual (this patch adds new functions,
but upstream intermediate patches not backported here also added
new features, and the resolution was picking out just the portions
needed by this commit). virnetsocket.c also had slightly
different locking semantics.
Currently virNetSocketNew fails because virSetCloseExec fails as there
is no proper implementation for it on Windows at the moment. Workaround
this by pretending that setting close-on-exec on the fd works. This can
be done because libvirt currently lacks the ability to create child
processes on Windows anyway. So there is no point in failing to set a
flag that isn't useful at the moment anyway.
(cherry picked from commit fcfa4bfb1660cdb083aa61e366ddc8e91a53e3ed)
After freeing the bitmap pointer, it must set the pointer to NULL.
This will avoid any other use of the freed memory of the bitmap pointer.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1006710
Signed-off-by: Liuji (Jeremy) <jeremy.liu@huawei.com>
(cherry picked from commit ef5d51d491356f1f4287aa3a8b908b183b6dd9aa)
Conflicts:
src/conf/domain_conf.c
Commit 29fe5d7 (released in 1.1.1) introduced a latent problem
for any caller of virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel and where
the domain already had a uid:gid label to be parsed. Such a
setup would collect the list of supplementary groups during
virSecurityManagerPreFork, but then ignores that information,
and thus fails to call setgroups() to adjust the supplementary
groups of the process.
Upstream does not use virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel for
qemu (it uses virSecurityManagerSetChildProcessLabel instead),
so this problem remained latent until backporting the initial
commit into v0.10.2-maint (commit c061ff5, released in 0.10.2.7),
where virSecurityManagerSetChildProcessLabel has not been
backported. As a result of using a different code path in the
backport, attempts to start a qemu domain that runs as qemu:qemu
will end up with supplementary groups unchanged from the libvirtd
parent process, rather than the desired supplementary groups of
the qemu user. This can lead to failure to start a domain
(typical Fedora setup assigns user 107 'qemu' to both group 107
'qemu' and group 36 'kvm', so a disk image that is only readable
under kvm group rights is locked out). Worse, it is a security
hole (the qemu process will inherit supplemental group rights
from the parent libvirtd process, which means it has access
rights to files owned by group 0 even when such files should
not normally be visible to user qemu).
LXC does not use the DAC security driver, so it is not vulnerable
at this time. Still, it is better to plug the latent hole on
the master branch first, before cherry-picking it to the only
vulnerable branch v0.10.2-maint.
* src/security/security_dac.c (virSecurityDACGetIds): Always populate
groups and ngroups, rather than only when no label is parsed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 745aa55fbf3e076c4288d5ec3239f5a5d43508a6)
The virBitmapParse function was calling virBitmapIsSet() function that
requires the caller to check the bounds of the bitmap without checking
them. This resulted into crashes when parsing a bitmap string that was
exceeding the bounds used as argument.
This patch refactors the function to use virBitmapSetBit without
checking if the bit is set (this function does the checks internally)
and then counts the bits in the bitmap afterwards (instead of keeping
track while parsing the string).
This patch also changes the "parse_error" label to a more common
"error".
The refactor should also get rid of the need to call sa_assert on the
returned variable as the callpath should allow coverity to infer the
possible return values.
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=997367
Thanks to Alex Jia for tracking down the issue. This issue is introduced
by commit 0fc8909.
(cherry picked from commit 47b9127e883677a0d60d767030a147450e919a25)
Conflicts:
src/util/bitmap.c - context, coverity fix not backported
Sometimes it's handy to know how many bits are set.
* src/util/bitmap.h (virBitmapCountBits): New prototype.
(virBitmapNextSetBit): Use correct type.
* src/util/bitmap.c (virBitmapNextSetBit): Likewise.
(virBitmapSetAll): Maintain invariant of clear tail bits.
(virBitmapCountBits): New function.
* src/libvirt_private.syms (bitmap.h): Export it.
* tests/virbitmaptest.c (test2): Test it.
(cherry picked from commit 0711c4b74d1f0e83b06c5b15a50f99d780478566)
Call virLogVMessage instead of virLogMessage, since libudev
called us with a va_list object, not a list of arguments.
Honor message priority and strip the trailing newline.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=969152
(cherry picked from commit f753dd62f951cc62e164421d0c6491f39e4c68ad)
Conflicts:
src/libvirt_private.syms
src/node_device/node_device_udev.c
src/util/logging.c
src/util/logging.h
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=964358
Attempts to start a domain with both SELinux and DAC security
modules loaded will deadlock; latent problem introduced in commit
fdb3bde and exposed in commit 29fe5d7. Basically, when recursing
into the security manager for other driver's prefork, we have to
undo the asymmetric lock taken at the manager level.
Reported by Jiri Denemark, with diagnosis help from Dan Berrange.
* src/security/security_stack.c (virSecurityStackPreFork): Undo
extra lock grabbed during recursion.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bfc183c1e377b24cebf5cede4c00f3dc0d1b3486)
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=964358
Commit 75c1256 states that virGetGroupList must not be called
between fork and exec, then commit ee777e99 promptly violated
that for lxc's use of virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel. Hoist
the supplemental group detection to the time that the security
manager needs to fork. Qemu is safe, as it uses
virSecurityManagerSetChildProcessLabel which in turn uses
virCommand to determine supplemental groups.
This does not fix the fact that virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel
calls virSecurityDACParseIds calls parseIds which eventually
calls getpwnam_r, which also violates fork/exec async-signal-safe
safety rules, but so far no one has complained of hitting
deadlock in that case.
* src/security/security_dac.c (_virSecurityDACData): Track groups
in private data.
(virSecurityDACPreFork): New function, to set them.
(virSecurityDACClose): Clean up new fields.
(virSecurityDACGetIds): Alter signature.
(virSecurityDACSetSecurityHostdevLabelHelper)
(virSecurityDACSetChardevLabel, virSecurityDACSetProcessLabel)
(virSecurityDACSetChildProcessLabel): Update callers.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 29fe5d745fbe207ec2415441d4807ae76be05974)
Conflicts:
src/security/security_dac.c - virSecurityDACSetSecurityUSBLabel needed similar treatment; no virSecurityDACSetChildPrcessLabel
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=964358
A future patch wants the DAC security manager to be able to safely
get the supplemental group list for a given uid, but at the time
of a fork rather than during initialization so as to pick up on
live changes to the system's group database. This patch adds the
framework, including the possibility of a pre-fork callback
failing.
For now, any driver that implements a prefork callback must be
robust against the possibility of being part of a security stack
where a later element in the chain fails prefork. This means
that drivers cannot do any action that requires a call to postfork
for proper cleanup (no grabbing a mutex, for example). If this
is too prohibitive in the future, we would have to switch to a
transactioning sequence, where each driver has (up to) 3 callbacks:
PreForkPrepare, PreForkCommit, and PreForkAbort, to either clean
up or commit changes made during prepare.
* src/security/security_driver.h (virSecurityDriverPreFork): New
callback.
* src/security/security_manager.h (virSecurityManagerPreFork):
Change signature.
* src/security/security_manager.c (virSecurityManagerPreFork):
Optionally call into driver, and allow returning failure.
* src/security/security_stack.c (virSecurityDriverStack):
Wrap the handler for the stack driver.
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c (qemuProcessStart): Adjust caller.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit fdb3bde31ccf8ff172abf00ef5aa974b87af2794)
Conflicts:
src/security/security_manager.c - context from previous backport differences
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=964358
The hook scripts used by virCommand must be careful wrt
accessing any mutexes that may have been held by other
threads in the parent process. With the recent refactoring
there are 2 potential flaws lurking, which will become real
deadlock bugs once the global QEMU driver lock is removed.
Remove use of the QEMU driver lock from the hook function
by passing in the 'virQEMUDriverConfigPtr' instance directly.
Add functions to the virSecurityManager to be invoked before
and after fork, to ensure the mutex is held by the current
thread. This allows it to be safely used in the hook script
in the child process.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 61b52d2e3813cc8c9ff3ab67f232bd0c65f7318d)
Conflicts:
src/libvirt_private.syms - context
src/qemu/qemu_process.c - no backport of qemud_driver struct rename
src/security/security_manager.c - no backport of making the security driver self-locking; just expose the interface
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=964358
POSIX states that multi-threaded apps should not use functions
that are not async-signal-safe between fork and exec, yet we
were using getpwuid_r and initgroups. Although rare, it is
possible to hit deadlock in the child, when it tries to grab
a mutex that was already held by another thread in the parent.
I actually hit this deadlock when testing multiple domains
being started in parallel with a command hook, with the following
backtrace in the child:
Thread 1 (Thread 0x7fd56bbf2700 (LWP 3212)):
#0 __lll_lock_wait ()
at ../nptl/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/lowlevellock.S:136
#1 0x00007fd5761e7388 in _L_lock_854 () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0
#2 0x00007fd5761e7257 in __pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x7fd56be00360)
at pthread_mutex_lock.c:61
#3 0x00007fd56bbf9fc5 in _nss_files_getpwuid_r (uid=0, result=0x7fd56bbf0c70,
buffer=0x7fd55c2a65f0 "", buflen=1024, errnop=0x7fd56bbf25b8)
at nss_files/files-pwd.c:40
#4 0x00007fd575aeff1d in __getpwuid_r (uid=0, resbuf=0x7fd56bbf0c70,
buffer=0x7fd55c2a65f0 "", buflen=1024, result=0x7fd56bbf0cb0)
at ../nss/getXXbyYY_r.c:253
#5 0x00007fd578aebafc in virSetUIDGID (uid=0, gid=0) at util/virutil.c:1031
#6 0x00007fd578aebf43 in virSetUIDGIDWithCaps (uid=0, gid=0, capBits=0,
clearExistingCaps=true) at util/virutil.c:1388
#7 0x00007fd578a9a20b in virExec (cmd=0x7fd55c231f10) at util/vircommand.c:654
#8 0x00007fd578a9dfa2 in virCommandRunAsync (cmd=0x7fd55c231f10, pid=0x0)
at util/vircommand.c:2247
#9 0x00007fd578a9d74e in virCommandRun (cmd=0x7fd55c231f10, exitstatus=0x0)
at util/vircommand.c:2100
#10 0x00007fd56326fde5 in qemuProcessStart (conn=0x7fd53c000df0,
driver=0x7fd55c0dc4f0, vm=0x7fd54800b100, migrateFrom=0x0, stdin_fd=-1,
stdin_path=0x0, snapshot=0x0, vmop=VIR_NETDEV_VPORT_PROFILE_OP_CREATE,
flags=1) at qemu/qemu_process.c:3694
...
The solution is to split the work of getpwuid_r/initgroups into the
unsafe portions (getgrouplist, called pre-fork) and safe portions
(setgroups, called post-fork).
* src/util/virutil.h (virSetUIDGID, virSetUIDGIDWithCaps): Adjust
signature.
* src/util/virutil.c (virSetUIDGID): Add parameters.
(virSetUIDGIDWithCaps): Adjust clients.
* src/util/vircommand.c (virExec): Likewise.
* src/util/virfile.c (virFileAccessibleAs, virFileOpenForked)
(virDirCreate): Likewise.
* src/security/security_dac.c (virSecurityDACSetProcessLabel):
Likewise.
* src/lxc/lxc_container.c (lxcContainerSetID): Likewise.
* configure.ac (AC_CHECK_FUNCS_ONCE): Check for setgroups, not
initgroups.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit ee777e994927ed5f2d427fbc5a53cbe8b5969bda)
Conflicts:
src/lxc/lxc_container.c - did not use setUIDGID before 1.1.0
src/util/virutil.c - oom handling changes not backported; no virSetUIDGIDWithCaps
src/util/virfile.c - functions still lived in virutil.c this far back
configure.ac - context with previous commit
src/util/command.c - no UID/GID handling in vircommand.c...
src/storage/storage_backend.c - ...so do it in the one hook user instead
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=964358
Since neither getpwuid_r() nor initgroups() are safe to call in
between fork and exec (they obtain a mutex, but if some other
thread in the parent also held the mutex at the time of the fork,
the child will deadlock), we have to split out the functionality
that is unsafe. At least glibc's initgroups() uses getgrouplist
under the hood, so the ideal split is to expose getgrouplist for
use before a fork. Gnulib already gives us a nice wrapper via
mgetgroups; we wrap it once more to look up by uid instead of name.
* bootstrap.conf (gnulib_modules): Add mgetgroups.
* src/util/virutil.h (virGetGroupList): New declaration.
* src/util/virutil.c (virGetGroupList): New function.
* src/libvirt_private.syms (virutil.h): Export it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 75c125641ac73473ba4b0542524d67a184769c8e)
Conflicts:
bootstrap.conf - not updating gnulib submodule...
configure.ac - ...so checking for getgrouplist by hand...
src/util/virutil.c - ...and copying only the getgrouplist implementation rather than calling the gnulib function; also, file still named util.c
src/libvirt_private.syms - context
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=964358
A future patch needs to look up pw_gid; but it is wasteful
to crawl through getpwuid_r twice for two separate pieces
of information, and annoying to copy that much boilerplate
code for doing the crawl. The current internal-only
virGetUserEnt is also a rather awkward interface; it's easier
to just design it to let callers request multiple pieces of
data as needed from one traversal.
And while at it, I noticed that virGetXDGDirectory could deref
NULL if the getpwuid_r lookup fails.
* src/util/virutil.c (virGetUserEnt): Alter signature.
(virGetUserDirectory, virGetXDGDirectory, virGetUserName): Adjust
callers.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit c1983ba4e3902308054e961fcae75cece73ef4ba)
Conflicts:
src/util/virutil.c - oom reporting/strdup changes not backported
Don't reuse the return value of virStorageBackendFileSystemIsMounted.
If it's 0, we'd return it even if the mount command failed.
Also, don't report another error if it's -1, since one has already
been reported.
Introduced by 258e06c.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=981251
(cherry picked from commit 13fde7ceab556804dc6cfb3e56938fb948ffe83d)
Don't check for '\n' at the end of file if zero bytes were read.
Found by valgrind:
==404== Invalid read of size 1
==404== at 0x529B09F: virCgroupGetValueStr (vircgroup.c:540)
==404== by 0x529AF64: virCgroupMoveTask (vircgroup.c:1079)
==404== by 0x1EB475: qemuSetupCgroupForEmulator (qemu_cgroup.c:1061)
==404== by 0x1D9489: qemuProcessStart (qemu_process.c:3801)
==404== by 0x18557E: qemuDomainObjStart (qemu_driver.c:5787)
==404== by 0x190FA4: qemuDomainCreateWithFlags (qemu_driver.c:5839)
Introduced by 0d0b409.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=978356
(cherry picked from commit 306c49ffd56a1c72b1892d50f2a75531c62f4a1d)
Free the old XML strings before overwriting them if the user
has chosen to reedit the file or force the redefinition.
Found by Alex Jia trying to reproduce another bug:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=977430#c3
(cherry picked from commit 1e3a252974c8e5c650f1d84dc2b167f0ae8cee3c)
If we are just ejecting media, ret == -1 even after the retry loop
determines that the tray is open, as requested. This means media
disconnect always report's error.
Fix it, and fix some other mini issues:
- Don't overwrite the 'eject' error message if the retry loop fails
- Move the retries decrement inside the loop, otherwise the final loop
might succeed, yet retries == 0 and we will raise error
- Setting ret = -1 in the disk->src check is unneeded
- Fix comment typos
cc: mprivozn@redhat.com
(cherry picked from commit 406d8a980973cfd4caebbc886f5b283233409a64)
In 84c59ffa I've tried to fix changing ejectable media process. The
process should go like this:
1) we need to call 'eject' on the monitor
2) we should wait for 'DEVICE_TRAY_MOVED' event
3) now we can issue 'change' command
However, while waiting in step 2) the domain monitor was locked. So
even if qemu reported the desired event, the proper callback was not
called immediately. The monitor handling code needs to lock the
monitor in order to read the event. So that's the first lock we must
not hold while waiting. The second one is the domain lock. When
monitor handling code reads an event, the appropriate callback is
called then. The first thing that each callback does is locking the
corresponding domain as a domain or its device is about to change
state. So we need to unlock both monitor and VM lock. Well, holding
any lock while sleep()-ing is not the best thing to do anyway.
(cherry picked from commit 543af79a14f06cd16844c28887210bbb93a455fa)
Conflicts:
src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=892289
It seems like with new udev within guest OS, the tray is locked,
so we need to:
- 'eject'
- wait for tray to open
- 'change'
Moreover, even when doing bare 'eject', we should check for
'tray_open' as guest may have locked the tray. However, the
waiting phase shouldn't be unbounded, so I've chosen 10 retries
maximum, each per 500ms. This should give enough time for guest
to eject a media and open the tray.
(cherry picked from commit 84c59ffaecc983083e2e885fa59c4f0ec1812656)
This patch is in relation to Bug 966449:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=966449
This is a patch addressing the coredump.
Thread 1 must be calling nwfilterDriverRemoveDBusMatches(). It does so with
nwfilterDriverLock held. In the patch below I am now moving the
nwfilterDriverLock(driverState) further up so that the initialization, which
seems to either take a long time or is entirely stuck, occurs with the lock
held and the shutdown cannot occur at the same time.
Remove the lock in virNWFilterDriverIsWatchingFirewallD to avoid
double-locking.
(cherry picked from commit 0ec376c20a42b9eb365c1f9a5596366023c20c35)
qemu-img resize will fail with "The new size must be a multiple of 512"
if libvirt doesn't round it first.
This fixes rhbz#951495
Signed-off-by: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9a8f39d097448b2b43c4a05d0edc213eacfc9ea6)
Typically when you get EOF on a stream, poll will return
POLLIN|POLLHUP at the same time. Thus when we deal with
stream reads, if we see EOF during the read, we can then
clear the VIR_STREAM_EVENT_HANGUP & VIR_STREAM_EVENT_ERROR
event bits.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit e7b0382945c9bf043f06ee4dd760c2051d63d0f0)
Reported by Anthony Messina in
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=904692
Present since introduction of smartcard support in commit f5fd9baa
* src/qemu/qemu_command.c (qemuBuildCommandLine): Match qemu spelling.
* tests/qemuxml2argvdata/qemuxml2argv-smartcard-host-certificates.args:
Fix broken test.
(cherry picked from commit 6f7e4ea359323f9bc413dfb738a5c544d4f9c4f8)
The previous commit was an incomplete backport of commit 83e4c775,
and as a result made any attempt to start a domain when cgroups
are enabled go into an infinite loop. This fixes the botched
backport.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=965169 documents a
problem starting domains when cgroups are enabled; I was able
to reliably reproduce the race about 5% of the time when I added
hooks to domain startup by 3 seconds (as that seemed to be about
the length of time that qemu created and then closed a temporary
thread, probably related to aio handling of initially opening
a disk image). The problem has existed since we introduced
virCgroupMoveTask in commit 9102829 (v0.10.0).
There are some inherent TOCTTOU races when moving tasks between
kernel cgroups, precisely because threads can be created or
completed in the window between when we read a thread id from the
source and when we write to the destination. As the goal of
virCgroupMoveTask is merely to move ALL tasks into the new
cgroup, it is sufficient to iterate until no more threads are
being created in the old group, and ignoring any threads that
die before we can move them.
It would be nicer to start the threads in the right cgroup to
begin with, but by default, all child threads are created in
the same cgroup as their parent, and we don't want vcpu child
threads in the emulator cgroup, so I don't see any good way
of avoiding the move. It would also be nice if the kernel were
to implement something like rename() as a way to atomically move
a group of threads from one cgroup to another, instead of forcing
a window where we have to read and parse the source, then format
and write back into the destination.
* src/util/vircgroup.c (virCgroupAddTaskStrController): Ignore
ESRCH, because a thread ended between read and write attempts.
(virCgroupMoveTask): Loop until all threads have moved.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 83e4c77547f5b721afad19a452f41c31daeee8c5)
Conflicts:
src/util/cgroup.c - refactoring in commit 56f27b3bb is too big
to take in entirety; but I did inline its changes to the cleanup label
The code for putting the emulator threads in a separate cgroup
would spam the logs with warnings
2013-02-27 16:08:26.731+0000: 29624: warning : virCgroupMoveTask:887 : no vm cgroup in controller 3
2013-02-27 16:08:26.731+0000: 29624: warning : virCgroupMoveTask:887 : no vm cgroup in controller 4
2013-02-27 16:08:26.732+0000: 29624: warning : virCgroupMoveTask:887 : no vm cgroup in controller 6
This is because it has only created child cgroups for 3 of the
controllers, but was trying to move the processes from all the
controllers. The fix is to only try to move threads in the
controllers we actually created. Also remove the warning and
make it return a hard error to avoid such lazy callers in the
future.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 279336c5d8c44f28956b3427ab2bf207d06878e2)
The QEMU driver has a list of devices nodes that are whitelisted
for all guests. The kernel has recently started returning an
error if you try to whitelist a device which does not exist.
This causes a warning in libvirt logs and an audit error for
any missing devices. eg
2013-02-27 16:08:26.515+0000: 29625: warning : virDomainAuditCgroup:451 : success=no virt=kvm resrc=cgroup reason=allow vm="vm031714" uuid=9d8f1de0-44f4-a0b1-7d50-e41ee6cd897b cgroup="/sys/fs/cgroup/devices/libvirt/qemu/vm031714/" class=path path=/dev/kqemu rdev=? acl=rw
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7f544a4c8f0353e4ff9ca08aafbb86ff8f60da0a)
When given a CA cert with basic constraints to set non-critical,
and key usage of 'key signing', this should be rejected. Version
of GNUTLS < 3 do not rejecte it though, so we never noticed the
test case was broken
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0204d6d7a0519377b2e6bc296b00328cd748f55d)
CVE-2013-1962
remoteDispatchStoragePoolListAllVolumes wasn't freeing the pool.
The pool also held a reference to the connection, preventing it from
getting freed and closing the netcf interface driver, which held two
sockets open.
(cherry picked from commit ca697e90d5bd6a6dfb94bfb6d4438bdf9a44b739)
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=924501 tracks a
problem that occurs if uid 107 is already in use at the time
libvirt is first installed. In response that problem, Fedora
packaging guidelines were recently updated. This fixes the
spec file to comply with the new guidelines:
https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Packaging:UsersAndGroups
* libvirt.spec.in (daemon): Follow updated Fedora guidelines.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit a2584d58f6f7d941b960f996c8e26df8294b79b9)
Conflicts:
libvirt.spec.in - no backport of c8f79c9b %if reindents
When a changelog entry references an RPM macro, % needs to be escaped so
that it does not appear expanded in package changelog.
Fri Mar 4 2009 is incorrect since Mar 4 was Wednesday. Since
libvirt-0.6.1 was released on Mar 4 2009, we should change Fri to Wed.
(cherry picked from commit 53657a0abe273000a8aa2bfc0417a92dcd9dd5b7)
The macro was made to help installing broken packages that did not use
DESTDIR correctly by overriding individual path variables (prefix,
sysconfdir, ...). Newer rpm provides fixed make_install macro that calls
make install with just the correct DESTDIR, however it is not available
everywhere (e.g., RHEL 5 does not have it). On the other hand the
make_install macro is simple and straightforward enough for us to use
its expansion directly.
(cherry picked from commit d45066a55f866a793f346bde1ac6d0f552aa9e52)
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=922186
Commit d04916fa introduced a regression in audit quality - even
though the code was computing the proper escaped name for a
path, it wasn't feeding that escaped name on to the audit message.
As a result, /var/log/audit/audit.log would mention a pair of
fields class=path path=/dev/hpet instead of the intended
class=path path="/dev/hpet", which in turn caused ausearch to
format the audit log with path=(null).
* src/conf/domain_audit.c (virDomainAuditCgroupPath): Use
constructed encoding.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 31c6bf35b9d9de04158318658f4fbf6a9e54ff28)
When virStorageBackendLogicalCreateVol() creates a snapshot for a
logical volume with backingStore element, it fails with the message
below:
2013-01-17 03:10:18.869+0000: 1967: error : virCommandWait:2345 :
internal error Child process (/sbin/lvcreate --name lvm-snapshot -L 51200K
-s=/dev/lvm-pool/lvm-volume) unexpected exit status 3: /sbin/lvcreate:
invalid option -- '=' Error during parsing of command line.
This is because virCommandAddArgPair() uses '=' to connect the two
parameters, it's unsuitable for -s option of the lvcreate.
Signed-off-by: Atsushi Kumagai <kumagai-atsushi@mxc.nes.nec.co.jp>
(cherry picked from commit ffee627a4a52bf13d787cec883054fe2e7d9465c)
Avoid requesting information such as identity or power state when it
is not necessary.
Lookup virtual machine list with the required fields (configStatus,
name, and config.uuid) to make esxVI_GetVirtualMachineIdentity work.
No need to call esxVI_GetNumberOfSnapshotTrees. rootSnapshotTreeList
can be tested for emptiness by checking it for NULL.
esxVI_LookupRootSnapshotTreeList already does the error reporting,
don't overwrite it.
Check if autostart is enabled at all before looking up the individual
autostart setting of a virtual machine.
Reorder VIR_EXPAND_N(doms, ndoms, 1) to avoid leaking the result of
the call to virGetDomain if VIR_EXPAND_N fails.
Replace VIR_EXPAND_N by VIR_RESIZE_N to avoid quadratic scaling, as in
the Hyper-V version of the function.
If virGetDomain fails it already reports an error, don't overwrite it
with an OOM error.
All items in doms up to the count-th one are valid, no need to double
check before freeing them.
Finally, don't leak autoStartDefaults and powerInfoList.
(cherry picked from commit 5fc663d8bedc082585941e1453229cdcf5fe2880)
Normally libvirtd should run with a SELinux label
system_u:system_r:virtd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
If a user manually runs libvirtd though, it is sometimes
possible to get into a situation where it is running
system_u:system_r:init_t:s0
The SELinux security driver isn't expecting this and can't
parse the security label since it lacks the ':c0.c1023' part
causing it to complain
internal error Cannot parse sensitivity level in s0
This updates the parser to cope with this, so if no category
is present, libvirtd will hardcode the equivalent of c0.c1023.
Now this won't work if SELinux is in Enforcing mode, but that's
not an issue, because the user can only get into this problem
if in Permissive mode. This means they can now start VMs in
Permissive mode without hitting that parsing error
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1732c1c62997b9f5ce39e5eb4d1ef2f842af73e1)
Conflicts:
src/security/security_selinux.c
Pull the code which parses the current process MCS range
out of virSecuritySELinuxMCSFind and into a new method
virSecuritySELinuxMCSGetProcessRange.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 4a92fe4413d2a43cf1215e26be7551b653d9a992)
Conflicts:
src/security/security_selinux.c
The body of the loop in virSecuritySELinuxMCSFind would
directly 'return NULL' on OOM, instead of jumping to the
cleanup label. This caused a leak of several local vars.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit f2d8190cfb8e52b006a5cfd080b42d2a1755fd28)
Since we switched from direct host migration scheme to the one,
where we connect to the destination and then just pass a FD to a
qemu, we have uncovered a qemu bug. Qemu expects migration FD to
block. However, we are passing a nonblocking one which results in
cryptic error messages like:
qemu: warning: error while loading state section id 2
load of migration failed
The bug is already known to Qemu folks, but we should workaround
already released Qemus. Patch has been originally proposed by Stefan
Hajnoczi <stefanha@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit ceb31795af40f6127a541076b905935ff83e5b11)
Commit c308a9ae was incomplete; it resolved the configure failure,
but not a later build failure.
* src/util/virnetdevbridge.c: Include pre-req header.
* configure.ac (AC_CHECK_HEADERS): Prefer standard in.h over
non-standard ip6.h.
(cherry picked from commit 1bf661caf4e926efcad6e85151a587cea5fd29f4)
